Essays on Evaluation of Active Labour Market Policy by Speckesser, Stefan
 
 
 
 
Essays on 
Evaluation of Active Labour Market Policy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Inauguraldissertation zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades  
eines Doktors der Wirtschaftswissenschaften 
der Universität Mannheim 
 
 
 
 
 
Stefan Speckesser 
 
 
 
 
 
Vorgelegt im März 2004 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Referent: Prof. Bernd Fitzenberger, Ph.D., Mannheim 
Korreferent: Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. mult. Wolfgang Franz, Mannheim 
Dekan: Prof. Konrad Stahl, Ph.D., Mannheim 
 
Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 2. Juni 2004 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Meiner Mutter in Dankbarkeit gewidmet 
 
Acknowledgements 
This dissertation is the result of my stimulating time at the Chair of Econometrics at the Department 
of Economics at the University of Mannheim.  It could not have been finished without the support 
from my advisors, colleagues, friends and family.   
First of all, I am greatly indebted to my supervisor, Bernd Fitzenberger, for his countless suggestions 
and his motivating support.  This work benefited very much from his advice.  Many thanks go to my 
second supervisor, Wolfgang Franz, for his valuable comments on earlier versions of the four essays.   
For this dissertation, I use several large comprehensive data bases.  This could only be achieved 
with the support and contributions of many institutions and people: Thanks go to Thomas Ketzmer-
ick of the ZSH, Halle, for the provision and help with the data for the analysis of the second section.  
The third section would have been impossible without using social insurance data generated in the 
joint project “On effectiveness of further training programmes.  An evaluation based on register data 
provided by the Institute of Employment Research” of our Chair and Michael Lechner’s research 
group at the Swiss Institute for International Economics and Applied Economic Research at the Uni-
versity of St. Gallen (SIAW).  I am indebted to all project members, especially to Stefan Bender of 
the Institute of Employment Research (IAB), Nuremberg.  The work of the fourth section has been 
performed during my stay at the Policy Studies Institute (PSI) in London, where I benefited much 
from discussions with Michael White.   
I am grateful to my colleagues Martin Biewen, Karsten Kohn, Daniel Radowski, Torsten Saadma, 
Robert Völter and Gaby Wunderlich at the Department of Economics, University of Mannheim, and 
Alfred Garloff, Tobias Hagen, Michael Maier, Alexandra Spitz and Ralf Wilke from the Center for 
European Economic Research (ZEW), for many enlightening discussions at the Applied Economics 
and Econometrics Brownbag Workshop and the Seminar for Doctoral Studies of our Chair.  Most of 
all, I want to thank Andreas Irmen and Isabel Schnabel for many interesting discussions about my 
dissertation, for their encouragement, advice and sympathy with me throughout the years in Mann-
heim.   
Finally, I would like to thank my family and my partner Antje for their love and understanding dur-
ing the time I worked on the dissertation.  
 
 
Mannheim, June 2004 
Stefan Speckesser 
 i
Contents 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
General introduction 1
1 The evaluation of active labour market policy in Germany: A survey 7
1.1 Introduction 7
1.2 Active labour market policy in Germany 8
1.2.1 ALMP interventions 8
1.2.2 Regulation of ALMP 9
1.2.3 Institutional change 10
1.2.4 ALMP programmes 11
1.2.4.1 Training 11
1.2.4.2 Subsidised employment 12
1.2.4.3 Mobility 16
1.2.5 Expenditure and participation 16
1.2.6 Institutional framework and evaluation 18
1.3 Methodological issues in the evaluation of ALMP 19
1.3.1 Success criteria 19
1.3.2 The microeconomic evaluation problem 19
1.3.2.1 Selection on observables 20
1.3.2.2 Selection on unobservables 23
1.3.2.3 Preprogramme test and Ashenfelter's dip 24
1.3.2.4 Heterogeneous treatment 25
1.3.2.5 Identification and specification issues 26
1.3.3 Macroeconomic effects 28
1.4 Evaluation results 29
1.4.1 Microeconometric evaluations 29
1.4.1.1 Evaluation on the basis of survey data 29
1.4.1.2 Training programmes 32
1.4.1.3 Job creation 43
1.4.1.4 Other programmes 48
1.4.2 Evaluations of macroeconomic outcomes 51
1.5 Conclusion 55
1.6 References 57
2 Evaluation of further training in East Germany 
based on observational data 62
2.1 Introduction 62
2.2 Institutional regulation 63
2.2.1 Further training 63
2.2.2 The Labour Promotion Act 63
2.2.3 Participation 64
 ii
 
 
 
 
 
2.3 Non-experimental evaluation 65
2.3.1 The evaluation problem 65
2.3.2 Selection bias based on observable characteristics 66
2.3.2.1 Nearest neighbour matching 67
2.3.2.2 Kernel matching 68
2.3.3 Multiple treatments 72
2.3.4 Selection bias based on unobservable characteristics 73
2.4 Empirical analysis 74
2.4.1 Data 74
2.4.2 Matching 76
2.4.2.1 Estimation of the propensity score 76
2.4.2.2 Nearest neighbours 76
2.4.2.3 Kernel matching 77
2.4.3 Specification of outcome equation 79
2.4.4 Evaluation results 83
2.4.4.1 Nearest neighbour matching 83
2.4.4.2 Kernel matching 84
2.4.4.3 Bootstrap confidence intervals 88
2.5 Conclusion 91
2.6 References 93
2.7 Appendix 95
3 Using social insurance data for the evaluation of active labour 
market policy: Employment effects of further training for the
unemployed in Germany 104
3.1 Introduction 104
3.2 Regulation of further training 106
3.2.1 Programmes 106
3.2.2 Changes in the regulation 107
3.2.3 Participation 108
3.3 Social insurance data 109
3.3.1 Merging insurance account data with participation data 109
3.3.1.1 Employment subsample and the benefit recipients data 110
3.3.1.2 Data for training participation 111
3.3.1.3 Evaluation data 112
3.3.2 Varieties of further training 114
3.3.2.1 Target specific types of further training 115
3.3.2.2 Identifying further training in merged data 118
3.3.3. Descriptive Statistics 120
 iii
 
 
 
 
 
3.4 Empirical evaluation 124
3.4.1 Methodology 124
3.4.1.1 Conditional independence assumption 124
3.4.1.2 Sample stratification 126
3.4.1.3 Kernel matching 128
3.4.1.4 Outcomes and preprogramme test 131
3.4.2 Implementation 132
3.4.2.1 Case selection and sample stratification 132
3.4.2.2 Matching 137
3.4.2.3 Preprogramme test 141
3.4.2.4 Employment outcomes 142
3.4.3 Results 143
3.5 Conclusion 152
3.6 References 153
3.7 Appendix 155
4 The aggregate impact of active labour market policy in Germany 
and the UK: Evidence from administrative data 173
4.1 Introduction 173
4.2 ALMP programmes 174
4.2.1 ALMP 174
4.2.2 Germany 175
4.2.2.1 Basic regulation 175
4.2.2.2 Organisational change 175
4.2.2.3 Programmes 175
4.2.2.4 Participation 177
4.2.3 The New Deal in the UK 180
4.2.3.1 Introduction of the New Deal 180
4.2.3.2 The options 181
4.2.3.3 Participation 183
4.3 Expected outcomes 183
4.3.1 Effects of ALMP on wage-setting 186
4.3.2 Labour demand 187
4.3.3 Matching 187
4.3.4 Previous empirical evidence 189
4.4 Empirical Analysis 193
4.4.1 Data 193
4.4.1.1 Germany 193
4.4.1.2 UK 194
 iv
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tables 
 
 
 
4.4.2 Empirical model 195
4.4.2.1 Effects on extended unemployment 195
4.4.2.2 Modelling ALMP allocation 196
4.4.2.3 Dynamic model: Matching 198
4.4.3 Estimation and results 200
4.4.3.1 Germany 200
4.4.4.2 UK 207
4.5 Conclusion 211
4.6 References 212
4.7 Appendix 215
Table 1.1 Main ALMP programmes in Germany 13
Table 1.2 Expenditure of the German Federal Employment Service, 95-8 17
Table 1.3 Participation entries in ALMP as percentage of total civilian labour force 18
Table 1.4 Data used for the microeconomic evaluation of ALMP 31
Table 1.5 Overview of micro-evaluations, further training 38
Table 1.6 Overview of micro-evaluations, job creation 46
Table 1.7 Overview of micro-evaluations, other programmes 50
Table 1.8 Overview of macro evaluations 53
Table 2.1 Participation stocks in further training in East Germany, 90 to 99 65
Table 2.2 Participation entries in further training in East Germany, 90 to 99 65
Table 2.A1 Descriptive statistics for participants in 1st further training and non-
participants 95
Table 2.A2 Descriptive statistics for participants in 2nd further training and non-
participants 96
Table 2.A3 Propensity score estimations for 1st and 2nd further training programmes
97
Table 2.A4 Estimation results of the effects of 1. further training on 
differences in employment 98
Table 2.A5 Estimation results of the effects of 2. further training on 
differences in employment 101
Table 3.1 Participation in further training until 1997 109
Table 3.2 Type of treatment and benefit payment 121
Table 3.3 Participation in further training by type of treatment 124
Table 3.4 Exemplary entry cohort (October 92) 135
 v
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.5 Descriptive Statistics for cohorts starting treatment after short-term 
unemployment in 93 and naïve control group (prior to matching) 136
Table 3.A1 Descriptive Statistics for cohorts starting treatment after short-term 
unemployment between January and December 93 and naïve control group 155
Table 3.A2 Probit estimation of the propensity scores, treatment in 1993 after short-term 
(left), medium-term (centre) and long-term (right)  unemployment in West 
Germany
157
Table 3.A3 Differences in matched samples (selected co-variates) treatment in 1993 after 
short-term, medium-term and long-term unemployment 161
Table 3.A4 Differences in matched samples with respect to outcome variable before 
treatment (PPT) 163
Table 4.1 Main ALMP programmes in Germany 179
Table 4.2 Participation entries in ALMP as percentage of total civilian labour force 180
Table 4.3 Quarterly participant stock on NDYP 183
Table 4.4 Descriptive Statistics 202
Table 4.5 Effects of ALMP on extended unemployment (FE) 204
Table 4.6 Effects of ALMP on extended unemployment (IV) 204
Table 4.7 Descriptive Statistics - quarterly data (3/00 - 6/02) 205
Table 4.8 Effects of ALMP on matching (Fixed effects) 206
Table 4.9 Effects of ALMP on matching (Dynamic Panel) 207
Table 4.10 Descriptive Statistics - quarterly data (6/98 - 6/01) 208
Table 4.11 Effects of ALMP on matching (Fixed effects) 209
Table 4.12 Effects of ALMP on matching (Dynamic Panel) 210
Table 4.A1 Instrumental variable estimations 215
Figure 2.1 Multiple treatments of active labour market policy in East Germany 76
Figure 2.2 Employment effects of 1st participation in a further training scheme, 
December 1992 86
Figure 2.3 Employment effects of 2nd participation in a further training scheme, 
December 1994 87
Figure 2.4 Employment effects of 1st participation in a further training scheme - LL 
kernel matching, h = hROT - Confidence intervals & bootstrap confidence 
intervals - 90
Figure 3.1 Merging insurance account data with participation data 113
Figure 3.2 Calendar time relative to the time of treatment (exemplary for treatment in 93 
starting after one to three months of unemployment) 127
Figure 3.3 Employment effects for participants in 1993 after short-term (top), medium-
term (mid) long-term (bottom) unemployment, in West (left) and East (right) 
Germany 145
 vi
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4 Employment effects for participants in 1994 after short-term (top), medium-
term (mid) long-term (bottom) unemployment, in West (left) and East (right) 
Germany 146
Figure 3.5 Employment effects for participants in 1993 after short-term (top), medium-
term (mid) long-term (bottom) unemployment, in West (left) and East (right) 
Germany age group below 36 148
Figure 3.6 Employment effects for participants in 1994 after short-term (top), medium-
term (mid)  long-term (bottom) unemployment, in West (left) and East (right) 
Germany  age group below 36 149
Figure 3.7 Employment effects for participants in 1993 after short-term (top), medium-
term (mid) long-term (bottom) unemployment, in West (left) and East (right) 
Germany age group above 35 150
Figure 3.8 Employment effects for participants in 1994 after short-term (top), medium-
term (mid)  long-term (bottom) unemployment, in West (left) and East (right) 
Germany age group above 35 151
Figure 3.A1 Predicted propensity scores, treatment after short-term(i), medium-term (ii) 
and long-term (iii) unemployment in West Germany 1993 (left: N, right: % of 
total) 164
Figure 3.A2 Predicted propensity scores, treatment after short-term(i), medium-term (ii) 
and long-term (iii) unemployment in West Germany 1994 (left: N, right: % of 
total) 165
Figure 3.A3 Predicted propensity scores, treatment after short-term(i), medium-term (ii) 
and long-term (iii) unemployment in East Germany 1993 (left: N, right: % of 
total) 166
Figure 3.A4 Predicted propensity scores, treatment after short-term(i), medium-term (ii) 
and long-term (iii) unemployment in East Germany 1994 (left: N, right: % of 
total) 167
Figure 4.1 The three stages of the NDYP 181
Figure 4.2 Layard-Nickell-Jackman-Framework 184
Figure 4.3 Calmfors' LNJ-Framework 185
 1
General introduction 
Over the last three decades, all major industrial societies have been plagued with high levels of 
structural unemployment.  Germany – in a singular situation after the unification – was particularly 
hit by unemployment, although the government widely implements policies that should balance 
between supply and demand on the labour market with respect to regions, sectors and qualifica-
tions and improve the employment chances for the unemployed and those threatened by unem-
ployment.  These policies – mainly the provision of training and job creation to problem groups – 
are usually referred to as active labour market policy (ALMP) and have been extensively used from 
the mid 70s in West Germany and even more far–reaching in East Germany after the unification.  
However, unemployment still is high and persistent.  The seemingly apparent failure of the prob-
lem–solving capacities of social and governmental institutions in an era of tight government budgets 
demands for methods allowing to identify the causal effects of such policies on the labour market.   
Certainly, the central question for social scientists as well as for policy makers is whether ALMP 
actually increases the employment chances of the people they seek to help.  This doctoral disserta-
tion consists of four stand–alone papers, each investigating some topics of particular importance to 
answer this question.  The following paragraphs provide a short motivation for the main sections of 
the thesis and the related research questions that should be answered by this study. 
Chapter 1 (“The Evaluation of active labour market policy in Germany: A survey”) summarises the 
state of the art of ALMP evaluation in Germany as described under (i) – (iii) below.  Chapter 2 (“Mi-
croeconomic evaluation of further training in East Germany based on observational data”) analyses 
how far the choice of the evaluation methodology influences the estimated ALMP effects (iv – vii).  
Chapter 3 (“Using social insurance data for the evaluation of active labour market policy: Employ-
ment effects of further training for the unemployed in Germany”) re–examines the effects of ALMP 
using reliable social insurance data instead of general household panel surveys.  Chapter 4 analyses 
macroeconomic effects of ALMP in Germany and compares the outcomes with programmes in the 
United Kingdom (“The aggregate impact of active labour market policy in Germany and the UK: 
Evidence from administrative data”) 
(i) The institutional design of active labour market policy 
At the beginning, this thesis provides an overview of the literature on evaluation of ALMP in Ger-
many.  First, this requires an in–depth description of the institutions of ALMP in Germany.  We fo-
cus on the outcomes these policies intend to achieve with respect to the individual employment 
situation of the participants in the programmes.  The most important insight of the description of the 
highly diversified policy field of ALMP is that it consists of a wide range of programmes for many 
different target groups.  Some of these programmes should be regarded as functionally equivalent 
with respect to the integration target, and different institutional arrangements can in principal serve 
the same problem groups.  The implementing body of these policies, the Federal Employment Ser-
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vice (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit) then can chose among several programmes.  Other policies are com-
plementary and allow the integration of the participants via different paths, either with training out-
side the labour market or by providing practical work experience.  In practice, policies are com-
bined or reiterated in order to achieve an integration target.   
The description of ALMP in Germany points out that a credible evaluation of the employment effect 
for the lifelike variety of combinable treatments and programme sequences for specific target groups 
should be provided rather than focusing on effects of programme categories like “job creation” or 
“further training”, which in themselves are too heterogeneous to deduce clear policy recommenda-
tions from.   
However, the state of the art in evaluation research – both theoretically and empirically – still fo-
cuses on programmes.  In the subsequent chapters, some attempts are carried out in order to esti-
mate the ALMP effects when taking the institutional design of policies more seriously: ALMP in this 
study is evaluated by either considering the multiple treatment structure of ALMP (implemented in 
Chapter 2) or by evaluating explicitly the outcomes of treatments directed to specific problem 
groups (implemented in Chapter 3). 
(ii) Methods to evaluate micro and macroeconomic outcomes of ALMP  
Following the description of ALMP institutions, the thesis surveys the methods and the previous 
empirical evidence of ALMP effects on micro and macroeconomic outcomes in Germany.  It is im-
portant to know that – with few exceptions– there does not exist experimental evidence for ALMP 
effects in Germany.  Therefore, any empirical evaluation has to address difficult methodological 
issues in identifying the programme impact for the participants, because the estimation of the non–
policy outcome – the outcome one has to contrast the observed policy effect to – remains hypo-
thetical both at the micro and macroeconomic level.  The parameters of interest of the hypothetical 
outcome are either 1) the outcome of an individual who has taken part in a programme if exactly 
this individual did not participate (microeconomic) or 2) a macroeconomic outcome in a situation 
without ALMP for a world where ALMP exists and depends exactly this labour market outcome it-
self.   
The solution of the microeconomic evaluation problem can only be achieved by identifying as-
sumptions because the situation of non–treatment is trivially not observable for the treated individ-
ual.  Therefore, the methodological literature assumes various forms of conditional mean independ-
ence, claiming that the outcomes of non-participation in a programme do not differ between par-
ticipants and non-participants as long as they show comparable observable characteristics.  Then, an 
appropriate non–treatment outcome for a treated is just the most similar non–participant.  Apart 
from observable characteristics, the methodological literature offers only vague recommendations, 
e.g. it is unclear how selection bias based on unobservable characteristics can be taken into consid-
eration and how the dynamic reduction of the employment rate before treatment should be consid-
ered in the evaluation of outcomes (Chapter 2 of the thesis implements some approaches with re-
spect to these issues).  For macroeconomic evaluations, the reliability of estimated ALMP effects 
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depends critically on instruments allowing to identify the exogenous variation of ALMP and to solve 
the endogeneity problem (with respect to this, chapter 4 suggests IV and panel estimators). 
(iii) Previous empirical evidence  
The first chapter reviews all studies of ALMP in Germany that explicitly pay attention to the difficult 
issue of identifying the policy effects.  Most studies evaluate programme effects of job creation 
schemes or further vocational training.  The previous empirical evidence shows rather a failure of 
the policies: Only very few studies find positive microeconomic employment effects of ALMP for 
certain subpopulations, which are not robust to specification issues.  Most studies estimate insignifi-
cant or negative employment effects.  Macroeconomic evaluations find mostly significantly negative 
employment effects of any of the programmes.  In some studies, further training seems to decrease 
the regional rate of long–term unemployment, whereas job creation programmes show in some case 
significantly positive effects on the matching.   
The description of the previous empirical evidence suggests that the different data sources and the 
huge differences in the methodological design of the studies might to a certain extent cause the un-
clear evidence.  Besides, most studies usually apply data from panel surveys (such as the German 
Socioeconomic Panel), which however do not provide a link of the reported individual treatment 
information to understandable concepts of ALMP.  Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis therefore provide 
facts how sensitive estimated ALMP effects are with respect to 1) the choice of the evaluation ap-
proach, 2) the aggregation of first and reiterated treatments and 3) the underlying data.  Certainly, 
these two chapters are the main contributions of this thesis.  They provide new evidence for the 
microeconomic effectiveness of ALMP in Germany.  Essentially, the following three features are 
analysed (iv – vi): 
(iv) Sensitivity of the estimator  
Most studies evaluating ALMP outcomes for the 90’s implement either parametric evaluation ap-
proaches or non–parametric nearest neighbour matching in order to estimate the non–treatment 
outcome for the treated.  In recent years, non–parametric matching approaches based on the pro-
pensity score gained importance because these estimators impose less structural assumptions than 
traditional econometric models, which usually use a parametric specification to account for the im-
pact of observable characteristics and implicitly estimate the potential outcome in the non–treated 
state as the fitted value on the regression functional. 
However, statistical matching estimators offer options among which the researcher has to choose, 
too, and which can be quite influential with respect to the outcome: The non–parametric estimation 
of the non–treatment outcome of the treated makes it necessary to decide upon the type of the esti-
mator, the underlying probability distribution and the local area for which the non–treatment out-
come is predicted.  Chapter 2 shows how the choice of the evaluation approach and of critical pa-
rameters influences the estimated policy effect.  We report the sensitivity of the estimated effects of 
treatment–on–the–treated if we vary 1) the local estimator (nearest neighbour, Nadaraya–Watson or 
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local linear estimators), 2) the bandwidth and 3) take into account the sampling variability of the 
propensity score estimate which forms the basis for matching.  Contrary to simulation studies, Chap-
ter 2 brings about evidence for the robustness of estimates for real–world data if we critically con-
sider the changes of these parameters.   
As a result of this methodological exercise, we can conclude that the estimated effects are lower for 
evaluations of matched samples based on kernel regressions compared to the estimators in the case 
of nearest neighbour matching.  The selection of the local area of the non–parametric estimators 
(the so–called “bandwidth”) also affects the results, however – contrary to what the vast literature on 
the correct choice of the bandwidth in non–parametric estimators suggests – this is of minor impor-
tance in our application.  The result of this exercise is to gain more knowledge how far the econo-
metric specification influences the evaluation results – even if evaluation applies nonparametric 
approaches that impute less structure on the models than traditional econometric estimators.   
The result of the application of the bootstrap procedure indicates that the error of the confidence 
intervals increase significantly if we control for estimation error of the propensity score prior to 
matching. 
(v) Sensitivity in case of multiple treatments and if treatment effects vary over time 
A second missing aspect in the empirical evaluation of ALMP originates from the fact that basically 
none of the previous studies distinguishes the effects of a first from those of a second treatment, and 
that treatments are assumed to exhibit the same outcomes in different years.  In order to become 
sensible how far this aggregation of treatments influences the evaluation outcomes, we  
§ distinguish the effects of a first from those of a second treatment in further training and esti-
mate the effects of both separately and 
§ allow the treatment effect to vary over time. 
The results reported at the end of Chapter 2 indicate that neither the participation in a first nor in a 
second further training have positive effects for the participants.  The participation in a first further 
training significantly decreases employment compared to non–participation.  Participants in a sec-
ond programme have an effect of treatment on the treated concerning employment, which is zero.  
Besides, the negative effects decrease over time. 
(vi) Sensitivity of the treatment effect when using social insurance data instead of surveys 
Practically all previous studies were based survey data of the German Socioeonomic Panel and the 
Labour Market Monitor for East Germany.  These two panel surveys however suffer from severe 
shortcomings with respect to 1) the quality of the treatment information and to 2) the precision of 
the employment history before and after treatment.  Furthermore, 3) mainly policies for East Ger-
many are evaluated for the early 90’s and 4) the evaluation results usually refer to very small sam-
ples sizes of the treatment group.   
 5
The conclusion of all these deficiencies of previous studies can only consist of using alternative data 
offering precise information about the employment history of the individual as well as treatment and 
providing a larger sample size the panel surveys.  Therefore, chapter 3 provides an evaluation 
analysis of a specific type of further training based on integrated register data from the unemploy-
ment insurance.  These data have been generated in a research project, to which the author of this 
thesis contributed important parts, and offer extensive and detailed information about the legal regu-
lation under which the treatment was carried out.  Using these data allows identifying clear–cut 
treatments with respect to the type of courses, the intended integration objectives and the contents 
of the courses.   
However, social insurance data are not directly applicable to evaluation questions because the in-
formation provided does not correspond to any socioeconomic concept of work, treatment or un-
employment.  Consequently, an extensive recoding is implemented in order to identify informative 
treatment groups in the sample (first part of Chapter 3). 
The evaluation then implements multiple procedures to overcome the microeconomic evaluation 
problem: It relies on a conditional independence assumption and restricts participants and non-
participants to individuals experiencing the same employment history prior to treatment or non-
treatment.  Again, matching approaches are implemented.  We extensively test whether the match-
ing approach generates appropriate evaluation data.   
Like in previous studies, ALMP outcomes are significantly negative immediately after the beginning 
of the treatment.  Some months later, training seems to initiate a positive employment dynamic.  
However, the effect of the treatment remains negative or insignificant for long–time after the begin-
ning of the treatment, when the training itself is supposed to have ended for the treated.  These in-
significant employment effects are found for different years and different target groups starting 
treatment after short–term, medium–term and long–term unemployment.  And they are surprisingly 
similar for East and West Germany.   
(vii) Evaluating macroeconomic outcomes 
Finally, Chapter 4 provides some evidence for the aggregated outcomes of ALMP.  Evaluation stud-
ies of the macroeconomic effects of ALMP can be seen as a complementary for the understanding of 
positive or negative microeconomic effects: If a positive microeconomic effect of treatment–on–the–
treated suggests a positive outcome of the programme, macroeconomic evaluations could indicate 
whether this positive effect is partially counteracted by negative effects on the non–treated.  In con-
trast, a negative microeconomic effect with respect to employment could exhibit positive outcomes 
on the economy as a whole because it could lower the aggregate wage pressure and then lead to 
higher employment on the macroeconomic level.   
Empirical evaluations of macroeconomic effects of ALMP face identification problems because of 
the endogeneity of the ALMP: The political system answers to unemployment by allocation of 
ALMP, so that we observe the simultaneous occurrence of high levels of ALMP and high unem-
ployment.  Without the explicit control for the endogeneity of ALMP, the estimated policy effect 
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would be biased.  In order to estimate the macroeconomic effect of ALMP, the analysis either con-
trols for endogeneity by instrumental variables with the intention of identifying the exogenous varia-
tion of ALMP irrespective the level of unemployment or by implementing dynamic panel models. 
The macroeconomic analysis finds a reducing effect of further training on the extended unemploy-
ment rate in the short run in fixed effects models, which is however not confirmed by estimations 
which explicitly instrument for ALMP.  The estimations of the dynamic panel models of the match-
ing function shows that some specific job creation programmes improve matching in the short run, 
however, in the long–run, the effect is exactly zero. 
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1 The Evaluation of active labour market policy in Germany: A sur-
vey 
1.1 Introduction 
In 98, the Federal Employment Service (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, BA) supports active labour market 
policy (ALMP) with total expenditure of 27.7 Billion DM (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit 1999: 23).  Addi-
tionally, 10.9 Billion DM are spent for “other Programmes of ALMP” amounting to a total of 36.6 
Billion.  ALMP consists of a number of different job–creation and further training programmes for 
different target groups.  Participants in the main programme areas (further training, job creation 
schemes and targeted wage subsidies for the employment of long–term unemployed) make up to 
3.8% of the total labour force and are especially numerous in East Germany with a participation rate 
of 13.8% of the labour force (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit 1999).  The dimension of the policy interven-
tion into the labour market itself, but also the high and persistent level of unemployment especially 
in the East justifies a continuous evaluation of ALMP and demand for methods that allow identifying 
the causal effects of such policies on employment outcomes. 
ALMP intends to reintegrate participants into regular employment.  This integration however cannot 
be answered by the statistical effect of ALMP on the unemployment figures, but necessitates evaluat-
ing the policy effect on the basis of an adequate situation of “policy non–appearance”, i.e. the hypo-
thetical outcome of non–treatment either on the microeconomic or in the macroeconomic level.  
This “non–appearance of policy” can either be modelled by identifying (i) the outcomes of an indi-
vidual who has taken part in a programme if this individual did not participate (microeconomic 
modelling of non–appearance of policy) or by (ii) modelling an exogenous allocation of ALMP in a 
world where ALMP allocation is actually endogenous and depends on the labour market outcome 
itself.  Both strategies are assumed to provide the only satisfactory measure one can correspond the 
observed policy effect to.   
In the following, we review the evaluation studies of ALMP in Germany that explicitly pay attention 
to the difficult issue of identifying the policy effects in this sense.  In Germany, most studies evaluate 
the effects of (i) job creation schemes and (ii) the support of further vocational training on the micro 
and macroeconomic outcomes.  These are also the most important programmes.   
The following essay is subdivided into three main parts: In the second section, we recapitulate the 
catalogue of the different programmes of ALMP in Germany. Although the basic regulation of ALMP 
changed in 98, it is worth discussing the institutional framework according to the new regulation, 
because most evaluation results can be linked to the new regulation, too, since the principal pro-
grammes of ALMP remained in place.  This section describes which policy outcomes are intended 
and how the different programmes should increase individual employment opportunities.  The third 
section presents the methodological issues of the evaluation of ALMP.  It is well known that the 
empirical evaluation of programmes has to address difficulties in identifying the programme impact 
for the participants based on non–experimental data: The situation of non–treatment is not observ-
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able for the treated individuals and the situation of non–treated individuals as well as the situation 
of the treated individuals before the participation in the programme do not provide an appropriate 
estimate for the non–treatment outcome.  On the macroeconomic level, the evaluation of ALMP 
faces severe identification problems because of the endogeneity of ALMP caused by the response of 
the political system to unemployment by the allocation of ALMP.  In macroeconomic studies, it is 
crucial to control for endogeneity because the simultaneous occurrence of high levels of ALMP and 
high unemployment could otherwise lead to biased estimates about policy effects. 
The fourth part of the paper provides an overview of the scientific evaluation of ALMP in Germany 
on the micro and macroeconomic level.  There is only little consensus in the microeconomic stud-
ies whether the correction of selection bias based on observable characteristics is sufficient or how 
far panel data could be of help to overcome remaining selection bias based on unobservable char-
acteristics.  Maybe due to the very different methodological strategies implemented in the evalua-
tion studies of the last years, we do not find clear empirical evidence of the microeconomic effect of 
further training, which however is negative or insignificant in most cases.  The macroeconomic stud-
ies, too, apply relatively dissimilar data and refer to different methods for the evaluation of the ef-
fects of training and job creation.  In the field of macroeconomic evaluations, there have also been 
found mainly negative or insignificant employment outcomes.  The last section offers a conclusion 
of the evidence found in the evaluation studies. 
1.2 Active labour market policy in Germany  
1.2.1 ALMP interventions 
Active labour market policy is assumed to be a useful instrument in the search of a balance between 
supply and demand on the labour market with respect to regions, sectors and qualifications and 
shall improve employment chances for the unemployed and those threatened by unemployment.  
According to the ILO definition, ALMP is a selective intervention by the government in the pursuit 
of efficiency and/or equity objectives, acting indirectly or directly to provide work to, or increase 
the employability of people with certain disadvantages in the labour market.  In a narrower sense 
(following the OECD), ALMP consists of five different policy areas.  These are (i) Public employment 
service and administration, (ii) labour market training for unemployed and employed adults, (iii) 
youth measures, (iv) subsidised employment (temporary job creation measures) and (v) measures for 
the disabled (OECD 1993: 39 ff.).  In accordance to this, ALMP only includes government–financed 
services and programmes.  It does not comprise programmes in the private sector except if they are 
publicly financed (i.e. no policies based on collective agreements).  ALMP only consists of selective 
public interventions for the benefit of special categories of individuals and not general employment 
policy such as changes in the taxation and social security contributions for certain groups and ex-
plicitly excludes policies of the temporary or permanent reduction of workforce for employment 
security of other groups (i.e. early retirement for labour market reasons or short–time work allow-
ance) and special industrial policies (e.g. the employment maintenance by general industrial subsi-
dies as in mining in Germany) (cf. OECD 1993: 39 ff.). 
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Applying this definition to the German situation, ALMP are predominantly policies of the Federal 
Employment Service (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, BA) under the regulatory framework of the Sozialge-
setzbuch III (Social law book III, SGB III).  Other programmes of ALMP exist at the level of local 
municipalities, of the German Länder and at the European level.  These policies however co–
finance in most cases ALMP of the BA.  In municipal ALMP, programmes that integrate recipients of 
social assistance into regular employment are predominant: Since the cities carry the financial bur-
den of social assistance, they seek to reintegrate these individuals into employment subject to man-
datory social insurance payments by creating temporary public sector jobs, so that the participants 
re–qualify for unemployment benefits and leave to social assistance register.  In 98, these pro-
grammes offered temporary employment for over 200,000 individuals and entailed a financial vol-
ume of ten billion DM (Deutscher Städtetag 1999).  However, the regulations of the local employ-
ment promotion programmes differ widely and are hardly comparable, so that we focus on country–
wide programmes according to the SGB III regulation in the following.   
1.2.2 Regulation of ALMP 
In 98, the basic regulation on ALMP in Germany, the former Labour Promotion Act (Arbeits-
förderungsgesetz, AFG), was replaced by the SGB III.  For the general targets as well as for the or-
ganisation and implementation of ALMP in Germany, this reform had far reaching consequences, 
which are briefly described in the following.  The programmes of the former AFG however re-
mained in place (see section 1.2.4 below), and we decided to discuss the empirical evidence of the 
following sections with respect to the current regulation.  
The aims of the former AFG were formulated under good economic conditions, full employment 
and labour shortage and they were embedded in an institutional framework of both economic and 
social policy.  When the AFG was introduced in 69, two other important regulations were simulta-
neously launched and reinforced the importance of ALMP in the area of economic policy: The Law 
on stability and growth (StWG) and the Law on vocational training (BBiG) were introduced as com-
plementary to the AFG.  With respect to this motivation, the first paragraph of the AFG stressed the 
role of ALMP for the allocation of workforce (AFG, § 1 and 2), the optimisation and adjustment of 
qualifications and that a “lack of qualified workforce should be prevented“.  Thus, ALMP was in-
tended to equalise between demand and supply of workforce and between cross–regional imbal-
ances.  It should promote structural change and increase the productivity of the workforce.   
With the changing labour market situation in Germany since the mid 70’s, the AFG was being re-
vised by 115 amendments until 97 taking into consideration the labour market situation after the 
first oil crisis when structural change, persisting unemployment, increased female participation in 
the labour market and new financial constraints of the unemployment insurance forced the legisla-
tor to restrict ALMP to problem groups.   
A complete revision of the AFG regulation became inevitable after the German unification when an 
ongoing labour market intervention for a long period and an extended group of participants was 
regarded as an appropriate instrument for absorbing the shocks on the labour market after the 
breakdown of the GDR economy.  The widespread implementation of subsidised employment indi-
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cated the end of ALMP as a “growth policy” and stressed the role of ALMP as social policy for 
groups particularly affected by unemployment.  The federal legislator adapted ALMP to these new 
labour market conditions: With the beginning of 98, the new SGB III was implemented. 
The SGB III defines the objectives of ALMP as the integration of disadvantaged groups and the im-
provement of the labour market situation of these target groups by increasing their placement poten-
tial with advice, training measures, and special subsidies for professional integration or business 
start ups.  The instruments of ALMP in Germany are now “clearly more subsidiary“ (Sell 1998: 545).  
Furthermore, the SGB III accentuates more the principle of an insurance, and underlines that the 
promotion of employment opportunities for disadvantaged groups primarily aims at the reduction of 
income maintenance payments (SGB III, §§ 1). 
1.2.3 Institutional change 
The introduction of the SGB III significantly modifies the allocation of ALMP by means of organisa-
tional and financial reforms of the internal structure of the BA1.  These institutional changes are 
briefly discussed in this section. 
With the reform of the organisational structure, integration of formerly separate budgets for the sup-
port of further training and job creation programmes was introduced at the level of the local em-
ployment offices.  Those were no longer forced to implement a specific quantity of training or job 
creation and were enabled to implement programmes according to local requirements.  The for-
merly homogeneous labour market policy designs on the disaggregated level gave way to an ALMP 
characterised by more diversity in the design and the local implementation.  Additional to the flexi-
ble shift between the different schemes of the SGB III, the new regulation allows that 10% of the 
regional budgets of ALMP can be used for an “experimental“ ALMP on the regional level (§ 10, SGB 
III).  With these funds the local employment offices can supplement ALMP in order to establish re-
gional specific solutions for individuals and special problem groups (Sell 1998: 541).   
However, the introduction of the SGB III shows only small changes the programmes themselves: in 
general, the programmes of the former AFG2 remained in place.  Nevertheless, two important 
changes in the instruments indicate the new role of ALMP measures: (i) The introduction of the “in-
tegration plan“ strengthens the position of counselling and guidance in ALMP: For special problem 
groups, the SGB III introduces early and short–term training programmes for their job–search activ-
ity.  (ii) A new “integration contract“ offers a temporary subsidy to employers for the creation of new 
employment probabilities with a special emphasis on training on the job.   
To summarise, with the introduction of the SGB III, only few changes in the design of instruments 
were implemented, but the local employment offices gained a wider flexibility in planning and im-
plementation of the programmes.  This is supposed to cause a wide regional variation in outcomes 
in future.   
                                                          
1 Changes in the regulation of passive labour market policy, especially the income maintenance function of 
the unemployment compensation, are not discussed here (for a summary, see Sell 1998). 
2 A detailed description of the instruments follows in the next part. 
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1.2.4 ALMP programmes 
ALMP in Germany consists of three main policy areas, of which the most important is the integra-
tion or re–integration of problem groups by the support of individual vocational and further train-
ing.3  The second policy is the creation of temporary or permanent employment opportunities with 
a broad variety of wage–cost subsidies4.  The third area is grants for occupational or regional mobil-
ity.5  The most important programmes of these areas are described in the following section6 and are 
summarised in Table 1.1. 
1.2.4.1 Training 
In Germany, most labour market entrants pass through the cooperative dual system of first voca-
tional training, so that youth employment programmes are of minor importance in Germany com-
pared to many other countries, except to some extend in East Germany.  Thus Support for voca-
tional training makes up only a small quantity of ALMP and basically consists of an allowance for 
trainees who are not living with their parents.   
Among the ALMP programmes for adults, further training is the most important.  It aims at the inte-
gration of unemployed persons and those at risk of becoming unemployed by providing recognised 
vocational qualifications.  It consists of measures for individuals who completed first vocational 
training and aims at the assessment, maintenance, extension or adaptation of vocational skills to 
technical developments or changing employment opportunities.  Participants may be granted an 
“income maintenance payment“ (Unterhaltsgeld) if they have been previously in employment, 
which was subject to social contributions for a minimum length during a set period of time or if they 
have received unemployment benefits or assistance.  Under certain conditions, these payments can 
be extended to persons who return to the labour market.  The income maintenance payment is 
                                                          
3 This target area contains the following programs: Vocational training (Förderung der beruflichen Aus-
bildung, SGB III: §§ 59–76), further vocational training (Förderung der beruflichen Weiterbildung, SGB III: 
§§ 77–96 and §§ 153–159), support for training institutions (Institutionelle Förderung der beruflichen 
Bildung, SGB III: §§ 248–251), preparatory vocational training measures for young people (Förderung 
berufsvorbereitender Bildungsmaßnahmen für Jugendliche, SGB III: §§ 59 ff.), vocational training for those 
with learning difficulties and trainees at a social disadvantage (Förderung der Berufsausbildung von lern-
beeinträchtigten oder sozial benachteiligten Auszubildenden, SGB III: § 235 and §§ 240 ff.), vocational 
rehabilitation (Berufliche Rehabilitation, SGB III: §§ 97–99, §§ 236–239 and §§ 248–251) and the im-
provement of the prospects of integration by training (Maßnahmen zur Verbesserung der Eingliederung-
saussichten [Trainingsmaßnahmen], §§48 – 51 SGB III) 
4 More detailed, these are job creation measures (Förderung von Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen [ABM], 
SGB III: §§ 260–271, § 416), structural adjustment measures (Förderung von Strukturanpassungsmaßnah-
men, SGB III: §§ 272–279, § 415.), integration subsidies (Eingliederungszuschüsse SGB III: § 218), re-
cruitment subsidies for businesses start–ups (Einstellungszuschuß bei Neugründungen, SGB III: § 225) and 
integration contracts (Eingliederungsvertrag, SGB III: §§ 229–233). 
5 These programmes do not strictly match to the definition of ALMP as described under section 1.2.1, but 
can be understood either as a special category of wage–subsidies or as a part of the placement activity of 
the employment service.  Here, we summarise the programmes bridging allowance (Übergangsgeld, §§ 
57–58 SGB III) and mobility allowance (Mobilitätshilfen, §§ 53–55 SGB III) 
6 Placement services and counselling are also areas under the definition of ALMP, but are not taken into 
consideration in this paper. They are available to the whole active labour force and not only to specific 
target groups. To our knowledge, these services have so far not been subjected to any scientific evaluation 
of the type discussed here.  
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equal to unemployment allowance, i.e. 60–67% of the previous net wage.  The training courses are 
usually carried out by private training centres, which offer programmes for specified target groups in 
accordance to the requirements of the local employment offices.  The selection of appropriate par-
ticipants among the unemployed lies in the responsibility of the local employment office.  The dura-
tion of training varies between 3 and 8 months for further training and up to 24 months for re–
training.   
The programme improving the prospects of integration supports short–term training courses or prac-
tical activities that improve the prospects of unemployed workers for integration by the assessment 
of the suitability of the unemployed person for employment or training.  They can include job–
application training, counselling on job– search possibilities or treatment, which investigate the 
unemployed person's willingness and ability to work and are intended to promote the individual 
job–search activity. 
1.2.4.2 Subsidised employment 
The second main group of ALMP instruments summarises targeted wage subsidies.  There are nu-
merous programmes promoting employment opportunities for hard–to–place both in temporary, 
additional jobs and by subsidising permanent employment contracts.  Especially programmes aim-
ing at the integration in regular employment can often be considered as equivalent, with respect to 
the integration purpose: Irrespective under which regulation the treatment is carried out, any of 
these programmes aim at the integration of the same target group with basically the same pro-
gramme design. 
The most important programme is Job creation measures (Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen, JC).  JC 
aim at the creation of temporary employment for long–term unemployed (>12 months) in projects, 
which “have to benefit the community“ and “must be additional“, meaning that they would not 
have carried out without the subsidy.  In general, JC is a co–financed programme, in which between 
30% and 90% of the whole wage sum of the participant (i.e. the gross wages plus the employers’ 
shares of the social insurance contributions) is subsidised by the BA.  The implementing institutions 
– public or private legal entities – incur further (e.g. material) costs.  ABM gives priority to projects 
that considerably improve the chances for permanent jobs, that support structural improvement in 
social or environmental services or that aim at the integration of extremely hard–to–place individu-
als.  The wages paid to the participants must not exceed 80% of a comparable unsubsidised job.  
The duration of JCs is in most cases restricted to 1 year, but can be extended up to 36 months if 
permanent employment is offered subsequently.   
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Table 1.1 Main ALMP programmes in Germany 
 
Youth 
Programme name Aim SGB III Target group ALMP support Duration Participants, 98 Costs, 98 
Support for  
vocational training  
Vocational training 
allowance  
§§ 59–76  Trainees not living in the 
parental home 
§ Refund of course fees and 
travelling expenses 
§ Vocational training allow-
ance (optional) 
36 months (max.) 
 
Total:  165,100 
East: 61,200 
West: 103,900 
 
Total: 1.043bn DM 
East: 313m DM 
West: 730m DM 
 
 
Training 
Programme name Aim SGB III Target group ALMP support Duration Participants, 98 Costs, 98 
a) Further training  
b) Re–training 
Improving qualifica-
tion of unemployed 
§§ 77–96; 
§§ 153–156  
§ Unemployed with 
“training necessity“ 
§ Re–entrants from 
inactivity 
§ Course fees  
§ Income maintenance pay-
ment for participants (equal 
to unemployment benefit) 
§ Costs for accommodation 
and child care (if necessary) 
a) 2 to 8 months 
b) 24 months 
 
Total: 607970 
East: 235959 
West: 372011 
 
Total: 12.505 bn DM 
East: 5.468 bn DM 
West: 7.038 bn DM 
Improving prospects of 
integration 
Improvement of job 
search  
§§ 48–51 Unemployed § Course fees 
§ Costs of accommodation 
and child care (if necessary) 
½ to 2 months 
 
n.a. 
 
n.a. 
 
 
Mobility  
Programme name Aim SGB III Target group ALMP support Duration Participants, 98 Costs, 98 
Mobility allowance Financial assistance  
for entry in regular 
employment 
§§ 53–55  Unemployed Double household or mobility 
allowance (up to 500 DM 
monthly) or relocation subsidy 
6 months 
 
 
n.a. 
 
Total: 51.3m DM 
East: 24.6m DM 
West: 26.7m DM 
 
Bridging allowance Financial assistance  
for entry in self–
employment 
§§ 57–58  Unemployed Income maintenance equal to 
unemployment benefit 
6 months 
 
Total: 97,800 
East: 31,600 
West: 66,200 
 
Total: 1.248bn DM 
East: 362.4m DM 
West: 885.6m DM 
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Table 1.1 Main ALMP programmes in Germany (cont.) 
 
Subsidised Employment 
Programme name Aim SGB III Target group ALMP support Duration Participants, 98 Costs, 98 
Job creation measures 
(ABM) 
Temporary integra-
tion in “additional“ 
employment in the 
public interest 
§§ 260–217; 
§ 416  
Long–term unemployed  § Wage cost subsidy (30–90% 
of the wage sum) 
§ Wages paid must not exceed 
80% of equal unsubsidised 
employment  
§ Financial support for institu-
tions 
§ 12 to 24 months 
§ 36 months (if 
creation of per-
manent em-
ployment fol-
lows) 
 
Total: 366,555 
East: 271,768 
West: 94,787 
 
Total: 7.424bn DM 
East: 5.453bn DM 
West: 1.971bn DM 
Structural adjustment 
measures (SAM) 
Temporary integra-
tion in “additional“ 
employment im-
proving social 
service and the 
environment 
§§ 272–279; 
§ 415  
§ Long–term unem-
ployed  
§ Unemployed  
§ Persons at risk of 
becoming unem-
ployed 
§ Wage cost subsidy (equiva-
lent to individual unem-
ployment benefit)  
§ Social insurance contribu-
tions 
§ Wages < 80% of equal 
unsubsidised job 
§ 36 months  
§ 48 months (if 
creation of per-
manent em-
ployment fol-
lows) 
 
Total: 272,178 
East: 257,919 
West: 14,259 
 
Total: 4.593bn DM 
East: 4.277bn DM 
West: 316m DM 
Integration subsidies Permanent integra-
tion in regular 
employment 
§§ 217–224  § Unemployed and 
re–entrants if fa-
miliarisation re-
quired (group a) 
§ Long–term unem-
ployed (b) 
§ Aged at least 55 (c) 
Wage cost subsidy 
§ 30% (groups a and b) 
§ 50% (group c, in certain 
cases b) 
of wage costs 
§ 12 –24 months 
(groups a and b) 
§ 36 months 
(group c) 
 
Total: 70,900 
East: 21,600 
West: 49,300  
 
Total: 1.142bn DM 
East: 291.9m DM 
West: 850.3m DM 
Recruitment subsidies for 
business start–ups 
Permanent integra-
tion in start–up firms 
§§ 225–228  § Unemployed 
§ Participants in ALMP 
measures 
Wage cost subsidy  
50% of wage costs 
12 months 
 
 
Total: 9,400 
East: 2,200 
West: 7,200 
 
 
Total: 171.9m DM 
East: 37.1m DM 
West: 134.8m DM 
Integration contracts Permanent integra-
tion in regular 
employment 
§§ 229–234  § Short–term unem-
ployed with place-
ment problems  
§ Long–term unem-
ployed  
Wage cost subsidy (only for 
periods with training and inter-
nal qualification) 
100% of wage costs 
6 months 
 
Total: 2,800 
 
Total: 4.75m DM 
Employment assistance for 
long–term unemployed 
Permanent integra-
tion in regular 
employment 
(Federal law) LTU of duration 
§ 1–2 years (group a) 
§ 2–3 years (group b) 
§ > 3 years (group c) 
Wage cost subsidy 
§ 50% (group a) 
§ 60% (group b) 
§ 70% (group c) 
12 months 
 
Total: 66,600 
East: 17,300 
West: 49,300 
 
Total: 878.7m DM 
East: 194.4m DM 
West: 684.3m DM 
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The structural adjustment measures aiming at the temporary re–integration of long–term unem-
ployed have less strict eligibility criteria, which are applied to participants, e.g. participation is also 
possible for individuals starting treatment directly from employment.  Nevertheless, priority is given 
to individuals that cannot be placed in regular employment without subsidies in foreseeable future, 
i.e. long–term unemployed.  The wage cost subsidy is a flat rate equal to the amount of unemploy-
ment allowance or assistance the individual would have received if unemployment had continued.  
Temporary employment is supported by means of this programme mainly if the projects conserve or 
improve the environment or provide social services.  The implementing institutions, public institu-
tions or private companies, pay the remaining personnel and material costs.  As for ABM job crea-
tions, wages for participants in this programme must not exceed 80% of equal unsubsidised em-
ployment.  The subsidy is paid for 36 months and can be extended up to 48 months if the partici-
pants are regularly employed after the end of the programme.   
Integration subsidies serve the same target of integrating long–term unemployed and labour market 
entrants.  This scheme works as follows: Employers receive wage subsidies to compensate for lower 
performance of the eligible persons for a certain period, in which participants: a) become familiar 
with the work situation, b) have special integration requirements due to disability or personal cir-
cumstances or c) need longer integration periods because of an age above 55 years.  The amount 
and duration of the subsidies depend on the extent to which the employee's performance is reduced 
and on the individual familiarisation requirements.  The subsidy varies between 30% and 50% of 
the wage costs (i.e. the wages and additionally the employers’ share of the social insurance contri-
butions) for a period between 12 and 36 months.  Employers have to provide regular employment 
to participants for at least 12 months after the programme expiration. 
Almost the same eligibility criteria are applied in the programme offering recruitment subsidies for 
business start–ups, aiming at the permanent integration of unemployed in the regular labour market.  
In this programme, the wage–cost subsidy of 50% of the total wage costs is limited to 12 months 
and regular employment of at least 12 months must follow the programme. 
The integration contract – another programme for the re–integration of long–term unemployed – 
offers employers a 100% wage–subsidy for the time a participant needs to qualify for the occupa-
tion in training institutions outside the firm or to get familiarised with the work environment.  Em-
ployers who benefit from integration contracts commit themselves to providing unemployed work-
ers the access to qualification.  The integration contract is limited to a maximum of six months.   
The fourth wage–cost subsidy scheme aiming at the integration of long–term unemployed into regu-
lar employment is the programme employment assistance for long–term unemployed.  Here, the 
employer receive a wage–cost subsidy if he offers permanent employment to an employee who has 
been registered as unemployed for at least one year immediately prior to being recruited.  The dura-
tion of the programme is limited to a maximum of 12 months, and the level of the subsidy depends 
on the individual unemployment duration before employment (between 50% and 70% of the wage 
costs). 
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1.2.4.3 Mobility 
Mobility allowances are traditionally of minor importance in Germany.  There are two programmes 
supporting regional or occupational mobility: 
Regional Mobility allowance offers financial aid for the entry into contributory employment: a) A 
bridging subsistence loan can be given to individuals until payment of the first wage of 80% of the 
expected first wage, b) an equipment allowance of up to DM 500 for work, clothes and tools or c) 
an allowance for travelling between the recipient's home and the place of work in another district or 
alternatively a relocation loan within 2 years of entering employment.   
The bridging allowance aims at the support of self–employment by subsidising formerly unem-
ployed who become self–employed: The payment can last up to 26 weeks and amounts to the un-
employment benefit or assistance, which the claimant had previously received or could have re-
ceived.   
1.2.5 Expenditure and participation 
Table 1.2 shows the expenditure on ALMP for the years 95–8.  Due to the changes in legislation, 
the 98 figures are not fully comparable with the figures referring to earlier years and we recalculated 
subtotals according to the former regulation.  One can observe a stable expenditure development 
for ALMP over the last years.  After a tightening of budgets for training and employment promotion 
in 97, ALMP again grew in 98.  The overall budget declined by almost four billion DM, however 
ALMP gained importance.   
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Table 1.2 Expenditure of the German Federal Employment Service, 95–87 
 Expenditure in thousand DM 95 96 97 98 
            
 1. Training and Re–Integration* 22,937,007 24,959,039 21,860,748 22,805,854 
 
2. Measures for Employment 
 Promotion (incl.  short–time work 
 allowance and early retirement 
 schemes)** 
 
 
 
14,794,891 
 
 
 
13,110,094 
 
 
 
10,720,878 
 
 
 
12,237,971 
 
3. Income Maintenance for Building  
 and Civil Engineering*** 
 
1,585,160 
902,674 443,233 471,209 
 4. Income Maintenance 49,895,084 57,959,263 61,505,145 54,881,647 
 5. Staff, Equipment, Investments,  
 IT of the Organisation 
 
7,577,327 
 
8,176,006 
 
7,445,872 
 
8,452,025 
 6. Other Expenditure 313,608 480,716 747,296 N/A, 
      
  
Total Expenditure 
 
97,103,081 
 
105,587,795 
 
102,723,175 
 
98,848,705 
Source: Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, Geschäftsbericht 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 modified subtotals 
The participation figures in ALMP are shown in table 1.3.  Considerable changes occurred over the 
last six years in both East and West Germany: Inflows into job creation and structural adjustment 
measures in the public sector (“traditional SAM“) vary between 0.2% and 0.36% of the total civilian 
labour force between 93 and 98 in West and 2.5% and 4.4% in East Germany.  There are two peaks 
in 94 and 98, indicating that the participation and the extend of the programme depended on the 
election to the federal parliament.  In total, about 1% of the total civilian labour force start an JC of 
the ABM programme or a traditional SAM each year and except for the two peak years.  The pro-
gramme size remains relatively stable.  The inflows into programmes aiming at the integration of 
hard–to–place individuals into the regular labour market gained importance over the last years.  
This category, including integration subsidies, recruitment subsidies for business start–ups, integra-
tion contracts and the employment assistance for long–term unemployed as well as special SAMs 
for the private sector, comprises about 0.44% of the total civilian labour force in West Germany and 
3.38% in East Germany in 98.  We see a significant increase in the use of this incentive scheme: In 
98, five times more participants started regular employment with temporary wage subsides than in 
93 in both East and West Germany. 
Further training, the biggest ALMP programme, shows participation figures similar to the ABM pro-
gramme (1.17% of total civilian labour force in 98).  In the West, further training involves twice as 
many participants compared to ABM and traditional SAM.  In East Germany this is just opposite: 
                                                          
7  As the BA changed the accounting for expenditure after 98 due to the implementation of the SGB III, we 
had to relocate the expenditure of the old annual report systematic to ensure comparability.  
 The results are differently in the sum as the annual report contains a mistake in the accounting of the ex-
penditure for ALMP under its position IV 1. where a total of 24,666,585.976 thousand DM is reported, but 
where the correct sum would be 24,663,585.976 thousand DM.  
* According to the old systematic, we here subsume Unterstützung, Trainingsmaßnahmen, Mobilität, Ar-
beitnehmerhilfe, Unterhaltsgeld, Maßnahmekosten, Einstellungszuschüsse, Eingliederungsvertrag, Ben-
achteiligte Auszubildende, Sozialplan, Jugendwohnheime, Reha Ersteinstellung, Reha, Wiedereinstellung, 
Freie Förderung, Berufsausbildungsbeihilfe, Anschlußunterhaltsgeld, Förderung selbständiger Tätigkeit, 
Eingliederung bei Berufs, Institutionelle Förderung, ESF, Sonstige Ausgaben Kap. 3 
** Eingliederungszuschüsse, ABM, Kurzarbeitergeld, Altersteilzeit AN/AG, Strukturanpassungsmaßnahmen 
***Wintergeld, Winterausfallgeld, SV–Zuschüsse für umlagefinanziertes WAG 
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After a decline from 3.87% to 2.42% between 93 and 98, we see that the first and extensive use of 
further training after unification ended.   
Overall, we see a declining use of further training among the German ALMP, no clear trend in the 
usage of “classical“ ABM programme with temporary employment opportunities and an increasing 
implementation of programmes that offer a temporary wage–subsidies for permanent jobs.   
Table 1.3 Participation entries in ALMP as percentage of total civilian labour force 
  93 94 95 96 97 98 
West 0.20 0.31 0.30 0.31 0.26 0.35 
East 4.12 4.74 3.74 3.80 2.54 4.39 
Job–creation measures (ABMs) and traditional 
structural adjustment measures (SAM) 
Total 0.97 1.17 0.97 0.99 0.71 1.15 
West 0.09 0.09 0.20 0.16 0.21 0.44 
East 0.68 0.53 0.84 0.60 1.46 3.38 
Regular employees receiving ALMP subsi-
dies* 
Total 0.20 0.18 0.32 0.25 0.46 1.02 
West 1.12 0.98 1.30 1.23 0.89 0.86 
East 3.87 3.82 3.44 3.62 2.20 2.42 
Further training 
Total 1.66 1.53 1.72 1.70 1.15 1.17 
West 1.41 1.38 1.80 1.71 1.37 1.66 
East 8.66 9.09 8.03 8.01 7.17 12.93 
Total 
Total 2.84 2.88 3.01 2.94 2.51 3.87 
Source: Amtliche Nachrichten der Bundesanstalt für Arbeit (Official Bulletin of the Federal Employment Ser-
vice), 1, 1999: 14ff.; own calculations 
1.2.6 Institutional framework and evaluation 
This section described the institutional framework of ALMP in Germany and the main instruments of 
ALMP.  The recent changes towards organisational decentralisation lead to a greater diversity of the 
instruments with implications for the evaluation of policy outcomes.  The evaluation studies should 
take into account the greater diversity of measures and that a comparison of participants across re-
gions becomes more difficult with respect to the programme design and duration.   
Wee see that various options exist for the integration of hard–to–place and problem groups.  Train-
ing programmes or temporary subsidised employment explicitly focus on the integration of long–
term unemployed, and the local employment offices are now enabled to choose between different 
policy options.  Presumably, this recently gained flexibility will change the participants' assignment 
to programme types in general and the programme impact.   
Among the different programmes, the local employment office has in principle a choice between 
higher or lower integration subsidies of shorter or longer duration for basically the same target 
group.  An assessment of integration subsidies should take into account these differences in pro-
gramme design. 
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1.3 Methodological issues in the evaluation of ALMP 
There exists a growing literature on the methodological issues involved when trying to evaluate the 
microeconomic and macroeconomic effects of ALMP, see Heckman et al. (1999) for a recent sum-
mary of the state–of–the–art, Calmfors and Skedinger (1995) for the issues involved in macroeco-
nomic evaluations of ALMP.  This section cannot provide a comprehensive summary of the meth-
ods.  Instead, we describe the main methodological issues necessary to discuss the German litera-
ture and recent extensions like the timing–of–events approach and further identifying assumptions 
in the context of different starting dates of the programmes.  We present various criteria for the 
evaluation of how the various authors have resolved the respective methodological problems in-
volved.  Since the available evidence for Germany is based on non–experimental data, we restrict 
our attention to methods for this case.   
An evaluation of a specific programme, which is part of ALMP, basically involves four issues: First, 
one has to define the criteria by which to assess the success of the programme.  Second, it is to be 
investigated whether the programme leads to a causal improvement for the individual participant 
with regard to the relevant success criterion.  Third, one has to analyse whether the individual suc-
cess of the programme justifies the direct costs of the measure.  The second and third issue together 
form the microeconomic evaluation problem.  Fourth, turning to the macroeconomic level one is 
interested whether the programme leads to an improvement in the aggregate outcome.   
1.3.1 Success criteria 
Regarding the first issue, we focus here on economic outcome variables such as the (re)employment 
prospects, the stability of employment or the level of earnings while acknowledging the importance 
of non–economic goals in actual political decision processes.  The economic outcome variables 
considered here are part of the goals formulated by ALMP in Germany, especially the target of inte-
gration into regular employment (see section 1.2).  They are defined at the individual level and can 
be aggregated to the macroeconomic level. 
1.3.2 The microeconomic evaluation problem 
A microeconomic evaluation investigates whether participation in the programme causes an im-
provement in the relevant outcome variable for the participants and whether this success is large 
enough to justify the costs.  An assessment of the costs is necessary for a comprehensive microeco-
nomic programme evaluation (see Heckman et al. 1999) but this issue has not been addressed in 
the recent German literature on microeconomic evaluations of ALMP.  This is probably due to the 
intensive discussion about whether one can even identify positive individual effects of ALMP on the 
respective outcome variable (without even considering the costs) and to the fact that positive effects 
at the individual level are necessary (but not sufficient) for a positive overall evaluation. 
Microeconomic evaluations typically build upon a potential–outcome–approach to causality, i.e. 
the causal effect of the programme for individual i is the difference between the outcome variable 
iYT  when receiving the treatment (i.e. participating in the programme) and the outcome variable 
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iYC  when the same individual is not receiving the treatment.  The evaluation problem lies in the 
fact that one can only observe one of the two outcome variables ( )ii YCYT ,  for the same individual 
at the same time.  In order to estimate the effects of treatment–on–the treated, one has to estimate 
the outcome variable in the situation of not being treated for the group of treated individuals (those 
with treatment dummy 1=D ).  As average potential outcome, this is given by  
{ }1=DYCE  
which is typically estimated based on the measured past non–treatment experience of the treated 
individuals (before–after comparison) or on the experience of other non–treated individuals (D=0, 
i.e. comparison with control group).  Having to rely on plausible though untestable identification 
assumptions, the non–treatment outcome of other individuals or of the same individuals in other 
time periods defines the comparison level (when relying on other non–treated individuals one refers 
to the control group) for the treatment outcome8. 
Put more formally, the average treatment effect on the treated ( )1=D  is given by  
{ } { }11 =-= DYCEDYTE           (1) 
and the evaluation problem consists of estimating { }1=DYCE  since the outcome in the non–
treated situation is not given for the treated individual.   
Typically, the average non–treatment outcome either for the non–treated individuals or for the 
treated individuals before treatment )0( =D  do not provide an adequate estimate of the compari-
son level, i.e. selection bias of the form  
{ } { }01 =¹= DYCEDYCE           (2) 
arises due to differences in observable or in unobservable characteristics between treated and non–
treated individuals.  The recent literature on evaluation methods also points to the possible bias 
introduced into the analysis by using misspecified statistical or econometric models, see Heckman 
et al. (1999).  In the following, we will describe these issues slightly more formally and sketch the 
popular approaches to account for selection bias.   
 
1.3.2.1 Selection on observables 
Let X be the relevant observable characteristics of treated and non–treated individuals then the con-
ditional independence assumption (CIA)  
{ } { }XDYCEXDYCE ,0,1 ===          (3) 
                                                          
8  When the evaluation is concerned with the average treatment effect for the entire population of treated 
and non–treated individuals the potential but unobservable outcomes for both subgroups have to be esti-
mated. 
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eliminates selection bias conditional on X.9 Thus, even though treated ( )1=D  and non–treated 
)0( =D  individuals with different X are not comparable, conditional on X they become comparable 
in their (potential) outcome in the non–treated state.  Note that CIA is not testable.  The CIA is the 
basis of the popular matching approach to programme evaluation, which involves matching treated 
and non–treated individuals with respect to their observable characteristics such that the treatment 
effect can be consistently estimated by the average difference in treated and estimated non–
treatment outcome based on matched non–treated individuals.  In its most rigorous form, matching 
replicates the idea of a control group from experimental evaluations where in a sample of compara-
ble individuals it is randomly decided who receive treatment and who does not.  The latter indi-
viduals then form the control group and the treatment effect can be consistently estimated as the 
outcome difference between treatment and control group.   
In a multi–dimensional setting, it is not always the case that one can find for each treated individual 
one – or even more than one – non–treated individuals corresponding exactly to the treated in all 
observable characteristics.  This is sometimes referred to as a lack of overlap in the distribution of 
observables between the sample of treated and non–treated individuals.  With the treatment effect 
not being constant, Heckman et al. (1999) emphasise that due to lack of overlap it might not be 
possible to evaluate the treatment effect for all possible observable characteristics (this can also re-
sult in a difference between the effect of treatment–on–the–treated and the average treatment ef-
fect).  If all individuals with a certain occupation in a certain region receive treatment because a 
large company terminates its operation and if these characteristics exhibit an impact on labour mar-
ket outcomes, it will be virtually impossible to find adequate matches among the non–treated popu-
lation.   
In practice, evaluation studies use similar matches to define the comparison level based on three 
basic approaches, see Heckman et al. (1999, section 7.4.1),  
Kernel matching 
Under the Conditional Independence Assumption, the average effect of treatment–on–the–treated 
can be estimated by  
( )
{ }{ }
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Di Dj
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         (4) 
where { }0=Î Dj  is the group of non–treated individuals and the kernel weight ( )jiw ,  defines the 
“closeness“ between the treated individuals i and j in terms of the relevant observable characteris-
tics.  Here, one simply estimates the non–treatment outcome of any treated individual i with ob-
servable characteristics X by taking an average outcome for non–participants with the same charac-
teristics X – these are the fitted values of nonparametric regressions in the sample of non–
participants at the local individual’s characteristics X.  The nonparametric regression basically can 
                                                          
9  Strictly speaking, our formulation considers only mean independence which suffices for estimating the 
average treatment effect, see Heckman et al. (1999) for the general case. 
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be interpreted as a weight function ( )jiw , : j should have a higher weight for i if the two are more 
similar.  For each treated individual i, the weights sum up to 1 over the whole sample of non–
participants. The estimated effect of treatment–on–the–treated can then just be estimated by averag-
ing this difference of the observed treatment outcome and the locally estimated non–treatment out-
come over the whole sample of treated individuals N. 
Variants of kernel matching are nearest–neighbour–matching where only the “closest“ non–treated 
individual is used for comparison and caliper–matching where a match is only made if there exists 
at least one individual which is sufficiently close to the treated individual i (problem of overlap). 
Propensity score matching  
The major disadvantage of kernel matching is the “curse–of–dimensionality”, i.e. again it might be 
difficult to match with respect to a high–dimensional vector of observable characteristics.  There-
fore, most evaluation studies actually use the result by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) that the CIA in 
equation (3) also holds with respect to the probability of treatment (“propensity score”) P(X) as a 
function of the observable characteristics X, i.e.  
( ){ } ( ){ }XPDYCEXPDYCE ,0,1 === .         (5) 
This result allows matching upon the one–dimensional probability by using the “closeness“ in the 
propensity score as the weighting scheme in equation (4).  This dimension–reduction feature re-
duces the problem of finding adequate matches but it comes at the cost that the propensity score 
has to be estimated itself.  In general, it is an open question which form of matching is most appro-
priate; see Heckman et al. (1999).  The recent German literature building on a suggestion by 
Lechner (1998) mostly uses a hybrid approach combining matching on the propensity score with 
matching on selective important observable characteristics, which often are not time–invariant.  
One issue, which has not been addressed so far by the German literature is the fact, that the stan-
dard error of the estimated treatment parameter should take account of the fact that the propensity 
score used for matching is a preestimated quantity, see Heckman et al. (1999, section 7.4.1).   
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Parametric regression  
Traditional econometric regression methods typically use a parametric specification to account for 
the impact of observable characteristics and implicitly estimate the potential outcome in the non–
treated state as the fitted value on the regression functional.  As the of nonparametric analysis be-
came more popular, these methods have been criticised heavily in the literature.  Parametric regres-
sion models might not be flexible enough to capture the true relationships and often rely on arbi-
trary identification assumptions, which allow the researcher to extrapolate into areas of the regres-
sors X for which no observations are available and hide the lack–of–overlap.  However, many 
evaluation studies still use parametric regression methods, as part of their analysis and it has to be 
investigated whether they suffer from the aforementioned problem.  One reason for the popularity 
of parametric regression methods is that a fully nonparametric analysis involves the curse–of–
dimensionality problem.   
1.3.2.2 Selection on unobservables  
While conditioning properly on a large number of observable characteristics allows to correct for 
most of the selection bias when contrasting the outcome for treated and non–treated individuals.  It 
is argued that the CIA in equation (3) is not a reasonable identifying assumption for their actual 
evaluation problem; see Heckman et al. (1999).  There exist various plausible channels why unob-
servable characteristics or differences in the gains from a programme might in fact influence the 
decision whether to participate, thus violating the CIA: 
§ Individuals might know more about their labour market prospects with and without treat-
ment.   
§ The eligibility for programme participation (including the discretion by programme adminis-
trators) may depend on variables, which are unobservable to the researcher.   
§ The labour market behaviour of individuals before treatment might be altered by the pros-
pect of future treatment.   
Under these circumstances, it is not possible to infer the adequate comparison level (i.e. the average 
non–treatment outcome) for the treated population from the outcome of non–treated individuals 
with same observable characteristics as stated by the CIA.  To account for selection on unobserv-
ables, the literature has pursued various strategies: 
Econometric selection models  
Similar to parametric models used to correct for selection on observables the application of the clas-
sical econometric selection models10 in the context of the evaluation problem has been criticised 
                                                          
10  These models typically specify a separate participation equation for treatment which includes additional 
regressors compared to the outcome equation. Selection on unobservables involves a correlation between 
the error term in the outcome equation and the error term in the participation equation. The Heckman cor-
rection is the simplest and most widely used on these estimation approaches. Other alternatives are full in-
formation maximum likelihood models. 
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quite heavily in the literature, see Heckman et al. (1999, section 7.4.2), for using restrictive func-
tional form assumptions thus yielding a variety of estimates based on typically misspecified models.  
Although there has been made a lot of progress in estimating semiparametric selection models, such 
models have not yet been applied in the evaluation of ALMP in Germany.   
Conditional Difference–in–Differences estimation  
The difference–in–differences (DiD) estimation approach requires panel data and builds on the as-
sumption of time–invariant linear selection effects.  This estimator extends simple before–after com-
parisons to determine the treatment effect based on the presumption that the outcome variable can 
also change over time due to reasons, which are unrelated to the treatment.  Thus, the change for 
the treated has to be contrasted to the change for comparable non–treated individuals.  Assuming 
that the employment outcome is given by  
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )tiCitCititTitTititi XgDXgDY ,,, 1 eea +-+++=      (6) 
with titi YYT ,, =  for 1, =tiD and titi YYC ,, =  for 0, =tiD , a general DiD estimator consists of match-
ing individuals i and j with the same observable characteristics 1,1, tjti XX =  and 0,0, tjti XX =  where 
i receives treatment between period t0 and t1 and j is a non–treated individual.  Further assumptions 
are that ( )itT Xg  and ( )itC Xg  are the individual specific outcomes in the treated and non–treated 
state, respectively, that the permanent unobservable individual effect ia  is correlated with pro-
gramme participation and that itT ,e  and itC ,e  are additional error terms for the treatment and non–
treatment state.  Thus, ia  captures the effect of selection on unobservables and can be differenced 
out in order to obtain a constant treatment estimator by  
( ) ( ) 0,1,0,1,110,1,0,1, )()( jtCjtCitCitTitCitTtjtjtiti XgXgYCCYYCYT eeee +--+-=---  (7) 
Heckman et al. (1999) term (7) the conditional DiD estimator since individuals i and j with the same 
(or reasonably similar) observable characteristics are matched.  In a regression specification, the 
conditional DiD estimator in (7) can be implemented by using both a preprogramme dummy and a 
postprogramme dummy Di,t in the pooled outcome regression.  The preprogramme dummy indi-
cates whether a person receives treatment in the future.  Hence, the difference between the regres-
sion coefficients for the postprogramme and the preprogramme dummy provides the DiD estimate.  
Heckman et al. (1999) refer to various studies for the U.S. indicating that conditional DiD combined 
with nonparametric matching has shown to be a very effective tool in controlling for both selection 
on observables and unobservables.  However, it has to be emphasised that its validity depends criti-
cally on the time–invariant nature of the selection effect, see the discussion on preprogramme tests 
and Ashenfelter's dip in the next section.   
1.3.2.3 Preprogramme test and Ashenfelter's dip 
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Pre programme dummies indicating further treatment have also been used as a specification test 
both in a regression or in a nonparametric matching context to investigate whether the chosen 
method has properly controlled for time–invariant selection effects.  To our knowledge, Heckman 
and Hotz (1989) had first advocated this approach as the preprogramme test.  It is now criticised 
heavily by Heckman et al. (1999, section 8.4) as the “Fallacy of Alignment“.  The preprogramme 
test is motivated by the idea that if the evaluation method corrects properly for all differences – both 
observable and unobservable – between treated and non–treated individuals then no significant 
differences in the outcome variables should exist between comparable treated and non–treated in-
dividuals before treatment.  Put differently, significant differences before treatment indicate remain-
ing time–invariant differences, which are effectively used by the DiD estimator described in the 
previous section.  In a regression context, the preprogramme test is implemented by adding a pre-
programme dummy to the outcome regression.   
Heckman et al. (1999) argue that the validity of the preprogramme test as a specification test11 is 
questioned by a finding termed “Ashenfelter's Dip”, which was first discovered when evaluating the 
treatment effect on earnings but which can also apply to other outcome measures.  Ashenfelter's 
Dip involves a disproportionate decline in earnings before the programme starts.  It is likely that this 
decline in earnings is related to the subsequent participation and, thus, cannot be used to test for 
“correct alignment“ of treated and non–treated individuals before treatment.12 To address this prob-
lem, Bergemann et al. (2000) suggest testing for “alignment“ early enough before the start of the 
programme such that the preprogramme outcome is not affected by future participation.   
1.3.2.4 Heterogeneous treatment  
The discussion so far has implicitly assumed that all treated individuals participate in one homoge-
neous programme.  However, the different programmes in Germany allow for a lot of heterogeneity 
in the type of treatment (length of the programme, different contents of training courses, different 
provider of courses or employers etc.) and it has been observed that hard–to–place individuals often 
participate in more than one programme over time (“programme career“).  It is obvious that the in-
tensity and the quality of a programme should have an impact on the labour market outcome and 
that complicated dynamic selection effects occur when individuals participate in different pro-
grammes one after the other (possibly in order to remain eligible for transfer payments by the labour 
offices).  The survey by Heckman et al. (1999) does not discuss the methodological aspects of these 
issues and therefore, it does not come as a surprise that applied academic evaluation research has 
been restricted to the evaluation of single programmes either ignoring their heterogeneity or restrict-
ing the analysis to a subset of fairly homogeneous treatments while ignoring the interaction with 
other programmes.  Recently, Lechner (2001) has made theoretical progress in evaluating multiple 
treatments under the CIA.  He extends the method of propensity score matching and shows that the 
relative outcome effect of different treatments can effectively be evaluated by a bivariate evaluation 
of the outcome variables of matched individuals receiving different treatments (no treatment effec-
                                                          
11  Ultimately, without being acknowledged in this way by Heckman et al., this criticism applies also to the 
conditional DiD estimator which had been evaluated favourably by these authors. 
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tively becomes one form of treatment).  Interestingly, it provides some ex post justification for those 
earlier studies in the literature, which evaluated one programme based on the sample of individuals 
receiving no treatment what–so–ever together with those individuals participating in the programme 
of interest.  Nevertheless, one has to acknowledge that more research is needed on the methodo-
logical aspects of programme heterogeneity.   
1.3.2.5 Identification and specification issues 
The recent discussion on evaluation of ALMP focuses on the (i) timing of treatments and the (ii) 
identification of causal effects if treatment is restricted to unemployed and may start at any time 
during unemployment – a situation common in Europe and widely ignored by the American debate 
usually discussing treatment as a binary choice problem, see Heckman et al. 1999.  Most evaluation 
studies however benefit from panel data, in which both aspects are crucial.  Therefore the following 
section provides a short description of timing–of–events and identification problems in panel data, 
although there does not exist any application for ALMP in Germany yet (opposite to many other 
European countries). 
Identification without CIA: Timing–of–events 
Alternatively to the CIA; Abbring, van den Berg (2003) suggest an identification of the treatment 
effect using duration data which benefits from the variation in the duration until treatment relative to 
the duration until the outcome of interest in the case of non–experimental evaluation.  This informa-
tion is usually ignored in applying the CIA as in (3) for the binary treatment problem.  The timing–
of–events approach13 models simultaneously the outflows from unemployment into regular work 
and the programme participation in a mixed proportional hazard model.  Both, the participation 
hazard function and the hazard rate into regular employment depend on observed characteristics X 
and unobserved heterogeneity u in a multiplicatively separable form elapsed duration t as  
( ) ( ) ( )uDXtuDxt uuu ++= dblq 'exp,,|  
where ( )uDxtu ,,|q  is the exit rate from unemployment at time t conditional on observed character-
istics, unobserved characteristics and the treatment variable D (Lalive, van Ours, Zweimüller 2002: 
14).  ( )tul  denotes the effect of the elapsed duration.  The treatment, too, is supposed to follow a 
proportional hazard specification as  
( ) ( ) ( )vXtuDxt ppp += blq 'exp,,| . 
v introduces unobserved heterogeneity into the hazard to treatment and u and v follow a joint dis-
tribution denoted by G(u,v).  Assuming randomness oft the unemployment duration, the timing–of–
events approach uses the variation in unemployment duration and the variation in the duration until 
the start of the treatment in order to identify the unobserved heterogeneity distribution.  The differ-
                                                                                                                                                                                           
12  Analogously, preprogram earnings cannot be used as "reference level" for DiD estimation. 
13 In the following, the methodology is described following the recent application by Lalive, van Ours and 
Zweimüller for the effect of benefit sanctions on the duration of unemployment in Switzerland 
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ences in the duration of unemployment until the start of the programme are determined by a com-
bination of the search behaviour of the unemployed and the assignment process of the employment 
service.  Under this identifying assumption, the introduction of unobserved heterogeneity creates 
homogeneous samples.  Within these homogeneous groups, the parameter estimate of the treatment 
dummy exhibits the difference in the hazard rates related to the treatment for such homogeneous 
groups after treatment.  However, it is necessary to assume that the treatment is not anticipated.  
This might usually not be the case for long–lasting ALMP programme, but for short–term treatments 
(e.g. sanctions to unemployed, and most applications of the timing–of–events approach deal with 
sanctions).   
Identification under the CIA if non–treatment is temporary 
There are different arguments why neither static matching estimators nor the application of propor-
tional hazard rate models are sufficient to control for selection bias without further assumptions (see 
Frederiksson, Johansson 2003: 6ff.) and why the estimated effects could be either upward biased or 
downward biased: First, the effect of treatment–on–the–treated as discussed under section 1.3.2.1 
assumes that treatment and non–treatment take place at the same time.  This might be true in the 
case of experiments where treatment and non–treatment are really offered at the same time – in 
non–experimental evaluation, the non–treatment group has in fact no starting date of the treatment. 
Secondly, most participants in ALMP programmes have to experience a certain period of unem-
ployment before any assignment to the programme: Most evaluation studies model the assignment 
process typically within a certain time window, e.g. the first six months of unemployment, so a po-
tential comparison group usually consists of persons who are unemployed up to this period – but 
not treated.  The problem then is that those who had luck of finding a job quickly are more likely to 
be found in the control group than in the treatment group (ibd., 9.). 
Frederiksson, Johansson (2003) discuss these two lifelike problems extensively and show that the 
conditional independence assumption as in (3) does not hold: First, individuals who are not treated 
up to the end of the time window might be participants in a programme after this time, so that a 
certain conditioning on the future is implemented, and it can be shown that the effect of treatment–
on–the–treated is then positively biased.  Essentially, it is not possible to create a sample of match-
ing individuals who do not receive treatment at any point in time.  It is however possible to consis-
tently estimate the effect of treatment–on–the–treated if one assumes that the timing of treatment 
matters: e.g. if treatment in one year differs from the treatment in the next year, then a comparison 
group whose members do not start treatment in the specific period could provide a valid non–
treatment outcome; therefore the authors recommend that one should take the timing of the treat-
ment seriously.   
The second aspect – a control group usually consisting of individuals that did not participate in a 
programme because of finding employment before an already planned programme could start – 
implicitly conditions on the outcome measure, i.e. the employment rate.  Consequently, the non–
treatment outcome is over estimated. leading in downward biased estimators for the effect of treat-
ment–on–the–treated.   
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1.3.3 Macroeconomic effects 
Now, we turn to the issue of how to determine the effects of ALMP on the outcome at a more ag-
gregated level, i.e. beyond the ceteris paribus effect on the treated.  Macroeconomic effects consist 
of equilibrium price effects, behavioural changes, and other repercussions on the non–treated la-
bour force or on the entire economy.  Such indirect effects are likely to be of importance given the 
extend of ALMP in Germany (in particular in East Germany).  Calmfors (1994) reviews the methodo-
logical issues involved when trying to estimate the indirect effects of ALMP.  He distinguishes dis-
placement effects (treated workers gain their jobs at the expense of non–treated workers), dead-
weight effects (subsidising a treatment, which would have occurred anyway), substitution effects 
(replacement of jobs for other types of non–treated workers because of relative wage changes), and 
tax effects (the effects of financing ALMP).  The following discussion neglects fully specified General 
Equilibrium approaches, as described in Heckman et al. (1999, section 9.2), since we are not aware 
of applications to ALMP in Germany.   
A simple reduced form approach to estimate displacement (or substitution) effects in employment 
would be to regress the employment of non–treated individuals on the employment of treated indi-
viduals (often lagged).  A coefficient of zero would suggest that no displacement occurs while a 
coefficient of minus one suggests full displacement.  However, reduced form evidence of this type is 
not convincing since the extent of ALMP typically depends on the state of the labour market, thus 
the above regressor is likely to be endogenous and the regression overstates the displacement effect 
(the coefficient is downward biased).  To control for the endogeneity of ALMP, it is necessary to use 
instruments, which have an impact on the extent of ALMP and which at the same time do not influ-
ence directly the state of the labour market. 
Most recent analyses for Germany implement a more structural approach to the evaluation of the 
macroeconomic effects of ALMP.  Here, we want to mention two basic approaches that have been 
implemented in various studies based on regionally disaggregated data.  The first type builds on 
Beveridge–curve–type–models involving the simultaneous occurrence of unemployment and va-
cancies, see Bellmann and Jackman (1996a).  The second type uses the Layard–Nickell–Jackman 
(1991) labour market framework modelling the aggregate outcome by the interaction of a wage set-
ting relationship and a labour demand equation, see Calmfors and Skedinger (1995).  In contrast to 
the reduced form regressions described above, these two approaches allow to model directly the 
impact of ALMP within a structural relationship (e.g. on wage setting or on matching efficiency).  
Thus, it is conceivable to relate the analysis more closely to the microeconomic evaluations and to 
differentiate effects on the structural rate of unemployment from short–run shocks to the state of the 
labour market.  Obviously, the reliability of the estimated effects of ALMP again hinges critically on 
the availability of instruments to identify the structural models while making use of an exogenous 
variation of ALMP.  This literature typically addresses two particular issues: First, does ALMP lead to 
less wage restraints in wage setting since it accommodates the costs of higher wages? And second, 
does ALMP reduce the mismatch in the labour market, i.e. the discrepancy between the vacancies 
and the unemployed workers? 
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1.4 Evaluation results 
1.4.1 Microeconometric evaluations 
1.4.1.1 Evaluation on the basis of survey data 
Evaluations of ALMP in Germany are mainly based on data from household panel surveys.   
There are two panel data surveys applied in most of the evaluation studies cited in this synopsis: the 
German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP), which consists of two main subsamples for East and West 
Germany,14 and the Labour Market Monitor East Germany (LMM)15.  In this section, we discuss the 
information about ALMP available from these two panels and the principal advantages and short–
comings of survey based evaluation.  The sample sizes of the different evaluation studies differ with 
respect to the data sources: The GSOEP has an average sample size of 12,000 individuals for both 
East and West Germany and is available for the period from the year 84 to date (for East Germany: 
from 90) whereas the LMM was a panel exclusively drawn for the East and limited to the period 
from 90–94, starting with an overall population of 10,751 for the East. 
In addition to these two panel surveys, other data are used for programme evaluations in some few 
studies.  Pfeiffer, Reize (1999) evaluate the promotion of self employment using data of the firm 
start–up panel of the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW start–up panel), and add addi-
tional programme data taken from administrative records.  Besides, there are evaluations of further 
training on the basis of alternative data: the IAB–BiBB Qualification and Occupational Career data 
(QOC, cited in Pfeiffer and Reize 1999), the retrospective data of German Life History Study (GLS, 
Schömann, Becker 1998)16 and subsample of the official “contributory employment record” (Bender 
and Klose 2000)17.  For the evaluation of job creation schemes and further training, two evaluation 
studies are based on the regional data set of the Labour Market Monitor Sachsen–Anhalt (LMM–SA, 
Eichler, Lechner 1998, Bergemann et al. 2000)18.  The most recent study about the effectiveness of 
job creation by Hujer, Caliendo, Thomson (2003) uses the official programme data and data drawn 
from the unemployment insurance and job seeker records.  Another recent study by Hujer, 
Caliendo, Radic (2001) evaluates the effects of different types of wage–subsidies with data from the 
establishment panel of the German Institute for Employment Research (IAB–Betriebspanel).   
Evaluation studies that explicitly discuss the evaluation problem exist only for Job Creation schemes 
(JC) and public sector sponsored further training (PSFT).  Although information about the subpro-
                                                          
14  Information of the concept, design and basic frequencies of the GSOEP can be obtained from the GSOEP 
web site at the DIW (http://www–soep.diw–berlin.de/). 
15  The LMM was conducted for Eastern Germany only in the period 1990– 1994 (Bielenski, Enderle, von 
Rosenbladt 1991). 
16 The GLS is a retrospective data set for three birth cohorts with an overall sample size of around 2,200 
(Mayer, Brückner 1989). 
17  A summary of the information available in these data sources can be obtained on the web sites of the 
ZUMA (http://www.zuma–mannheim.de/data/microdata/). 
18  The Labour Market Monitor Sachsen–Anhalt (LMM–SA) is a panel survey with information for the period 
1990–97 and with a population of around 8,000 individuals in 1997.  
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grammes of e.g. further training (consisting of short–term training, the provision of limited profes-
sional skills or retraining) is generally available, these have hardly been subject to any evaluation so 
far.  To our knowledge, there exists only one evaluation with LMM data that provide information 
about different types of PSFT (Fitzenberger, Prey 2000).  All other studies follow a broad treatment 
definition.   
For the evaluation of job creation programmes, there are also very few studies for the subpro-
grammes because the panel surveys of GSOEP and LMM always aggregate two separate pro-
grammes: the structural adjustment measures (SAM) and the classical job creation scheme (ABM).  
As far as we know, there is only one very recent evaluation that explicitly evaluates the effects of 
job creations following the ABM regulation (Hujer, Caliendo, Thomsen 2003). 
Information about wage subsidy programmes targeted at the reintegration of the hard–to–place into 
regular employment can neither be obtained from any of the panel surveys and was only evaluated 
at the macroeconomic level.  However, it could be difficult to obtain valid information on these 
programmes by surveying individual labour market participants as these programmes are usually 
given directly to the companies.  Besides, although significantly growing over the last years, wage 
subsidy programmes in general are smaller scale programmes in both East and West Germany and 
subsamples from the survey data of GSOEP and LMM would be too small for credible evaluation. 
Therefore, this survey reports mostly findings for ALMP micro–evaluations of PSFT and JC.  Besides, 
there are some few other evaluation studies for the support of self–employment (Pfeiffer, Reize 
1999), the effects of different wage subsidies on the employment performance of firms (Hujer, 
Caliendo, Radic 2001) or the regional programme of non–profit temporary work for reintegration 
(Almus et al. 1999), which are considered in this survey.   
Table 1.4 summarises the data sources of existing evaluation studies for German ALMP and indi-
cates the high importance of GSOEP and LMM for the evaluation research of the last years.   
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Table 1.4 Data used for the microeconomic evaluation of ALMP 
 Socioeconomic Panel 
(GSOEP) 
 
Labour 
Market 
Monitor 
East (LMM) 
Labour 
Market 
Monitor 
Saxony 
Anhalt 
(LMMSA) 
ZEW Start–
up Panel  
Qualifica-
tion and 
occupa-
tional 
career data 
(QOC) 
German 
Life History 
Study (GLS) 
Employ-
ment regis-
ter and 
participa-
tion data 
IAB– 
establish-
ment panel 
 East West East East, only  
Sachsen 
Anhalt 
East and 
West 
East and 
West 
East and 
West 
East and 
West 
East and 
West 
Job Creation Schemes (JC) X  X X      
 Classical Job Creation (CJC)        X X 
 Structural Adjustment Measures (SAM)         X 
Further training (FT) X X X X  X X   
 Public sector sponsored further  
 training PSFT) 
X X X     X  
  Public sector sponsored  
  further training with income  
  maintenance (PSFT–IM) 
X X X       
 On–the–Job Training (OJT) X X X   X    
  On–the–Job Training with  
  income maintenance (OJT– 
  PIM) 
         
 Off–the–Job Training (OFT) X X X   X    
  Off–the–Job Training with  
  income maintenance (OFT– 
  PIM) 
         
Mobility Incentives           
 Mobility Allowance          
 Bridging Allowance     X     
Wage–sudsidy programmes         X 
X Evaluations cited in this survey 
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1.4.1.2 Training programmes 
Most evaluation studies published so far are evaluations of public sector sponsored further training 
(PSFT).  These studies are quite heterogeneous concerning the evaluation methods and with regard 
to the underlying data and usually analyse an aggregation of different programmes or types of train-
ing.   
Despite of this variety, evaluations of all types of public sector sponsored further training (PSFT) can 
hardly be achieved by any of these evaluations.  First, both sources (GSOEP and LMM) refer to 
panel data of the active population and survey only information of the individuals.  They offer data 
for relatively broad categories of training, either further training in general or retraining, either by 
private initiative or as part of ALMP.  Besides, information whether on–the–job training was fi-
nanced or co–financed by means of the Federal Employment Service cannot be obtained in the 
data.  Therefore, most authors evaluate only treatment accompanied by the receipt of individual 
income maintenance during the time in training (PSFT–IM).  Individuals who did not receive in-
come maintenance while being treated because of being in contributory employment or in other 
ALMP schemes at the time of training are not subject to evaluation.  PSFT is likely to be underesti-
mated by applying the narrow definition of PSFT–IM as public sector sponsored training.  For West 
Germany, evaluations often combine assessments of the outcomes from training in general, thus for 
both PSFT and training initiated by the individuals without public sponsoring, which clearly over-
states PSFT.  We assume that the heterogeneity of different time periods for evaluations together 
with the different definitions of treatment as broad further training, PSFT–IM, or non specified on–
the–job or off–the–job training to have considerable influence on the results found in the studies. 
1.4.1.2.1 East Germany 
Data and evaluation period 
Data for the evaluation of training in East Germany mainly refers to the GSOEP East, which started 
in 90 (Lechner 1998, 1999, Pannenberg 1995, 1996, Staat 1997, Hujer, Wellner 2000) and the 
LMM East, available for 90–94 (Hübler 1994, 1997, Fitzenberger, Prey 1998, 2000, Prey 1999, 
Kraus, Puhani, Steiner 1999).   
The data of the GSEOP East provide broad socioeconomic information, e.g. individual labour mar-
ket variables but also socioeconomic variables of the household.  The other data, the LMM, offer 
less information about the socioeconomic background of its population.  A very important limitation 
of this data is the lack of time variable information on the training programmes.  Nevertheless, there 
are clear advantages as these data were with 10,751 observations at the starting point twice as big as 
the GSOEP (N=4,453 in 90).  Even in the presence of serious panel mortality, the sample is still 
quite large at the end of the observation period in 94 (N=3,500). 
The evaluations analyse both data sets for different periods: One part of the evaluations focuses on 
the implementation of training until 92 (Hübler 1994, Kraus, Puhani, Steiner 1999, Pannenberg 
1995).  Most studies however evaluate training over period 90–94 (Lechner 1998, 1999, Fitzenber-
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ger, Prey, 2000, Pannenberg 1996, Hübler 1997, 1998, Hujer, Wellner 2000).  Staat (1997) evalu-
ates treatments starting 92–4.  After 94, the income maintenance information used for the identifica-
tion of public sector sponsored further training was dropped out of the questionnaire for the GSOEP, 
so that PSFT was no longer identifiable.   
The selection of different periods for the assessment of outcomes is assumed to have influence on 
the results of the studies because of two reasons: First, PSFT in the early period of 90–2 is hardly 
comparable to the later years, because building the institutions for the implementation of pro-
grammes in East Germany was still in progress by then.  Secondly, the differences in the observation 
period also determine to which extent the evaluation studies can consider the differences in the 
pre–training labour market history or the differences in the employment prospects after the pro-
grammes.   
Programme variables 
As indicated in the description of the data under section 4.1, the evaluation studies define treatment 
not consistent as PSFT, but with respect to the different data sources as: evaluations of further train-
ing in general, covering both PSFT and privately initiated training (Hübler 1994, Pannenberg 1995).  
The reason why we included these studies in this survey is twofold, first it is plausible that the over-
all share of PSFT was high especially in the beginning of training in East Germany, and secondly it is 
worth comparing the outcomes with studies that only evaluate a subgroup of the PSFT–IM (with 
income maintenance).  Many studies focus on the narrow distinction of further training as PSFT–IM 
and underestimate PSFT in East Germany.  Further training (FT) can be subdivided into two different 
subgroups: (i) There are evaluations of training within firms (on–the–job–training, OJT) or courses in 
training centres providing further training outside firms (especially for the unemployed, off–the–job 
training, OFT), which again cover both PSFT or non–public sector sponsored training (Pannenberg 
1996, Lechner 1998).  Especially in East Germany, OFT was often explicitly targeted to unemployed 
persons and should be (mainly) regarded as PSFT.  (ii) We find evaluations that assess explicitly the 
subgroup of PSFT–IM (Lechner 1998, Fitzenberger, Prey 1998, 2000, Prey 1999, Hübler 1997, 
1998, Staat 1997, Hujer, Wellner 2000, Kraus, Puhani, Steiner 1999).   
Outcome variables 
As shown in Table 1.5, the studies evaluate training on various outcomes: Five evaluations are 
based on hazard rate models (Pannenberg 1995, 1996, Hujer, Wellner 2000, Kraus, Puhani, Steiner 
1999), estimating the outcomes of PSFT on the transition from unemployment to employment after a 
programme or with respect to the search duration for new employment (Staat 1997).  The studies by 
Fitzenberger, Prey (1998, 2000), Hübler 1994 and Hübler 1997 estimate the effects on dummy 
variables indicating at a certain point in time whether an individual was in employment or not.  
Four evaluation studies focus on differences in average unemployment rates of participants and 
non–participants (Fitzenberger, Prey 1998, Lechner 1998, 1999, Bergemann et al. 2000) with non-
parametric approaches.  In most studies, there are estimates on the effects of training programmes 
on individual earnings, too. 
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Methodology 
The evaluation studies differ widely with respect to the methodological design and the solution of 
the evaluation problem as well as the measurement of ALMP outcomes.  All in all, there are two 
main groups of evaluations, parametric panel data estimates and nonparametric evaluations based 
on matched samples.   
The first group of evaluations are parametric estimations that usually apply linear panel data esti-
mates for the treatment effects on wages (Hübler 1997, Pannenberg 1995).  For the evaluations of 
employment outcomes, either random effects probit and tobit maximum likelihood estimates 
(Hübler 1997, 1998, Fitzenberger, Prey 1998, 2000, Prey 1999) or hazard rates models (Pannen-
berg 1995, 1996, Hujer, Wellner 2000) are used.   
The evaluation problem is solved with methodologies either controlling on observables within the 
parametric outcome equation (Pannenberg 1995), by instrumental variables (such as the propensity 
score to participate in further training estimated with a probit model, cf. Staat 1997), or by a simul-
taneous estimation of programme participation and outcomes (Fitzenberger, Prey 2000, Prey 1999).  
Furthermore, some approaches include the pre–programme test in order to sufficiently encounter 
the problem of unobservables (Hübler 1997, 1998, Fitzenberger, Prey 1998, 2000, Bergemann et 
al. 2000).  Fitzenberger, Prey (1998, 2000) and Bergemann et al. (2000) additionally implement 
difference–in–differences estimators (DID), by including preprogramme and postprogramme dum-
mies in the outcome estimate.  The estimated coefficients then provide the programme effects by 
subtracting the preprogramme from the postprogramme coefficient.   
The studies by Hujer, Wellner (2000) and Hübler (1997, 1998) apply matching techniques either by 
removing observations from the control group and the creation of (reduced) “most similar samples” 
(Hübler 1997) or by nearest neighbour matching on the basis of the propensity score and further 
conditioning variables in order to obtain matched samples for the application of parametric models 
(e.g. hazard rates, Hujer, Wellner 2000).19 
The idea of matching participants and non–participants is also central in the application of non-
parametric evaluation approaches.  The studies by Lechner (1998, 1999) and Bergemann et al. 
(2000) apply matching on the estimated propensity score (and additional variables) and identify the 
non–treatment outcome by the nearest neighbour in the sample of non–treated individuals.  Within 
the matched samples, the outcome is just the average difference between the treatment sample and 
the matched non–treatment observations or a difference–in–differences that also controls for time 
constant selection bias on unobservable characteristics. 
                                                          
19 Methodology of matching approaches, see section 1.3 
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Results 
The results of the different evaluations do not show clear outcomes of PSFT on employment in East 
Germany.  Due to the dissimilar designs of the studies, a direct comparison of the obtained estima-
tors for the effect of PSFT is hardly possible.  Therefore, we rather concentrate on positive, negative 
or insignificant effects as the results of the different studies.   
For the broad category of further training (FT), a clear statement on the effectiveness of the pro-
grammes cannot be found in the evaluation studies: Pannenberg (1995) finds positive effects for 
OFT, although these effects are lowered depending on the duration of programmes and previous 
unemployment experience.  Lechner (1999) and Bergemann et al. (2000) do not find any significant 
effect in evaluations on the average unemployment difference between the matched pairs of partici-
pants and non–participants in the long–run.  Bergemann et al. (2000) also evaluate the effects of a 
second treatment, which however also does not lead to an increased employment of the treatment 
group compared to the non–treatment outcome either. 
For the evaluations of the narrower concept of PSFT, too, there are mainly negative or insignificant 
outcomes: Fitzenberger, Prey (1998) find positive employment effects in the DID estimates in simul-
taneous random effects probit estimates for the period 93–4 and 90–4 if the employment history of 
the individuals in the period before the measurement of outcomes is taken into consideration (dy-
namic specification).  Staat (1997) concludes that training had no significant effect on employment 
stability, except for participants aged above 45 years who seem to increase their probability to be 
employed due to treatment.  In hazard rate estimations on the basis of matched samples, Hujer, 
Wellner (2000) find insignificant effects comparable to Lechner (1998) on the basis of the same data 
and the same period with a nonparametric analysis of average differences in employment and un-
employment based on matched samples.  Fitzenberger, Prey (1998) who additionally to parametric 
evaluation apply a matching approach in order to check the sensitivity of outcomes with respect to 
the underlying methodology do not find that significant differences in employment any longer based 
on this approach.   
Only once, the studies found significant effects on individual wages (Pannenberg 1996) for the par-
ticipation in OFT between 90 and 94.  All other studies surveyed do not estimate significant wage 
effects, neither in parametric nor in nonparametric approaches. 
1.4.1.2.1 West Germany 
Data and evaluation period 
In the second part of Table 1.5 we summarise recent evaluation studies for further training in West 
Germany.  The majority of these studies refers to the data of the GSOEP West.  One study makes 
use of the data of the German Life History Study (GLS), a retrospective survey of several birth co-
horts with approximately 2,200 individuals (Schömann, Becker 1998).   
Generally, the GSOEP data are available for the period from 84–94.  Information on the periods of 
training, employment or unemployment can be exactly reconstructed on a monthly basis surveyed 
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by a retrospective question about the employment history of the previous year at each point of ob-
servation.  Like for East Germany, the evaluations differ with respect to the observation period and 
only Hujer, Maurer, Wellner (1997b, 1998) use the whole period: Pannenberg (1995) reduces the 
data to the period of 84–91, Prey (1997) to 84–93, Hujer, Maurer, Wellner (1997a) use the data for 
the period 86–91, Prey (1999) from 85 to 94.  Except for the evaluation of the German Life History 
study (GLS), in which data are sampled on the basis of birth cohorts, all evaluation studies cited 
here assess the impact of the policies of the 80’s and 90’s, when ALMP was already targeted to-
wards the problem groups on the labour market.  This however was less important in the 70’s, so 
that the results based on the GLS can hardly be compared with the other studies.   
The sample sizes are small: For the treatment group, most studies work with samples of around 100 
participants (the treatment group sometimes consists of more observations, depending on the design 
of the data, either as a panel data or spell data).  For the group of PSFT–IM, the sample size in most 
cases lies clearly below 100 observations.   
The programme variables 
For West Germany, too, the cited evaluations differ in terms of the definition of treatment as either 
further training in general (FT) or specified as further training with income maintenance (PSFT–IM).  
Four evaluations for West Germany are based on the broad category of treatment (Pannenberg 
1995, Hujer, Maurer, Wellner 1997a, 1997b, 1998, Schömann, Becker 1998).  Aside from Hujer, 
Maurer, Wellner 1997a, 1997b, who evaluate treatments separately for short–term and long–term 
courses, the evaluations do not distinguish the treatment within the broad category of FT.  PSFT–IM 
is subject to three evaluation studies (Prey 1997, 1999, Staat 1997) for West Germany.   
The outcome variables 
In most cases, the outcome variable is specified as the transition rate from unemployment to em-
ployment (Pannenberg 1995, Hujer, Maurer, Wellner 1997a, 1997b, 1998).  The outcomes are es-
timated by discrete hazard rate models either including an instrument instead of the treatment 
dummy (Hujer, Maurer, Wellner 1997a) (see section below) or different treatment dummies for 
short–term or long–term training (Hujer, Maurer, Wellner 1997b).  Staat (1997) estimates the effects 
of training by ordered probit models for the duration of job search and employment stability.  For 
the evaluation of PSFT–IM, Prey (1997, 1999) evaluates the effects on employment or unemploy-
ment in random effect probit models.  In the evaluation based on the German Life Study 
(Schömann, Becker 1998), the outcomes are specified as individual wages.   
Methodology 
The evaluations by Hujer, Maurer and Wellner (1997a,b, 1998), develop different evaluation strate-
gies the same data in order to solve selection bias.  In their first paper, Hujer, Maurer and Wellner 
(1997a) replace the treatment dummy by the propensity score in order to control for selection on 
observables and use the propensity score as an instrument (IV), which is comparable to Staat (1997).  
In their second and third analysis for training in West Germany, Hujer, Maurer and Wellner (1997b, 
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1998) prefer matching on the propensity score and further conditioning variables either as an over-
sampling of treated and non–treated individuals (1997b) or as a matching of treated individuals to 
the nearest neighbour of the control sample (1998).   
Analogously to the evaluation of training for East Germany, Prey (1997, 1999) estimates programme 
effects on the basis simultaneous random effect probit estimations of participation, employment and 
wages, including preprogramme variables.  Schömann, Becker (1998) implement linear panel esti-
mations on wages, which control for observables within the parametric model. 
Results 
Two evaluations find significantly negative effects for public sector sponsored further training 
(PSFT–IM): Pannenberg (1995) finds negative effects for the whole population and Prey (1997) for 
men (compared to women who do not show significant changes in the probability of employment 
due to the treatment).  Staat (1997) finds positive effects of training on employment for the group of 
lower skilled workers as well as positive effects on women’s employment.  With slightly different 
data, Hujer, Maurer and Wellner find more positive than negative outcomes: Based on the first ap-
proach that models the estimated propensity score as an instrumental variable, the effects for short 
term courses are positive and the effects for long–term courses are insignificant with respect to the 
transition to employment (Hujer, Maurer, Wellner 1997a).  In their second study (Hujer, Maurer, 
Wellner 1997b), the hazard rates to employment are positively increased by short–term and long–
term courses.  In their follow–up study on the outcomes of FT, Hujer, Maurer, Wellner (1998), the 
authors compare the short–term and long–term effects training on the basis of nearest neighbour 
matching and find a positive training effect on outcomes in the short run, which disappears over 
time (Hujer, Maurer, Wellner 1998). 
Prey (1999) analyses the effects of PSFT–IM for the period 85–94, so that we rather have a subsam-
ple of the treated individuals in the evaluations by Hujer, Maurer and Wellner.  Here, we find sig-
nificantly negative long–term employment effects for men, and insignificant effects for women. 
A different outcome is evaluated in Schömann, Becker (1998).  This study focuses on the wage ef-
fects of training (FT) with split samples for men and women.  Schömann, Becker (1998) find signifi-
cantly positive income effects of training for men under the restriction that they do not change the 
employer or the occupational position within the firm over time.  Men, who change the employer, 
do not benefit from further training.  For women, the results are opposite, indicating that further 
training leads to a significant increase in individual earnings only if women change their employer, 
but has only insignificant effects if women stay with their firm.   
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Table 1.5 Overview of micro–evaluations, further training (East Germany, Notes: end of table 1.5) 
Authors Data  
Period 
No.  of Observations Programme Outcome Variable Evaluation Methodology Results 
Hübler (1994) LMM East, 90 N: 4,679 
P: 1,276 
FT § Job search prob. 
§ Working time 
Simultaneous probit estimates for participation in 
training and job search 
Job search  + 
Working time  – 
Pannenberg 
(1995) 
GSOEP East 
90– 1992 
N: 2,017 
P: 76 
FT § Transition rate 
from unemploy-
ment (OFT) (1) 
§ Monthly gross 
wages (OJT) (2) 
§ Discrete hazard rate model (1) 
 
§ Linear panel estimate with fixed effects (2) 
(Displayed for PSFT–IM only): 
Transition rate from unemployment: 
FT * income maintenance (PSFT–IM):– 
 
Wages:  
FT * income maintenance (PSFT–IM): 0 
Pannenberg 
(1996) 
GSOEP East  
90–94 
Employment: 
1.  N: 1,075 
P: 90 
 
Wages:  
2.  N: 661  
P: 55 
OFT § Transition from 
unemployment to 
employment (1) 
§ Individual wages 
(2) 
Discrete hazard rate model (1) 
Linear panel model with fixed effects (2) 
 
§ Preprogramme test 
1) Employment.: 
§ Training effect:   + 
§ Duration of scheme:  0 
§ Prev.  Unemployment > 6 months: – 
2) Wages: training effect:  + 
 Duration:  – 
 Years of training:  – 
 Previous unemployment: 0 
Fitzenberger 
Prey (2000) 
 
 
 
LMM East, 
90–94 
  N: P: 
Women  2409 325 
Men  2414 146 
PSFT–IM § Employment 
§ Real net hourly 
wages  
§ Simultaneous RE models for treatment, em-
ployment, and wages 
§ PPT and endogenous modeling of real wages 
§ Regression based difference–in–differences 
estimator  
§ Sensitivity tests for 1990–93 
Employment:   
Wages:  0 
Hübler (1997)     See Section job creation   
Staat (1997) GSOEP East N: 1,153 (Employment) 
P: 315 
 
N: 916 (Wages) 
P: 172 
PSFT–IM § Job search dura-
tion 
§ Employment 
stability 
§ Wages 
Age group specific control groups,  
§ Probit regression for participation 
§ Outcome variable: Search and employment 
duration, both ordered probit model 
§ Treatment dummy replaced by the estimated 
propensity score (IV approach) to control for se-
lection 
Search duration:  0 
Employment stability: 0 
Except age group 25–34: – 
age group 45–54:+ 
wages (employed only): 0  
 39 
Table 1.5 Overview of micro–evaluations, further training (East Germany) (cont., Notes: end of table 1.5) 
Authors Data  
Period 
No.  of Observations Programme Outcome Variable Evaluation Methodology Results 
Hübler (1998) LMM East 
90–94 
N: 2,886 
 
P: 
PSFT–IM 206 
 
Unemployed 223 
Non–participants 922 
PSFT–IM 
(among several 
others) 
1) Employment 
2) Job search probabil-
ity 
3) Working time  
4) Income 
 
(3) and 4) employed 
only) 
§ RE Estimates with matched samples 
§ PPT: Significant differences between P and C 
group remain in unobservables 
 
§ OLS on wages and working time 
§ Logit Estimates on employment and job search 
effects 
 
(displayed for PSFT–IM only) 
1994 outcomes 
§ OLS (according to time of training 
1990/1991/1992/1993) 
    income working t. 
PSFT–IM   /0/–/0 /0/–/0 
§ LOGIT (according to time of training 
1990/1991/1992/1993) 
   Employment Job Search 
PSFT–IM  /–/0/– /+/+/+ 
§ RE without reduction of the C–Group 
   Emp.  Inc. Job Search 
PSFT–IM  –  –  + 
§ RE with reduction of the C–Group  
(5–35% of non–participants an PPT) 
    Emp.   Inc. Job Search 
PSFT–IM  – – 0 
Fitzenberger 
Prey (1998) 
LMM East 
90–94 
93–94 
Various sub samples  
§ 1990–94 
§ Men:  N: 3,862 
 PSFT–IM P: 27* 
§ Women: N: 3,637 
 PSFT–IM P:57 
 
§ average total and partici-
pants per year 
PSFT–IM 
(among several 
others) 
§ Employment 
§ Net hourly wages  
§ Simultaneous static and dynamic RE Probit  
Static = without lagged employment 
Dynamic = lagged employment included 
Specifications of the RE model: 
1: Static (93–94) 
2: Dynamic (93–94) 
3: Dynamic, long–term effects of PSFT–IM  
(93–94) 
4: Dynamic, long–term effects of PSFT–IM, 
preprogramme dummy (93–94) 
5: Static (90–94), long–term effects 
6: Static (90–94), long–term effects, prepro-
gramme dummy 
7: Dynamic with long–term effects of PSFT–IM 
(90–94) 
8: Dynamic, long–term effects of PSFT–IM, 
preprogramme dummy (90–94) 
Difference–in–differences (4, 6, 8) 
1.  RE (displayed for PSFT–IM variables only) 
§ Employment  
  Men Women 
1  short–term – – 
 medium – – 
2  short–term 0 0 
 medium 0 + 
3  short–term 0 0 
 long–term 0 (+) 
4  long–term + + 
5  short–term – – 
 long–term – – 
6  long–term – – 
7  long–term 0 0 
8  long–term 0 + 
§ Wages:  always 0 
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Table 1.5 Overview of micro–evaluations, further training (East Germany) (cont., Notes: end of table 1.5) 
Authors Data  
Period 
No.  of Observations Programme Outcome Variable Evaluation Methodology Results 
Fitzenberger 
Prey (1998) 
(cont.) 
    § Differences in employment and wages 
with matching on propensity score and time 
varying covariates (nearest neighbour match-
ing) 
§ Sensitivity analysis with reduced sample 93–94 
2.  Matching 
§ Employment: Men Women:  
Short–term – – 
Long–term 0 0 
§ Wages  Men Women:  
Short–term 0 0 
Long–term 0 0 
Lechner 
(1998) 
GSOEP East 
90– 94 
N: 1,163 
P 103 
PSFT–IM § Unemployment 
§ Full employment 
§ Real gross wages 
§ Nearest neighbour matching  
– propensity score (Probit estimate) and  
– additional time varying covariates 
§ Average differences in matched sample 
Unemployment:  Short–term: + 
  Long term: 0 
Full–employment: Short–term: – 
  Long–term: 0 
Wages: 0 
Hujer, Well-
ner (2000) 
GSOEP East  
90–94 
(Unbalanced 
panel) 
N: 1632 
P: 142 (231) 
 
PSFT–IM § Employment 
duration after 
programme (1) 
§ Reemployment 
probabilities after 
programme (2) 
§ Nearest neighbour matching with 
– propensity score (RE Probit with time varying 
covariates before begin of programme) 
– further matching variables 
§ Mixed proportional discrete time hazard rate 
model in matched sample 
Short–term courses: 
Reemployment chances 0 
Employment duration 0 
Long–term courses: 
Reemployment chances 0 
Employment  0 
Kraus, Puhani, 
Steiner (1999) 
LMM East 
90–94 
 
2 Periods: 
90–92 
92–94 
Participation N: 3,503 
Unemployment N: 3,095 
Training N: 1,744 (spells) 
Estimate on % of total 
period 90–2 92–4 
men 24,2 12,8 
women 35,6 27,4  
PSFT–IM Transition rate from 
unemployment or 
training to (stable and 
unstable) employment  
§ Controlling for observables; 
§ Preprogramme test 
§ No differences in non–observables (after com-
parison) 
§ Discrete hazard rates 
Women 1st:  – 
Women 2nd  + 
Men 1st:  – 
Men 2nd  + 
Lechner 
(1999) 
GSOEP East 
90–94 
N = 1105 
P = 131 
OFT § Differences in 
unemployment 
rates (in %)  
§ Differences in 
gross monthly 
wages  
§ Nearest neighbour matching (2 alternatives) 
a) Matching on p–score (time invariant vari-
ables) and time varying covariates  
b) Matching on p–score estimate (invariant 
and varying covariates)  
§ Nonparametric differences in matched sample 
Unemployment: 0 
Wages  0 
Bergemann, 
Fitzenberger, 
Schultz, 
Speckesser 
(2000) 
LMM SA 91–
98 
N = 4656 
P = 920 
P (2nd) = 184 
FT 
reiterated treat-
ments 
§ Employment rate § Nearest neighbour matching with 
propensity score  
§ Difference–in–Differences 
Employment rate 
early period (1992)  – 
late period (1994)  – 
Reiterated treatment 0 
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Table 1.5 Overview of micro–evaluations, further training (West Germany) (Notes: end of table 1.5) 
Authors Data  
Period 
No.  of Observations Programme Outcome Variable Evaluation Methodology Results 
Pannenberg 
(1995) 
GSOEP West 
84–91 
 OJT OFT 
N:  1965 715 
P:  308 26 
  
FT Transition rate from 
unemployment (for 
OJT, among others) 
§ Discrete hazard rate (off–the–job) 
§ Probit and logit estimates 
§ Linear panel estimate with fixed effects (wages) 
(Displayed for PSFT–IM only): 
OFT * income maintenance  
(=PSFT–IM): 0  
Hujer, 
Maurer, Well-
ner (1997a) 
GSOEP West, 
86–94 
N: 827 
P: 100 
FT Transition rate from 
unemployment 
§ Random effects probit for propensity score 
§ Treatment dummy in Outcome equation re-
placed by propensity score (estimated from 1) 
to account for selection (IV approach) 
§ Discrete hazard rates with unobserved hetero-
geneity 
Short–term courses:  + 
Long–term courses:  0 
Hujer, Mau-
rer, Wellner 
(1997b) 
GSOEP West 
84–94 
N: 1180 
P: 113 (218 controls) 
FT Transition rate from 
unemployment 
§ Matched samples (oversampling) with 
1) Propensity score (probit estimate with time 
invariate characteristics)  
2) Time varying covariates (1– 12 months be-
fore the begin of the measure) 
§ Discrete hazard rates 
Short–term courses:  + 
Long–term courses:  0 à + 
Prey (1997) GSOEP West 
84–93 
N: 7522 
P: 134 (1985) (FT) 
PSFT–IM 
(among others) 
§ Employment 
probability  
Simultaneous, dynamic RE probit model with 
preprogramme test 
Long–term effect (for PSFT–IM only): 
Men:  – 
Women:  0 
Staat (1997) GSOEP West 
84– 94 
Employment, Job Search 
N: 1702 
P: 311 
Wages:  
N: 1569 
P: 247 
PSFT–IM § Job search dura-
tion 
§ Employment 
stability 
§ Wages 
Age group specific control groups,  
§ Probit regression for participation 
§ Outcome variable: Search and employment 
duration, both ordered probit model 
§ Treatment dummy replaced by the estimated 
propensity score (IV approach) to control for se-
lection 
§ Search duration: 0, except for  
Aged > 45:  – 
Low skilled: – Women: – 
§ Employment stability: 0, except for 
low skilled: + 
§ wages: + only for women 
Hujer, Mau-
rer, Wellner 
(1998) 
GSOEP West 
84–94 
N: 934 
P: 219 
FT Transition rate from 
unemployment 
§ Nearest neighbour matching by 
Propensity score: RE probit on time constant 
variables and  
Time variable covariates of labour market status 
before start of scheme 
§ Discrete hazard rates w. unobserved heteroge-
neity 
Short–term effects: + 
Long–term effects: 0 
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Table 1.5 Overview of micro–evaluations, further training (West Germany) 
Authors Data  
Period 
No.  of Observations Programme Outcome Variable Evaluation Methodology Results 
Schömann, 
Becker (1998) 
German Life 
history study 
(59–83) 
Men:  
N: 1089 
Women:  
N: 1082  
FT Income for workers 
– without mobility 
– with internal mob. 
– or external mob. 
Linear panel estimate,  
Treatment dummy replaced by participation prob-
ability in training estimated in a Cox–model  
  Men Women 
Internal mob.   + 0 
External mob.  0 + 
No mobility + 0 
Prey (1999) GSOEP West 
85–94 
N: 469 
P: 42 (PSFT–IM) 
PSFT–IM 
(among others) 
§ Employment 
probability 
§ Wages 
Simultaneous, dynamic RE probit model with 
preprogramme test 
Long–term effects (for PSFT–IM only): 
Employment:  – 
Wages:  – 
Bender, Klose 
(2000) 
IAB  
Employment 
Statistic 
Specified subsample 
P: 1150 
CTRL (pre–match): 9440 
Matched pairs: 878 
PSFT–IM § Unemployment 
post training 
§ Employment 
duration after re–
ntering  
§ Selection of control groups 
Matching on the basis of socioeconomic indica-
tors 
Long–term effects:  + 
 
Notes 
 
FT Further training – positive effect GSOEP German Socioeconomic Panel OLS Ordinary least squares 
OFT Off–the–job training 0 insignificant effect LMM Labour Market Monitor East 
LSDV Least squares dummy vari-
ables 
OJT On–the–job–training + negative effect 
LMM–
SA 
Labour Market Monitor Saxony–
Anhalt 2SLS Two stage least squares 
PSFT 
 
Publicly sponsored 
further training 
 
with respect to the 
outcome variable N Sample size 
FGLS Feasible Generalised Least 
Squares 
JC Job creation   P 
 
Size of the treatment group IV Instrumental variables 
WS Wage subsidy   CRTL Size of the control group RE 
Random effects probit esti-
mates 
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1.4.1.3 Job creation 
Data and period 
Except for the most recent microeconomic evaluation for JC on the basis of the official employment 
register for East and West Germany (Hujer, Caliendo, Thomsen 2003), basically all previous empiri-
cal evidence for the effects of job creation refer to the East German situation at the beginning of the 
90’s.  These evaluation studies use data provided by the Labour Market Monitor Sachsen–Anhalt 
(LMM–SA) or by the LMM for East Germany and evaluate the effectiveness of the policies with re-
spect to employment.  Because of the extensive implementation of JCs in the period after 1991, 
these data offer sufficiently big treatment group for a credible evaluation of JC.  Evaluations on in-
come effects of JC have neither been carried out in East nor in West Germany so far.   
In the following, we discuss all available evaluation studies for JC.  In most cases, there is no ex-
plicit distinction which programme is evaluated (either SAM or ABM) except for the recent study by 
Hujer, Caliendo, Thomsen (2003) who evaluate the effects of job creation in East and West Ger-
many following the ABM regulation.   
The evaluations by Steiner, Kraus (1995), Kraus, Puhani, Steiner (2000), Hübler (1997) evaluate the 
short–term and medium term outcomes on employment (up to 94).  The more recent evaluations by 
Eichler, Lechner (1998) and Bergemann et al. (2000) with the Labour Market Monitor Sachsen–
Anhalt cover a longer period of observation (up to 1998), but only for one of five East German re-
gions.  The most recent study by Hujer, Caliendo, Thomsen (2003) evaluates outcomes for an entry 
cohort into JC in the year 2000.   
Outcome variables 
Steiner, Kraus (1995) and Kraus, Puhani, Steiner (2000) focus on the transition rate from unemploy-
ment to employment and implement discrete hazard rate estimations of the transition probability to 
employment.  Hübler (1997) evaluates the differences in the transition probability to employment, 
unemployment or inactivity at the end of the observation period (November 94) with the same data 
set and an almost identical subsample.  The study estimates the differences in employment on the 
basis of multinominal logit models and probit estimates.  Eichler, Lechner (1998) evaluate the out-
comes on the basis of matched individuals of the treated and non–treated populations and compare 
the average differences in unemployment within matched samples.  Bergemann et al. (2000) and 
Hujer, Caliendo, Thomsen (2003) estimate the impact on employment within matched samples 
applying propensity score matching and difference–in–differences estimators.   
 44 
Methodology 
In their first evaluation study on JC in East Germany, Steiner Kraus (1995) control for selectivity, by 
the specification of different reference groups on the basis of observable information and compare 
the different outcomes of the treated compared to the non–treated control group.  They implement 
specific preprogramme tests to control for the individual differences in employment prospects be-
fore the start of the programme, but cannot find differences between the treated and non–treated 
individuals, so that they conclude that a “sufficient control on unobserved heterogeneity“ is 
achieved.   
In their second evaluation on JC in East Germany, Kraus, Puhani, Steiner (2000) implement an ex-
tended approach to control for selectivity based on observable characteristics.  Unobserved hetero-
geneity is not considered.  As the preprogramme differences in the outcome variable are again in-
significant, they estimate the impact on the hazard rate to employment.   
Hübler (1997) applies different procedures to control for selectivity: By that, the results clearly show 
the sensitivity to the method of correction for selectivity.  In different specifications, the selection is 
corrected by either controlling on observables (1), simultaneous parametric random effects estimates 
with preprogramme test (2) and additional “restrictions” of the naive control group by the applica-
tion of “matched samples“ based on a treatment estimate (random effects probit) and further vari-
ables.   
Eichler, Lechner (1998) correct for selection bias based on observable characteristics by nearest 
neighbour matching on the propensity score, which they estimate by a parametric probit model.  
Preprogramme differences in employment probabilities of treated and non–treated individuals are 
not taken into consideration, and unobserved heterogeneity across the treated and non–treated in-
dividuals is assumed to be stable.  The most recent studies by Bergemann et al. (2000) and Hujer, 
Caliendo, Thomsen (2003) implement matching approaches on the propensity score, too. 
Results 
As in the case of evaluation studies of further training, the results suggest rather a failure of the effec-
tiveness of JC with respect to the employment prospects of the treated compared to the non–treated 
individuals: Steiner and Kraus (1995) found significantly positive employment effects for men 12 
months after the end of the treatment.  However short–term effects for men were significantly nega-
tive as well as the short– and long–term effects for women.  Due to the restricted period of observa-
tion (90–2), this evaluation has to be interpreted as preliminary compared to the other evaluations 
with a longer period (usually up to 94).   
Hübler (1997) uses the same data, however evaluates the effects for several different employment 
outcomes.  Long–term effects of JC on employment, unemployment and inactivity are estimated by 
multinomial logit estimates for the employment status at the end of the period of observation (No-
vember 94).  This study finds positive treatment effects on employment in the short as well as in the 
long–run.  However, there in is no significant effect on the labour market participation in general 
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and a negative effect on activity in the long–run.  When controlling on observables, the results are 
almost the same: The long–term positive effects of JC remain, i.e. treated individuals are more likely 
to be employed in November 94 than non–treated when controlling on observables.  Within 
matched samples, Hübler (1997) finds that both short and long–term effects are no longer significant 
for women.  For men, there are negative outcomes in both the short and the long run.   
Eichler, Lechner (1998) find contrasting results in their nonparamentric evaluation of average differ-
ences of the unemployment within matched samples.  According to their analysis, job creation in-
creases employment rates for men and for women, both in the short and in the long–run.  However, 
JC shows also negative effects on the participation in the labour force for women – a partially op-
posing effect.   
Kraus, Steiner, Puhani (2000) conclude that the transition probability from unemployment to em-
ployment is significantly lower for men and women if being treated.  The results hold true for both 
periods of measurement, 90–2 and 92–4.   
Bergemann et al. (2000) also find negative effects in the short– as well as in the long–run, however 
the negative effects becomes insignificant for treatments starting in the later years.  Hujer, Caliendo, 
Thomsen (2003) find negative employment effects for all participation groups in the short–run, 
however in the long–run, they do no longer find significantly different employment rates.  Surpris-
ingly, these results hold for both West and East Germany. 
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Table 1.6 Overview of micro–evaluations, job creation (East Germany) (Notes: end of table 1.5) 
Authors Data  
Period 
No.  Of Observations Programme Outcome Variable Evaluation Methodology Results 
Steiner, Kraus 
(1995) 
LMM East 
90– 1992 
N: 2179 (unemployed) 
P: 582 
 
Split samples for men and 
women 
JC Transition rates to 
employment and 
unemployment  
§ Different groups (“reference groups) as control 
groups specified by socioeconomic and previ-
ous unemployment characteristics for men and 
women  
§ Discrete hazard rates with ordered Logit mod-
els 
Outflows to employment: 
Men:  
§ short–term: 0 
§ after 12 months + 
Women: 
§ short–term: – 
§ long–term: – 
Hübler (1997) LMM East 
90–94 
N: 2886 Simultaneous 
evaluation of 
JC and PSFT–IM 
(among others) 
Employment (com-
pared to unemploy-
ment and inactivity as 
specified in the last 
column) 
§ Multinominal logit: Employment status 1994 
(without treatment determinants) 
§ Random Effects Probit Estimates 
Different evaluation approaches 
– controlling on observables 
– random effects estimates 
– preprogramme test and 
– matched sampling approaches  
JC and PSFT–IM only 
§ Without determinants: 
1.  M–Logit Estimates: Unemployment: 
 Short–term long–term 
PSFT–IM: +  + 
JC:  0  + 
2.  M–Logit Estimates: Inactivity : 
 Short–term long–term 
PSFT–IM: +  + 
JC:  0  0 
§ Controlling  on observables: 
Long–term outcomes compared to … 
 Unemployment  Inactivity 
PSFT–IM:  +  0 
JC:  +  – 
§ RE Probit on employment  
Men Short–term long–term 
PSFT–IM: –  + 
JC:  –  – 
Women Short–term long–term 
PSFT–IM: –  – 
JC:  0  0 
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Table 1.6 Overview of micro–evaluations, job creation (East and West Germany) (Notes: end of table 1.5) 
Authors Data  
Period 
No.  Of Observations Programme Outcome Variable Evaluation Methodology Results 
Eichler, Lech-
ner (1998) 
LMM SA 91–
97 
Spells: 
No–P: 12,565 
P: 1,123 
JC Unemployment  § Nearest neighbour matching on propensity 
score (Probit) and Time varying covariates im-
mediately before the begin of a programme 
§ Intertemporal Stability of selection on observ-
ables assumed  
§ Nonparametric difference–in–differences  
  Men Women 
Short–term:  – – 
Long–term  – – 
Kraus, Puhani, 
Steiner (2000) 
LMM East 
90–94 
 
2 periods: 
90–92 
92–94 
Participation model 
N: 3503 
JC model 
N: 718 
Unemployment model 
N: 3095 
JC 
 
Transition rates to 
(stable or unstable) 
employment or inac-
tivity 
§ Controlling for observables 
§ Error component specification for outcome and 
selection equations concerning unobserved 
heterogeneity: negligible 
§ Discrete hazard rates with unobserved hetero-
geneity 
In both periods: 
Men– 
Women – 
 
Bergemann, 
Fitzenberger, 
Schultz, 
Speckesser 
(2000) 
LMM SA 91–
98 
N = 4656 
P = 606 
P (2nd) = 146 
JC 
reiterated treat-
ments 
§ Employment rate § Nearest neighbour matching with 
propensity score  
§ Difference–in–Differences 
Employment rate 
§ Early period (1992) – 
§ Late period (1994) 0 
§ Reiterated treatment 0/+ 
Hujer, 
Caliendo, 
Thomsen 
(2003) 
Programm and 
register data 
P: 11,376 
CRTL: 232,399 
JC § Registered unem-
ployment 
§ Job seeking 
§ Nearest neighbour matching based on the  
propensity score 
§ Average differences in matched samples 
Short–term effects 
  Men Women 
East:  – – 
West    – – 
Long–term effects 
  Men Women 
East:  0 0 
West:   0 0 
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1.4.1.4 Other programmes 
Some few microeconometric evaluations exist for programmes other than JC and PSFT.  Table 1.7 
summarises the findings of these studies.  Basically, there are two evaluations focusing on the sup-
port of self–employment (Pfeiffer, Reize 1999, 2001), one on the effects of various types of wage 
subsidies on the employment performance of firms (Hujer, Caliendo, Radic 2001) and one on the 
temporary integration of unemployed in non–profit temporary work schemes (Almus et al. 1999).  
All evaluations are based on administrative data recorded in the implementation process of the pro-
grammes, which are not available from the survey data like the GSOEP and the LMM.   
Pfeiffer, Reize (1999) evaluate the outcomes of the bridging allowance programme, the temporary 
income maintenance for unemployed who take up new self–employment.  On the basis of the 
start–up panel of the Center for European Economic Research (ZEW), the authors evaluate the effect 
of the subsidy on the survival of business start–ups.  The sample is restricted to firms with a maxi-
mum of 18 employees at the time of the start–up, which are located in selected local employment 
office districts in Germany.  The treatment group comprises 124 start–ups in West and 196 in East 
Germany.  Selection bias taken into consideration by simultaneously estimating the survival prob-
ability (modelled as a probit model) and the probability of being subsidised, so that the estimation 
controls for the correlation of the error terms between the two estimated forms.  As a result, the au-
thors do neither find significant gains in the survival probability nor negative effects.   
In a follow–up study, Pfeiffer, Reize (2001) evaluate the outcomes of supported training on the 
probability of employment and self–employment with data taken from the Federal Institute of Oc-
cupational Training for the period 90–92 in West Germany.  The outcomes are estimated as the 
likelihood to become self–employed in a probit model, which corrects for selectivity by including 
the inverse of the Mills’ ratio into the outcome equation.   
A most recent study by Hujer, Caliendo, Radic (2001) focuses on the effects of wages subsidies on 
the employment performance of firms and applies data from the German IAB establishment panel.  
This data set, a yearly survey of more than 4,000 establishments in West Germany, allows to esti-
mate the employment effect for different skills groups.  Unfortunately, the firm data are not rich 
enough to analyse the effects of different types of wage subsidies as described above under section 
1.2.4.2 and pools either wage–subsidies, job–creation or structural adjustment programmes.  The 
study uses the matching approach based on observable characteristics and implements either near-
est (i) neighbour matching without replacement , (ii) nearest neighbour matching with additional 
covariates or (iii) kernel matching.  Within the matched samples of – the unit of interest is the estab-
lishment – the authors implement difference–in–differences estimators (DiD), so that further time 
constant selection bias based on unobservable characteristics is controlled for by differencing.  The 
DiD–approach estimates the effects of wages subsidies on the actual employment of the firm in dif-
ferent skills groups for a period up to three years after the implementation of wage subsidies (1997–
9).  The effects are in all cases and for all skill groups insignificant.   
The last study cited under this section is an evaluation of the non–profit temporary work programme 
in the West German region Rhineland–Palatinate.  Treated individuals of the programme are com-
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pared with controls from administrative data with respect to the average difference in unemploy-
ment after treatment.   
In order to obtain adequate controls from the administrative data covering 144,000 individuals for 
the period of observation (96–8), this study applies nearest neighbour matching on the basis of the 
propensity score and further time varying covariates and estimates the outcomes nonparametrically: 
In the short–run, this study finds a positive programme effect, which however do not hold in the 
long–run.   
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Table 1.7 Overview of micro–evaluations, other programmes (Notes: end of table 1.5) 
Authors Data  
Period 
No.  of Observations Programme Outcome Variable Evaluation Methodology Results 
Pfeiffer, Reize 
(1999)  
§ ZEW Panel  
§ official data 
 
East and West 
15 districts 
93 – 95  
Firms <= 18 
employees 
Survival probability:  
 West  East 
N: 2461 2240 
P: 124 196 
Employment: 
 West  East 
N: 1879 1788 
P: 105 179 
Income mainte-
nance for new 
self–employed 
(“Bridging 
Allowance”) 
§ Survival of start–
up 
§ Employment 
§ Controlling for observables  
§ Probit for the existence of adequate information 
on employment 
 
Probit model on survival and subsidisation  
  West  East 
Survival  0 0  
Employment 0 0 
Pfeiffer, Reize 
(2001)  
QOC 
91–92 
W.–Germany 
N: 3964 (new employees 
and self–employed) 
FT  Income of  
§ new self em-
ployed 
§ new dependent 
employees 
§ Effects of training on business–start up (Probit) 
§ Effects of incomes with correction of the selec-
tion bias by the inverse of the Mills ratio 
§ No correction of unobserved heterogeneity 
Influence on start–up: + 
Effects on income: 0 
 
Almus, Egeln, 
Lechner, 
Pfeiffer, 
Spengler 
(1999) 
Prg.  data 
Jo seekers data 
96–98  
P: 134 
CRTL: 144.002 (Potential 
controls) 
Temporary work 
for reintegration  
Re–Integration into 
regular employment 
§ Pre–match on the basis of a first probit (time 
constant variables) 
§ Nearest neighbour matching on propensity 
score (Probit estimate) and time varying covari-
ates 
§ Differences in matched sample 
Short–term: + 
Long–term: 0 
Hujer, Calien-
do, Radic 
(2001) 
IAB Establish-
ment Panel 
N: 1700 (firms) 
P: 87 
Wage subsidies Actual (i) low, (ii) 
medium and (iii) high 
skilled employment of 
the firm one, two and 
three years after the 
programme 
§ Matching on propensity score (either nearest 
neighbours, nearest neighbours with additional 
covarites or kernel matching) 
§ Further differencing within matched samples 
(i)  0 
(ii)  0 
(iii) 0 
 
in short, medium and long–run 
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1.4.2 Evaluations of macroeconomic outcomes 
Many estimations of macroeconomic outcomes of ALMPs are cross–national comparisons (OECD 
1993, Kraft 1994, Bellmann, Jackman 1996b, Schmid 1995) on the basis of internationally compa-
rable data of unemployment and vacancies.  Although these studies also cover Germany, they bring 
about only imprecise evidence for the functioning of ALMP, which is usually modelled by the level 
of expenditure for ALMP as percentage of the national gross domestic product.  A further differentia-
tion of ALMP is not taken into consideration and only few policy recommendations can be gained 
from these studies.  Besides, the problems concerning the international comparability of data and 
institutional frameworks of ALMP, these evaluations in most cases do not include information on the 
design of ALMP and the different programmes.  Therefore, we focus on studies, which were explic-
itly estimated the macroeconomic outcome for Germany on the basis of regional data.   
For aggregate outcomes, there are in principle two different approaches to estimate the impact of 
ALMP, either on a general equilibrium or reduced form approaches identifying effects on outcomes 
such as the Beveridge curve and the wage setting framework (see section 3 of this paper for an 
overview, Layard, Nickell, Jackman 1991).   
Since the beginning of the 90’s, eight macroeconomic evaluation studies have been published esti-
mating the effectiveness German ALMP: Bellmann, Lehmann (1991) evaluate outcomes of ALMP on 
the aggregate regional outflows for specific groups of short–term and long–term unemployed men.  
Pannenberg, Schwarze (1996) estimate an extended wage curve approach and evaluate, to which 
extent the average regional wages are affected by the level of ALMP.  Büttner, Prey (1998) and Prey 
(1999) evaluate the outcomes of ALMP on the regional mismatch.  Schmid, Speckesser, Hilbert 
(2001) evaluate policy outcomes on regional structural unemployment, the effect of ALMP on the 
regional level, share and change of unemployment as well as on the aggregate regional outflows 
from unemployment.  Hagen, Steiner (2000) evaluate the effects of ALMP on the regional level of 
unemployment for East Germany for the years 93–99 by estimating separately the effect on inflows 
and outflows.  In the follow–up study by Hagen (2003), the author estimates the macroeconomic 
effects of ALMP in East Germany with three different approaches either for the regional matching 
efficiency (inflows into regular employment), the regional job seeker rates (Beveridge curve) or the 
dynamic labour demand on the same data basis, however with quarterly data for the years 1998–
2001.  Hujer, Blien, Caliendo and Zeiss (2002) estimate the macroeconomic employment outcome 
of ALMP on the regional job–seekers rate with regional data for West and East Germany for the 
same period  
The control for endogeneity is crucial for the results of these evaluations, as indicated in section 3.4 
of this paper.  The authors cope with endogeneity by the application of different approaches: Bell-
mann (1991), Pannenberg, Schwarze (1996), Schmid, Speckesser, Hilbert (2001) and Hagen, Steiner 
(2000) implement fixed regional effects in the estimations to control for endogeneity.  Büttner, Prey 
(1998) and Prey (1999) use additionally to fixed effects instrumental variables.  Hagen (2003) and 
Hujer, Blien, Caliendo and Zeiss (2002) control for endogeneity by several instrumental variables 
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estimators for dynamic panel models, including the estimator developed by Arellano, Bond (1991) 
and Blundell, Bond (1998). 
ALMP is usually modelled in form of accommodation ratios.  These ratios indicate the participation 
stocks in each ALMP programme as a percentage of the whole regional extended unemployment, 
i.e. the total programme participants and the total regional unemployment, and hence, they describe 
the regional programme level applied to the group of (potential) participants – the whole non–
employment in the region.  Pannenberg, Schwarze (1996) focus on further training, Prey (1999) and 
Büttner, Prey (1998), Hagen, Steiner (2000), Hagen (2003) and Hujer, Blien, Caliendo and Zeiss 
(2002) evaluate the outcomes of the two main programmes JC and PSFT.  Bellmann, Lehmann 
(1991) and Schmid, Speckesser, Hilbert (2001) estimate the outcomes of JC, PSFT and targeted 
wage–subsidy programmes for the long–term unemployed.   
Bellmann, Lehmann (1991) conclude that JCs significantly promotes outflows from short–term un-
employment.  The two other programmes, wage subsidies and further training have neither a posi-
tive nor a negative impact on the outcome variables, neither in the short–term nor in the long–term.  
Pannenberg, Schwarze (1996) focus on the outcomes of further training on wages in East Germany.  
The impact of ALMP in this context can be interpreted as successful, because the regional level of 
PSFT has a lowering effect on wages.  In one of their estimations on regional unemployment out-
flows, Schmid, Speckesser, Hilbert conclude that JC did not significantly affect for the overall out-
flows from unemployment and that PSFT has a slightly decreasing impact on this outcome, which is 
comparable to the result by Büttner, Prey (1998) and Prey (1999) for the dynamic specification of 
the disequilibrium model, which indicates that further training had an increasing effect on regional 
mismatch.  On the other hand, Schmid, Speckesser, Hilbert (2001) find significantly negative effects 
of PSFT on the regional level and structure of long–term unemployment, which is the main target 
group of ALMP and conclude that PSFT has a decreasing impact at least for the problem groups on 
the labour market in the short–run.  Prey (1999) finds overall decreasing effects of JC on the regional 
mismatch.  In separate specifications for men and women, the effect of JC can no longer be found 
for the subpopulation: significantly negative effects on regional mismatch can only be found for 
men due to the JC programme, while PSFT has no effects for men and has even an increasing effect 
for women.  Hagen, Steiner (2000) find a positive effect of ALMP on the level of unemployment in 
the long run, i.e. the unemployment level increased.  Hujer, Blien, Caliendo and Zeiss (2002) esti-
mated separately the effects on mismatch for East and West Germany.  They find a reducing effect of 
further vocational training and job creation in West Germany on the job–seekers rate, whereas for 
Eastern Germany no significant effect could be found.  Hagen (2003) finds a negative effect of job 
creation on the regional matching function and no significant effects of further training and struc-
tural adjustment schemes as well as insignificant effects for all different programmes of ALMP in the 
long–run based on the estimation of the Beveridge curve.  The estimation of the labour demand 
function shows that further training has no effects on employment, but job creation leads to signifi-
cant displacement effects. 
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Table 1.8 Overview of macro evaluations (Notes: end of table 1.5) 
Authors Data  
Period 
No.  of Observations Programme Outcome Variable Evaluation Methodology Results 
Bellmann, 
Lehmann 
(1991) 
Employment 
offices districts 
79–88 (quarterly 
data) 
N: 142 PSFT, JC and 
WS 
Unemployment dura-
tion specific outflow 
rates (five categories) 
§ Linear estimate with regional fixed effects 
§ Hausman Test to control for endogeneity  
 
 JC PSFT WS 
STU – 0 0 
LTU 0 0 0 
 
Pannenberg, 
Schwarze 
(1996) 
E.–German 
employment 
offices districts 
92–94  
N: 35 PSFT Aggregate wages § Influence of job searcher rate on unemploy-
ment 
§ Wage curve estimates controlling for endoge-
neity: 
OLS fixed regional effects (1) 
FGLS with random individual and fixed re-
gional effects (2) 
IV(2SLS) with fixed regional effects (3) 
Results for wage increases: 
 
(–) 
(–) 
(–) 
 
Büttner, Prey 
(1998) 
 
(extended by 
Prey [1999]) 
W.–German 
Planning Regions 
86– 93 
N: 74 JC 
PSFT 
Mismatch: labour 
market disequilibrium 
 
§ Estimation of “transacted labour ” and determi-
nation of the regional jobless rate 
§ Estimate of matching efficiency with OLS, 
LSDV, 2SLS, Dynamic Panel (GMM) 
§ Controlling for endogeneity 
– fixed regional and time effects 
– IV and regional labour market structure 
JC: – 
PSFT: 0 
 
Extended by Prey (1999) 
Prey (1999) W.–German 
Planning Regions 
86– 93 
N: 74 See Büttner, 
Prey 1998 
Mismatch: labour 
market disequilibrium 
See Büttner, Prey 1998; 
 
Further specifications: 
§ controlling for regional age structure and re-
cipients of social assistance 
§ separate accommodation of ALMP for men and 
women 
§ Extended model: 
(several specifications separated by /) 
  JC   PSFT 
Static  0/+   0/0 
Dynamic  –/–/–   0/+/0 
§ ALMP accommodation for men/ women 
(specifications separated by /) 
1.  static   JC PSFT 
Men  0 0 
Women  0 0 
2.  dynamic JC PSFT 
Men  –/– 0/0 
Women  0/0 +/+ 
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Table 1.8 Overview of macro evaluations (cont., Notes: end of table 1.5) 
Authors Data  
Period 
No.  of Observations Programme Outcome Variable Evaluation Methodology Results 
Schmid, 
Speckesser, 
Hilbert (2001) 
W.–German 
employment 
offices districts 
94– 97 
N: 142 PSFT, JC and 
WS 
1) Long–term unem-
ployment  
(groups with unem-
ployment of > 6 
months or > 24 
months) 
 
2) Unemployment 
outflows 
§ Linear estimate with regional fixed effects 
 
 
 
 
 
§ Linear estimate with first differences 
 
1) Long–term unemployment (LTU) 
§ as % of total labour force 
 JC PSFT WS  
> 6  0 – 0 
> 24 0 – – 
§ as % of all unemployed 
  JC  PSFT WS  
> 6  0 – 0  
> 24 0 (–) 0  
§ Change of LTU  
  JC  PSFT WS  
> 6  0 0 –  
> 24 0 0 –  
2) Aggregate Unemployment Outflows: 
 PSFT:  – 
 JC:  0 
 WS:  0 
Hagen, Steiner 
(2000) 
E.–German 
employment 
districts 93–99 
N = 35 PSFT and JC  regional job matching Linear estimate with regional fixed effects 
 
short–run 0,  long run: + 
flows into of unemployment +  
flows out of unemployment + 
Hujer, Blien, 
Caliendo and 
Zeiss (2002) 
E.– and W.– 
German em-
ployment dis-
tricts 
N = 175  
(N = 141 West. 
N = 34 East, quarterly data) 
PSFT and JC 
 
regional job–seekers 
rate 
§ Fixed effects 
§ 2SLS 
§ Dynamic panel models (System GMM) 
West Germany  
§ further training – 
§ job creation –  
East Germany 0 
Hagen (2003) E.–German 
employment 
districts 98–01 
N = 35 
quarterly data 
PSFT, structural 
adjustment and 
JC 
1) matching efficiency 
2) job seeker rate 
3) Labour demand 
§ Fixed effects 
§ GMM 
§ 2 SLS 
1) Matching: 
§ PSFT:  0 
§ JC:  – 
§ SAM: 0 
2) Job seekers rate: 
§ PSFT:  0 
§ JC:  0 
§ SAM: 0 
) Labour demand: 
§ PSFT:  0 
§ JC:  – 
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1.5 Conclusion 
This paper provides an overview of the evaluation of ALMP in Germany of the last years.  The fol-
lowing results can be summarised: 
§ ALMP in Germany consists of a wide range of different programmes for different target 
groups.  Some of these programmes serve the same target groups and work with the same or 
very similar incentive structures.  Others programmes are complementary concerning the in-
tegration targets the seek to fulfil.  After the reform of the legal basis of ALMP in Germany, 
the local offices of the German Employment Service gained a new flexibility in linking pro-
grammes better to the regional conditions.  Therefore, we expect more heterogeneous 
treatments in the future as well as a narrower targeting towards the groups with severe prob-
lems of finding work. 
§ With respect to the methodology of ALMP evaluation, we conclude that the solution of the 
microeconomic evaluation problem in non–experimental evaluation implements different 
approaches either applying parametric correction on observables or – especially of late – the 
popular statistical matching approaches.  Even though matching techniques based on the 
propensity score became more important over the last years, there is no “best practice” how 
one should cope with selection bias based on observable characteristics.  Besides, there are 
wide controversies in the literature how selection bias based on unobservable characteristics 
can be taken into consideration in the design of evaluation studies and how the dynamic re-
duction of the employment rate before treatment should be considered in the evaluation of 
outcomes (“Ashenfelter’s Dip”).   
§ The recent methodological developments in the context of European ALMP, especially 
whether one can use a random variation in the starting dates of ALMP programmes as an al-
ternative identifying assumption (“timing–of–events”) or how an adequate control group can 
be obtained if the timing of the non–treatment needs to be considered, have not yet been 
explicitly modelled in the evaluation studies for Germany.  Timing–of–events could be an 
instrument to model both the participation decision and the outcome simultaneously, how-
ever assuming that anticipation of the programme does not occur (which is unlikely in the 
context of generous ALMP programmes).  Furthermore, the recent methodological literature 
forces evaluation research to reconsider the problem of finding a sufficient control group 
without conditioning on the future outcome and without the implicit assumption that a con-
trol observation remains a control observation.  With respect to this, the findings of the 
ALMP evaluations for Germany need to be interpreted as evaluations that analyse treatments 
for a specific period, for which the timing of treatment and non–treatment matches suffi-
ciently and only if a current control group is interpreted adequately as the control group for 
a time–specific treatment.  These methodological constraints need to be considered if one 
tries to draw any inference from the evaluation studies.   
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§ When paying attention to the methodological constraints of the recent German literature of 
ALMP evaluation, we can summarise the following findings: 
1. For East Germany, only few studies found positive employment effects of ALMP for cer-
tain subpopulations, which however are not consistent across all different specifications.  
In most studies, only insignificant or negative employment effects could be found.   
2. For West Germany, the policy effects of ALMP are vague because of the fact that most 
studies evaluate the effects of both public sector and privately financed further training.  
Those studies exclusively evaluating the effects of public sector sponsored training (Prey 
1997, 1999 and Staat 1997) show – with the exception of low skilled workers – on av-
erage negative employment effects.   
3. The most recent evaluations of job creation programmes shows negative effects on em-
ployment.  In East Germany, only Eicher/Lechner(1999) find positive effects of job crea-
tion, all other evaluations indicated that job creation reduces the employment chances 
of the treated.   
4. The macroeconomic outcome of ALMP found in most studies is significantly negative.  
In some studies, further training seems to decrease the regional rate of long–term unem-
ployment, whereas job creation programmes show in some case significantly positive ef-
fects on the matching.   
The conclusion with respect to the effectiveness of ALMP, which can be drawn from this survey, 
however should be interpreted with care.  Especially, we need to restrict the interpretation in the 
following way:  
1. As shown in the first part, we see a wide range of ALMP in Germany.  However, only 
job creation and further training have been subject to evaluation so far, and this mainly 
for the East.  For a large number of ALMP programmes, there does not exist any empiri-
cal evidence, e.g. there is only one evaluation study dealing with the effects of wage–
subsidies (Hujer, Caliendo, Radic 2001).  
2. The overview of the different evaluation studies could clarify that a unique way of solv-
ing the problems of selection on observable and unobservable characteristics does not 
exist.  The different approaches how selection bias based on observable characteristics 
can be supposed to have an important influence on the evaluation results, especially if 
the recent methodological debates are considered that disallow to interpret most evalua-
tion results without further assumption than the CIA (Fredricksson, Johansson 2003). 
3. As important as different methodological approaches how to evaluate ALMP are the big 
differences in the data mainly consisting of small sections of the survey data provided by 
the GSOEP and the LMM.  With few exceptions, it is impossible to exactly mirror the in-
stitutional regulation of the treatments with these data: The category “further training” 
basically consists of a wide range of either privately or public sector financed training.  
And even if one could clearly distinguish publicly from privately initiated further train-
ing, the treatments are heterogeneous with respect to the duration of training, they can 
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offer short– or longer term treatments for more or less firm specific skills, they might 
consist of basic occupational knowledge or the provision of limited skills and tech-
niques.  To the authors’ opinion, the policy conclusions of an evaluation of such broad 
policy categories remain unclear.   
While considering these constraints, the implication one can conclude from the cited studies is 
weak.  However, we believe that the average employment effect of both programmes (further train-
ing and job creation) at best are insignificant, because otherwise they should have been more obvi-
ous across all the cited studies – even if the underlying data are different and the methodology cho-
sen to overcome the identification problem influences the results to a certain extent.   
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2 Evaluation of further training in East Germany based on observational 
data 
2.1 Introduction 
In the absence of experimental data, any empirical evaluation of programmes of active labour 
market policy (ALMP) has to address difficult methodological issues in identifying the programme 
impact for the participants because the situation of non–treatment is not observable.  Both selec-
tion bias based on observable and unobservable characteristics prevent from using the non–
treatment population or the situation of the treated before treatment as the non–treatment outcome 
of the treated. 
For the construction of an adequate comparison group for participants, the vast literature on 
evaluation offers quite a range of different procedures, and in recent years, the use of non–
parametric matching approaches based on the propensity score became to some extent the stan-
dard procedure in non–experimental evaluation because of only few functional form assumptions 
of the problem of selection bias based on observable characteristics compared to e.g. regression 
based correction for selection on observables.  However, critical parameters need to be set for 
implementing matching, too, and the purpose of this paper is to provide a sensitivity analysis about 
the changes of the outcomes if certain parameters in matching approaches are varied, especially 
the (i) matching estimator itself and the (ii) bandwidth.  Furthermore, we show how the outcomes 
change if we draw inference based on (iii) a bootstrap procedure taking into account that the pro-
pensity score is itself estimated.  We check the sensitivity of the results of a Difference–in–
differences estimator that additionally to selection on observable can take account of remaining 
selection bias based on unobservable characteristics and which proved to be a very effective tool 
in controlling for both selection on observables and unobservables (Heckman et al. 1998 refer to 
various studies for the U.S. in which he compares the properties of DiD estimators in matched 
samples based on the propensity score with those found in experimental evaluation approaches). 
The data we refer to in this paper are of the Labour Market Monitor Sachsen–Anhalt (Ar-
beitsmarktmonitor Sachsen–Anhalt LMM–SA) and we estimate the programme effect for a first or a 
second, reiterated participation in the further training programme in East Germany, which is effec-
tively the most important ALMP programme in Germany.  Although the specification of the out-
come equation in form of a DiD–estimator considers to a certain extent selection on unobservables 
– and can also depict that shortly before the participation in a labour market program the employ-
ment situation of the future participants deteriorates disproportionately – the estimated model is 
not flexible enough to take into account the dynamic nature of the employment process.  There-
fore, we implement an outcome equation in the associated paper (Bergemann, Fitzenberger, 
Speckesser 2004), which estimates difference–in–differences for hazard rates and evaluates em-
ployment effects controlling for the path dependency of the employment history of both treated 
and non–treated individuals.  With regard to the purpose of this paper, the specification however 
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is acceptable because it focuses on learning with “real world data”, how and to which extent the 
choice of critical parameters influences the estimated policy impact of the programme.   
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2.2 gives a short description of ALMP 
in Eastern Germany, which was carried out in accordance with the former Labour Promotion Act 
(Arbeitsförderungsgesetz, AFG) for the period of observation of the LMM–SA data.  Section 2.3 
discusses the microeconomic evaluation problem and describes, how matching approaches can 
help to overcome selection on observables.  We describe nearest neighbour estimators – a special 
case of the category of non–parametric estimators – and kernel matching estimators.  We briefly 
describe the parameter of interest of an evaluation of a reiterated participation in further training 
and how we estimate the outcomes in matched samples in the presence of further selection bias 
based on unobservables and a dynamic selection processes before the treatment.  Section 2.4 im-
plements the different matching approaches and compares the results, especially, how the preci-
sion of critical parameters influences the outcomes. 
2.2 Institutional regulation  
2.2.1 Further training 
The public promotion of further vocational training as a scheme of ALMP was first regulated in the 
Labour Promotion Act (AFG) of 69.  It was amended extensively between 69 and 97 mirroring the 
changing labour market conditions of the 70’s.  These amendments took into consideration struc-
tural change, persisting unemployment, increased female participation in the labour market and 
new financial constraints on the unemployment insurance.  However, the three principal further 
training programmes remained until the complete revision of the labour promotion in 97/98: Fur-
ther Training (Fortbildung), Retraining (Umschulung) and Integration Subsidies (Einarbeitung) were 
left unchanged (§§ 33 – 52).  In the process of Economic and Social Intergration of the former 
GDR, the regulation of the AFG was implemented in the GDR as of July 90 (§ 249 AFG).   
In 98, the AFG was replaced by the new Social Law Book III (SGB III).  The redesign of ALMP pro-
grammes themselves led only to few new instruments; in general, the programmes of the former 
AFG remained in place (except the Integration Subsidy, which is now subsumed under ”subsidised 
employment“). 
2.2.2 The Labour Promotion Act 
Further vocational training (§ 41 AFG) includes programmes by which vocational knowledge and 
skills are assessed, maintained and extended or adapted to technical developments.  These pro-
grammes offer opportunities for career advancement, provide a vocational qualification or enable 
the participants to work in other employment.  Participants in full–time courses may be paid a sub-
sistence allowance (Unterhaltsgeld) if the conditions of entitlement are satisfied.  To qualify, the 
person must meet the requirement of being previously employed for a minimum duration during a 
set period of time, i.e. at least 1 year in contributory employment or receipt of unemployment 
benefit or subsequent unemployment assistance.  This set period may be extended for persons 
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returning to the labour market.  The subsistence allowance amounts to 67% for participants with at 
least one dependent child, otherwise 60% of wages.  A prerequisite condition in all cases is that 
participation in the training programme is ”necessary”.  In cases where the person has not fulfilled 
the requirement of previous employment, but had received unemployment assistance until the 
start of the programme, a subsistence allowance equal to the rate of unemployment assistance may 
be paid.  The BA may bear the costs of further training incurred directly through the training 
scheme, especially including course fees.   
The target of the retraining (§ 47 AFG) is the promotion of a new basic vocational training (includ-
ing a new certificate) for people who have already finished a first professional training.  Such a 
promotion of training can be justified if industrial and/or occupational change lead to the obsoles-
cence of skills.  Additionally, personal reasons could justify retraining, if a person is no longer ca-
pable to work in his/her current position (e.g. health restrictions).  The promotion of retraining is 
restricted to a maximum period of 24 months, for this period, the person may also be granted a 
subsistence allowance as for further training if the eligibility criteria apply.   
The third instrument under the AFG are integration subsidies (§ 49 AFG).  Under this regulation, 
employers receive wage subsidies to compensate for lower performance so that workers may be 
integrated into the labour market.  This ”familiarisation integration subsidy“ corresponds to 30% of 
the total wage costs (i.e. the wages and the employers’ share of the social insurance contributions) 
and can be granted up to a duration of six months, for the very difficult–to–place up to one years 
with a rate subsidy 50% of the wage costs.  Participants under this scheme receive the standard 
negotiated salaries (usually based on collective agreements).   
2.2.3 Participation 
Participation in further training schemes started immediately after the unification: In the last three 
months of 90, already 98,500 persons participated.  During the year 91 participation peaked and 
nearly 900,000 persons started a programme.  After 91 participation entries continuously declined 
to a minimum of 166,000 in 97.  In 99 there are still 183,000 persons entering a further training 
scheme (Table 2.1).  The participants started any of the three subprogrammes, and the shares of 
these programmes seem to be relatively stable over the period of observation.  After 98 the subto-
tals are no longer available due to the change in legislation (introduction of the SGB III).   
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Table 2.1 Participation stocks in further training in East Germany, 90 to 99 
 90* 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 
Total  98,561 892,145 887,555 294,153 286,928 257,463 269,227 166,031 235,959 183,317 
Further  
Training  
74,511 629,656 591,016 181,592 199,144 184,347 204,090 128,190 ** ** 
 
Retraining  
19,408 129,862 183,089 81,460 68,569 52,756 48,102 27,258 ** ** 
Integration  
Subsidy  
4,642 132,627 113,450 31,101 19,215 20,360 17,035 10,583 ** ** 
* Data for September–December 1990; ** not available 
Source: Bundesanstalt für Arbeit (1993, 1997, 2000) 
The participation stocks are comparable, although the annual stocks are of course lower than the 
entries for further training and integration subsidies (these programmes usually last less than one 
year).  The figures of the stocks of participants in retraining are higher, indicating that retraining has 
an on average higher duration than the other programmes (Table 2.2). 
Table 2.2 Participation entries in further training in East Germany, 90 to 99 
 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 
Total ** 279,800 491,200 380,608 258,945 255,796 238,904 183,570 151,034 143,356 
Further  
Training 
** ** ** 154,674 105,372 143,801 141,173 107,786 ** ** 
 
Retraining 
** ** ** 221,540 150,780 107,198 92,886 72,092 ** ** 
Integration 
Subsidy 
** ** ** 4,394 2,793 4,797 4,845 3,692 ** ** 
** Not available 
Source: Bundesanstalt für Arbeit (1993, 1997, 2000) 
If the participation figures of the first ten years after unification are added up, this would amount to 
3.571 Million entries into these programmes.  If the labour force of East Germany is assumed to be 
approximately 7.5 Million, this figure clearly shows the far reaching impact of further training in 
East Germany. 
2.3 Non–experimental evaluation 
2.3.1 The evaluation problem 
Non–experimental evaluation is based on a ”potential–outcome–approach“ to causality (Rubin 
1974).  It states that the causal effect of treatment–on–the–treated can be identified by comparing 
the results of a programme ( )YT  for the participating individuals after the treatment ( )1=D  with 
the hypothetical situation of the same individuals if they had not taken part in the programme 
( )1=DYC .  Thus, the average effect of treatment–on–the–treated is given by 
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(1) { } { }11 =-= DYCEDYTE . 
The evaluation problem consists of estimating { }1=DYCE  since the outcome in the non–treated 
situation cannot be observed for the treated individuals.  In principle, two alternative approaches 
can be applied to estimate the average non–treatment outcome based on the situation of (i) pro-
gramme participants before treatment (before–after–comparison) or (ii) a control group of persons 
which did not participate.  The major drawback of the before–and–after comparison lies in the 
assumption of a constant average non–treatment outcome over time for the treated population.  
For instance, changes in the overall state of economy might lead to a violation of this assumption 
(2) { } { }11 10 =¹= DYCEDYCE tt ,  
where 0t  denotes a point of time before treatment and 1t  after treatment.  Furthermore, the aver-
age value of the outcome of non–participants typically does not represent the correct average non–
treatment outcome as participants and non–participants differ in characteristics which influences 
the outcome variable, 
(3) { } { }01 =¹= DYCEDYCE . 
Thus, the participants differ from participants before treatment and from non–participants due to 
observable and unobservable characteristics giving rise to a selection bias.   
2.3.2 Selection bias based on observable characteristics 
To take account of the problem of selection on observables, the paper refers to the Conditional 
Independence Assumption (CIA) which implies that it does not make a difference whether one 
estimates the average results without treatment on the basis of persons of the participating or the 
non–participating group as long as they have the same characteristics X .  Under the CIA, one gets 
(4) { } { }XDYCEXDYCE ,0,1 ===  
indicating that treatment group and the non–treatment group which according to equation (3) are 
not comparable are now comparable on average when conditioning on X .   
This approach allows us to estimate consistently the average effect of treatment–on–the–treated for 
the participants if they are compared to corresponding non–participants.  Referring to the CIA, it is 
necessary to discuss the way how an appropriate non–treatment outcome can be estimated from 
the data.  A very popular method of evaluating the effect of treatment–on–the–treated is the so 
called matching approach which ”is based on the intuitively attractive idea of contrasting the out-
comes of programme participants (denoted iYT ) with the outcomes of comparable non–
participants (denoted jYC ).  Differences in the outcomes between the two groups are attributed to 
the programme“ (Heckman, Ichimura, Todd 1998, notation adjusted to the author’s notation).   
Under the Conditional Independence Assumption, the average effect of treatment–on–the–treated 
can be estimated by  
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where { }0=Î Dj  is the group of non–treated individuals and the kernel weight ( )jiw ,  defines 
the “closeness“ between the treated individuals i and j in terms of the relevant observable charac-
teristics.  Here, one simply estimates the non–treatment outcome of any treated individual i with 
observable characteristics X by taking an average outcome for non–participants with the same 
characteristics X – these are the fitted values of nonparametric regressions in the sample of non–
participants at the local individual’s characteristics X.  The nonparametric regression basically can 
be interpreted as a weight function ( )jiw NN ,10 , : j should have a higher weight for i if the two are 
more similar.  For each treated individual i, the weights sum up to 1 over the whole sample of 
non–participants. The estimated effect of treatment–on–the–treated can then just be estimated by 
averaging this difference of the observed treatment outcome and the locally estimated non–
treatment outcome over the whole sample of treated individuals 1N . Thus, the non–treatment out-
come for participant { }1=Î Di  is constructed on the basis of the whole sample of non–
participants 0N , so that  
(6) { }å =Î =0 , 1),(10Dj NN jiw  
and 0N  and 1N  are the numbers of individuals for which { }0=D  and { }1=D , respectively (cf. 
Heckman et al. 1998).   
Matching estimators differ only with respect to the weights attached to members of the comparison 
group (ibd.: 1023).  Generally, the choice of the comparison group lies in between two extremes: 
On the one hand, the comparison group can consist of all non–treated observations and the indi-
vidual non–participants are weighted.  On the other hand, the matched control observation could 
consist only of the most similar non–participant with respect to X .  The two options are shown in 
more details in the next two sections. 
2.3.2.1 Nearest neighbour matching 
The basic idea behind nearest neighbour matching is intuitively clear: We take one treated indi-
vidual i  from the sample of treated individuals and look for the most similar individual from the 
non–treated observations j , so that a one to one match leads to a very favourable structure of our 
sample.  The respective treated individual is contrasted directly to one non–treated individual.  
This matching procedure works as follows: We define a neighbourhood )( iXC  for each treated 
individual i .  The persons matched to i  are in iA , where { } ( ){ }iji XCXDjA Î=Î= 0 .  In the 
case of nearest neighbour matching, the neighbourhood is defined as 
(7) { }{ }0,minarg)( =Î-== DjXXXXXC jijjji  
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in a flexible way:  is a norm, 1),(
10 ,
=jiw NN  for iAj Î  and 0),(10 , =jiw NN  otherwise (ibd.: 
1023).   
The favourable structure of a strict matching of one treated to one control observation comes at the 
cost that nearest neighbours can nevertheless be quite different in terms of X .  So nearest 
neighbours do not guarantee a priori that a good match is achieved.  Secondly, a strict one–to–one 
matching might lead to a loss of appropriate comparison observations depending on the matching 
procedure itself (cf. section 2.4.2.2 below for the implementation of matching in the data): Con-
sider a matching for all treated observations i , where we start with the first observation and match 
it in terms of nearest neighbours with an appropriate control observation.  If the matched control 
observation is removed from the pool of all control observations, fewer and fewer potential control 
observations remain to reiterate this procedure for the entire sample of treated observations.  Thus, 
the later treated observations might only find poor comparison observations in terms of nearest 
neighbours.  Similarly to definition of calipers, a ”golden rule“ for the matching procedure does 
not exist even though sensitivity analyses show the properties of certain algorithms for certain 
samples (cf. Augurzky 2000).  In small samples, it is supposed to be critical for the quality of the 
match whether identified comparison observations remain in the group of potential controls for 
further matching or not. 
On the other hand, it is not guaranteed that a one–to–one matching of nearest neighbours exploits 
the information of the sample of control observations appropriately; further options could be to 
match to more than one control observation by applying a weight function, a variable number of 
control observations or by applying nearest neighbours only within predefined calipers.  Some 
authors suggest, that especially in small samples, the properties of the matched samples highly 
depend on whether the pool of controls remains constant and/or control observations are applied 
more than once as the control observation for a treated individual i  (Hübler 1998; Hujer, Wellner 
1999).   
2.3.2.2 Kernel matching 
The intention of kernel matching is the application of a weight function for the identification of the 
appropriate weight for the whole sample of non–observations to construct the potential non–
treatment outcome for the treated individual.  Here, the weight function in equation (6) is specified 
as  
(8) 
{ }å =Î
=
0
, ),(10
Dj ij
ij
NN K
K
jiw  
where ( )( )hXXKK ijij /-=  is a weighting function that downweights distant observations jX  
from iX and h  is a bandwidth parameter (Heckman et al. 1998: 1024).  The potential outcome is 
estimated by local regressions at i  on the basis of all non–treated individuals j , i.e. the expected 
outcome for treated individuals i  in the hypothetical state of non–treatment is estimated on the 
basis of a weighted average of all non–treated individuals { }0=Î Dj  following the idea of a local 
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linear regression model.  The weights depend on the deviation of observable characteristics 
( )ij XX -  with a sum of the weights equal to one.   
Local regression 
Without assuming a specific form of the regression function m , a datum point remote from iX  
carries little information about the value of ( )iXm .  Thus, an intuitive estimator for the conditional 
mean function ( )iXm  is the running local average.   
An improved version of this is the locally weighted average which is illustrated for one partici-
pant’s non–treatment outcome in the following: Let K  be any real–valued function assigning 
weights to observations, i.e. a formula that gives each observation the same weight or weights with 
an underlying probability distribution.  The function K  is usually a symmetric probability function 
(‘kernel’).  Let h  – the bandwidth – be a nonnegative number controlling the size of the local 
neighbourhood.  Then, the Nadaraya–Watson kernel regression estimator (NW) mxm =)(  mini-
mises  
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with respect to m , giving the normal equation 
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so that KYC is a weighted average of jYC values with respect to the characteristics iX  of the local 
treated individual i  (Pagan, Ullah 1999: 93).  This weighted regression formula is then repeated 
for the entire sample of the participants  
An alternative estimator is a Local Linear Regression (LL), where the minimisation problem imple-
ments a local slope parameter:  
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and minimises with respect to m  and b .  This local regression estimator can be calculated by 
running a weighted least squares regression not only on a constant but including the deviation 
( )ij XX -  as a second variable in the estimated equation.   
Thus, whereas the NW estimator fits a local constant with respect to the observable characteristics 
iX , the local linear estimator fits a straight line (ibd.).  With the LL estimator, we can consider the 
local curvature.  By mean of this, we expect better local fit by applying the local linear model.  In 
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the empirical part, the NW as well as the LL model are applied to find out whether and to which 
extent we can see a difference between the two estimators with respect to the outcomes.   
Concerning the asymptotic behaviour of NW and LL non–parametric estimators, Fan, Gijbels 
(1996: 20) emphasise that the local linear estimator is to be preferred to the NW estimator as it 
”adapts automatically to the random design by assigning an asymmetric weighting scheme, while 
maintaining the same kind of smooth weighting scheme as the NW estimator“.  Following their 
explanation, the bias should be smaller when applying the local linear regression than in the NW 
estimation procedure.  However, such an a priori statement which estimator is superior with re-
spect to the evaluation problem (which can also be found in Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, Todd 
1998) seems not to be permitted: based on simulated data, Frölich (2003) could demonstrate that 
the properties of the LL estimator are especially sensitive to the choice of the bandwidth and the 
choice of the kernel (for a kernel with bounded support like the Epanechnikov kernel), so that the 
asymptotic superior behaviour when applying these estimators to small samples crucially depends 
on the selection of bandwidth and kernel function.   
Kernel function 
As mentioned above, the kernel function is a probability distribution (such as a standard Gaussian), 
a function defined to be zero outside of a certain range, or any other convenient form.  The kernel 
function should be symmetric.  The bandwidth h  is a smoothing parameter and will be discussed 
in greater detail shortly.  A closer examination of the numerator of equation (9) or (10) gives some 
insight into the weighting situation, that is, more weight is associated with the observations at loca-
tions close to iX  and less weight to observations more distant.  The kernel function in this paper is 
always specified as a Gaussian kernel with 
(11) ( ) )2/1exp(2)( 22/1 jpj -= -K  with ( )( )hXX ij /-=j .   
Other options what kind of unimodal distribution functions could be applied are the uniform, the 
Epanechnikov, the biweight and triweight kernel functions (Fan, Gijbels 1996: 15).  Härdle (1990) 
and Härdle, Linton (1994) concluded that it is the choice of bandwidth, and not the choice of ker-
nel function, that is critical to performance of the nonparametric fit.  Therefore, the normal kernel 
function will be used in this application: The bandwidth determines how fast the weights decrease 
as the distance from iX  increases.  The rate at which the weights decrease relative to the locations 
of the jX  controls the smoothness of the resulting estimate. 
Bandwidth choice 
Consider first the case where h  is small (close to zero): The point of prediction itself possesses 
most of the weight with only the closest observations to this point receiving the remainder of the 
weight (recall the weights do sum to unity).  Under such a scenario, the resulting fit would essen-
tially ”connect the dots“ formed by the observed data points and possess high variance.  In other 
words, instead of obtaining a robust underlying fit for the process, different samples would yield 
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much different fits due to sampling variability and the over–dependence of the fits on the respec-
tive individual data sets.   
Now consider the other case where h  is very large (equal to or close to equal to the entire range 
in jX ).  Instead of concentrating the weights on a single point or handful of data, the weight is 
fairly evenly distributed across all the observations.  Such a fit is considered oversmoothed (with 
high bias) because it essentially fits the value iYC  at each data point (ibd.). 
In principle, there is no ”golden rule of bandwidth selection“.  Pagan, Ullah (1999: 19) discuss that 
if h  is chosen high the variance of the estimated parameters is quite low as a large number of 
points are used for the estimation.  On the other hand, a small h  gives fragile density estimates 
and locally, only few points are included in the estimation, so that the variance increases, but less 
bias is produced.  Thus, the trade–off between variance and bias is especially important in our 
application, where actually selection bias is to be minimised with respect to the central question of 
this paper.  Frölich (2003) extensively discusses the sample properties of various non–parametric 
matching estimators, including the Nadaraya–Watson estimator, local linear and nearest neighbour 
matching.  Based on simulated data, he could show that local linear estimators are especially sensi-
tive with respect to the bandwidth choice in areas of sparse data.  With respect to the performance 
of the different estimators assessed by the mean integrated squared error criterion, he concludes 
that the bandwidth selection for local linear estimators seems to be difficult and suggests to a rather 
small bandwidth value for this estimator compared to the Nadaraya–Watson estimator (ibd., 74).  
Thus, we should rather tend to a undersmoothing than to have a too high value of h .   
As a first option, the selection of the bandwidth could follow a visual insight in the data.  There-
fore, the literature recommends for example to plot the relevant variables and to decide according 
to this impression (Pagan, Ullah 1999: 49).  Another option quite extensively used in the vast 
amount of literature on bandwidth selection is the application of Silverman’s Rule of Thumb 
(ROT).  As an optimal bandwidth selection for a Gaussian kernel, Silverman (1986: 47f.) gives the 
recommendation of  
(12) 
5/19.0 -×= nAhROT  
where h  is the selected bandwidth and ( )34.1/,min iqrstdA = , in which std  is the standard de-
viation and iqr  the interquartile range of the sample (the sample size is n ).   
Note that Silverman’s rule provides an optimal bandwidth choice for local density estimations. In 
this paper, we refer to this bandwidth and over or under smooth with respect to it, which is often 
applied also in nonparametric regression functions.  However, an optimal bandwidth choice for a 
nonparametric regression function would imply that the error sum of squares are minimised for 
one individual observation.  The literature suggested different strategies to achieve this (see Pagan, 
Ullah 1999: 118–122), e.g. a bandwidth choice based on cross–validation where the error sum of 
squares is minimised for an observation if this is omitted from the sample (“leave–one–out”).  Our 
associated paper (Bergemann, Fitzenberger, Speckesser 2004) implements a bandwidth choice by 
a two step leave–one–out procedure which mimics the estimation of the average expected non–
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participation outcome for each period:  First, we identify the nearest neighbour of non–participants 
for each treated individual, i.e. the individual whose propensity score is closest to the non–
participant.  Secondly, a bandwidth is chosen that minimises the sum of the period–wise squared 
prediction errors for the nearest neighbour of non–participants applying a sample of non–
participants, that omits the nearest neighbour of the treated individual over the whole time period 
(90–99).  The resulting bandwidth is usually smaller than the bandwidth according to Silverman’s 
rule. 
In order to become sensitive for the selection of bandwidth with respect to the outcomes, also over 
and undersmoothing with respect to Silverman’s rule of thumb ( )06.0»ROTh  are considered, 
hence bandwidths of 02.0=h  and 06.0=h  are selected.  Especially an undersmoothing should 
lead to more favourable features with respect to solving selection bias as the bias will be mini-
mised with 0®h  in non–parametric estimations.   
Matching on the propensity score 
The observable characteristics have not been specified yet.  X  should be considered as a vector of 
many different variables which determine the participation in a programme of further training.  
Therefore, a disadvantage of matching is the ”curse–of–dimensionality“, i.e. it might be difficult to 
match with respect to a high–dimensional vector of X .  Therefore, this paper follows the result of 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) that the CIA in equation (4) also holds with respect to the probability 
of treatment (“propensity score”) ( )XP  as a function of the observable characteristics X , i.e.  
(13) ( ){ } ( ){ }XPDYCEXPDYCE ,0,1 === .   
On the one hand, this result allows to match upon the one–dimensional probability effectively 
using the ”closeness“ in the propensity score as the weighting scheme in equation (4).  This dimen-
sion–reduction feature reduces the problem of finding adequate matches.  On the other hand, the 
difficult issue in this context is that the propensity score has to be estimated itself.  In general, it is 
an open question which form of matching is more efficient, see Heckman, LaLonde, Smith (1999) 
and Rubin, Thomas (2000), and the recent German literature mostly follows a suggestion by 
Lechner (1998) who uses a hybrid approach combining matching nearest neighbours on the pro-
pensity score with matching on selective important observable characteristics which often are not 
time–invariant (e.g. the previous employment status).   
2.3.3 Multiple treatments 
To take into account multiple treatments, we expand the evaluation approach sketched above.  
According to our definition, multiple treatments are repeated ALMP experiences over the lifecycle 
meaning that an individual is assigned more than once to a programme.  Our approach estimates 
the average effect of treatment–on–the–treated of the ith participation in further training compared 
to the situation of not having participated in the programme at most (i–1) times. 
(14) ( ){ } ( ){ }XPDYCEXPDYTE ii ,0,1 =-=  
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Evaluating the additional employment effect of the ith participation occurs in two steps: First, we 
estimate the propensity score for the event that an individual participates at least i separate times in 
the programmes as opposed to participating at most (i–1) times.  Matches are then formed between 
the two groups of individuals such that for each individual participating at least i times the best 
match is found among those individuals participating at most (i–1) times.   
The additional treatment effect is estimated as the average DiD in employment in the matched 
sample.  By estimating DiD and treating previous programme participation as non–employment, 
we ”automatically“ estimate the average additional effect of the ith programme participation.  The 
matching procedure implies that conditional on the propensity score, the matched controls are 
found among all non–participants based on the likelihood to participate zero, one, and up to (i–1) 
times, respectively.   
Note that we are only evaluating the incremental effect of a second treatment in this application.  
An alternative evaluation could investigate multiple treatments with respect to the combined out-
comes, which is probably interesting if the participants are unlikely to find a job after the first 
treatment and are treated by sequences of programme combinations in order to reach a specific 
treatment goal (this is estimated in the corresponding paper Bergemann, Fitzenberger, Speckesser 
2004).  If the policy design (and the related selection process of the participants) suggests that such 
programme sequences are already foreseen for participants at the beginning of the first treatment, 
there should be no problems of modelling appropriately the selection process. 
However, to a certain extent, the evaluation of combined treatment sequences could condition on 
future outcomes: It is an open question whether the effect of the combined sequences can be iden-
tified with the whole group of non–participants or whether the selection process occurs to a later 
point in time.  Probably, the effect of treatment–on–the–treated of a second treatment can only be 
identified based on the participants of the first treatment.  However, we do not know whether the 
sequences are already planned when the individuals start the first treatment or whether the second 
treatment is only offered to individuals who passed the first treatment, so that the choice of an ap-
propriate control group is probably difficult and the identification of the effect of treatment–on–
the–treated requires further assumptions.  Therefore, we only estimate the average incremental 
effect of treatment–on–the–treated.   
2.3.4 Selection bias based on unobservable characteristics 
Most econometric literature on the evaluation of ALMP makes use of the assumption that selection 
bias due to observable characteristics and selection bias due to unobservable characteristics can be 
considered separately (Heckman, Ichimura, Todd 1998).  While matching estimators as well as 
other solutions on selection bias due to observable characteristics copes with the influence of 
measurable and measured variables on the participation decision, selection bias due to unobserv-
able characteristics has to be dealt with differently.  The following section suggests the solution of 
a difference–in–difference estimator.   
In particular unobservable characteristics could be differences in the benefits which individuals 
expect from participation in a treatment which might influence their decision whether to partici-
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pate or not, because these characteristics are hardly measurable.  In addition, particular groups of 
individuals might exhibit bad labour market prospects which the employment agencies are target-
ing at and which cannot be identified by the researcher.  Furthermore, differences in the motiva-
tion of participants are also unobservable to us but not necessarily so for the agents in the em-
ployment offices.   
To account for selection on unobservables, the literature has pursued various strategies (economet-
ric selection models and difference–in–difference estimators, see Heckman, LaLonde, Smith 1999).  
Here, we implement a ”conditional difference–in–differences estimator“ (cDiD), where conditional 
means that treatment and control group are already comparable conditional on X  by applying 
e.g. matching approaches.  The DiD–estimator is based on the assumption of time–invariant linear 
selection effects.  This estimator extends simple before–after comparisons to determine the treat-
ment effect based on the presumption that the outcome variable can also change over time due to 
reasons which are unrelated to the treatment.  Thus, the change for the treated is contrasted to the 
change for comparable non–treated individuals.  Assuming that the observed outcome tiY ,  for in-
dividual i  at time t  can be described by the following equation:  
(15) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )tiCitCititTitTititi XgDXgDY ,,, 1 eea +-+++=  
with titi YYT ,, =  for 1, =tiD and titi YYC ,, =  for 0, =tiD , a general DiD estimator consists of match-
ing individuals i and j with the same observable characteristics 1,1, tjti XX =  and 0,0, tjti XX =  
where i receives treatment between period t0 and t1 and j is a non–treated individual.  Further 
assumptions are that ( )ittiT Xg ,  and ( )ittiC Xg ,  are the individual specific outcomes in the treated 
and non–treated state, respectively, that the permanent unobservable individual effect ia  is corre-
lated with programme participation and that itT ,e  and itC ,e  are additional error terms for the treat-
ment and non–treatment state.  Thus, ia  captures the effect of selection on unobservables and can 
be differenced out in order to obtain a constant treatment estimator by  
(16) ( ) ( ) 0,1,0,1,110,1,0,1, )()( jtCjtCitCitTitCitTtjtjtiti XgXgYCCYYCYT eeee +--+-=---  
Heckman, Ichimura, Todd (1998) refer to various studies for the U.S.  based on experimental evi-
dence which indicate that conditional DiD combined with non–parametric matching has shown to 
be a very effective tool in controlling for both selection on observables and unobservables.   
2.4 Empirical analysis 
2.4.1 Data 
The empirical evaluation of further training programmes is based on data from the Labour Market 
Monitor Sachsen–Anhalt (Arbeitsmarktmonitor Sachsen–Anhalt, LMM–SA) from the years 97, 98 
and 99.  The LMM–SA is a panel survey of the working–age population of this Bundesland with 
7,100 participants in 97 and 5,800 in 98.  99, the sample size is around 4,760.  From the 97 sur-
vey onwards, information became available that allows the researcher to reconstruct the complete 
labour market history of the individuals on a monthly basis since the beginning of 90.  Those who 
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first participated in the panel survey after 97, e.g. in latter two waves, are recorded retrospectively 
until 90.   
The monthly data cover all labour market positions, i.e. whether individuals were in employment, 
unemployed or participated in a programme of ALMP, as well as information on periods in the 
education system, inactivity or in military service up to December 99.  Individuals who did not 
participate in the 98 survey are recorded until at least September 97, those who dropped out in 99 
at least until October 98.   
In general, the unbalanced panel comprises all individuals with complete information about their 
labour market history between January 90 and at least until September 97 (i.e. individuals who 
completed the retrospective question of the 97 survey and later).  The individuals are at least 25 
years old in January 90 and are in dependent employment, self–employment, or on maternal leave 
before the start of the Economic and Social Union in June 90, so that only persons who were part 
of the active labour force of the former GDR are included in the sample.  Persons, whose labour 
market status is any other than employed, unemployed, on maternal leave, inactive or in ALMP 
programmes at any time (i.e. civil servants, persons in the military service or in the education sys-
tem) are excluded completely from the analysis.  Excluding these groups from the sample can be 
justified in order to build the analysis upon a consistent data base: Civil servants a priori show a 
lower risk of being laid–off than employees of the non–public sector (essentially, there is no risk at 
all for civil servants, and civil servants are exempted from contributing to the unemployment in-
surance, too) and persons in military service and the education system were not part of the active 
population in East Germany subject to this evaluation.   
The resulting sample consists of 5,224 individuals which are representative for the former GDR 
labour force.  Figure 2.1 summarises the basic figures about participation in ALMP programmes in 
East Germany.  In the first ten years after the unification, 37% of the total labour force participated 
at least once in ALMP.  All programmes were extensively implemented (13% of the sample started 
at least once a Job Creation Scheme, 4% worked under a wage–subsidy programme in the private 
sector), but further training of course was the most important programme1: one fifth of all observa-
tions had a least one spell of training2 during the 90ies, in the sample to be analysed here, these 
are 1,021 treated individuals. 
Reiterated treatment in the further training programme occurred in 216 cases, i.e. more than one 
fifth of the population with a first treatment in this programme participated at least a second time.  
                                                          
1 The data base does not allow to differentiate whether a treatment in further training specifically was 
a further vocational training or a retraining scheme (integration subsidies are excluded in the survey 
design of the LMM-SA).  Therefore, the broad category of further training evaluated in this analysis 
can only give an average treatment effect across these programmes, which nevertheless covers pos-
sible heterogeneous treatment effects of the subprogrammes. 
2 The question in the LMM-SA on further training does also include privately financed training.  How-
ever, calculations with the aid of the GSOEP–East shows that a high coverage of public sector spon-
sored training is achieved (for 1993 more than 88%). 
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In the point of view of the author, it is therefore rational to differentiate the effects of a first and a 
second treatment (as suggested in Bergemann et al. 2000).3 
Figure 2.1 Multiple treatments of active labour market policy in East Germany  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.4.2 Matching 
2.4.2.1 Estimation of the propensity score 
The propensity score is estimated by a parametric Probit model.  As the data do not provide time–
varying information, the model includes only static observable characteristics as occupational de-
gree, gender, age, residence and interaction terms of sex and occupation degree (estimation results 
can be found in Table 2.A3 in the appendix).  The estimation is conducted individually for the first 
and the second treatments in a further training programme so that we obtain values for the propen-
sity individually.  The potential control group of ’non–participants’ from which to match are – as 
indicated under section 2.3.4 – individuals who are not treated in the specific programme and 
specific iteration but who could have been or could be participant in any other programme.  This 
implies that the pool of control observations is always relatively large and a sufficient number of 
observations is available for matching.   
2.4.2.2 Nearest neighbours 
For nearest neighbour matching, the matching procedure works as follows: As the first step, the 
propensity score is estimated for both the first and the second further training scheme.  Thus, two 
specific matched samples are constructed on the basis of the participants in programme m  and all 
other persons who have not been assigned either to a first or to a second programme of further 
training.   
                                                          
3 The descriptive statistics for individuals participating in a first and a second further training program 
com pared to non–participants and the total sample can be seen in Tables A1 – A2 (Appendix).   
2. Job Creation
27 % (N =185)
2. Further Training
21% (N = 216)
1. Job Creation
13 % (N =689)
1. Further Training
20% (N = 1021)
Employed, Self-employed and on maternal leave June 1990
(100% of the sample, N = 5224)
Wage Subsidies
4% (N = 222)
No ALMP
63% (N=3292)
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Step 1: The sample is divided into two separated subsamples.  The first group consists of the 
treated individuals i  of programme m  (T–group) and the naive control group of non–
participants j  (C–group).  The propensity score is estimated. 
Step 2: One individual mi  is randomly selected from the T–group. 
Step 3: Find the person mij ,  in the C–group which has the most similar propensity score among 
all control observations, so that the difference of the propensity scores between mi  and 
mij ,  is minimised.   
Step 4: Save the matched nearest neighbours for all available months, so that mi  is removed from 
the T–group and mij ,  is removed from the C–group
4. 
Step 5: Restart the matching for the next observation of the T–group until no more observations 
are left in the T–Group.   
As assumed in the associated paper (Bergemann et al. 2004), time variable selection bias on the 
basis of unobservable characteristics may still exist in the data.  Since the additional effect of the 
respective participation should be estimated, the DiD–estimator is included as a second step.  
Other approaches are suggested and implemented in Lechner (1998) and Hujer, Maurer, and 
Wellner (1998) who in addition to the propensity score match on the time varying information 
about the employment status before individuals enter a programme.   
Based on several short and long–term preprogramme tests, it can be shown that the anticipation of 
a programme seems to involve a dynamic and disproportionate decline of the participants em-
ployment chances relative to those of non–participants before the programme starts.  It is likely 
that this decline is related to the subsequent participation and the DiD estimator should be aligned 
with respect to the preprogramme level of employment early enough not to be affected by 
Ashenfelter’s Dip (Ashenfelter 1978). 
2.4.2.3 Kernel matching 
As in the case of nearest neighbour matching, kernel matching also uses the propensity score and 
no further additional time variable covariates in the matching algorithm.  In total, four matched 
samples are constructed for each the first and second further training scheme, because in the case 
of kernel matching, more options have to be specified (bandwidth, kernel, estimator).  Therefore 
the construction of four specific matched samples should allow to control for a part of the proper-
ties associated with possible specifications of the nonparametric form.  Again, the first step is a 
parametric estimation of the propensity score.  After that, the procedure works as follows:  
                                                          
4 Removing the matched individuals from the pool of possible control observations ensures that one 
observation can be matched exactly once to a treated individual.  If individuals were matched more 
than once, the variance of the matched sample would be underestimated.  In principle, the multiple 
use potential control observations could increase the quality of matching and reduce bias, but the 
variance should be weighted accordingly. 
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Step 1: The sample is again divided into two subsamples.  The first group consists of the treated 
individuals of the respective sequence of the programme (i.e. first or second further train-
ing, T–group), the second group is the group of non– participants in (C–group).  Note that 
for the reiterated treatment, the control group consists of either participants in the first fur-
ther training or individuals who did not participate at all on order to identify the average 
incremental effect of treatment–on–the–treated for the specific iteration (not conditional 
on the first participation).  The propensity scores are estimated for both the first and the 
second participation, so that the following steps are separately implemented for both first 
and second further training participants. 
Step 2: We select the bandwidth within the sample of non–participants for the estimated propen-
sity score.  In this step, three different bandwidths are selected, so that all following steps 
multiply.  The chosen bandwidths are: 
 ROThh =  02.0=h  06.0=h  
Step 3: We select the first treated individual for his first available point in time corresponding to 
the 18th month before the start of the treatment and for which a non–treatment outcome 
shall be estimated based on the matching.  The basis for the estimation of the non–
treatment outcome are all available non–treated individuals at the same calendar time, 
i.e. the kernel matching controls for the panel mortality and uses only individuals who are 
available to the same calendar time. 
Step 4: A weighting function is created as  
 ( )( )hXXK ij /ˆˆ bb -   
with a Gaussian Kernel weighting the predicted propensity scores jXbˆ  of the non–
treatment sample with respect to the predicted propensity score iXbˆ  of the (local) 
treated individual mi . 
Step 5: The expected employment outcome of non–participation 
 ( )( )
{ }
å
=Î
-- ==
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18,,18, ),(1, 10
Dj
tjNNiti YCjiwDXPYCE   
for the first treated individual in the hypothetical state of non–treatment for the month 
 –18 is estimated by a nonparametric regression with the weighting function of step 4 in 
the sample of all non–treated observations.  Two alternative estimators are applied, so 
that the following steps multiply: 
  a) Nadaraya–Watson   b) Local Linear 
Step 6: Step 3, 4 and 5 are also implemented to estimate the expected values of the socioeco-
nomic characteristics of the non–treatment outcome (age, gender, whether an individual 
was treated in another ALMP programme before.  The weights are defined as in step 4, 
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but of course relative to the value of the socioeconomic variables of the treated individ-
ual. 
Step 7: The observed information on employment, age, gender and programme participation of 
the first treated individual and the nonparametrically estimated non–treatment outcomes 
for employment, age, gender and programme participation are written to a new data set.  
This observation is  the first ”matched sample“ for the first participant at the first point of 
time. 
Step 8: Repeat step 3 to step 7 for all months from 17 before to 36 months after the participation 
of the individual for data available.   
Step 9: Repeat step 3 to step 8 for all other treated individuals. 
2.4.3 Specification of outcome equation 
While matching is supposed to take account of selection bias on observable characteristics, selec-
tion bias on the basis of unobservable characteristics might still exist.  Therefore a conditional 
DiD–estimator5 is implemented to cope with selection on unobservable characteristics at least if 
these are time constant.  This DiD–estimator is applied for the outcome variable of employment as 
a dummy variable indicating either employment or non–employment.  The state of non–
employment includes the participation in ALMP programmes such that previous and subsequent 
participation in a programme are both accounted for in the evaluation.   
The DiD estimator evaluates an average employment effect of a programme relative to all possible 
non–employment states for the treated individuals.  The outcome variable measures the effect of 
treatment–on–the–treated based on a DiD approach.  Here we focus on differences in employ-
ment between treatment and non–treatment outcome:  
(19) tiKtiti YCYTY ,,, -=D  
with tiYT , , taking the value of 1(dependent employment, self–employment) or 0 (unemployment, 
motherhood, housewife, retirement, ALMP programme).  tiKYC , is the estimated non–treatment 
outcome of the respective person based on nearest neighbour or kernel matching.  Note that in 
case of kernel matching, the predicted non–treatment outcome can show any value between 0 and 
1.  
If the potential outcome is estimated with nonparametric regressions, the values can be different 
than 0 or 1 for the non–treatment outcome.  As non–employment for the treated and controls 
comprises both unemployment and other forms of inactivity as well as programme participation, it 
is implicitly controlled for repeated participation after the end of a programme in the outcome 
variable.  If an individual restarts treatment within the time window, this treatment is seen as a 
                                                          
5 The specification of the outcomes within matched samples of nearest neighbours follows the associ-
ated paper by Bergemann et al. (2000, 2004).  The test for the specification estimated here are avail-
able upon request.   
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failure of the programme (i.e. it is coded as non–employment in the outcome variable).  The same 
argument applies to the out–of–labour–force states (motherhood, housewife, retirement). 
The outcome equation considers a time window of 18 months before treatment and 36 months 
after treatment.  The DiD–estimator is implemented by including the employment situation before 
treatment in the panel regression for the time after treatment where the estimated parameters to 
any point in time after treatment show the DiD estimator of the programme effect (Bergemann, 
Fitzenberger, Speckesser 2004).  Note that the effects are estimated for the period after the end of 
the programme, i.e. the duration of the programme itself is not included.  There might be reasons 
why one should include the programme duration itself into the outcome equation, especially if the 
programme is short term and aims at the integration of the participant by stimulating the search 
process.  In such cases it would be worth evaluating the programme effect immediately after the 
start of the treatment.  However, as most programmes are longer term and intend to increase the 
employability of the participants by additional skills and formalised occupational degrees, indi-
viduals tend to interrupt the search process and to resume searching after the end of the pro-
gramme – complying with the design of the programme (full–time training).  In our associate paper 
(Bergemann, Fitzenberger, Speckesser 2004), we evaluate the programme effects for both cases – 
either by including the programme duration in the period of outcomes or by starting the evaluation 
after the end of the programme.  Except for the very early months of the post–treatment period, the 
outcomes hardly differ.  As the effect of the programme may vary upon socioeconomic characteris-
tics of the participants and the timing of the programme, these characteristics are included in the 
outcome regression.   
The preprogramme employment level for the alignment of the DiD–estimator proves critical for 
the outcome as pointed out above.  Therefore dummy variables are included in the regression 
which control for the preprogramme effects on the outcome variable.  This effect together with the 
long–run preprogramme employment differences are allowed to depend upon various socioeco-
nomic characteristics and upon the timing of the programme t.  Put together, the outcome equa-
tion based on monthly data for )0(36,...18 ¹-= tt  is specified as 
(20)   
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where  
t    month before )0( <t  and after treatment )0( >t  
t    calendar time of treatment beginning (month) 
X
~
 vector of pair wise socioeconomic characteristics of treated and matched 
control (age dummy for individuals aged 40 and above, sex, dummy par-
ticipation in another ALMP of a different type before) defined as deviations 
form their average in the treatment sample 
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xaaaa ,,, 210  coefficients measuring the long–run preprogramme differences depending 
upon the month when the programme starts )(t  and the characteristics X
~
  
)(tAD  month before the begin of the programme when Ashenfelter’s Dip starts 
depending upon t  
1,0, , kk bb  coefficients modelling the differences in DYi,j for )(tADk ³  as a function of 
t relative to the long–run preprogramme differences for individuals with av-
erage characteristics 
PO
x
PO
x
AD
x
AD
x 1,0,1,0, ,,, gggg  coefficients modelling the impact of socioeconomic characteristics X
~
 dur-
ing Ashenfelter’s Dip )(AD  and after the programme )(PO  (with  
[ 1,xg ] and without [ 0,xg ] an interaction of the calendar time t). 
D  dummy variable taking the value of one when the event in parentheses oc-
curs  
Equation (20) is estimated as a linear regression and inference is based upon heteroskedasticity–
consistent standard error estimates6.   
By implementing the DiD estimator this way, XPOX
PO
Xtt
~
)'( 1,0,1,0, tggbb +++  shows the postpro-
gramme effect relative to long–term preprogramme situation – the average employment outcome 
for the period from 18 months before the treatment up to the beginning of Ashenfelter’s dip (de-
pending on the timing of the treatment covers the first two to six months before the treatment).  In 
this form, long–term preprogramme are reported in the intercept term, the time trends and long–
term differences caused by observable characteristics xaaaa ,,, 210 .  Inserting further prepro-
gramme dummies for the period of Ashenfelter’s dip in the DiD outcome estimation pays attention 
to the dynamic selection process immediately before treatment (i.e. increasing differences between 
treated individuals and the matched control), so that the post treatment effects – the DiD estimates 
– are related only to the long–run preprogramme differences7.   
The specification allows the employment differences before and after the programme to depend in 
a very flexible way upon the month when the programme begins and other socioeconomic charac-
teristics.  Therefore, possible heterogeneity in the preprogramme period is taken into account by 
selection level and in the impact of the programme.  In particular, the analysis depends critically 
on the time t  when the programme starts.  While in 90 and 91 the preprogramme selection level 
                                                          
6  In order to account also for the estimation error of the propensity score estimation, we implement a 
bootstrap procedure in section 2.4.4.3 
7  In our corresponding paper (Bergemann, Fitzenberger, Speckesser 2004), the specification is slightly 
different, estimating the long-term preprogramme differences separately. The outcome is then mod-
elled explicitly as difference-in-differences by subtracting the outcome from these estimated long-
term preprogramme differences. This procedure – contrarily to the estimation of DiD as modelled in 
(20) – accounts for the fact that only individuals that are available for the long-term preprogramme 
period are used in order to estimate xaaaa ,,, 210 . 
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is likely to be small since unemployment had been rare in the past, it quickly grows with the rise of 
unemployment during the next years.  In addition to the heterogeneity discussed so far, also the 
length of a possible preprogramme decline in the outcome variable is allowed to depend upon the 
time when the programme starts.  During the period shortly after unification, it is likely that the dip 
is fairly short since programme participation could not have been anticipated long before.  How-
ever, the situation changes with the occurrence of high unemployment when people realised that 
labour market problems were quite severe and that ALMP at a large scale was likely to be a per-
manent feature of the labour market.  To capture the transitory employment declines before the 
programme starts as Ashenfelter’s Dip, the following heuristic approach is chosen.  For the first 
programme participation, a visual inspection of the average employment differences between 
treated and matched controls before and after the programme as a function of the time when the 
programme starts indicates that the dip occurs during one to two months in 90/91 and increases 
over time to something of at most six months.  In order to obtain a lower bound of the DiD esti-
mate of the employment effects of a programme (the employment of the future participants de-
creases during the dip), we are conservative in constructing )(tAD  as follows 
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where the eventual starting point AD  is –6 months.  Between November 90 and July 94, )(tAD  
increases in absolute value from 2 months to || AD .  The weights tw  are constructed to provide a 
linear interpolation and )(tAD  is rounded to the nearest integer. 
The average DiD employment estimate of the programme based on the specification in (16) for 
month 36,...,1=t  after the programme is given by  
(17) )1(~)'ˆˆ(ˆˆ 1,0,1,0, ³+++= tDXDiD
PO
X
PO
Xttt tggbb  
where tDiD  depends upon the time t  when the programme starts and it is evaluated at average 
socioeconomic characteristics.  The effects for individuals with different characteristics can be 
evaluated by adding XPOX
PO
X )'( 1,0, tgg +  for specific participation groups.   
Within the context of multiple treatments, one can identify the average effect of either the first or 
the second treatment with respect to employment.  Thus, concerning the effect of a second treat-
ment, the DiD–estimation provides the average additional employment effect of the second treat-
ment based on the construction of our DiD–estimator and the definition of the employment vari-
able.  The effect of a first treatment for a person in a second treatment is included in the permanent 
preprogramme effect.   
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2.4.4 Evaluation results 
The following sections summarise important results of the evaluation of a first or second further 
training programme for the different matching approaches suggested.  The results are presented in 
figures 2.2–2.3.  In general, these figures should be interpreted as follows: The thick line shows the 
tDiD –estimator for the time period until 36 months after participation as defined in equation (17).  
The preprogramme period depends on the time of treatment.  The surrounding lines indicate the 
90% confidence interval.  Participation takes place at time 0.  This is shown as an interruption of 
the curves.  The postprogramme period here shows the average treatment effect on the treated; if 
individuals with specific socioeconomic characteristics X  are considered, the respective terms 
X'g  of the outcome equation can be added.  The results of the estimations can be found in tables 
2.A4 and 2.A5 (Appendix).   
The zero–line is the reference line in relation to which a success or failure of the programme is 
measured: A programme can be considered as economically successful in terms of employment if 
the confidence interval lies in the positive region.  Additionally, the alpha–coefficient 
²210 tataa ++  in the figures indicates the remaining level of long–term unobserved heterogene-
ity within the matched pairs or between the treated individual and the nonparametrically estimated 
non–treatment outcome in percentage points of the employment rate.  Again the surrounding thin 
lines are the associated confidence intervals.  The alpha–coefficient gives the percentage points by 
which the employment rate of participants differs to the comparable non–treatment outcome be-
cause of remaining unobservable characteristics.  Again, if individuals with specific characteristics 
are considered, the terms of the outcome equation have to be added.  A negative coefficient could 
be interpreted as a successful targeting of ALMP on persons with a very bad labour market pros-
pect. 
2.4.4.1 Nearest neighbour matching 
As the focus in this paper is laid on average employment effects of first treatments in further train-
ing programmes starting in December 92 and a second participation in these schemes starting in 
December 94, the results shown here should only be understood as exemplary.   
Concerning a first treatment in the further training, the estimated results show a sharp decline in 
employment for the participants compared to the non–treatment outcome in the period immedi-
ately before treatment.  Within the matched samples, the employment rates of treated are to 33 
percentage points (ppoints) lower.  After the end of the programme the employment rate is still 
much below the level of comparable control observations, but shows a positive dynamic.  After 
more than two years, the average effect of the programme on the participants is insignificant which 
can be interpreted as an overall effect of treatment on the treated of zero in terms of employment.  
Although the initial employment level after treatment is negative, the employment dynamic is 
higher due to a programme participation and the overall effect is at least nonnegative.   
The remaining level of unobserved heterogeneity indicates that participants have in general re-
duced employment chances than the matched controls: The long–term preprogramme differences 
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in employment are –25 ppoints.  Thus the targeting towards groups which are particularly affected 
by labour market problems can be seen as successful (figures 2.2–2.3).   
Individual programme effects are also estimated for individuals who participate in a second pro-
gramme of further training by the end of 94.  Here, the evaluation indicates that the phenomenon 
of Ashenfelter’s Dip is less important than for participants in a first further training programme: The 
employment level decreases only to a level of –10 ppoints compared to non–participants in antici-
pation of the programme.  After the end of the programme, the participants on average exhibit 
insignificant employment effects, i.e. they have no benefit or disadvantage due to the participation 
in the programme (figures 2.2–2.3).  Although the employment effect seems to decrease after 19 
months relative to the end of the treatment, this result is not supposed to be very robust because 
the number of matched pairs decreases over time.   
The level of unobserved heterogeneity for participants in second further training is much lower 
than for the treatment in a first further training which indicates that the participants in such a pro-
gramme have much worse employment chances than the matched controls.  These programmes 
can also be understood as successful in terms of targeting: The participants have on average 65 
ppoints reduced employment chances. 
2.4.4.2 Kernel matching  
One central question of this analysis is the identification of differences in employment effects re-
sulting from the method used for solving selection bias due to observable characteristics.  There-
fore, the evaluation of the employment effects of a first or second further training programme is 
replicated on the basis of alternative matching approaches.  Interesting differences between the 
different matching approaches with respect to the employment outcomes of a first treatment of 
further training are:  
a) NW: Compared to the evaluation based on nearest neighbour matching, the first participation 
in further training has quite different employment outcomes.  On the one hand, the decline of 
employment rate of the participants is more severe if NW matching is applied: Participants 
have an on average by 39 ppoints reduced employment compared to 34 ppoints in the case of 
nearest neighbour matching.  On the other hand, the level of remaining unobserved heteroge-
neity is higher: –28 ppoints compared to –25 ppoints in the NN matching.  Besides this, the 
most important difference is that the average treatment effect remains consistently negative 
over time: For a long period the individuals significantly decreased their employment chances 
by participating in the programme.  Comparing this to the results of NN matching, the em-
ployment effects of the treated are 10 ppoints lower if matched samples are constructed by 
nonparametric regressions estimates (figure 2.2).   
b) In the case of applying local linear estimations, employment effects for the first treatment look 
similar to those of the NW regression matching.  Employment immediately before treatment 
varies depending on the specification of the bandwidth between –35 ppoints for 02.0=h  and 
–39 ppoints 06.0=h .  The average employment effect due to participation in the programme 
36 months after treatment varies between –13.7 ppoints for 02.0=h  and –12.7 ppoints for a 
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bandwidth selection of ROThh = .  Although these differences are not very high, the specifica-
tion of the bandwidth clearly matters (figures 2.2–2.3).   
Similarly to the estimations based on NN matching, the estimators indicate a positive employment 
dynamic caused by the programme participation.  The matched samples here however show that 
employment is only increasing up to 18 months after treatment, whereas the estimator in NN 
matched samples has a consistently upward slope until the end of the observation period.  The 
evaluation based on kernel matching has obviously better properties with respect to the declining 
number of observations at the end of the period than a strict one–to–one matching based on near-
est neighbours – the confidence intervals are smaller.   
Estimations of the outcome of a second further training scheme based on kernel matching also 
show quite different outcomes than those using nearest neighbours.  The results can be summa-
rised as follows:  
a) NW: While matched samples on the basis of nearest neighbours suggest a 10 ppoints re-
duced employment of treated individuals immediately before the begin of a programme, in 
matched samples based on NW–estimations, employment rates of treated are only 14 
ppoints lower than those of non–treated.  Furthermore estimations for nearest neighbours 
suggest increasing employment dynamics up to 18 months after treatment, although the av-
erage employment effect remains insignificant over the whole period of observation.  This 
positive dynamic cannot be found for the tDiD  estimator here: The effect immediately after 
participation is zero and does not show any dynamic over time.  The remaining level of un-
observed heterogeneity finally suggests that participants have much lower long–term pre-
programme employment rates if samples are matched with the aid of the NW regression 
than in the case of NN matching: The alpha coefficient lies ten percentage points below the 
level of the NN matching (figure 2.3). 
b) LL: The results of the estimations with matched samples based on LL regressions differ only 
to a minimal quantity from those estimated in NW regression matched samples (figures 2.2–
2.3).  Nevertheless, according to the specification of the bandwidth parameter, the em-
ployment effects of treatment on the treated decrease as 0®h .   
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Figure 2.2 Employment effects of 1st participation in a further training scheme, December 1992 
– Estimates based on Nearest Neighbour Matching – – Estimates based on Kernel Matching with N/W Estimator, h = 
hROT– 
 
 
 
 
 
– Estimates based on Kernel Matching with Local Linear Estima-
tor, h = hROT – 
– Estimates based on Kernel Matching with Local Linear Estima-
tor, h = 0.02– 
 
 
 
 
 
– Estimates based on Kernel Matching with Local Linear Estima-
tor, h = 0.06– 
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Figure 2.3 Employment effects of 2nd participation in a further training scheme, December 1994 
 
– Estimates based on Nearest Neighbour Matching – – Estimates based on Kernel Matching with N/W Estimator, h = 
hROT– 
 
 
 
 
 
– Estimates based on Kernel Matching with Local Linear Estima-
tor, h = hROT – 
– Estimates based on Kernel Matching with Local Linear Estima-
tor, h = 0.02– 
 
 
 
 
 
– Estimates based on Kernel Matching with Local Linear Estima-
tor, h = 0.06– 
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2.4.4.3 Bootstrap confidence intervals 
The dimension reduction feature of matching on the propensity score comes at the costs that the 
propensity score itself is estimated by a parametric probit model.  Therefore, the standard errors of 
the estimated treatment effects are likely to be underestimated.  To take account of the sampling 
variability of the propensity score estimate, we implement a bootstrap procedure for construction 
of confidence intervals.8 
The basic principle of the bootstrap involves reiterated estimation of the parameter of interest by 
drawing randomly new samples with replacement from the original data.  The sampling procedure 
with replacement implies that one can select certain observations two or more times and others 
not at all.  Each sample then is slightly different from the original sample.  Repeating this procedure 
for a large number, one gets pseudo samples similar to the underlying distribution of the data.  We 
resample the data before estimating the propensity score and before fixing the bandwidth in the 
sample of the non–treatment observations, so that the estimated outcomes within the matched 
samples estimates from the pseudo samples take into account of the sampling error of the propen-
sity score.  We repeatedly estimate the coefficients of the outcome equation from the random sam-
ples and calculate the empirical variance of the estimated coefficients in order to obtain bootstrap 
standard errors of our estimates.  These standard errors then do not rely on any distributional as-
sumptions (like normality). 
More formally, we want to estimate the standard error of an estimator qˆ  in a dataset DN.  The 
sample values are the outcomes of random variables zi with a probability density of pz.  We want 
to make inference about the true parameter q, the outcome of applying the statistical functional t(.) 
to F, so that q=t(f).  The simplest example of such a functional is just the average.  The estimate of 
q is )ˆ(Ftt =  where Fˆ  is an estimate of the empirical distribution function F based on the data zi.  
The bootstrap now enables the estimation of the variance of the functional t, i.e. by repeatedly 
estimate qˆ  by using a simulated data set (Efron 1979, Efron, Tibshirani 1993) and we consider the 
dataset  
{ }**2*1)( ,..., Nb zzzD =  
obtained by randomly sampling the known distribution.  )(bD  is called the bootstrap sample. 
                                                          
8 The bootstrap standard errors are calculated for a simplified version of the outcome equation, omit-
ting the terms for the socioeconomic characteristics, which mainly replicates the extended model 
including the socioeconomic covariates.  The exact form of the model underlying the bootstrap 
standard errors is 
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 where estimation of the influence of socioeconomic characteristics is omitted (see Bergemann, 
Fitzenberger, Speckesser 2004). 
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Consider B repetitions of )(bD  sampling and define  
( ) BbDt bb ,...,1ˆ )( ==q  
the statistic computed by BbD b ,...,1,)( = .  bqˆ  is called the bootstrap replication of qˆ .  The statisti-
cal properties of qˆ  can then be calculated on the basis of the distribution of bqˆ .  The bootstrap 
estimator of the variance of the estimator is the variance of the set bqˆ Bb ,...,1, = : 
(21)  ( ) ( )( )1
ˆˆ
ˆ 1
2
(.))(
-
-
= å =
B
Var
B
b b
bs
qq
q  
where  
B
B
b bå == 1 )((.)
ˆ
ˆ qq  
Under the assumption that the estimator qˆ  is normally distributed with mean q  and variance s², 
one can easily calculate the confidence intervals by plugging the bootstrap estimate of the variance 
into the well known parametric confidence interval formula, using the critical values of the normal 
distribution.  Then, the 100(1-a)%–confidence interval is given by 
(22) ( ) ( )( )1
ˆˆ
ˆˆˆ 1
2
(.))(
2/2/ -
-
±=± å =
B
zVarz
B
b b
bs
qq
qqq aa  
where az is the a–quantile from the standard normal distribution.   
As exemplary, we report the confidence intervals of the estimated CDiD estimators for matching  
based on the propensity score with local linear regressions when the bandwidth is chosen accord-
ing to Silverman.  The following figure 2.4 reports the results for the estimated effects of participa-
tion in a first further training at different points in time.  The left part of this figure describes the 
estimated confidence intervals without bootstrapping, the right side shows the confidence intervals 
for the same effects when the bootstrap estimated standard errors are based on 200 resamples.  As 
expected, the standard errors increase for the CDID–estimator if we do not ignore the estimation 
error of the propensity score.  It is however surprising that this does mainly affect the long–term 
preprogramme differences, for which the confidence intervals become much bigger.  The confi-
dence intervals of the CDID estimates increase, too, but mainly for the outcomes of very early 
(1990) and very late (1996) participation.  The estimated effects of treatment on the treated are still 
significantly negative. 
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Figure 2.4 Employment effects of 1st participation in a further training scheme– LL kernel matching, h 
= hROT – Confidence intervals & bootstrap confidence intervals –  
December 1990 
 
 
 
 
 
December 1992 
 
 
 
 
 
December 1994 
 
 
 
 
 
December 1996 
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2.5 Conclusion 
The wide use of non–parametric matching approaches for the evaluation of ALMP in recent years 
originates from the awareness that one should be less restrictive to the data in non–experimental 
studies with respect to the functional form when creating an adequate comparison level one wants 
to contrast the estimated treatment effect to.  However, non–parametric matching, too, offers op-
tions, among which the researcher has to choose with respect to critical parameters when applying 
these procedures.  In this paper, we show the sensitivity of the estimated effects of treatment–on–
the–treated if we vary (i) the local estimator (nearest neighbour, Nadaraya–Watson or local linear 
estimators), (ii) the bandwidth and (iii) take into account the sampling variability of the probit esti-
mate for drawing inference on the estimated employment effect.  Contrary to simulation studies, 
this paper should bring about evidence for the robustness of the evaluation results of real–world 
data if we critically consider the changes of certain parameters.  First and foremost, this was done 
in order to decide upon the most appropriate specification applied in our associated paper (Ber-
gemann, Fitzenberger, Speckesser 2004).  The study conducted here should increase the sensitivity 
towards the results of the effects of further training reported in our associated paper, where we 
estimate the effects of further training based on the Labour Market Monitor Sachsen–Anhalt.   
Following the suggestion of the previous paper (Bergemann et al.  2000), this evaluation distin-
guishes the effects of a first from those of a second treatment in further training and identifies aver-
age treatment effects on the treated of a first and the average incremental effect of a second partici-
pation in further training.  The treatment effect is allowed to vary over time, so that we restrict the 
sensitivity analysis to exemplary evidence for the evaluation of a first participation in a further 
training programme starting by the end of 92 and a second further training programme starting by 
the end of 94.  The robustness of the treatment effects when applying non–parametric standard 
errors resulting from a bootstrap is shown exemplarily for participation in a first further training 
programme at the end of 90, 92, 93 and 94 and matching on with local linear regressions and se-
lecting the bandwidth according to Silverman’s rule for the density of the standard normal distribu-
tion. 
The results in section 2.4.4 indicate that neither the participation in a first nor in a second further 
training have positive effects for the participants in any specification.  The participation in a first 
further training significantly decreases employment compared to non–participation.  Participants in 
a second programme have an effect of treatment on the treated concerning employment, which is 
zero.   
However this paper shows that the evaluation approach influences to a certain extent the evalua-
tion results.  In particular, the comparison of different matching approaches point out: 
§ The estimated effects are lower for evaluations of matched samples based on kernel regressions 
compared to the estimators in the case of nearest neighbour matching.  We believe the results 
of kernel matching – and thus the more negative treatment outcome when applying the respec-
tive outcome equation – to be more credible because of two reasons: 
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1. Panel mortality: If we match participants to nearest neighbour non–participants, we do not 
benefit as much as we can from the information provided by the whole group of non–
participants: As it is not warranted to observe nearest neighbour for the same period, the 
insignificant effect at the end of the period of observation when applying nearest neighbour 
matching could reflect composition effects of the non–treatment sample.  We might e.g.  
observe mainly unemployed in the control group in the long run, because other individuals 
left the local labour market via intra German moving activity to the West.  Then, the effects 
based on nearest neighbour matching overstate the true effect of treatment–on–the–treated.  
Kernel matching makes use of all available control observations at different points in time 
and allows to create a locally weighted average of all available non–treatment observa-
tions.  It then provides a more credible non–treatment outcome if compositional effects of 
the naïve control group occur. 
2. Practice of nearest neighbours: It is often stated that nearest neighbours prove better with 
respect to the solution of selection bias based on observables than kernel matching estima-
tors, following the simple argument that nearest neighbour estimators correspond to kernel 
estimators with the smallest possible bandwidth – and thus the most similar non–treatment 
outcome and the smallest possible remaining bias based on observables.  However, in 
practice, the advantages of nearest neighbour matching are less obvious, especially if im-
plemented without replacement of the non–treatment observations.  In this case, nearest 
neighbours can be quite dissimilar and the estimator is probably not optimal with respect 
to the balancing properties of differences in observable characteristics between treated and 
non–treated individuals.   
3. Besides the problem of finding adequate matches in general (support problem), there is no 
consensus for the nearest neighbours estimators on how to take into consideration the sub-
stantive variability of the probit estimation to which the whole matching procedure refers.  
It could be shown how important the sampling error of the probit estimation is when re-
porting bootstrap standard errors. 
§ The selection of bandwidth in non–parametric regressions also affects the results.  However, 
this is – contrary to what the vast literature on the correct choice of the bandwidth in non–
parametric estimators suggests – of minor importance in our application.   
To summarise, a clear statement about the efficiency of further training remains difficult.  Although 
all results are negative, there is only little robust evidence about the true effectiveness of further 
training: Sensitivity to critical issues of matching show how far the econometric specification does 
influence the evaluation results – even if applying approaches that impute less structure on the 
models than traditional econometric estimators.   
In our corresponding paper (Bergemann, Fitzenberger, Speckesser 2004), we explicitly model the 
employment dynamics and specify separate outcome equations for either the probability of staying 
in employment or of leaving non–employment.  Considering the transition from non–employment 
to employment to be less likely than the probability of staying in employment, modeling the em-
ployment outcome as transition rates is more appropriate than using unconditional employment 
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rates.  In the case of such an employment outcome, the training effects become in some cases posi-
tive, but mostly insignificant.   Training as a first treatment shows mostly insignificant but for some 
cases positive effects on the employment probabilities conditional upon the employment state in 
the previous month.  The effect depends on the time the programs took place corresponding to the 
institutional changes taking place during the 90s.  Combined sequences of two programs with a 
first training program do not prove successful.  The incremental effects of the second treatment 
however appear to have slightly positive effects on the probability to remain employed.   
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2.7 Appendix 
Table 2.A1 Descriptive statistics for participants in 1st further training and non–participants 
 Treated Non–treated Total  
 Mean Std–Dev Mean Std–Dev Mean Std–Dev 
Age 1990 36.5509 7.0363 37.8967 7.3796 37.6311 7.3321 
Gender (1= female) 0.5858 0.4928 0.4500 0.4976 0.4768 0.4995 
Region 
Dessau 0.1309 0.3375 0.1142 0.3181 0.1175 0.3221 
Halberstadt 0.0902 0.2866 0.0944 0.2925 0.0936 0.2913 
Halle 0.1620 0.3686 0.1951 0.3963 0.1886 0.3912 
Magdeburg 0.2338 0.4234 0.2411 0.4278 0.2397 0.4269 
Merseburg 0.1445 0.3518 0.1290 0.3353 0.1321 0.3386 
Sangerhausen 0.1232 0.3288 0.0923 0.2895 0.0984 0.2979 
Stendal 0.0660 0.2483 0.0837 0.2770 0.0802 0.2716 
Wittenberg 0.0495 0.2170 0.0501 0.2181 0.0500 0.2179 
Professional education 
Semi–skilled worker 0.0107 0.1028 0.0143 0.1188 0.0136 0.1158 
Skilled worker 0.4772 0.4997 0.4140 0.4926 0.4265 0.4946 
Craftsman 0.0640 0.2449 0.0808 0.2726 0.0775 0.2675 
Technical college 0.1872 0.3903 0.1913 0.3934 0.1905 0.3927 
University education 0.2444 0.4300 0.2757 0.4469 0.2695 0.4438 
Participation 
Begin of treatment 50.8700 28.8891     
End of treatment 66.3395 28.8847     
Number of observations 1031 4193 5224 
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Table 2.A2 Descriptive statistics for participants in 2nd further training and non–participants 
 Treated Non–treated Total  
 Mean Std–Dev Mean Std–Dev Mean Std–Dev 
Age 1990 36.3871 6.8838 37.6850 7.3468 37.6311 7.3321 
Gender (1= female) 0.7419 0.4386 0.4654 0.4989 0.4768 0.4995 
Region 
Dessau 0.1567 0.3643 0.1158 0.3201 0.1175 0.3221 
Halberstadt 0.0876 0.2833 0.0939 0.2917 0.0936 0.2913 
Halle 0.1475 0.3554 0.1903 0.3926 0.1886 0.3912 
Magdeburg 0.2258 0.4191 0.2403 0.4273 0.2397 0.4269 
Merseburg 0.1429 0.3507 0.1316 0.3381 0.1321 0.3386 
Sangerhausen 0.1336 0.3411 0.0969 0.2958 0.0984 0.2979 
Stendal 0.0461 0.2102 0.0817 0.2739 0.0802 0.2716 
Wittenberg 0.0599 0.2379 0.0495 0.2170 0.0500 0.2179 
Professional education 
Semi–skilled worker 0.0046 0.0679 0.0140 0.1174 0.0136 0.1158 
Skilled worker 0.5207 0.5007 0.4224 0.4940 0.4265 0.4946 
Craftsman 0.0277 0.1644 0.0797 0.2708 0.0775 0.2675 
Technical college 0.1843 0.3887 0.1907 0.3929 0.1905 0.3927 
University education 0.2581 0.4386 0.2700 0.4440 0.2695 0.4438 
Participation 
Begin of treatment 77.4793 22.5928     
End of treatment 87.0230 20.9206     
Number of observations 217 5007 5224 
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Table 2.A3 Propensity score estimations for 1st and 2nd further training programmes 
 1st Further Training 2nd Further Training 
Parameter Estimate t–statistic Estimate t–statistic 
Constant -0.95499 -5.55459 -2.23460 -5.81302 
Age 35 - 44 -0.09174 -2.00778 -0.07353 -1.02142 
Age 45 and older  -0.30528 -5.44670 -0.27571 -2.95357 
Region 
Halberstadt -0.08435 -0.95830 -0.14740 -1.06757 
Halle -0.17174 -2.29109 -0.24357 -2.07289 
Magdeburg -0.10208 -1.44008 -0.18402 -1.68509 
Merseburg -0.01614 -0.20355 -0.09536 -0.78347 
Sangerhausen 0.08255 0.97595 0.01502 0.11780 
Stendal -0.21131 -2.23869 -0.36481 -2.26036 
Wittenberg -0.09081 -0.84968 -0.07440 -0.46031 
Professional education (all) 
Skilled worker 0.08384 0.50110 0.40526 1.05797 
Craftsman -0.00739 -0.04022 -0.05233 -0.11637 
Technical college 0.30257 1.66604 0.34878 0.84045 
University education 0.18180 1.07158 0.56095 1.45740 
Professional education (women) 
Semi-skilled worker 0.14164 0.44635   
Skilled worker 0.50664 8.32502 0.66004 6.55025 
Craftsman 0.77006 4.32762 0.95078 2.71710 
Technical college -0.03407 -0.34066 0.47237 2.39654 
University education 0.12014 1.51021 0.33052 2.66986 
Number of Observations 5165 5165 
Number of pos. Observations 1021 216 
LR (zero slopes) 149.588 107.587 
Log likelihood -2493.06 -843.292 
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Table 2.A4 Estimation results of the effects of 1. further training on differences in employment 
 NEAREST  NEIGHBOURS NADARAYA-WATSON LOCAL LIN. h=ROT LOCAL LIN. h=0.06 LOCAL LIN. h=0.02 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
ao 0.1266 9.4509 -0.1180 -3.8384 -0.1117 -3.8218 -0.0643 -1.9405 -0.1382 -5.7269 
a1 -0.0143 -22.8885 -0.0054 -5.6725 -0.0057 -6.2094 -0.0070 -7.0837 -0.0050 -6.1978 
a2 0.0001 19.2843 0.0000 5.2796 0.0000 5.7068 0.0000 6.5977 0.0000 5.6538 
aage controls -0.0195 -1.9280 0.0393 3.1854 0.0475 3.9300 0.0632 5.2389 0.0418 3.7839 
a sex controls 0.2163 2.4345 -0.1031 -0.5545 -0.2712 -1.7915 -0.4032 -1.9227 -0.1713 -1.7407 
a another ALMP 
before controls 
0.5457 21.2612 1.4912 3.6341 1.4886 3.6794 1.9996 4.1505 1.1314 3.9086 
a age treated -0.0024 -0.2433 -0.0477 -6.3903 -0.0477 -6.3875 -0.0476 -6.3829 -0.0477 -6.4177 
a sex treated -0.2486 -2.7955 -0.0672 -9.1897 -0.0667 -9.1341 -0.0669 -9.1509 -0.0663 -9.0695 
a another ALMP 
before treated 
-0.5292 -42.7166 -0.5476 -52.0288 -0.5479 -52.0362 -0.5480 -52.0360 -0.5482 -51.8882 
b -6,0 -0.7516 -6.3773 -0.5878 -5.3511 -0.5640 -5.1612 -0.6700 -5.9039 -0.4830 -4.7534 
b -5,0 -0.6258 -6.8274 -0.4413 -4.8846 -0.4245 -4.7378 -0.5287 -5.6293 -0.3449 -4.1582 
b -4,0 -0.5034 -8.4243 -0.3524 -5.3109 -0.3442 -5.2676 -0.4441 -6.3323 -0.2840 -4.9525 
b -3,0 -0.4424 -10.2938 -0.3129 -5.6407 -0.3091 -5.6985 -0.3993 -6.7128 -0.2472 -5.2250 
b -2,0 -0.4178 -11.3945 -0.3469 -6.1567 -0.3381 -6.1326 -0.4264 -6.9279 -0.2683 -5.7436 
b -1,0 -0.5285 -13.8837 -0.4840 -7.3886 -0.4710 -7.3173 -0.5570 -7.6663 -0.3944 -7.4626 
b 1,0 -0.5932 -14.0871 -0.3255 -6.4622 -0.3496 -7.1583 -0.3568 -6.7021 -0.3485 -8.1196 
b 2,0 -0.5582 -13.3336 -0.2910 -5.8398 -0.3148 -6.5146 -0.3225 -6.1312 -0.3145 -7.3843 
b 3,0 -0.5236 -12.2935 -0.2601 -5.2753 -0.2838 -5.9351 -0.2920 -5.6137 -0.2844 -6.7280 
b 4,0 -0.5371 -12.4872 -0.2546 -5.1960 -0.2783 -5.8539 -0.2869 -5.5623 -0.2798 -6.6330 
b 5,0 -0.5343 -12.5007 -0.2442 -5.0277 -0.2679 -5.6823 -0.2769 -5.4206 -0.2702 -6.4371 
b 6,0 -0.5086 -11.9074 -0.2315 -4.8113 -0.2552 -5.4614 -0.2645 -5.2319 -0.2584 -6.1989 
b 7,0 -0.4927 -11.2618 -0.2188 -4.5786 -0.2424 -5.2185 -0.2523 -5.0281 -0.2466 -5.9358 
b 8,0 -0.4915 -11.0077 -0.2081 -4.3817 -0.2314 -5.0113 -0.2419 -4.8560 -0.2365 -5.7105 
b 9,0 -0.4600 -10.2434 -0.1807 -3.8495 -0.2040 -4.4698 -0.2148 -4.3630 -0.2101 -5.1278 
b 10,0 -0.4328 -9.4541 -0.1492 -3.2152 -0.1722 -3.8163 -0.1835 -3.7726 -0.1784 -4.4003 
b 11,0 -0.4213 -9.1192 -0.1317 -2.8603 -0.1548 -3.4563 -0.1665 -3.4500 -0.1620 -4.0203 
b 12,0 -0.4155 -8.9978 -0.1080 -2.3686 -0.1312 -2.9595 -0.1432 -2.9969 -0.1404 -3.5161 
b 13,0 -0.4073 -8.8577 -0.0828 -1.8277 -0.1059 -2.4038 -0.1183 -2.4930 -0.1163 -2.9310 
b 14,0 -0.3963 -8.4863 -0.0672 -1.4943 -0.0902 -2.0638 -0.1030 -2.1857 -0.1014 -2.5739 
b 15,0 -0.3630 -7.5012 -0.0516 -1.1632 -0.0749 -1.7371 -0.0881 -1.8947 -0.0872 -2.2477 
b 16,0 -0.3853 -7.8562 -0.0391 -0.8854 -0.0621 -1.4462 -0.0760 -1.6420 -0.0744 -1.9219 
b 17,0 -0.3540 -7.4480 -0.0192 -0.4369 -0.0422 -0.9883 -0.0565 -1.2259 -0.0561 -1.4584 
b 18,0 -0.3401 -7.0237 -0.0084 -0.1921 -0.0310 -0.7287 -0.0460 -1.0004 -0.0460 -1.2006 
b 19,0 -0.3254 -6.5487 0.0052 0.1196 -0.0175 -0.4114 -0.0329 -0.7161 -0.0327 -0.8531 
b 20,0 -0.3068 -6.1257 0.0040 0.0918 -0.0188 -0.4413 -0.0346 -0.7528 -0.0355 -0.9256 
b 21,0 -0.3128 -6.3476 0.0075 0.1704 -0.0152 -0.3556 -0.0316 -0.6855 -0.0325 -0.8454 
b 22,0 -0.2877 -5.7891 0.0303 0.6912 0.0081 0.1895 -0.0089 -0.1940 -0.0105 -0.2742 
b 23,0 -0.2947 -5.8678 0.0270 0.6141 0.0046 0.1087 -0.0127 -0.2745 -0.0140 -0.3635 
b 24,0 -0.2949 -5.6969 0.0291 0.6612 0.0069 0.1618 -0.0108 -0.2335 -0.0127 -0.3304 
b 25,0 -0.3031 -5.8570 0.0290 0.6558 0.0069 0.1603 -0.0112 -0.2405 -0.0136 -0.3514 
b 26,0 -0.3125 -6.0922 0.0430 0.9665 0.0208 0.4827 0.0022 0.0478 -0.0004 -0.0116 
b 27,0 -0.2856 -5.5179 0.0615 1.3781 0.0393 0.9077 0.0203 0.4303 0.0168 0.4336 
b 28,0 -0.2734 -5.2518 0.0679 1.5197 0.0457 1.0544 0.0261 0.5534 0.0225 0.5829 
b 29,0 -0.2640 -4.8911 0.0710 1.5776 0.0491 1.1231 0.0290 0.6088 0.0250 0.6417 
b 30,0 -0.2532 -4.6684 0.0803 1.7702 0.0583 1.3268 0.0379 0.7907 0.0333 0.8526 
b 31,0 -0.2531 -4.5041 0.0818 1.7894 0.0597 1.3471 0.0391 0.8083 0.0331 0.8426 
b 32,0 -0.2472 -4.3755 0.0827 1.7931 0.0608 1.3590 0.0398 0.8123 0.0332 0.8393 
b 33,0 -0.2486 -4.2236 0.0909 1.9501 0.0692 1.5328 0.0476 0.9618 0.0403 1.0119 
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Table 2.A4 (cont.) Estimation results of the effects of 1. further training on differences in employment 
 NEAREST NEIGH-
BOURS 
NADARAYA-
WATSON 
LOCAL LIN. h=ROT LOCAL LIN. h=0.06 LOCAL LIN. h=0.02 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
b 34,0 -0.2441 -4.1745 0.1009 2.1426 0.0791 1.7347 0.0572 1.1431 0.0490 1.2222 
b 35,0 -0.2346 -3.9837 0.1104 2.3185 0.0884 1.9180 0.0662 1.3069 0.0582 1.4372 
b 36,0 -0.2316 -3.9414 0.1188 2.4642 0.0969 2.0756 0.0741 1.4440 0.0657 1.6071 
b -6,1 0.0158 9.2680 0.0079 4.3194 0.0078 4.3248 0.0102 5.2622 0.0063 3.9756 
b -5,1 0.0136 9.5220 0.0057 3.5803 0.0056 3.6115 0.0080 4.7680 0.0041 2.9811 
b -4,1 0.0114 10.2306 0.0043 3.1641 0.0043 3.2612 0.0066 4.6267 0.0029 2.5748 
b -3,1 0.0099 10.3561 0.0034 2.6598 0.0034 2.7799 0.0056 4.1791 0.0020 1.8949 
b -2,1 0.0087 9.8345 0.0034 2.6303 0.0034 2.6702 0.0055 3.9619 0.0018 1.6996 
b -1,1 0.0098 10.6895 0.0050 3.4288 0.0049 3.4247 0.0070 4.3892 0.0032 2.7025 
b 1,1 0.0118 11.3687 0.0025 2.1296 0.0031 2.7225 0.0037 2.9533 0.0030 2.8991 
b 2,1 0.0114 10.9123 0.0022 1.8467 0.0028 2.4256 0.0033 2.6951 0.0026 2.5731 
b 3,1 0.0110 10.3014 0.0018 1.5164 0.0024 2.0827 0.0029 2.3915 0.0022 2.1953 
b 4,1 0.0114 10.5806 0.0018 1.5406 0.0024 2.1104 0.0029 2.4303 0.0022 2.2367 
b 5,1 0.0116 10.7344 0.0018 1.5831 0.0024 2.1554 0.0030 2.4832 0.0023 2.2949 
b 6,1 0.0112 10.3308 0.0017 1.4979 0.0023 2.0687 0.0029 2.4140 0.0022 2.2117 
b 7,1 0.0110 9.8547 0.0016 1.4082 0.0022 1.9739 0.0028 2.3390 0.0021 2.1222 
b 8,1 0.0114 9.7968 0.0017 1.4483 0.0022 2.0122 0.0028 2.3862 0.0022 2.1824 
b 9,1 0.0108 9.1574 0.0013 1.1493 0.0019 1.7057 0.0025 2.1108 0.0018 1.8587 
b 10,1 0.0105 8.7617 0.0009 0.7508 0.0014 1.2932 0.0020 1.7373 0.0014 1.4191 
b 11,1 0.0105 8.6447 0.0007 0.6101 0.0013 1.1514 0.0019 1.6143 0.0013 1.2783 
b 12,1 0.0107 8.7349 0.0004 0.3550 0.0010 0.8914 0.0016 1.3821 0.0010 1.0137 
b 13,1 0.0109 8.9146 0.0001 0.0811 0.0007 0.6084 0.0013 1.1287 0.0007 0.7252 
b 14,1 0.0108 8.5591 -0.0002 -0.1795 0.0004 0.3394 0.0010 0.8874 0.0004 0.4439 
b 15,1 0.0102 7.8135 -0.0006 -0.5408 0.0000 -0.0176 0.0006 0.5713 0.0001 0.0713 
b 16,1 0.0110 8.1163 -0.0008 -0.7039 -0.0002 -0.1877 0.0005 0.4251 -0.0001 -0.1028 
b 17,1 0.0102 7.8424 -0.0011 -1.0393 -0.0006 -0.5325 0.0001 0.1148 -0.0004 -0.4537 
b 18,1 0.0100 7.3993 -0.0013 -1.1973 -0.0007 -0.7005 0.0000 -0.0292 -0.0006 -0.6172 
b 19,1 0.0102 7.4025 -0.0015 -1.4052 -0.0009 -0.9136 -0.0002 -0.2196 -0.0008 -0.8426 
b 20,1 0.0095 6.8282 -0.0016 -1.4602 -0.0010 -0.9725 -0.0003 -0.2656 -0.0008 -0.8871 
b 21,1 0.0095 6.8238 -0.0017 -1.5829 -0.0011 -1.1023 -0.0004 -0.3754 -0.0009 -1.0146 
b 22,1 0.0089 6.2470 -0.0022 -2.0196 -0.0016 -1.5603 -0.0009 -0.7888 -0.0014 -1.5014 
b 23,1 0.0091 6.3160 -0.0022 -2.0077 -0.0016 -1.5463 -0.0009 -0.7701 -0.0014 -1.4696 
b 24,1 0.0091 6.0550 -0.0024 -2.2453 -0.0018 -1.7956 -0.0011 -0.9930 -0.0016 -1.7270 
b 25,1 0.0093 6.1282 -0.0026 -2.4140 -0.0020 -1.9750 -0.0013 -1.1515 -0.0018 -1.9119 
b 26,1 0.0097 6.2731 -0.0027 -2.5563 -0.0022 -2.1255 -0.0014 -1.2840 -0.0019 -2.0626 
b 27,1 0.0094 5.9549 -0.0030 -2.8220 -0.0025 -2.4033 -0.0017 -1.5309 -0.0022 -2.3559 
b 28,1 0.0099 6.1354 -0.0034 -3.1308 -0.0028 -2.7246 -0.0020 -1.8151 -0.0025 -2.7136 
b 29,1 0.0097 5.6778 -0.0035 -3.2644 -0.0030 -2.8690 -0.0022 -1.9380 -0.0026 -2.8669 
b 30,1 0.0092 5.3058 -0.0037 -3.3804 -0.0031 -2.9936 -0.0023 -2.0472 -0.0028 -2.9927 
b 31,1 0.0095 5.1597 -0.0037 -3.4181 -0.0032 -3.0362 -0.0024 -2.0808 -0.0028 -3.0300 
b 32,1 0.0093 5.0117 -0.0038 -3.4990 -0.0033 -3.1265 -0.0025 -2.1576 -0.0029 -3.1193 
b 33,1 0.0100 5.1292 -0.0040 -3.6294 -0.0035 -3.2690 -0.0026 -2.2798 -0.0030 -3.2676 
b 34,1 0.0098 4.9230 -0.0043 -3.8455 -0.0037 -3.4954 -0.0029 -2.4847 -0.0033 -3.5098 
b 35,1 0.0096 4.8534 -0.0044 -3.9607 -0.0039 -3.6177 -0.0030 -2.5924 -0.0034 -3.6508 
b 36,1 0.0097 4.9259 -0.0046 -4.0811 -0.0040 -3.7474 -0.0032 -2.7051 -0.0036 -3.7886 
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Table 2.A4 (cont.) Estimation results of the effects of 1. further training on differences in employment 
 NEAREST NEIGH-
BOURS 
NADARAYA-
WATSON 
LOCAL LIN. h=ROT LOCAL LIN. h=0.06 LOCAL LIN. h=0.02 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
gADage controls,0 0.0033 0.0638 -0.3495 -5.3961 -0.2924 -4.4689 -0.3266 -4.9735 -0.2304 -3.8428 
g ADage controls,1 0.0003 0.0170 -0.0621 -2.1549 -0.0412 -1.4107 -0.0514 -1.7612 -0.0180 -0.7133 
g POage controls,0 -0.0377 -1.7835 -0.0995 -4.9446 -0.0832 -4.1631 -0.0926 -4.6154 -0.1013 -5.3734 
g POage controls ,1 0.0028 3.0381 0.0015 2.0149 0.0015 1.9570 0.0013 1.6886 0.0019 2.6185 
g AD age treated,0 0.0170 0.3321 0.0534 1.7855 0.0521 1.7363 0.0490 1.6396 0.0533 1.7747 
g AD age treated,1  0.0120 0.7420 0.0215 2.4931 0.0210 2.4285 0.0206 2.3948 0.0206 2.3906 
g POage treated,0 -0.0453 -2.1783 -0.0574 -4.2976 -0.0584 -4.3734 -0.0600 -4.4962 -0.0555 -4.1663 
g POage treated,1 -0.0008 -0.9422 0.0005 0.9221 0.0005 0.9031 0.0005 0.9696 0.0004 0.7943 
g ADsex controls,0 -0.0672 -0.1444 -2.4324 -3.0259 -1.5844 -2.1431 -1.7894 -1.8483 -0.8934 -1.8160 
g ADsex controls,1 -0.0190 -0.1276 -0.6192 -2.8531 -0.4293 -2.1863 -0.6040 -2.3863 -0.2110 -1.6961 
g POsex controls,0 -0.6278 -5.1170 -1.5294 -4.4950 -1.0604 -3.6618 -1.5267 -3.8120 -0.6190 -3.2255 
g POsex controls,1 0.0113 2.5283 0.0378 2.9447 0.0314 2.8961 0.0468 3.1226 0.0043 0.5804 
g ADsex treated,0 -0.0042 -0.0091 -0.0518 -1.8226 -0.0546 -1.9176 -0.0528 -1.8551 -0.0577 -2.0270 
g ADsex treated,1 0.0067 0.0450 -0.0042 -0.5212 -0.0047 -0.5763 -0.0046 -0.5725 -0.0047 -0.5849 
g POsex treated,0 0.4439 3.6138 -0.1645 -12.8935 -0.1643 -12.8840 -0.1647 -12.9051 -0.1633 -12.8055 
g POsex treated,1 -0.0092 -2.0517 0.0033 7.0234 0.0033 7.0376 0.0033 7.0146 0.0034 7.0795 
gAD another ALMP 
before controls,0 
-0.1452 -1.5123 -2.7769 -2.0226 -2.9127 -2.1247 -3.9735 -2.4438 -1.8270 -1.8597 
g AD another ALMP 
LMP before controls,1 
-0.0037 -0.1414 -0.2064 -0.5529 -0.3099 -0.8365 -0.1738 -0.3945 -0.3627 -1.3823 
g POanother ALMP 
LMP before controls,0 
-0.1050 -1.8189 -0.2864 -0.4185 -0.8246 -1.2393 -0.5720 -0.7313 -0.7151 -1.4935 
g PO another ALMP 
before controls,1 
0.0017 0.5519 0.0482 1.9538 0.0503 2.1141 0.0429 1.5301 0.0286 1.6593 
g AD another ALMP 
before treated,0 
0.3925 9.1539 0.4102 13.6398 0.4097 13.5801 0.4065 13.4947 0.4092 13.6641 
g AD another ALMP 
before treated,1 
0.0315 2.8605 0.0326 4.0752 0.0323 4.0355 0.0319 3.9951 0.0318 3.9852 
g PO another ALMP 
before treated,0 
0.4604 18.0888 0.4881 27.6976 0.4866 27.6247 0.4849 27.5063 0.4893 27.8076 
g PO another ALMP 
before treated,0  
0.0011 0.8389 0.0010 1.5709 0.0010 1.5517 0.0010 1.6218 0.0009 1.4765 
No. of obser-
vations 
5509 11504 11504 11504 11504 
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Table 2.A5 Estimation results of the effects of 2. further training on differences in employment 
 NEAREST NEIGH-
BOURS 
NADARAYA-
WATSON 
LOCAL LIN. h=ROT LOCAL LIN. h=0.06 LOCAL LIN. h=0.02 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
ao -0.2186 -2.7270 -0.3397 -3.0999 -0.3614 -3.3105 -0.3619 -3.3198 -0.3032 -3.4990 
a1 -0.0118 -4.8443 -0.0121 -5.0234 -0.0119 -4.8804 -0.0118 -4.8808 -0.0139 -6.2748 
a2 0.0001 4.5871 0.0001 6.3002 0.0001 6.2841 0.0001 6.2830 0.0001 7.4816 
aage controls 0.1212 3.9927 -0.1682 -2.7047 -0.1707 -2.7348 -0.1708 -2.7359 -0.0438 -0.6778 
a sex controls -0.1892 -7.5467 0.2046 0.3782 0.4168 0.8756 0.4088 0.8631 -0.2313 -1.1843 
a another ALMP 
before controls 
0.6330 19.1325 0.7701 1.1911 0.5709 0.9172 0.5682 0.9159 0.1220 0.3804 
a age treated -0.0814 -2.5082 0.0286 1.8706 0.0287 1.8804 0.0287 1.8805 0.0256 1.6905 
a another ALMP 
before treated 
-0.1524 -6.7059 -0.1448 -9.2263 -0.1441 -9.1406 -0.1441 -9.1395 -0.1405 -8.9652 
b -6,0 -0.4094 -1.6448 -0.7096 -2.8716 -0.6365 -2.6512 -0.6368 -2.6570 -0.7450 -4.2448 
b -5,0 -0.4514 -2.2161 -0.6152 -2.9572 -0.5564 -2.7406 -0.5566 -2.7459 -0.6573 -4.2069 
b -4,0 -0.6009 -3.6849 -0.5459 -3.2523 -0.5023 -3.0956 -0.5024 -3.1008 -0.5893 -4.6620 
b -3,0 -0.5935 -4.2151 -0.5021 -3.2861 -0.4751 -3.2424 -0.4751 -3.2473 -0.5300 -4.4480 
b -2,0 -0.6075 -4.3760 -0.5525 -3.4413 -0.5409 -3.5964 -0.5408 -3.6011 -0.5786 -4.9850 
b -1,0 -0.6624 -4.6467 -0.6039 -3.2669 -0.6077 -3.5804 -0.6075 -3.5853 -0.6282 -4.9950 
b 1,0 -0.4091 -1.9958 -0.3510 -2.1658 -0.3233 -2.0371 -0.3245 -2.0478 -0.5681 -4.4025 
b 2,0 -0.4057 -1.9572 -0.3598 -2.2488 -0.3326 -2.1206 -0.3338 -2.1309 -0.5721 -4.4600 
b 3,0 -0.3470 -1.6713 -0.3770 -2.4357 -0.3506 -2.3046 -0.3517 -2.3149 -0.5826 -4.6791 
b 4,0 -0.3866 -1.9062 -0.3972 -2.5976 -0.3710 -2.4662 -0.3720 -2.4762 -0.5953 -4.8035 
b 5,0 -0.2448 -1.2319 -0.4299 -2.8157 -0.4047 -2.6905 -0.4057 -2.7002 -0.6224 -4.9803 
b 6,0 -0.2230 -1.0957 -0.4629 -3.0209 -0.4382 -2.8989 -0.4390 -2.9082 -0.6492 -5.1166 
b 7,0 -0.1453 -0.6771 -0.4846 -3.2148 -0.4607 -3.0964 -0.4615 -3.1055 -0.6657 -5.3248 
b 8,0 0.0222 0.0985 -0.4429 -2.8308 -0.4191 -2.7094 -0.4198 -2.7168 -0.6123 -4.6244 
b 9,0 0.0397 0.1633 -0.4100 -2.5782 -0.3871 -2.4607 -0.3877 -2.4670 -0.5739 -4.2214 
b 10,0 -0.1292 -0.5299 -0.4341 -2.7517 -0.4118 -2.6377 -0.4123 -2.6437 -0.5898 -4.3570 
b 11,0 -0.2233 -0.8631 -0.4372 -2.8071 -0.4152 -2.6927 -0.4156 -2.6982 -0.5855 -4.3708 
b 12,0 -0.1742 -0.6800 -0.5218 -3.4756 -0.5002 -3.3649 -0.5006 -3.3707 -0.6630 -5.2173 
b 13,0 -0.2848 -1.2208 -0.5366 -3.6383 -0.5160 -3.5314 -0.5162 -3.5369 -0.6724 -5.3850 
b 14,0 -0.2570 -1.0973 -0.5067 -3.3881 -0.4867 -3.2840 -0.4869 -3.2886 -0.6368 -4.9856 
b 15,0 -0.2744 -1.1499 -0.5027 -3.3783 -0.4834 -3.2769 -0.4835 -3.2808 -0.6245 -4.8974 
b 16,0 -0.2321 -1.0062 -0.5200 -3.4358 -0.5014 -3.3352 -0.5014 -3.3384 -0.6361 -4.8456 
b 17,0 -0.3722 -1.6093 -0.5374 -3.5435 -0.5194 -3.4455 -0.5193 -3.4483 -0.6480 -4.9119 
b 18,0 -0.3325 -1.1035 -0.5565 -3.6872 -0.5393 -3.5929 -0.5391 -3.5953 -0.6585 -5.0143 
b 19,0 -0.2960 -0.9775 -0.5815 -3.8308 -0.5645 -3.7364 -0.5642 -3.7382 -0.6750 -5.0893 
b 20,0 -0.2412 -0.8015 -0.5971 -3.9443 -0.5813 -3.8612 -0.5809 -3.8627 -0.6842 -5.1948 
b 21,0 -0.2456 -0.8183 -0.6167 -4.2246 -0.6012 -4.1476 -0.6008 -4.1491 -0.6955 -5.5299 
b 22,0 -0.3072 -0.9133 -0.5979 -3.9032 -0.5827 -3.8344 -0.5822 -3.8348 -0.6693 -4.9903 
b 23,0 -0.3771 -1.0886 -0.6375 -4.1537 -0.6230 -4.0934 -0.6225 -4.0936 -0.7020 -5.2317 
b 24,0 -0.4091 -1.1321 -0.6184 -4.0269 -0.6044 -3.9713 -0.6037 -3.9709 -0.6752 -5.0508 
b 25,0 -0.3480 -0.9184 -0.6640 -4.3844 -0.6506 -4.3383 -0.6499 -4.3378 -0.7147 -5.4587 
b 26,0 -0.2387 -0.6314 -0.5969 -3.8762 -0.5841 -3.8332 -0.5833 -3.8317 -0.6392 -4.8058 
b 27,0 -0.3488 -0.8992 -0.5682 -3.5951 -0.5562 -3.5612 -0.5552 -3.5587 -0.6022 -4.3897 
b 28,0 -0.4243 -1.0616 -0.6029 -3.8251 -0.5918 -3.7982 -0.5908 -3.7955 -0.6306 -4.6038 
b 29,0 -0.4570 -1.0747 -0.6175 -3.9315 -0.6066 -3.9141 -0.6055 -3.9109 -0.6361 -4.6746 
b 30,0 -0.2914 -0.7737 -0.6418 -4.0364 -0.6310 -4.0273 -0.6298 -4.0239 -0.6510 -4.7420 
b 31,0 -0.3145 -0.8358 -0.6214 -3.8930 -0.6110 -3.8903 -0.6097 -3.8864 -0.6241 -4.5624 
b 32,0 -0.3318 -0.8849 -0.6435 -4.0243 -0.6337 -4.0327 -0.6323 -4.0284 -0.6387 -4.6856 
b 33,0 -0.3163 -0.7885 -0.5992 -3.6823 -0.5900 -3.6903 -0.5885 -3.6853 -0.5877 -4.2212 
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Table 2.A5 (cont.) Estimation results of the effects of 2. further training on differences in employment 
 NEAREST NEIGH-
BOURS 
NADARAYA-
WATSON 
LOCAL LIN. h=ROT LOCAL LIN. h=0.06 LOCAL LIN. h=0.02 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
b 34,0 -0.2616 -0.6171 -0.5585 -3.3778 -0.5497 -3.3811 -0.5482 -3.3754 -0.5376 -3.8035 
b 35,0 -0.1062 -0.2830 -0.5621 -3.3773 -0.5540 -3.3894 -0.5524 -3.3834 -0.5336 -3.7686 
b 36,0 0.0475 0.1249 -0.5796 -3.5072 -0.5718 -3.5273 -0.5701 -3.5211 -0.5424 -3.9072 
b -6,1 0.0108 2.7453 0.0160 4.2988 0.0151 4.1202 0.0151 4.1262 0.0178 6.0465 
b -5,1 0.0113 3.2456 0.0149 4.4955 0.0141 4.3196 0.0141 4.3248 0.0167 6.0644 
b -4,1 0.0135 4.3035 0.0138 4.7205 0.0132 4.5880 0.0132 4.5921 0.0157 6.2391 
b -3,1 0.0131 4.4211 0.0131 4.7515 0.0128 4.6964 0.0128 4.6999 0.0149 6.0954 
b -2,1 0.0131 4.4329 0.0137 4.8132 0.0135 4.8958 0.0135 4.8990 0.0154 6.3542 
b -1,1 0.0137 4.5451 0.0143 4.6156 0.0143 4.8396 0.0143 4.8431 0.0159 6.3557 
b 1,1 0.0125 3.2519 0.0117 4.0683 0.0113 3.9669 0.0113 3.9753 0.0158 6.2127 
b 2,1 0.0128 3.2657 0.0120 4.2242 0.0117 4.1224 0.0117 4.1305 0.0161 6.3477 
b 3,1 0.0121 3.0895 0.0123 4.3799 0.0119 4.2737 0.0119 4.2816 0.0162 6.4853 
b 4,1 0.0123 3.1720 0.0125 4.5072 0.0122 4.3988 0.0122 4.4063 0.0164 6.5721 
b 5,1 0.0099 2.5799 0.0130 4.6657 0.0127 4.5596 0.0127 4.5668 0.0168 6.6955 
b 6,1 0.0104 2.5760 0.0134 4.7804 0.0130 4.6746 0.0131 4.6815 0.0171 6.7513 
b 7,1 0.0093 2.1947 0.0136 4.8859 0.0132 4.7805 0.0132 4.7870 0.0172 6.8385 
b 8,1 0.0064 1.4871 0.0131 4.6764 0.0128 4.5709 0.0128 4.5766 0.0167 6.4980 
b 9,1 0.0065 1.4104 0.0129 4.5468 0.0126 4.4454 0.0126 4.4505 0.0163 6.3029 
b 10,1 0.0092 1.9113 0.0132 4.6776 0.0129 4.5769 0.0129 4.5816 0.0165 6.3948 
b 11,1 0.0110 2.2414 0.0132 4.7310 0.0129 4.6299 0.0129 4.6342 0.0165 6.4161 
b 12,1 0.0097 1.9974 0.0145 5.2640 0.0142 5.1612 0.0142 5.1656 0.0177 7.0048 
b 13,1 0.0115 2.4681 0.0148 5.4047 0.0145 5.3033 0.0145 5.3074 0.0179 7.1320 
b 14,1 0.0107 2.2760 0.0145 5.2754 0.0142 5.1768 0.0142 5.1803 0.0175 6.9430 
b 15,1 0.0120 2.4793 0.0144 5.2538 0.0141 5.1569 0.0141 5.1600 0.0173 6.8688 
b 16,1 0.0116 2.4039 0.0146 5.2749 0.0143 5.1776 0.0143 5.1801 0.0174 6.8244 
b 17,1 0.0145 2.8483 0.0150 5.4181 0.0147 5.3218 0.0147 5.3241 0.0177 6.9406 
b 18,1 0.0149 2.4142 0.0152 5.5256 0.0150 5.4312 0.0150 5.4331 0.0179 7.0124 
b 19,1 0.0138 2.1647 0.0157 5.6590 0.0154 5.5637 0.0154 5.5653 0.0182 7.0945 
b 20,1 0.0121 1.8828 0.0158 5.7221 0.0156 5.6334 0.0156 5.6347 0.0183 7.1403 
b 21,1 0.0115 1.7885 0.0158 5.8279 0.0156 5.7419 0.0156 5.7429 0.0182 7.2437 
b 22,1 0.0123 1.7520 0.0158 5.7055 0.0156 5.6279 0.0156 5.6284 0.0181 7.0349 
b 23,1 0.0134 1.8499 0.0163 5.8478 0.0161 5.7750 0.0161 5.7753 0.0184 7.1568 
b 24,1 0.0140 1.8067 0.0160 5.7679 0.0159 5.6999 0.0158 5.6998 0.0181 7.0485 
b 25,1 0.0119 1.4485 0.0165 5.9473 0.0163 5.8844 0.0163 5.8841 0.0185 7.2303 
b 26,1 0.0080 0.9617 0.0157 5.6374 0.0155 5.5801 0.0155 5.5793 0.0176 6.8657 
b 27,1 0.0103 1.1827 0.0154 5.4681 0.0152 5.4197 0.0152 5.4184 0.0172 6.6337 
b 28,1 0.0129 1.4108 0.0158 5.6184 0.0156 5.5710 0.0156 5.5694 0.0175 6.7545 
b 29,1 0.0142 1.4444 0.0159 5.6631 0.0157 5.6197 0.0157 5.6177 0.0175 6.7675 
b 30,1 0.0088 0.9898 0.0164 5.8072 0.0163 5.7698 0.0163 5.7676 0.0179 6.8853 
b 31,1 0.0111 1.2800 0.0161 5.6783 0.0159 5.6487 0.0159 5.6462 0.0175 6.7419 
b 32,1 0.0114 1.3180 0.0163 5.7543 0.0162 5.7312 0.0162 5.7284 0.0176 6.8012 
b 33,1 0.0104 1.0584 0.0158 5.5407 0.0157 5.5211 0.0157 5.5179 0.0170 6.5317 
b 34,1 0.0081 0.7089 0.0153 5.3142 0.0151 5.2951 0.0151 5.2915 0.0163 6.2464 
b 35,1 0.0017 0.1849 0.0153 5.3139 0.0152 5.3015 0.0152 5.2976 0.0163 6.2254 
b 36,1 -0.0037 -0.4498 0.0154 5.3651 0.0153 5.3581 0.0153 5.3541 0.0162 6.2806 
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Table 2.A5 (cont.) Estimation results of the effects of 2. further training on differences in employment 
 NEAREST NEIGH-
BOURS 
NADARAYA-
WATSON 
LOCAL LIN. h=ROT LOCAL LIN. h=0.06 LOCAL LIN. h=0.02 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
gADage controls,0 -0.1663 -1.6304 -0.0225 -0.1211 -0.0160 -0.0860 -0.0161 -0.0867 0.0387 0.3942 
g ADage controls,1 -0.0195 -0.8069 -0.0504 -0.7706 -0.0479 -0.7299 -0.0479 -0.7299 -0.0229 -0.7734 
g POage controls,0 -0.2422 -2.8807 0.0963 1.2041 0.1010 1.2567 0.1011 1.2575 0.1808 2.3848 
g POage controls ,1 0.0144 3.8364 0.0002 0.0844 0.0000 -0.0107 0.0000 -0.0108 -0.0080 -2.9862 
g AD age treated,0 0.1214 1.1241 -0.0534 -1.3842 -0.0531 -1.3742 -0.0530 -1.3738 -0.0513 -1.3375 
g AD age treated,1  0.0226 0.8755 0.0017 0.1711 0.0018 0.1788 0.0018 0.1792 0.0016 0.1602 
g POage treated,0 -0.1259 -1.4437 0.0218 0.9467 0.0215 0.9370 0.0215 0.9376 0.0175 0.7649 
g POage treated,1 -0.0198 -4.9271 -0.0041 -4.9966 -0.0041 -4.9945 -0.0041 -4.9948 -0.0038 -4.6584 
g ADsex controls,0 0.1084 1.2987 1.9883 1.2309 0.9523 0.7041 0.9591 0.7125 1.0475 2.0355 
g ADsex controls,1 0.0059 0.2786 0.4420 1.0636 0.1849 0.5319 0.1865 0.5392 0.1757 1.3262 
g POsex controls,0 0.0167 0.2704 0.0204 0.0265 -0.0490 -0.0715 -0.0543 -0.0797 -0.4355 -1.4575 
g POsex controls,1 0.0017 0.4717 0.0302 1.0726 0.0274 1.0939 0.0274 1.1000 0.0149 1.3626 
gAD another ALMP 
before controls,0 
-0.1604 -1.3169 -0.5969 -0.3615 -0.7743 -0.5265 -0.7722 -0.5267 -0.2013 -0.2656 
g AD another ALMP 
LMP before controls,1 
-0.0128 -0.4286 -0.1087 -0.2415 -0.2495 -0.5978 -0.2485 -0.5974 -0.1560 -0.7467 
g POanother ALMP 
LMP before controls,0 
-0.0034 -0.0490 2.0769 2.1183 2.3533 2.5407 2.3398 2.5342 0.6360 1.3175 
g PO another ALMP 
before controls,1 
-0.0250 -5.3561 -0.1249 -3.7869 -0.1316 -4.3246 -0.1308 -4.3123 -0.0418 -2.5395 
g AD another ALMP 
before treated,0 
0.1133 1.4972 0.0565 1.4574 0.0577 1.4724 0.0577 1.4722 0.0511 1.3162 
g AD another ALMP 
before treated,1 
0.0054 0.2856 -0.0023 -0.2181 -0.0016 -0.1559 -0.0016 -0.1562 -0.0026 -0.2507 
g PO another ALMP 
before treated,0 
0.2733 4.1594 -0.0497 -2.1403 -0.0511 -2.1980 -0.0511 -2.1972 -0.0394 -1.7044 
g PO another ALMP 
before treated,0  
-0.0191 -5.0073 0.0008 0.9522 0.0008 1.0072 0.0008 1.0054 0.0003 0.4262 
No. of obser-
vations 
40095 50917 50917 50917 50917 
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3 Using social insurance data for the evaluation of active labour market 
policy: Employment effects of further training for the unemployed in 
Germany 
3.1 Introduction1 
In 2002 the German Federal Employment Service (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, BA) spent around 20 
Bill. € for Active Labour Market Policies (ALMP)2 – mainly for further training and temporary em-
ployment aiming at the (re–) integration of unemployed.  The main question for social scientists as 
well as for policy makers is whether these policies actually increased the employment chances of 
the people they seek to help.   
Over the last years, a number of surveys have been published about the effectiveness of the pro-
grammes summarising empirical evaluation studies of further training and job creation schemes in 
Germany (Fitzenberger, Speckesser 2000, 2002; Hagen, Steiner 2000; Rabe 2000; Fertig et al. 
2001; Hujer, Caliendo 2001).  Practically all the studies make use of the micro data of panel surveys 
(such as the German Socio–Economic Panel [GSOEP] and the Labour Market Monitors for East 
Germany [LMM] or for the Federal State of Saxony–Anhalt [LMM–SA]).  Although the GSOEP and 
the LMM–SA are both rich with respect to informative covariates, which can be of help to overcome 
the microeconomic evaluation problem, the evaluation studies summarised in these surveys suffer 
from severe shortcomings with respect to the quality of the treatment information and to the preci-
sion of the employment history before and after treatment.  Besides, most evaluation studies only 
assess the effects of such policies in East Germany and only for an early period in the beginning 90’s 
(up to 94, because the income maintenance information used for the identification of public sector 
sponsored further training was then dropped out of the questionnaire for the GSOEP).  Finally the 
samples sizes of these studies are on average small and do neither allow the researcher to evaluate 
the effects of any heterogeneous treatment nor of treatments which are explicitly offered to specific 
target groups (e.g. short–term or long–term unemployed).  As a conclusion of all these shortcomings 
of the available data, the use of alternative data is necessary in order to estimate the effects of het-
erogeneous treatments.  To draw such kind of inference the researcher needs more information 
about the employment history of the individual, and especially a larger sample size than provided 
by the panel surveys of the 90’s.   
                                                          
1  This study is a part of the project “On the effectiveness of further training programmes.  An evaluation 
based on register data provided by the Institute of Employment Research, IAB (Über die Wirksamkeit von 
Fortbildungs– und Umschulungsmaßnahmen.  Ein Evaluationsversuch mit prozessproduzierten Daten aus 
dem IAB)”.  The data were generated within a joint project of the Chair of Econometrics at the University 
of Mannheim and the Swiss Institute for International Economics and Applied Economic Research at the 
University of St. Gallen (SIAW) (more information about the data and the construction of an integrated 
evaluation sample can be obtained in Bender et al. 2004).  Financial and technical support by the IAB un-
der contract number 6-531 A of the Federal Employment Service is gratefully acknowledged.  The project 
group is grateful to the Federal Ministry of Economics and Labour (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und 
Arbeit) for the provision of non anonymous data under the regulation of § 75 SGB X.   
 Of course, neither institution bears any responsibility for the uses made of the data, nor the inferences 
drawn by the author. 
2 http://www.arbeitsamt.de/hst/services/geschaeftsbericht/gb2002.pdf 
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This evaluation study is the first attempt to take advantage of the official social insurance data which 
are generated by the mandatory social insurance bodies and which are practically available for total 
dependent employment and registered unemployment.  These data – the employment register – 
consist of the employment history for approximately 50,000,000 individuals over the years 75 to 
97.  As the main source for this paper, we use a 1% non–anonymous subsample of these data.  Reg-
ister data were then merged in a  multiple–step procedure with benefit data for the unemployed and 
participants in training programmes and with data surveyed in the local offices of the Federal Em-
ployment Service for the participants in further training programmes for the period 80–97.  Com-
pared to the data of the GSOEP and other surveys, the data used in this paper offer rich information 
about quite heterogeneous courses: further training consists of a) the provision of specific occupa-
tional skills, b) complete retraining of the employed in order to obtain a formal degree for a different 
profession, c) short–term courses which increase the search effectiveness of the individuals or d) 
German language courses for the immigrants.  The data used in this study allow to distinguish these 
treatments and to examine the effects of informative categories of treatments for important target 
groups. 
This paper suggests to focus rather on types of training than on programmes and discusses how fur-
ther training can influence the employment prospects if a specific treatment is given to target groups 
experiencing a specific unemployment duration. In this paper we evaluate the most important type. 
From the technical point of view, the paper makes use of a conditional independence assumption 
which claims that the employment outcome for the treated and the non–treated populations in case 
of non–treatment are similar conditional on a set of covariates which cover socio–economic charac-
teristics as well as the previous employment history of the individuals, so that we can estimate the 
programme impact based on non–experimental data.  Due to a consistent stratification of treatment 
and control groups based on the same lay off time and the same duration of unemployment before 
treatment, no further differencing with respect to unobservable characteristics is taken into consid-
eration.  The analysis makes use of the popular matching approach.  We implement kernel match-
ing on the propensity score (Rosenbaum, Rubin 1983).  Within matched samples we compare the 
employment levels of treated and matched controls in a nonparametric way. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 3.2 gives a short description of the insti-
tutional regulation and the basic participation figures of ALMP.  The further training programmes 
considered in this study were carried out in accordance to the Labour Promotion Act (Arbeits-
förderungsgesetz, AFG).  However, the institutional regulation of further training does not provide 
information about specific policies implemented according to this regulation.  Therefore, section 3.3 
provides an understandable plot of the different options of further training, their target groups and 
course contents.  Section 3.3 also describes how data were merged from different sources and how 
we identify different treatments. 
Section 3.4 discusses the microeconomic evaluation problem and describes the the approach taken 
to control for selection on observables with a matching approach based on a non–parametric kernel 
regression.  It implements this methodology based on panel data and estimates the employment 
effects.  Section 3.5 offers a conclusion.   
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As in the case for the old evaluation studies based on survey data, the results indicate again that the 
estimated effects are in most cases negative, at best insignificant.   
3.2 Regulation of further training 
3.2.1 Programmes 
For the period of observation, further training in Germany is regulated on the basis of the Labour 
Promotion Act (Arbeitsförderungsgesetz, AFG) and is offered and co–ordinated by the German Fed-
eral Employment Service.  It aims at ensuring or improving occupational flexibility, career ad-
vancement and the prevention of skill shortages.  However, following the persistent unemployment 
after the 70’s, the programmes of further training change their character from a preventive ALMP 
rather towards an intervention policy offered to unemployed and those who are at severe risk of 
becoming unemployed.  However, the new target groups are offered the same type of programmes 
as formerly to the employed, either further training, retraining programmes or integration subsidies 
(“Fortbildung und Umschulung”, FuU).   
The increasing number of unemployed entering these programmes changed the aims of the pro-
grammes from the skill–upgrading programmes that were focused to the employed to short–term 
programmes in which individuals are taught new technologies and partial enhancement of existing 
skills for occupational re-integration.  Although many changes concerning benefit level and eligibil-
ity groups were implemented the traditional policies further training, retraining and integration sub-
sidy – remained unchanged until 97 and are still in practice today.  In the following, we give a short 
description of the programmes: 
§ Further training includes the assessment, maintenance and extension of skills, including 
technical development and career advancement (Weiterbildung).  The duration of the 
courses depends on individual pre–dispositions, other co–financing institutions and ade-
quate courses provided by the training suppliers. 
§ Retraining enables vocational re–orientation if a completed vocational training does not 
lead to adequate employment (Umschulung).  Re–training is supported for a period up to 2 
years and aims a providing a new certified occupational skill. 
§ As third programme of further training, the integration subsidy (Einarbeitungszuschuss) of-
fers financial aid to employers providing employment to workers who have been unem-
ployed or directly threatened by unemployment.  The BA offers the grant for an adjustment 
period until the supported persons reach full proficiency in their job.  The amount and the 
duration of the payment depend on the difference between the current productivity level of 
the employee and that required by the job (up to 50% of the standard wage in the respective 
occupation).   
§ In 79, short-term training was introduced under §41a AFG aiming to “increase prospects of 
integration”.  With this programme, skill assessment, orientation and guidance should be of-
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fered to unemployed.  The curricula under this programme are usually short–term lasting 
from two weeks up to two months and are intended to increase the placement rate of the 
unemployed.  Most of these programmes did not supply additional qualifications to the par-
ticipants, but aim at keeping their search behaviour upright and increasing the integration. 
Except for the integration subsidy in which participants are paid the standard salaries, the schemes 
work under the same conditions for the participants: Participants in full–time courses are granted an 
income maintenance (Unterhaltsgeld) if the conditions of entitlement are satisfied.  Under certain 
conditions a proportional income maintenance may also be granted to persons who are participat-
ing in a part–time course.  To qualify, persons must meet the requirement of being previously em-
ployed for a minimum duration during a set period of time, i.e. at least 1 year in contributory em-
ployment or receipt of unemployment benefit or subsequent unemployment assistance.  The set 
period may be extended for persons returning to the labour market.   
The income maintenance amounts to 67% of wages for participants with at least one dependent 
child, otherwise 60% which is equivalent to the unemployment benefit.  However, benefits used to 
be much higher for the 80’s and early 90’s with up to 80% of previous net earnings granted under 
specific conditions.  If a person does not fulfil the requirement of previous employment, but had 
received unemployment assistance until the start of the measure, an income maintenance may be 
paid as well.  While participating on the FuU schemes, participants re–qualify for unemployment 
insurance payments providing additional incentives to them to participate in programmes.  The BA 
bears all the costs of further training incurred directly through the training scheme, especially in-
cluding course fees.   
3.2.2 Changes in the regulation 
Programme changes 
Over the 80’s and 90’s policy changes are  implemented in the AFG regulation on further training.  
The major change is the termination of the “programme to increase the prospects of integration” 
(Programme zur Verbesserung der Vermittlungsaussichten, § 41a) in 92 when another programme 
substitutes it, which is  no longer considered as part of further training but of the general placement 
activity: participants starting this programme after 92 are  then recorded as unemployed while being 
treated.   
Changes of the benefit level 
Other important changes concern the level of the income maintenance.  Starting from a level of 
80% for participation in a programme, it is reduced to 75% for individuals with and 68% for those 
without children in 82.  In 84, a further reduction leads to a level of 68%/ 63% of the previous net 
earnings, which then is revised when the level increased back to 73%/70% in 86.  After 91, mi-
grants do no longer receive income maintenance because a special income maintenance scheme is 
implemented for this target group.  Up to 92, participants in language courses are a substantial 
quantity of the ALMP participants – not only in language courses, but also in occupational skill ad-
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justment programmes.  In 94 finally, the level of benefits for participants in any programme of fur-
ther training was reduced to 65%/60% of their previous earnings which corresponds also to the 
current benefit level. 
The grant of income maintenance always depends on the type of promotion, whether it is a “neces-
sary” participation because of individual unemployment or severe risks of becoming unemployed or 
whether participation is considered as “advisable” in terms of future employment and earnings ef-
fects for the participants.  A formal entitlement for the payment of income maintenance is only 
given to participants with “necessary” participation, however, the judgement about whether the 
programme is advisable or necessary lies in the responsibility of the individual employment office.   
Further training for the employed ended 
Further training offered to the employed or offered to unemployed without satisfying the condition 
of “necessary” training often consists of training provided to the employed for upper professional 
training and career advancement (“advisable training”).  In the 80’s, individuals participating under 
advisable training are also granted income maintenance payments and reimbursed for any course 
fees by the BA.  A major change takes place when income maintenance for advisable promotion of 
further training is granted as a loan after 82 with more restrictive criteria for the employed.  Indi-
viduals entering after 82 will therefore have a different incentive structure then before.  In 86, the 
criteria for adjustment and skill increase are weakened again, so that more employed persons are 
supposed to start these programmes.   
The “advisable” promotion of further training terminates in 94.  After 94, mainly unemployed par-
ticipants start a programme of further training, although especially in East Germany the participation 
under the weak criterion of “threatened by unemployment” still allows employed participants di-
rectly to start an ALMP programme even if there was no previous period of unemployment.  Given 
these differences in the participation structure of FuU and the changes in the legislation decreasing 
the incentives for employed individuals to participate in either one of these schemes, FuU can be 
considered to be a programme mainly focusing on the unemployed from the mid 80’s onwards.   
3.2.3 Participation 
Among the three FuU programmes, the general further training scheme (Berufliche Weiterbildung) is 
the by far most important in both East and West Germany.  Starting with a total of 232,500 partici-
pants in 80, about 70% of all participants started a further training scheme, whereas only 14% 
(32,600) begin a programme under the Integration subsidy (Eingliederungszuschüsse) scheme.  New 
participants in the retraining programme summed up to 37,900 (Berufliche Umschulung, about 16% 
of total).  On average, participant stock is about 89,300 in 80.  In 85, participant entries are already 
60% higher in total, with a specific gain in the further training programmes then amounting to 80% 
of all participant entries.  Between 80 to 90, participation in public sector sponsored further training 
more than doubles to 514,600, 74% of these are entries in further training programme.  The retrain-
ing programme has on average participation increases to 63,300 in 90 from 37,900 in 80.   
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When labour market policy is extended to East Germany, participation peaks at 887,600 entries in 
East Germany in 92 and 574,700 in West Germany and then declines to 378,400 in West Germany 
and 269,200 in East Germany in 96.  Over the years further training increases its share to 77% in 
West and 76% in East Germany.  The share of participants in retraining amounts to 20% in West 
and 18% in East Germany.  
Table 3.1 Participation in further training until 1997 
Annual entries Year 
Total Further 
training 
Retraining Integration 
Subsidy 
Annual 
average 
stocks 
1980 232,500 162,400 37,900 32,600 89,300 
1985 371,000 298,200 45,100 27,700 114,900 
1990 514,600 383,400 63,300 67,900 167,600 
1991 
West: 540,600 421,200 70,500 48,900 189,000 
East: 705,300 442,800 129,900 132,600 76,700 
1992 
West: 574,700 464,500 81,500 28,700 180,600 
East: 887,600 591,000 183,100 113,500 292,600 
1993 
West: 348,100 266,000 72,200 9,900 176,800 
East: 294,200 181,600 81,500 31,100 309,100 
1994 
West: 306,800 224,900 73,100 8,800 177,900 
East: 286,900 199,100 68,600 19,200 217,400 
1995 
West: 401,600 309,700 81,800 10,000 193,300 
East: 257,500 184,300 52,800 26,400 216,100 
1996 
West: 378,400 291,600 77,300 9,500 203,600 
East: 269,200 204,100 48,100 17,000 205,000 
 
Source: Amtliche Nachrichten der Bundesanstalt für Arbeit,  
several volumes 
3.3 Social insurance data  
3.3.1 Merging insurance account data with participation data  
The subsequent evaluation study is based on social insurance data and on data for training partici-
pants: On the one hand, the IAB Employment Subsample (IABS) consists of insurance register data 
for each employee recorded by the German social insurance system. Individuals in dependent em-
ployment are usually subject to the mandatory social insurance system. The IABS additionally re-
ports episodes, which individuals spent in unemployment related to benefit payments (see Bender, 
Haas, Klose 2000).  On the other hand, the German Employment Service used to report the struc-
ture, contents, duration and benefit payment for participants in further training schemes in a 
monthly survey as a result of internal and external monitoring objectives (FuU–data, see Bender et 
al. 2004).  The following section describes these basic data, the problem of creating an integrated 
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evaluation data base, how data are prepared for the subsequent analysis and how the information 
provided by the IABSLED– and the FuU–data were used in order to identify fairly homogeneous 
treatments in data. 
3.3.1.1 Employment subsample and the benefit recipients data 
The IABS consists of two major statistics: the core data are drawn from the Employment Subsample 
(Beschäftigtenstichprobe BST) of the Institute for Employment Research (IAB).  The BST is  a 1% 
random sample drawn from the mandatory employment register data for all employees who are 
covered by the social security system over the period 75–97.  Data are based on an integrated re-
porting system for all social insurance bodies (health, retirement and unemployment insurance) that 
are mandatory for all employees.  The procedure requires employers to report the beginning or end-
ing of any employment subject to social insurance contributions.  Additionally, employers are 
obliged to provide information on every ongoing employment subject to social insurance payments 
on December 31 of every year.  Information reported by the employer at every observation includes 
individual characteristics, such as sex, nationality, educational attainment, as well as gross earnings 
over the last employment spell.  The accounted earnings of these data serve as the basis for social 
insurance payments (especially unemployment benefit and pension payments).  Social insurance 
contributions are compulsory for dependent employees earning above a minimum wage that is free 
of social insurance contributions for the period we observe here.  However, among the dependent 
employees specific groups working on a part–time basis with few weekly hours and civil servants 
are excluded.  Although these groups are not sampled, the IABS covers approximately 80% of the 
German labour force. 
The second important source apart from the information of the BST is the benefit payment register 
(Leistungsempfängerdatei [LED]) of the Federal Employment Service.  LED data consist of spells for 
individuals who receive certain benefit payments from the BA.  Besides unemployment benefit or 
assistance, these data also record very detailed information about income maintenance payments 
related to the participation in further training schemes.   
The integrated data of the IABS comprising BST and LED samples rich and longitudinal information 
about the whole employment history and the participation in public sector sponsored further train-
ing for the majority of the German labour force.  However, the “standard” IABS known from other 
empirical studies (e.g. Fitzenberger 1999) does not provide an adequate source for the evaluation of 
further training because it does not report the receipt of benefit if the BST reports employment at the 
same time.  These parallel spells are likely to occur in the case of further training: Participants may 
be recorded as employed while being on an on–the–job–training within a firm, even if they are not 
compensated by the employer and continue the reception of income maintenance payments related 
to training.  Due to this structural underreporting of further training, the IABS needed to be merged a 
second time to the original LED–data, so that the evaluation data includes also benefit payments 
parallel to dependent employment (in the following denoted as IABSLED data).   
However, as basic sampling of the IABS results from the employment register, only individuals who 
experience at least one spell of dependent employment between 75–97 can be sampled.  Individu-
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als are omitted if they are experiencing only unemployment between 75–97 or a part of this period 
as long as unemployment was their only status on the labour market.  For the evaluation study this 
sampling implies that one should restrict the analysis to entrants into programmes from unemploy-
ment that were previously employed because the control group does not allow to construct a non–
treatment outcome for treated individuals who did not experience registered unemployment before.  
The IABS samples roughly 1% of the overall dependent employment and benefit receipt, resulting 
to 591,627 individuals in the period 75–97 for both East and West Germany and to 8,293,879 
spells.  Contrary to survey data, the employment and benefit information of IABS is assumed to be 
highly reliable because the data is collected in order to document the time individuals spend in 
employment or unemployment for the mandatory pension system. 
3.3.1.2 Data for training participation 
The participation data for further training programmes refer to a survey implemented in the local 
offices of the Employment Service under the regulation of the Labour Promotion Act (§ 6 P. 3 AFG).  
Information is collected for all participants in further training, retraining, integration subsidies and 
language courses in Germany (FuU–data).  These data report the entries into and exits from courses 
of further vocational training.  Besides it reports information about the type of courses, the intended 
integration objectives and rough information about the contents of the courses with respect to the 
skills provided.  The FuU-data originate from the BA’s internal controlling and give an overview 
about the persons in FuU–programmes, the type of programme, the aim of the courses, the type of 
training (whether the training takes place in classrooms or “on the job”), the carrier of the pro-
gramme and the beginning and ending of the treatment and again personal characteristics of the 
participants (information about sex, age, nationality, the region in which the programme takes 
place, the educational attainment, the employment status before treatment and other important 
characteristics).  The FuU–data also indicates the type of income maintenance paid during the par-
ticipation in a programme.   
These data were merged to the IABSLED data by the social insurance number as an identifier for all 
individuals sampled in the IABSLED–data.  Through the merging procedure, one can add the com-
plete employment history to the treatment information.  In the end, the merged data supplies an 
integrated evaluation data base consisting of comparable, longitudinal information for treatment and 
control group that covers all participants in further training, retraining, integration subsidies and 
short–term training courses as well as language training.  The sample size of the FuU–data amounts 
54,767 individuals corresponding to 72,983 spells of treatment in the period 80–97 (for West Ger-
many, and 91–7 for the new federal states).  Basically, all individuals receiving training related 
benefits that are sampled in the IABS and IABSLED–data should be part of the FuU–data3.   
However, some individuals are not accounted in the participation data because of a lack of reliabil-
ity of the survey.  These persons participating in a programme without being reported in the FuU–
data can be identified as participants from the income maintenance data of the IABSLED–data given 
                                                          
3  However, as it did not incur any sanctions for the local offices of the Employment Service not to report the 
data, the participation is not fully reported in the data. 
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they receive specific benefits related to training participation.  The coding information of the income 
maintenance variable from the LED–data allows for the identification of treatment. 
3.3.1.3 Evaluation data 
The IABSLED data and the FuU–data are merged to create an integrated data for evaluation because 
the participation data does neither cover any control group observation nor does it provide the lon-
gitudinal information for the treatment group and the IABSLED does not offer structural information 
for participants in further training schemes which is necessary to identify understandable, homoge-
neous treatments.  Besides, some of the treatments do not incur the payment of income mainte-
nance, so that participation would again be structurally underreported if the evaluation study was 
based only on the IABSLED data.   
The merging is complex because of the size of data, but the main problems arise from the different 
frequency of both files: While the IABSLED–data offer information with daily frequencies, the FuU–
data only provides monthly information.  The merging procedure therefore does only allow an ap-
proximate merge of both files.  It is based on the social insurance number, the timing correspon-
dence of information of both files and further important covariates.  As both data offer partly the 
same context information, one can achieve a good approximation if a complex merging procedure 
takes care of these contextual information: For example, both sources include the “reference num-
ber of the treatment” which codes an unique number to all treatments taking place in one of the 
181 subdivisions of the Federal Employment Service.  By using this information, one can merge the 
files even if they provide partly contradictory information concerning the income maintenance 
payments, the occupational status or the timing of the treatment.  Furthermore, income maintenance 
payments related to the treatment and the expected end of either the benefit (from the IABSLED–
data) or the course (from the FuU–data) allow an additional check whether data can be matched 
sufficiently.  An illustrative example of the merging procedure can be found in Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1 Merging insurance account data with participation data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The figure describes the merging procedure for one hypothetical individual in a very simple case.  
The upper third of the figure shows the information resulting from the merged IABSLED–data.  Two 
spells are recorded, which could be matched to the training spell from the FuU–data in the second 
third below.  Due to the monthly frequency of the data, we do not know whether the training spell 
started December 23rd or 28th.  However, the IABS provides additional information indicating that 
only one of the two spells of the IABS corresponds to a training participation of the individual: The 
variable BTYP (offering information about the employment or benefit status) indicates for both spells 
the receipt of benefit (code 7).  However, the information on income maintenance from the LED–
data indicates for the first spell the receipt of unemployment benefit (code 100) and only for the 
second spell a payment individuals receive only in case of further training (corresponding to code 
336).  Taking into consideration this additional information, we should match rather the second 
IABSLED spell than the first to the FuU–data.  Furthermore, the IABSLED data offer the “reference 
number of the treatment” that codes a unique identifier for a specific treatment implemented by one 
of the local offices of the employment service.  If the regional information from IABSLED is concor-
dant with those of the FuU–data (FMASNR [the reference number of the treatment from the FuU–
data] and L1MASRNR [the same information from the LED data] must be identical for the treatment 
spell).  In the example, only one of the two spells reports a valid reference number of treatment 
again indicating that a match of only the second spell to the FuU–spell is justified.  This example 
describes a very simple case how we achieve the merging of data with different frequency.  For a 
complete description of the merging procedure, see Bender et al. 2004, chapter 3.2.   
In addition to the merging itself, numerous corrections are implemented for increasing the quality of 
the data: Inconsistencies of both files occurred with respect to the reported level of education and 
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occupational status, the year of birth and the family status.  All these variables needed to be cor-
rected for in order to prepare the empirical analysis.  The correction of the variable providing infor-
mation on the level of school and professional education is especially important for this evaluation 
study, because we assume the individual skills to be the decisive reason for an assigned into treat-
ment.  However, the schooling and vocational training information in the IABS can be considered to 
be biased because the employer might only provide information about the actual occupations ful-
filled by the employees, although the variable in principle should report the formal level of educa-
tion.  The fulfilled occupation however does not necessarily correspond to the qualification individ-
ual obtained in schooling and vocational training:  It is likely that individuals may work below their 
actual level of education if the labour market conditions justify this.  This phenomenon is especially 
important for individuals who face a certain risk of loosing employment (e.g. due to structural 
change) or who are expected to bear higher occupational mobility (e.g. frequent job changes in 
service industries).  As the information of the individual’s vocational training is provided by the em-
ployers, we suppose it to be the level of education, which is necessary to fulfil the individual’s pre-
cise job, but the individual’s formal skill level may lie above this position.  Contrary it is unlikely 
that individuals working in a position with high formal skill requirements (e.g. a university degree) 
can actually fulfil their position without an adequate vocational training.  We therefore assume the 
information of the level of education in the IABS data to be downward biased.   
The correction of the skill level is mostly an upgrade of the reported skills to the highest level of 
education reported for the individual, based on assumptions how frequent different levels of educa-
tion need to appear before such an adjustment is justified (and at which individual age).  A detailed 
description of the correction can be found in Bender et al. (2004, chapter 3).  This correction of the 
level of education was implemented for both the treatment and the control group.  Many other indi-
cators have been subject to a comparable validation procedure, making both data sets consistent 
with respect to the information provided and the quality of conditioning on covariates for the 
evaluation study.   
The treatment population resulting from the merged IABSLED–FuU–data amounts to 1,169,871 
spells for the period 75–97, corresponding to 54,756 persons who participated at least once in fur-
ther training.  Overall, 72,897 treatments are recorded.  The merged IABSLED–data comprise 
3,603,265 spells for 208,928 persons who either belong to the treatment group (for individuals who 
are not reported by the FuU–data) or to the naïve control group.  As the spells usually vary widely 
with respect to the duration, data is recoded into a monthly panel for the analysis.   
3.3.2 Varieties of further training 
As mentioned in section 3.2, the basic regulation of further training only provides a framework, but 
does not define specific treatments with respect to integration targets or specific target groups.  In 
practice, very different treatments (e.g. training for career advancement or short–term courses for 
very long–term unemployed) can be implemented under the same AFG regulation.  Before turning 
to an empirical analysis, it is indispensable to reconsider specific type of further training and how 
such treatments can be identified in the data.  Social insurance records do not offer individual la-
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bour market information which can be interpreted for evaluation in a straightforward way.  The 
same is true for the participation figures provided by the FuU–data.  Thus, before analysing the data 
it is crucial to understand the coding of the variables and to integrate the fragmented information of 
the benefit variables from the IABSLED and the course descriptions from the FuU–data into an in-
terpretable concept of further training with homogeneous treatments.  The following section pro-
vides seven different types of further training (referred to as type [a]– [g]).   
3.3.2.1 Target specific types of further training 
(a) Preparation, social skills and short–term training 
This type of training provides non–vocational skills in educational institutions or participants are 
taking part in programmes evaluating their problems in finding regular employment (Feststel-
lungsmaßnahmen, § 41a AFG).  The training provides skills on a general level and focuses on an 
improvement of the job search process.  In other cases short–term training is implemented as a first 
stage for continued training, so that the programmes prepare the participants for another further 
training (Vorschaltmaßnahmen).  In short–term training, the provision of profession specific skills is 
supposed to be of minor importance and individuals who enter this type of treatment are supposed 
to lack fundamental general skills and social skills for job search.  Therefore, we assume these 
courses to offer the promotion of social, individual and methodical skills, especially for the difficult–
to–place unemployed in need of advice and guidance after long periods of unemployment, motiva-
tion for qualification and employment, strategies of behaving in conflict situations, techniques to 
learn more efficiently and training for application procedures.  We assume these treatments not to 
provide formal certificates or degrees.  
(b) Provision of specific professional skills and techniques  
The objective of this type of further education is the improvement of the starting position in finding 
a new job by providing additional skills and specific professional knowledge in short–term and me-
dium–term courses.  These programmes serve to learn or freshen up of single skills, e.g. computer 
skills or the new operational practises.  They are is intended for unemployed or persons at risk of 
becoming unemployed in order to facilitate integration into full employment.   
This type of treatment makes up the majority of public sector sponsored further training programmes 
and is usually carried out by external educational institutions. Courses provide classroom training 
and the acquisition of professional knowledge by working practise.  In most cases, participants are 
provided certificates about the courses, signalling refreshed or newly acquired skills and the amount 
of theory and work–experience achieved.  The treatment is specific to the skills of the first voca-
tional training degree and aims at increasing the individual chances of finding new employment 
within their profession.  Compared to the short–term courses above, this type of training is sup-
posed to have an influence on the matching probability of the unemployed with jobs offered be-
cause the qualification provided is formalised and individuals are given certificates after training.   
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(c) Qualification via the educational system/retraining 
This type of training consists of the provision of a new and comprehensive training according to the 
regulation of the German dual system of vocational training.  It is offered to individuals who com-
pleted already a first vocational training and face severe difficulties in finding a new employment 
within their profession.  Retraining is formal vocational training into a certified occupation after the 
end of a first vocational training.  It might however also be offered to individuals without a first for-
mal training, as long as participants are supposed to be integrated through the educational system.  
Up to 94, this type of treatment is also accessible to individuals without the formal criterion of “ne-
cessity” for career advancement.  Participants are then granted an income maintenance as a loan. 
Qualification via the educational system/retraining provides a formal certificate allowing individuals 
to increase their chances to find employment by enduing additional signals in the search process.  
As the retraining programme offers an in–depth training in the occupational skills following the 
regulation of the German system of apprenticeship, the formal certificates are widely accepted.  
Federal law regulates the curricular contents for such certificates.  Contents and lessons are sched-
uled with respect to the legal requirements and to the practical part in companies.  Most participants 
of the programme are interested in getting either a formal job qualification (§25 Federal Occupa-
tional Training Law [Berufsbildungsgesetz]; e.g. bricklayer, painter, carpenter) or a job certificate 
recognised by the chambers of industry and commerce.  Participants who have already finished a 
first apprenticeship are supposed to join the programme only due to severe personal reasons (e.g. 
health problems) or because of regional mismatch in their field of qualification due to structural 
change.   
Vocational training according to the German dual system consists of both, theoretical training and 
work experience.  The theoretical part of the training takes place in the educational institutions.  The 
practical part of the programme is often carried out in firms which provide participants work experi-
ence in their field, but sometimes also in training establishments of the institutions providing this 
type of training.  This type of treatment includes “encouragement of formal job qualifications” 
(Förderung beruflicher Abschlussprüfungen) and the official retraining programme (Umschulung).  
The goal of both is the achievement of a formal job qualification in order to improve the job match.   
(d) Training for specific job offers 
The main objective of this type of training is the provision of specific occupational and social skills 
to individuals who intend to accept a job offer and to fulfil the formal requirements for the specific 
job.  Training of this type provides specific skills and qualification as described under (b).  Generally 
individuals pass through short–term courses with specific professional skills in order to meet the 
requirements for a job offer.  The contents such courses are closely linked to the employment, in 
which individuals are employed afterwards.  Usually courses take place in the training division of 
companies.  Contents of the courses also consist of social, personal and methodological knowledge.  
Most of these courses are not supposed to result in a certified job qualification, but to provide prac-
tical education and qualification below the level of formal qualification.  Compared to training 
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which offers a certification after the end of a programme, this type of training has only little impact 
on future employment prospects, once the job match with the precise employer is achieved.  Dur-
ing the time of training participants are employed in the firm in which they intend to work after-
wards in regular employment or in firms of the same sector of activity preparing the work for regular 
employment. 
(e) Direct integration in the first labour market  
This type of training aims at integration through wage subsidies according to § 49 AFG.  Wage sub-
sidies are paid for the employment of formerly long–term unemployed and are intended to decrease 
the competitive disadvantage of these recruits for the period of familiarisation with the skill re-
quirement of the job.  Individuals receive only practical guidance for the employment according to 
the requirements of the firm and are not provided certifiable qualifications.  The training consists 
basically of working in the future profession under the supervision of the staff of the firm.  Some-
times training companies and suppliers of further training programmes prepare the type of training 
by providing special qualifications to the participants.  Mainly companies of the private sector im-
plement this type of training.  Firms are obliged to pay the agreed wage of the sector to the partici-
pant.  Furthermore, a minimum time of employment after the end of the scheme is required.   
(f) Career advancement subsidy 
This type of treatment provides training for individuals who are not unemployed or threatened by 
unemployment, either as a retraining or as a career advancement in a practised profession. This type 
of training terminates 94.  “Qualification for career advancement” works by providing loans to par-
ticipants.  Although not strictly active labour market policy, career advancement was an important 
part of public sector sponsored further training in the early 90’s (and before).  In this treatment, par-
ticipants are enabled to obtain an advanced formal degree in their profession, e.g. a 
§ “Foreman” degree: According to the regulations of the chamber of handicraft this formal de-
gree allows the holder to start an own business and to teach apprentices.  An examination 
board at the chamber of handicraft administers the exam, which is a substitute for a state 
controlled examination.  The examinee has to proof that he can perform his handicraft re-
markably well and that he has expert knowledge and a sufficient knowledge in business 
administration and law as well as skills in supervising apprentice.   
§ “Technician” degree: According to the general agreement of the conference of the ministers 
of education of the German federal states, the formal technical training lasts two years and is 
implemented mainly in public technical colleges.  A state examination board gives the de-
gree of a state audited technician with reference to the specialisation if an exam is passed 
(“Staatlich geprüfter Techniker”).  
§ “B.A. business administration”: This continued education takes place in applied business 
schools and lasts two years.  Structure, degree and organisation are regulated by general 
agreement of the conference of the ministers of education of the German federal states.  Par-
ticipants are qualified for a job at the lower management level in business or in the admini-
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stration.  The graduation allows the participant to call himself a “Staatlich geprüfter Betrieb-
swirt” (state audited master of business administration) with reference to his specialisation 
(e.g. state audited gastronome).   
(g) Language training 
Besides further vocational training, language training is also part of the provision of further training 
in Germany as regulated by the AFG.  The encouragement in participation in courses in German is 
intended to integrate asylum seekers, displaced persons, ethnic Germans and refugees into the la-
bour market.  Participants are provided support for an adequate education in language skills to fulfil 
regular employment.   
3.3.2.2 Identifying further training in merged data 
This section describes how we identify the aforementioned types of training in the merged.  The 
coding plan can be found in the appendix.   
Using the benefit information from the LED–data 
In the merged data set, we combine the IABS data a second time with the benefit data (LED).  As 
mentioned above under section 3.1, this merging procedure corrects for the fact that the IABS al-
ways records employment if the employer reports it – even if the individual receives benefits.  As 
the merged LED–information provides often a number of parallel spells for one IABS spell, it was 
necessary to match up to three benefit spells to one IABS spell reporting employment or benefit 
receipt (see Bender et al. 2004, Chap. 3.1). 
Therefore, the merged data consists of the benefit information from the IABS (the variable “original 
benefit information” [Leistungsart im Original] LA1) and three additional variables indicating parallel 
benefit reception from the original LED data (“parallel original benefit information 1–3” [Leistung-
sart im Original 1–3] L1LA1, L2LA1, L3LA1).  These four benefit variables offer valuable informa-
tion about the type of benefit paid by the employment service in case of training which facilitates 
the identification of the type of treatment: The benefit information does not only indicate whether a 
treatment is carried out under the further training or the retraining regulation, but also whether the 
transfer was given for full–time or part–time courses, to participants in language training or as a loan 
for career advancement training.  The exact coding plan of these variables changed over the years, 
so that the benefit codes provided by this variable have to be considered on a year–by–year basis.  
The types of training, which are discussed above, can be identified using these benefit variables, but 
also by combining this information with other variables of the IABS (especially the variable of the 
occupational status) and the merged FuU–participation data (see below). 
Type of training from FuU–data 
In this evaluation study one of the most important advantages compared to survey data is the infor-
mation about the precise type of training. It allows us to identify homogeneous treatments for the 
evaluation.  In the merging process, up to two parallel FuU–spells are merged to one spell of the 
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IABS data because in many cases the FuU–data provided more than one parallel spell.  These two 
parallel spells provide two variables indicating the type of course (Maßnahmeart [FMASART1, FMA-
SART2]). 
Combining the information in merged data 
Participation in training can be identified by either the LED–data or the FuU–data.  In the best case, 
both sources deliver the same information about the treatment.  Then, one can easily identify the 
type of treatment from both data sources.  However, due to the quality deficiencies in the participa-
tion data, in many cases participation is not documented in the FuU–data.  In this case, the LED–
data helps to identify the treatment on the basis of the benefit variable.  In other cases, we observe 
individual records showing employment in the IABS information and at the same time training in 
the FuU–data.  This is for example the case if the treatment takes place in a firm and individuals are 
paid a normal salary (e.g. integration subsidy) or if individuals are prepared for precise job offers.  In 
such cases, we are able to identify the treatment group only on the basis of the occupational status 
information from the IABS (“Beschäftigungstyp”, BTYP) combined with the information provided by 
FMASART1, FMASART2.   
We take advantage of the information form all three parallel benefit spells, the original benefit in-
formation as shown in the IABS and the type of treatment as recorded in the two parallel FuU–spells 
in order to generate the most precise information available with respect to the type of treatment of 
either the first, the second or the third spell of the LED data compared to the FuU–data.  We also 
identify treatments if one of the sources does not record an interpretable information about treat-
ment: Often it seems as if individuals were granted unemployment benefit while being in a training 
programme although the legal regulation would imply a receipt of special benefits related to the 
treatment: At this point again, we use the FuU–data for the identification of the treatment and as-
sume them to be more credible. 
Improving the precision of treatment information 
The following approach was chosen in order to ensure that both the information coming from FuU 
and LED–data are taken into consideration in order to obtain the most precise information of the 
type of training: 
· Since trainings spells are often coded as “other, non–specified programmes” (FMASART1=12 
[Sonstige Anpassungen]) in the FuU–data, we increase the precision of information about the 
type of treatment by relying on the second parallel information about the type of training: The 
second FuU–spell is used if the first FuU–spell is coded as “other adjustment” (“Sonstige Anpas-
sungen”).  If the second spell includes a code different from 12, which leads to a more precise 
information about the type of training, this information will be used instead of FMASART1.  This 
combined information of FMASART1 and FMASART2 is referred to as FMASART* in the follow-
ing. 
· If we observe parallel spells from the LED–data that provide contradictory information about the 
type of benefit paid to the claimant, we identify a treated person when ever one of the three 
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spells of benefit payments provide the information that an income maintenance payment related 
to training occurred.  To put it differently: if the L1LA1–variable indicates unemployment bene-
fit and the second variable (L2LA1) indicates any payment of a training related benefit, then the 
latter is used for the identification of the treatment status.  The aggregated information from the 
benefit data is referred to as L*LA1. 
· If the benefit variables L*LA1 show information opposing to a related FuU–spell we use the 
FuU–information in these cases (e.g. benefits for retraining in the LED data in combination with 
information about “provision of specific professional skills” in the FuU–data).  Another example: 
The benefit information is coded as 310 corresponding to “further education for resettlers or 
ethnic German” (EGGUF Notwendige Fortbildung bei Aus– und Übersiedlern) and the FMA-
SART* variables specify the treatment as “vocational exam”, FMASART* is supposed to be more 
precise with respect to the type of treatment. 
3.3.3. Descriptive Statistics  
Type of training and related benefit payments 
Table 3.2 describes the relationship between type of treatment (a) – (g) as defined above and the 
benefit payment related to treatment for the period 90–7 based on spell data of the merged IAB-
SLED–FuU–data: The types of training are displayed in columns and the benefit information coming 
from the IABSLED–data in rows.  The benefit information is subdivided into several target specific 
benefit payments.  First, we observe quite a substantive number of participants receive unemploy-
ment benefit or unemployment assistance while being in further training (indicated by the FuU–
data): especially participants in career advancement, short–term training and specific skills–training 
are receiving unemployment benefit at the time of treatment.  Without a merge of the IABSLED to 
the FuU–data, these individuals would not have been identified in the data as participants according 
to the benefit information.  These individuals would have been regarded as unemployed implying a 
structural underestimation of the participation in training:  the IABS without additional participation 
data would not have been appropriate for the evaluation of further training.   
The next part of table 3.2 shows in which type of training individuals participate if the benefit in-
formation refers to payments for resettlers, German ethnics and refugees.  In most cases, these bene-
fits are granted to participants in language courses as expected.  If the benefit granted is not explic-
itly related to the participation in language courses, we also find a substantive number of partici-
pants in either the career advancement or the specific skills training.   
In case of benefit payments related to short–term training, individuals mainly participate in this type 
of training, but also to a substantive fraction in retraining and career advancement schemes.  If indi-
viduals receive income maintenance related to retraining or further vocational training, we observe 
that many of these individuals also participate in other types of training, e.g. career advancement.  
Again, we see that it is necessary also to exploit the information from the FuU–data in order to iden-
tify the most similar participants for the latter analysis.   
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Table 3.2 Type of treatment and benefit** payment  
Type of training 
 
 
 
 
Information of income mainte-
nance payment 
Missing* Preparation, 
social skills 
and short–
term training 
(a) 
Specific 
job 
know–
ledge 
(b) 
First 
labour 
market 
education 
system (c) 
Precise 
jobs (d) 
Direct 
integration 
(e) 
Career adv-
ancement 
(f) 
Language 
training 
(g) 
Total 
Match of FuU–data and benefit 
information was not achieved*** 
1430   1764 7102 2172 8209 232 20909
Benefit information: Unemployment benefit or unemployment assistance 
Regular unemployment benefits 9 254 551 135  49 345 7 1350
Unemployment assistance for 
temporary soldiers 
  1 1    2
Unemployment assistance which 
follows unemployment benefits 
2 318 202 65  8 146 2 743
Original unemployment assis-
tance, no claim for unemploy-
ment benefits 
 42 36 4  3 13  98
Benefit information: Resettlers, German Ethnics and Refugees 
Benefits for language education   1     1
Benefits for further education for 
resettlers or German Ethnics 
  2041 152  14 125  2332
Income maintenance for language 
courses for asylum seekers and 
refugees 
      79 79
Income maintenance for language 
courses for German Ethnic or 
recipients of welcome benefits 
      728 728
Benefits for necessary further 
education for resettlers or German 
Ethnics 
   213  65  278
Benefits for full–time language 
courses for resettlers or German 
Ethnics 
      426 426
Benefits for part–time language 
courses for resettlers or German 
Ethnics 
      2258 2258
Benefits for full time language 
courses for asylum seekers and 
refugees 
      51 51
Other benefit for resettlers       405 405
Benefits for full time language for 
asylum seekers and refugees 
      1692 1692
* Missing values originate from codes which were obsolete in the 90’s, but which occur nevertheless for unknown reasons 
(e.g. benefit information L*LA1 = 315), from an illogical combination of short–term training according to §41a and em-
ployment at the same time which could not be interpreted as further training or from codes in the participation data which 
were not supposed to occur in the 90’s (e.g. FMASART*=22, 23). 
** Coding referring the 90’s (see Appendix for details) 
*** In most cases, the training information refers to the participation information from FMASART*, which however does not 
match to a related benefit information from the IABSLED–data (mismatch).  In these cases, the training is carried out while 
individuals were in contributory employment.  This usually happens if individuals are granted a career advancement sub-
sidy (39% of all cases).  See Bender et al. (2004) for further sources of failure in matching 
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Table 3.2  Type of treatment and benefit** payment (continued) 
Type of training 
 
 
 
 
Information of income mainte-
nance payment 
Missing* Preparation, 
social skills 
and short–
term training 
(a) 
Specific 
job 
know–
ledge 
(b) 
First 
labour 
market 
education 
system (c) 
Precise 
jobs (d) 
Direct 
integration 
(e) 
Career adv-
ancement (f) 
Language 
training 
(g) 
Total 
Benefit information: Income maintenance related to short–term training 
Income maintenance amounting 
to unemployment benefits for 
necessary short–term training in § 
41a 
 5      5 
Full income maintenance because 
of unemployment or in danger of 
loosing the job for necessary 
short–term training in § 41a 
 514  4  1 255  774 
Income maintenance amounting 
to un–employment assistance for 
necessary short–term training in § 
41a 
 595 6 478  2 9  1090 
Short–term training for resettlers 
or German Ethnics 
 451  3   1  455 
Benefit information: Income maintenance related to further vocational training 
Income maintenance for further 
education, unemployment and 
conditions for income mainte-
nance not met, income mainte-
nance amounting to unemploy-
ment benefits is paid 
 62 3   14  79 
Income maintenance for neces-
sary further education for unem-
ployed persons or persons whose 
jobs are in danger 
 3963 195  2 744 3 4907 
Income maintenance amounting 
to unemployment assistance 
because of necessary further 
education due to unemployment 
or danger of loosing the job as of 
1.1.94 
 369 22   83 27 501 
Income maintenance for part time 
further education 44 IIb 
 221   2 9  232 
Benefit information: Income maintenance related to retraining 
Income maintenance for retrain-
ing of unemployed persons or 
persons whose jobs are in danger 
  1913   91 4 2008 
Income maintenance amounting 
to unemployment benefits be-
cause of retraining of former 
unemployed persons 
  27   2  29 
Income maintenance amounting 
to unemployment assistance 
because of retraining of former 
unemployed persons 
  161   15  176 
Income maintenance for part time 
jobs and retraining 
  927  1 51 1 980 
* Missing values originate from codes which were obsolete in the 90’s, but which occur nevertheless for unknown reasons 
(e.g. benefit information L*LA1 = 315), from an illogical combination of short–term training according to §41a and em-
ployment at the same time which could not be interpreted as further training or from codes in the participation data which 
were not supposed to occur in the 90’s (e.g. FMASART*=22, 23). 
** Coding referring the 90’s (see Appendix for details) 
*** In most cases, the training information refers to the participation information from FMASART*, which however does not 
match to a related benefit information from the IABSLED–data (mismatch).  In these cases, the training is carried out while 
individuals were in contributory employment.  This usually happens if individuals are granted a career advancement sub-
sidy (39% of all cases).  See Bender et al. (2004) for further sources of failure in matching 
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Table 3.2  Type of treatment and benefit** payment (continued) 
Type of training 
 
 
 
 
Information of income mainte-
nance payment 
Missing* Preparation, 
social skills 
and short–
term training 
(a) 
Specific 
job 
know–
ledge 
(b) 
First 
labour 
market 
education 
system (c) 
Precise 
jobs (d) 
Direct 
integration 
(e) 
Career adv-
ancement (f) 
Language 
training 
(g) 
Total 
Benefit information: Income maintenance as a loan for “advisable” training 
Income maintenance paid as loan 
for advisable further education 
     2050 3 2053 
Income maintenance paid as loan 
for advisable retraining 
     19  19 
Benefit information not valid (due to coding errors or employment) 
No valid code* 920 218 10 170   351 5 1674 
Benefit information not valid (e.g. 
employment) 
377  2   2  381 
 
Total 
 
2738 2397
 
7463 
 
6239 
 
7102 
 
2254 12599
 
5923 
 
46715 
* Missing values originate from codes which were obsolete in the 90’s, but which occur nevertheless for unknown reasons 
(e.g. benefit information L*LA1 = 315), from an illogical combination of short–term training according to §41a and em-
ployment at the same time which could not be interpreted as further training or from codes in the participation data which 
were not supposed to occur in the 90’s (e.g. FMASART*=22, 23). 
** Coding referring the 90’s (see Appendix 3.7.2 for details) 
*** In most cases, the training information refers to the participation information from FMASART*, which however does not 
match to a related benefit information from the IABSLED–data (mismatch).  In these cases, the training is carried out while 
individuals were in contributory employment.  This usually happens if individuals are granted a career advancement sub-
sidy (39% of all cases).  See Bender et al. (2004) for further sources of failure in matching 
Descriptive Statistics  
Participation figures in the different types of further training for the years 90–97 are shown in table 
3.3 based on spell data.  These treatment figures result from the aforementioned assumptions of 
sections 3.2.1 and the identification of the treatments in the data set as defined under 3.2.2: The 
most important group consists of the participants in career advancement training amounting to one 
quarter of all treatment spells.  Usually, these persons are employed while participating.  For the 
90’s, we expected already a focus of the further training programmes on the problem groups on the 
labour market, so that the high share of participants in these trainings is quite surprising.   
For the types of training besides career advancement as defined above, the most important category 
is the “provision of specific professional skills”–training on which we will concentrate in the follow-
ing with 7,463 spells for the 90’s.  Almost equally important as this programme is participation in 
the retraining programme with 13.4% of all spells and “training for specific jobs” with 15.2% of all 
spells.  Language training courses are also an essential part of further training, with 12.7% of all 
spells.  Direct integration and the short–term training programmes are less important with around 
5% of all training spells.   
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Table 3.3 Participation in further training by type of treatment 
 Frequency Percentage Cumulated per-
centage 
Missing* 2738 5.9 5.9 
Preparation, social skills and short–
term training
2397 5.1 11.0 
Provision of specific professional skills 7463 16.0 27.0 
Integration via education system 6239 13.4 40.3 
Training for specific jobs 7102 15.2 55.5 
Direct integration (wage subsidy) 2254 4.8 60.4 
Career advancement 12599 27.0 87.3 
Language training 5923 12.7 100.0 
Total 46715 100.0  
* Missing values originate from codes which were obsolete in the 90’s, but which 
occur nevertheless for unknown reasons (e.g. benefit information L*LA1 = 
315), from an illogical combination of short–term training according to §41a 
and employment at the same time which could not be interpreted as further 
training or from codes in the participation data which were not supposed to oc-
cur in the 90’s (e.g. FMASART*=22, 23). 
3.4 Empirical evaluation 
3.4.1 Methodology 
3.4.1.1 Conditional independence assumption 
Like in most non–experimental evaluation studies following Roy (1951) or Rubin (1974) we rely on 
the assumption that the causal effect of treatment–on–the–treated can be identified by comparing 
the results of a programme ( )YT  for the participating individuals after the treatment ( )1=D  with 
the hypothetical situation of the same individuals if they had not taken part in the programme 
( )1=DYC .  Of course the non–treatment outcome is hypothetical and cannot be observed with 
non–experimental data.  Besides, the outcomes of any person do not depend on the overall level of 
participation in the programme, so that general equilibrium effects are assumed to be inexistent in 
the evaluation design4.  The average parameter of interest is the effect of treatment–on–the–treated 
given by 
(1) { } { }11 =-= DYCEDYTE . 
The main problem of all evaluation studies based on non–experimental data consists of estimating 
{ }1=DYCE .  In principle, two alternative approaches can be applied to estimate the average non–
treatment outcome: the situation of programme participants before treatment (before–after–
comparison) or a control group of persons, which did not participate.   
                                                          
4 This is referred to as the stable unit value assumption, see Lechner (1998: 19) for details. 
 125 
§ The major drawback of the before–and–after comparison lies in the assumption of a con-
stant average non–treatment outcome over time for the treated population.  For instance, 
changes in the overall state of economy might lead to a violation of this assumption 
(2) { } { }11 10 =¹= DYCEDYCE tt ,  
where 0t  denotes a point of time before treatment and 1t  after treatment.   
§ The average value of the outcome of non–participants typically does not represent the cor-
rect average non–treatment outcome as participants and non–participants differ in character-
istics which influences the outcome variable, 
(3) { } { }01 =¹= DYCEDYCE . 
Thus, the participants differ from participants before treatment and from non–participants due to 
observable and unobservable characteristics giving rise to a selection bias.  To correct for selection 
on observables, the paper refers to the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA) which implies 
that it does not make a difference whether one estimates the average results without treatment on 
the basis of persons of the participating or the non–participating group as long as they have the 
same characteristics X .  Under the CIA, one gets 
(4) { } { }XDYCEXDYCE ,0,1 ===  
indicating that treatment group and the non–treatment group are comparable conditional on X .   
In most evaluation studies the treatment assignment is a static problem and the information con-
tained in the timing of treatment is typically ignored.  With the merged IABSLED–FuU–data we can 
benefit from panel data which does not only offer information on the exact timing of the pro-
gramme, but also for a very long–time span before and after treatment documenting the employ-
ment history of the individuals as well as re–iterated and multiple treatments.  It allows us to be 
more precise with respect to the covariates X than most of the evaluation studies that rely on a static 
representation of conditional independence.   
The conditional independence assumed in the following takes into consideration that treatments can 
start at different points in an individual unemployment experience and that the timing of treatments 
is related to the expected outcomes with respect to both calendar time and time relative to treat-
ment supplementary to a conditioning on X.  Precisely, the conditional independence assumption is 
restricted to 
(5) 
( ){ }
( ){ }tttttt
tttttt
,1,0,,1,,
,1,0,,1,,
,,0
,,1
tkkk
tkkk
XttSDYCE
XttSDYCE
-==
=-==
 
where the potential outcomes YCk,t for either participation D=1 or non–participation D=0 in any of 
k=3 treatments (for the groups starting the treatment after short–term, medium–term or long–term 
unemployment) for a specific calendar time t are conditionally independent given an equal unem-
ployment duration St to the same calendar time lasting up to the time of treatment t1 from the start of 
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unemployment after being employed in t0 and further observable characteristics Xt,t at the time of 
the treatment assignment (i.e. the first month of treatment t1).   
The conditioning on unemployment duration for treatment and non–treatment populations is 
reached by sample stratification of the treatment and non–treatment populations with respect to the 
unemployment experience before treatment (3.4.1.2).  Further conditioning covariates X are then 
taken into consideration within each of the stratified samples (3.4.1.3).  The conditional independ-
ence assumption should also be sufficient to overcome differences in the outcome variables before 
treatment that could indicate remaining unobservable differences between the treatment and the 
non–treatment group.  This needs to be considered in the empirical implementation by testing for 
the significance of the difference in the outcome variables to various points in time before treatment 
(3.4.1.4).   
If sample stratification and further conditioning on observables are sufficient to overcome any differ-
ences in the outcome variable before treatment as well as in all other observable characteristics, 
then the average effect of treatment–on–the–treated is just the difference in the sample means of 
treated individuals and non–treated control observations at any point in time after the start of the 
programme in t1.   
3.4.1.2 Sample stratification 
Referring to the conditional independence assumption, we condition on the previous employment 
history before treatment by stratifying the samples.  The employment and unemployment experi-
ence previous to treatment is assumed to be the most important explanation for the assignment to 
treatment because of the institutional regulations of the eligibility to treatment.  Since treatment is 
particularly intended for groups with specific unemployment duration, the criterion of necessity of 
the treatment is usually related to previous unemployment of a specific duration.  On the other 
hand, the calendar time of treatment also affects the assignment process because of changing budget 
conditions within each calendar year or changes in the focus of the policies from one year to an-
other.  Therefore, we restrict our analysis to groups who start unemployment the same time relative 
to the following treatment or non–treatment and who start this treatment to the same calendar time 
so that treatment and control groups become comparable with respect to the timing of the treatment 
within an individual unemployment spell at t.  However, even when applying a stratification on the 
same unemployment duration, it is virtually impossible to control for all possible remaining differ-
ences in the outcome variable before treatment: The control group still might consist of individuals 
who start employment at the beginning of the next month – who already anticipate the beginning of 
a new employment spell in the month we apply for stratifying our samples! In such a cases, the ef-
fect of treatment–on–the–treated would be slightly underestimated because the employment out-
come for the non–treated individuals in the post–treatment period would be slightly higher than in 
the absence of such anticipation effects.  However, these effects are supposed to be very weak and 
controlled for to a certain extent by the matching procedure.   
A rigorous implementation of this stratification however fails due to practical limitations of the data: 
A stratification with respect to the calendar time of the programme and the time relative to the un-
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employment the individuals cannot be achieved due to the small sample sizes of treatment cohorts 
in specific calendar months t  after a specific duration of unemployment.  Therefore, the treatment 
groups are aggregated for a specific calendar year (t=93,94) and previous unemployment experi-
ences lying in intervals between 1–3, 4–6 and 7–9 months of unemployment before treatment.   
This aggregation to broader groups relaxes from an exact link between the calendar time t and the 
time relative to treatment t suggested in the conditional independence assumption.  Figure 3.2 gives 
a graphical illustration of the relation between treatment time and calendar time for entries into 
training after short–term unemployment in the calendar year 93, which is implemented in this 
analysis.  We aggregate all individuals who start treatment in 93 after 1–3 months of unemployment 
after employment ended – implying that treatments can start in any of the calendar months of the 
year 93 and that the individuals started unemployment between October 92 and November 93.   
Figure 3.2 Calendar time relative to the time of treatment (exemplary for treatment in 93 starting after 
one to three months of unemployment) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All other treatment and non–treatment samples (for the programmes starting 4–6 and 7–9 months of 
unemployment and programmes starting in 94) follow the same motivation.  In more details, the 
stratification works as follows: 
Treatment samples { }1, =Î tkDi  are drawn from a monthly panel of the IABSLED–FuU–  and the 
IABSLED–data: There are six different treatment groups for either East or West Germany consisting 
of the participants in the specific occupational skills training who start either after three different 
durations of unemployment k=1–3 (for the groups starting the treatment after 1–3, after 4–6 and 
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ples for East and West Germany are created based on the regional information at the time t=1 of 
treatment. 
Control groups are chosen based on the same stratification like for the respective treatment groups 
and consist of individuals who do not participate in the specific skills programme in these years (but 
who might participate in other programmes such as retraining).  For each treatment group, we draw 
a naïve control group of individuals who experienced the same duration of unemployment after 
being laid off from employment like the treated individuals before treatment at the same calendar 
time.  Of course, individual lay–off time and the individual duration of unemployment up to the 
time of the treatment might vary within the intervals as described above.  We select the control 
group observations on the basis of the time spent in unemployment up to the month when the 
treatment starts for the treated.  This selection procedure implies that observations might appear in 
the control groups of different treatment samples, e.g. 
§ The treatment group with individuals of 1–3 months of unemployment before treatment is 
juxtaposed to a naïve control group, i.e. the control group prior to matching, with the same 
unemployment experience before the calendar month of treatment.   
§ Individuals from the naïve control group who remain unemployed for a longer duration 
might also serve as a control groups for participants in a treatment after 4–6 months of un-
employment in the same calendar year.   
Finally, the stratification of treatment and control sample requires that members of the naïve control 
group need to be unemployed also in t=1.  Consequently, both groups are similar with respect not 
only to the time spent in unemployment after being laid–off from employment, but also with respect 
to the outcome in the first month of treatment.  Individuals who re–enter employment before t=1 of 
the treatment time as described under 3.4.2.2 are excluded from the naïve control group.  Again, 
the control groups for East and West Germany are constructed based on the regional information at 
t=1 of the treatment time.   
As aforementioned, the aggregation of the treatment and control samples to groups with short–term, 
medium–term and long–term unemployment before the treatment in the years 93–4 disallows (a) to 
relate exactly the timing of the unemployment duration before treatment and (b) the exact time of 
entry into the treatment between the treatment and the control observations.  Therefore, we include 
the calendar time of unemployment entry and the months of unemployment before treatment as 
further conditioning variables for the matching approach implemented in the next section with re-
spect to the remaining differences in observable characteristics X. 
3.4.1.3 Kernel matching 
In order to correct for remaining selection bias based on observable characteristics we implement a 
statistical matching approach.  Matching is widely used in the empirical social sciences in order to 
keep boundary conditions constant in causal analysis (Winship, Morgan 1999).  In the context of 
evaluation studies matching approaches produce a comparison group that resembles the treatment 
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group with respect to the observable characteristics, which in this context might be understood as 
the boundary conditions. 
Under the Conditional Independence Assumption, the average effect of treatment–on–the–treated 
can be estimated by  
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where t,,kiYT  is the outcome of a treated person { }1, =Î tkDi , t,,kjYC  the outcome for non–
treatment of all non–participants { }0, =Î tkDj  in the programme k (after a specific unemployment 
duration) in calendar year t.  For reasons of simplicity, we omit the indices k and t in the following.  
We construct the non–treatment outcome of a treated individual by implementing a weight function 
),( jiw  in the sample of the control observations with respect to X  of  each participant i .  The 
weight function gives a higher weight to untreated persons with high similarity with respect to the 
X  of the participant and a lower weight to persons with only low similarity with respect to X .  
According to this weight function, the non–treatment outcome for each participant { }1=Î Di  is 
constructed on the basis of the whole sample of non–participants, so that  
(7) { }å =Î =0 1),(Dj jiw  
Different matching estimators vary with respect to the weights attached to members of the compari-
son group: On the one hand, the comparison group can consist of all non–treated observations and 
the individual non–participants are weighted with respect to the characteristics of the local individ-
ual (e.g. kernel matching).  On the other hand, the matched control observation could consist only 
of the most similar non–participant with respect to X  (nearest neighbour matching).  Heckman, 
Ichimura, Todd (1998) discuss the properties of different matching estimators in more details.  In 
this paper, we apply kernel matching estimators with local linear regression which turned out to be 
as powerful as nearest neighbour estimators with respect to selection bias based on observable 
characteristics based on experimental evidence (Heckman, Ichimura, Todd 1998: 27).  Kernel 
matching implements weight functions for the sample of non–observations in order to construct the 
potential non–treatment outcome for a treated individual.  The weight function for this estimator is 
specified as  
(8) 
{ }å =Î
=
0
),(
Dj ij
ij
K
K
jiw  
where ( )( )hXXKK ijij /-=  is a kernel that down weights distant observations from the character-
istics of an individual participant iX .  h  is a bandwidth parameter.  The potential outcome is esti-
mated in a local linear regression at i  on the basis of a weighted average of all non–treated indi-
viduals { }0=Î Dj .  The weights depend on the deviation of observable characteristics ( )ij XX -  
with a sum of the weights equal to one.  We apply local linear regressions for the estimation of the 
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local treatment outcomes: The non–treatment outcome of a treated individual is estimated in the 
non–treatment sample depending on the observable characteristics Xj of the non–treated relative to 
the local treated individual’s characteristics Xi weighted by the kernel function.  The minimisation 
problem is analogous to a weighted least squares estimation:  
(9) ( ){ }
{ }
å
=Î
÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ -
---
0
2
Dj
ij
ijj h
XX
KXXmYC b   
where OLS minimizes with respect to m  and b .  The estimated parameter mˆ  then just represents 
the non–treatment outcome predicted by the local regression – a locally weighted average. How-
ever the local linear model allows for a local slope parameter.  A closer examination of the numera-
tor of equation (9) lends some insight into the weighting situation: more weight is associated with 
the observations at locations close to iX  (the fit location) and less weight to observations farther 
apart.  The kernel function throughout this paper is specified as a Gaussian kernel with 
(10) ÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ-= 2
2
1
exp
2
1
)( j
p
jK  with ( )( )hXX ij /-=j .   
Härdle (1990) concluded that the choice of the bandwidth – and not the choice of kernel function – 
is essential to the performance of the nonparametric fit.  The bandwidth determines how fast the 
weights decrease as the distance from iX  increases.  The rate at which the weights decrease relative 
to the locations of the jX  controls the smoothness of the resulting estimate.  There is no “golden 
rule of bandwidth selection”.  Pagan, Ullah (1999: 19) discuss that if h  is chosen high, the variance 
of the estimated parameters is quite low as a large number of points are used for the estimation.  A  
small h  gives fragile density estimates and locally, only few points are included in the estimation, 
so that the variance increases, but less bias is produced.  The trade–off between variance and bias is 
especially important in our application, where actually selection bias is to intended to be mini-
mized.  With respect to selection bias based on observable characteristics, we should rather tend to 
an under smoothing than to have a too high value of h .  An option quite often used is the applica-
tion of Silverman's Rule of Thumb (ROT).  As an optimal bandwidth selection for a Gaussian kernel, 
Silverman (1986: 47f.) gives the recommendation of  
(11) 
5/19.0 -×= nAhROT  
where h  is the selected bandwidth and ( )34.1/,min iqrstdA = .  std  stands for the standard devia-
tion, iqr  for the interquartile range of the sample, n  for the sample size.  In this paper, this recom-
mendation is followed.5  Note that Silverman’s rule – although often applied to local linear regres-
sions in the literature – basically provides an optimal bandwidth choice for local density estima-
                                                          
5 Additionally, we tried also bandwidths, which undersmooth relative to Silverman’s rule (e.g. hROT/2).  
However, as the matching based on the bandwidth hROT already corrects sufficiently for remaining selec-
tion bias based on observables (see below for the test statistics) in all specifications, an explicit under 
smoothing in order to obtain more favourable features with respect to solving selection bias was not im-
plemented in this paper (even though it is the case that the bias will be minimized with 0®h ). 
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tions.  The choice of the optimal bandwidth for a nonparametric regression function is more com-
plex and usually consists of reiterative procedures where the bandwidth is chosen many times in a 
reiterated procedure (Pagan, Ullah 1999: 199), so that the estimated prediction error of the local 
estimates is minimised. A bandwidth choice by reiterated procedures would certainly have been 
preferable, but could not be implemented so far due to the size of the data.   
For the follow-up study, a bandwidth choice based on cross–validation is foreseen for any of the 
treatments:  This procedure should lead to an optimal bandwidth choice by reproducing the estima-
tion of the average expected non–participation outcome in the sample of non–participants for each 
period in two steps: First, we identify the nearest neighbour nn(i) for each participant in the sample 
of non–participants with respect to the estimated propensity score. Then, the optimal bandwidth 
should minimise the sum of point–wise squared prediction errors over the points of time after 
treatment  
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where the prediction of the employment status for nn(i) is not based on the nearest neighbour nn(i) 
and t= 1, …T denotes the month for which the non-treatment outcome is estimated (i.e. 36 months 
after treatment, see Bergemann, Fitzenberger, Speckesser 2004: 9).   
Propensity score 
Consider X  to consist of a vector of many observable characteristics.  Then a disadvantage of 
matching is the “curse–of–dimensionality“ with respect to all dimensions of X .  Therefore, this 
paper follows the result of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) that the CIA in equation (4) also holds with 
respect to the probability of treatment (= propensity score) ( )XP  as a function of the observable 
characteristics X , i.e.  
(12) ( ){ } ( ){ }XPDYCEXPDYCE ,0,1 === .   
On the one hand, this result allows matching upon the one–dimensional probability.  Effectively we 
use the “closeness“ of the propensity score of control observations with respect to the treated indi-
viduals as an estimator for the non–treatment outcome.  This dimension–reduction diminishes the 
problem of finding adequate matches and the problem of empty cells.  However, propensity match-
ing comes at the costs that the propensity score has to be estimated itself.   
3.4.1.4 Outcomes and preprogramme test 
The correction for selection bias should make the employment history of participants and non–
participants comparable before treatment.  If the adjustment for selection–bias does not align the 
preprogramme outcomes for the future participants and the control–group, and “if it is plausible to 
assume that the source of preprogramme differences in earnings between the two types of individu-
als is the same as for the postprogramme differences, (…) the correction procedure is rejected.“ 
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(Heckman, Hotz 1989: 866).  The outcome of treatment–on–the–treated with respect to employ-
ment is 
(13)  tkiKtkitki YCYTY ,,,,,,,,, ttt -=D  
for any participant of the programme k after a specific period of unemployment duration in calendar 
year t (these subscripts will be dropped in the following) with tkiYT ,,, t  taking the value 1 in case of 
dependent employment and 0 in the case of recorded benefit reception in the data.  tkiKYC ,,, t  is the 
estimated non–treatment outcome of the respective person based on kernel matching.  t indicates 
the time relative to treatment.   
A preprogramme test consists of estimating the effect of treatment on the outcome variable before 
treatment.  By definition the employment outcomes are equal for the first month of treatment for 
both groups  Furthermore, the stratification takes into consideration that individuals start unem-
ployment after an ending employment spell to the same time relative to treatment (i.e. for individu-
als who start treatment after up to three months of open unemployment, the employment outcome 
is zero at least at t=–1).  With the propensity score matching employment and unemployment 
should be balanced out for the different groups.  We therefore decided to test the preprogramme 
effects of treatment as  
(PPT)  å
=
D=
tN
i
ti
t
t YN
PPT
1
,
1
 
for any of the months before the beginning of the unemployment spells resulting in either a treat-
ment k in calendar time t (indices dropped for simplicity) for the treatment group or non–treatment.  
The dummy coefficients for the points of time (t<–4) before treatment are modelling the average 
differences in tiY ,D  as a function of t.  The average difference for the treatment sample Nt of the re-
spective period t should not be different from zero if the sample is suitable for the evaluation of dif-
ferences in employment related to treatment.  The preprogramme test is estimated by evaluating 
(PPT) as a linear regression (inference is based upon heteroskedasticity–consistent standard error 
estimates). 
3.4.2 Implementation 
3.4.2.1 Case selection and sample stratification 
Monthly data 
We decided to create monthly data from the spell data of the merged evaluation database, so that 
we obtain a comparable panel data set.  As the spell data show a daily frequency, generating the 
monthly data could not be achieved without further assumptions.  The most important implication 
of the creation of monthly panel data was on the one hand that spells needed to be split to monthly 
labour market status information; on the other hand, we had to decide how spells with duration of 
less than one month were recoded into the monthly structure.  In these cases, the spell with the 
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longest duration was chosen, and the information of this spell was coded for the entire month.  If 
there were spells of equal length, which could serve as the “main” employment status of the respec-
tive month, we selected the first of any of these spells.   
Restriction to individuals starting treatment from unemployment 
The basic case selection restricts the sample to individuals who begin unemployment after being 
employed in the years 92–4.  It should be noted that unemployment here corresponds to the recep-
tion of unemployment benefit, because the social insurance data only record the receipt of unem-
ployment benefit, i.e. a smaller fraction then total unemployment.  Therefore, the results should be 
interpreted with care, especially for the post–treatment period.   
However, by focusing on individuals who terminated dependent employment before becoming 
unemployed, most unemployed individuals are recorded in our data because of having an unem-
ployment benefit claim resulting from the employment and because of important institutional incen-
tives to apply for unemployment benefit.  Even if individuals do not receive unemployment benefits 
in the first or second month after ending employment (because voluntary quits), they can claim un-
employment benefit from the third month onwards up to a period of one year.  In such cases, indi-
viduals are coded in our sample as being unemployed for three months.  It is therefore credible to 
assume that virtually all unemployed who leave dependent employment claim unemployment 
benefit within the first three months6 – and that data of benefit reception can be used for evaluation 
if the target group are short– and medium–term unemployed because these data covers the vast 
majority of all unemployed coming from dependent employment.   
In order to identify a homogeneous treatment group, we decided to focus on the employment ef-
fects of participants starting a training of the type “specific professional skills” after having experi-
enced unemployment for several durations.  This restriction allows us to take only individuals into 
consideration, which are either recorded once in the LED data.  Employed persons who never re-
ceive any payment of income maintenance are excluded from the analysis.  If we considered also 
individuals who start treatment directly from a previous employment spell or parallel to an em-
ployment spell, an appropriate comparison groups should also consist of these individuals because 
they are in principle also eligible to treatment and would be necessary in order to find a control 
group which is most similar with respect to the observable characteristics.  Another reason why we 
restricted the analysis to this target group is that it is more informative for policy makers to evaluate 
treatments targeted to the unemployed because this corresponds to the policy which is still in prac-
tice in Germany.   
Restriction to treatments starting 92–4 
We decided to restrict the sample on individuals who start at least one spell of open unemployment 
in the years 92–94 for both the treatment and the comparison group and focus on entries into pro-
                                                          
6 Of course, there are some exceptions to this: Individuals whose previous work experience is of less than 
one year are only entitled to unemployment assistance – and the reception of this benefit depends on the 
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grammes following a spell of unemployment in these years resulting in a huge reduction of the 
complexity of the data.  However, the employment information for all the individuals starting un-
employment in these and the previous and subsequent years still results in an overall sample size of 
4,280,557 person–month–observations for the period 88–97 for both East and West Germany 
(1,071,979 resulting from the merged IABSLED–FuU–data and 3,208,578 from the merged IAB-
SLED–data). 
Conditioning on employment/unemployment and stratification of samples 
Finally we concentrate on individuals who start unemployment after leaving employment in any of 
the months for this period of observation and to evaluate the effects of such policies for them.  An 
illustrative example of a monthly unemployment entry cohort can be found in table 3.4 where we 
show the labour market status for individuals starting an unemployment spell in the month October 
92 either from unemployment or from a status outside the labour force.  We see an overall sample 
of 2224 individuals starting unemployment in this month.  In the month before, these individuals 
are either in employment or outside the labour market.   
We observe this unemployment entry cohort over a period of four years and show the basic fre-
quencies of the cohort at any point in time after the unemployment experience.  The first and most 
important impression the data provides is that – besides the group re–entering employment – the 
most important alternative status to unemployment for this cohort is the participation in the “specific 
professional skills programme”, followed by the participation in retraining and direct integration.  In 
the following we will restrict the analysis to individuals who start a first treatment in the specific 
professional skills training.  Participants who start the participation in training after experiencing 
unemployment are not very numerous, so that in a later step of the analysis the sample should be 
extended to the participants starting the treatment after employment, too.  This however would also 
imply an extension of the control group: The naïve control group then should also consist of indi-
viduals who are never recipients of any benefit.   
Note that we restrict the control group to individuals who do not start treatment at all, i.e. individu-
als starting treatment after a longer unemployment experience are excluded as well as individuals 
who start treatment in any other year than 93 or 94.  We are aware that this restriction to non–
participants could be understood as a conditioning on future outcomes if we follow Frederiksson, 
Johansson (2003) and that further assumptions are required: Frederiksson, Johansson (2003) show 
that the conditional independence assumption does not hold if one accounts for the fact that indi-
viduals who are not treated up to the end of the time window might be participants in a programme 
after this time.  Their study could demonstrate that the effect of treatment–on–the–treated is posi-
tively biased if this is taken into account.   
As it is virtually impossible in non–experimental evaluation to create a control group of which we 
know for sure that its individuals will never receive treatment, the estimated effect of treatment–on–
the–treated of this analysis needs a further assumption (along the lines of Frederiksson, Johansson 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
whole household income and may not be granted in cases, in which the partner’s income exceed a certain 
range.   
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2003): Taking the timing of treatment seriously, one can understand the estimated effect as treat-
ment–on–the–treated for a specific period.  Assuming this, a comparison group whose members do 
not start treatment in this specific period could provide a valid non–treatment outcome.   
 
Table 3.4 Exemplary entry cohort (October 92) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.A1 in the appendix shows how many participants start a first specific professional skills type 
of treatment after one, two or three months of unemployment.  For individuals who start treatment 
in January 93 and who started prior unemployment either in October, November or December 92, 
the overall sample size is N=7 and the control group resulting from individuals who started unem-
ployment at the same time and who experience unemployment as long as the treatment population 
before month 1 of the treatment is N=1210.  As defined under section 3.4.1.2 we decided not to 
evaluate any treatment at any point in time after any specific duration of unemployment, but to gen-
erate aggregates of individuals starting either one of the treatments after either short–term, medium–
term or long–term unemployment in either 93 or 94.   
The basic descriptive figures for these aggregates are reported in table 3.5 as well as descriptive 
statistics for the treatment and the control group prior to matching.  For the year 93, the treatment 
group in specific professional skills training amounts to 121 in West and 170 in East Germany start-
ing treatment in any of the months in 93 after 1–3 months of unemployment, for individuals starting 
treatment after 4–6 months of unemployment, these figures amount to N=115 (West) and N=138 
(East), for entrants after 7–9 months of unemployment N=60 (West) and N=94 (East).  These are 
the basic sample sizes of the treatment group.  For 94, the overall sample sizes of the treatment 
group are slightly lower (table 3.5). 
Prep.
Specific 
skills Re-training Precise jobs
Direct 
integration Promotion Language
Aug 92 42 1843 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Sep 92 0 1836 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Oct 92 2224 0 4 5 5 0 0 5 0
Nov 92 1998 175 4 20 6 0 3 7 0
Dec 92 1832 284 4 34 6 0 3 9 0
Jan 93 1692 372 3 48 6 0 3 9 0
Jul 93 1143 719 1 53 7 0 13 6 1
Jan 94 924 806 0 30 11 0 1 4 0
Jul 94 715 904 0 27 10 0 3 2 0
Jan 95 655 881 2 27 8 0 0 0 0
Jul 95 503 945 1 23 7 1 0 0 0
Jan 96 518 877 1 19 8 0 1 0 0
Jul 96 457 931 2 22 6 1 1 0 0
Participation in Further Training
Unemployment Employment
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Table 3.5 Descriptive Statistics for cohorts starting treatment after short–term unemployment in 93 and 
naïve control group (prior to matching) 
 
Programme entry year
Programme entry time after unemplyment duration
Federal territory
Groups T NT T NT T NT T NT T NT T NT
Number of cases 121 17098 115 10898 60 7835 57 6616 95 5915 88 5816
Unemployment duration at programme start 2.909 3.462 5.93 6.568 8.95 9.614 3.123 3.507 6.084 6.662 9.148 9.751
Sector
Agriculture 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
Ground industry 0.09 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.10 0.14 0.07 0.13 0.06 0.12 0.10 0.13
Metal, automotive, electronics 0.21 0.20 0.17 0.23 0.20 0.24 0.12 0.13 0.23 0.19 0.22 0.21
Other industry 0.06 0.11 0.04 0.12 0.08 0.12 0.09 0.10 0.07 0.11 0.13 0.12
Building and civil engineering 0.08 0.10 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.12 0.15 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.07
Production related services, trade, and banking 0.39 0.26 0.40 0.26 0.37 0.24 0.44 0.26 0.38 0.27 0.39 0.26
Consumption related and social services, and the state 0.17 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.24 0.19 0.22 0.08 0.20
Occupational status of last employment
Trainee 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.03
Blue collar 0.37 0.62 0.48 0.60 0.55 0.61 0.49 0.69 0.41 0.62 0.47 0.61
White collar 0.50 0.24 0.42 0.25 0.27 0.26 0.40 0.20 0.52 0.24 0.38 0.25
Working at home or missing 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Part-time worker 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.15 0.11 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.10 0.11 0.11
Regional information at programme entry
Schleswig-Holstein/Hamburg 0.16 0.07 0.10 0.06 0.12 0.06 0.11 0.07 0.11 0.06 0.07 0.06
Lower Saxony/Bremen 0.07 0.14 0.20 0.14 0.10 0.14 0.11 0.15 0.07 0.15 0.18 0.14
Northrhine-Westphalia 0.31 0.27 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.30 0.32 0.25 0.31 0.29 0.21 0.30
Hesse 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.03 0.09 0.05 0.09
Rhineland-Palatinate/Saar 0.17 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.12 0.07 0.15 0.08 0.07 0.08
Baden-Wuerttemberg 0.11 0.15 0.12 0.16 0.13 0.16 0.09 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.17
Bavaria 0.16 0.21 0.17 0.18 0.20 0.17 0.19 0.24 0.19 0.17 0.30 0.17
Firm size of last employment
less than 11 0.31 0.27 0.29 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.28 0.33 0.25 0.27 0.26 0.24
11 to 200 0.36 0.42 0.45 0.40 0.48 0.39 0.56 0.46 0.52 0.43 0.46 0.42
200 to 500 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.07 0.12 0.11 0.08 0.06 0.10 0.10 0.11
more than 500 0.23 0.20 0.16 0.25 0.22 0.27 0.05 0.13 0.17 0.20 0.18 0.23
Level of education
No vocational training 0.15 0.28 0.18 0.29 0.18 0.30 0.18 0.25 0.10 0.27 0.13 0.29
Dual System 0.77 0.66 0.65 0.65 0.75 0.64 0.75 0.70 0.79 0.66 0.73 0.64
A-level 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01
Technical college or university 0.05 0.04 0.15 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.12 0.05 0.13 0.05
no information 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
Nationality
German 0.89 0.83 0.86 0.82 0.90 0.83 0.90 0.82 0.92 0.82 0.90 0.81
EU citizen (1995 enlargement) 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.05
Former Yugoslavia 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.03
Turkey 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.07
Others 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04
Region type
Rural area 0.21 0.21 0.11 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.12 0.26 0.15 0.18 0.23 0.16
Medium populated area 0.34 0.36 0.34 0.36 0.40 0.35 0.37 0.36 0.31 0.36 0.38 0.36
Densely populated area 0.26 0.28 0.39 0.31 0.28 0.31 0.39 0.26 0.36 0.30 0.31 0.32
Metropolitain areas 0.20 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.12 0.13 0.19 0.16 0.09 0.17
Gross salary of former employment (€) 54.97 50.88 55.85 50.76 50.67 50.92 53.60 51.68 65.02 52.34 54.36 52.52
Sex 0.47 0.39 0.39 0.42 0.32 0.42 0.26 0.35 0.40 0.39 0.38 0.40
West West
93
1-3 months
93
4-6 months
93
7-9 months
94
1-3 months
WestWestWest West
94 94
4-6 months 7-9 months
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Table 3.5 Descriptive Statistics for cohorts starting treatment after short–term unemployment in 93 and 
naïve control group (prior to matching, cont.)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.4.2.2 Matching 
The stratification on the previous unemployment duration and the calendar time of the treatment is 
the first part of the correction for selection bias due to observable characteristics.  Other observable 
covariates as shown in table 3.5 are very different for the treatment and the control groups: With 
respect to these covariates, we implement the aforementioned matching approach.  
(a) Probit Model 
We implement matching is based on the propensity score as shown in (12).  The standard approach 
for the estimation of the score function is a parametric model, which estimates the probability for 
both the treatment and the control group to participate in further training depending on observable 
Programme entry year
Programme entry time after unemplyment duration
Federal territory
Groups T NT T NT T NT T NT T NT T NT
Number of cases 170 8503 138 6919 94 5737 71 3287 96 2948 109 2658
Unemployment duration at programme start 2.918 3.554 6.051 6.672 8.904 9.73 3.099 3.551 6 6.642 9.046 9.727
Sector
Agriculture 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ground industry 0.16 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.09 0.15 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.06 0.11
Metal, automotive, electronics 0.17 0.10 0.20 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.07 0.07 0.19 0.09 0.12 0.10
Other industry 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07
Building and civil engineering 0.05 0.11 0.04 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.16 0.10 0.12 0.05 0.10
Production related services, trade, and banking 0.27 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.28 0.24 0.27 0.24 0.29 0.23 0.33 0.24
Consumption related and social services, and the state 0.28 0.34 0.29 0.34 0.34 0.32 0.37 0.35 0.23 0.39 0.39 0.39
Occupational status of last employment
Trainee 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02
Blue collar 0.44 0.59 0.45 0.56 0.34 0.54 0.56 0.66 0.47 0.60 0.40 0.58
White collar 0.47 0.28 0.46 0.31 0.54 0.31 0.31 0.21 0.42 0.25 0.45 0.28
Working at home or missing 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Part-time worker 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.11 0.13 0.10 0.12 0.15 0.11
Regional information at programme entry
Mecklenburg / West Pommerania 0.14 0.11 0.23 0.11 0.27 0.11 0.25 0.13 0.15 0.12 0.16 0.10
Berlin/ Brandenburg 0.22 0.29 0.18 0.29 0.18 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.19 0.29 0.22 0.30
Saxony-Anhalt 0.11 0.18 0.11 0.18 0.11 0.18 0.14 0.18 0.18 0.20 0.22 0.19
Saxony Free State 0.37 0.26 0.33 0.27 0.30 0.28 0.21 0.25 0.34 0.25 0.28 0.25
Thuringia 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.11 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.12 0.16
Firm size of last employment
less than 11 0.23 0.24 0.26 0.20 0.25 0.19 0.25 0.28 0.22 0.25 0.32 0.25
11 to 200 0.37 0.46 0.45 0.43 0.39 0.42 0.59 0.49 0.51 0.48 0.39 0.46
200 to 500 0.18 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.20 0.14 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.12
more than 500 0.22 0.18 0.16 0.23 0.16 0.25 0.06 0.12 0.16 0.15 0.19 0.17
Level of education
No vocational training 0.04 0.14 0.06 0.15 0.10 0.14 0.06 0.11 0.07 0.15 0.04 0.15
Dual System 0.84 0.76 0.85 0.75 0.72 0.74 0.78 0.82 0.83 0.77 0.85 0.76
A-level 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Technical college or university 0.12 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.16 0.07 0.14 0.05 0.09 0.05 0.10 0.06
no information 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.03
Nationality
German 0.99 0.97 1.00 0.98 1.00 0.98 1.00 0.97 1.00 0.97 1.00 0.97
EU citizen (1995 enlargement) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Former Yugoslavia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Turkey 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
Others 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
Region type
Rural area 0.45 0.46 0.45 0.45 0.49 0.44 0.55 0.48 0.44 0.48 0.47 0.45
Medium populated area 0.35 0.34 0.37 0.35 0.39 0.36 0.27 0.32 0.42 0.32 0.39 0.33
Densely populated area 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02
Metropolitain areas 0.14 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.10 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.10 0.17 0.12 0.19
Gross salary of former employment (€) 40.11 37.45 39.35 36.89 35.53 36.05 41.52 38.08 39.07 36.83 37.11 36.88
Sex 0.50 0.46 0.52 0.49 0.71 0.50 0.42 0.42 0.46 0.48 0.66 0.53
East
94 94 94
1-3 months 4-6 months 7-9 months
East
93 93 93
1-3 months 4-6 months 7-9 months
EastEast East East
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covariates 1,tiX . for any of the treatments k in calendar year t (indices dropped for simplicity).  The 
latent model behind the probit model can be represented as follows: 
(14) ititi XD eb +=
'
1,
*
1,  
where ( )1,0~ Nie .  The observed model however is a model of binary choice with 
î
í
ì
£
>
=
0,0
0,1
*
,1,
*
,1,
,1,
kti
kti
kti Dif
Dif
D  
where we observe that the event 1,, =kiD t  occurs with probability p  and fails to occur with prob-
ability p-1 .  Since ip  is a probability, we can take any probability distribution function in order to 
parameterise ip .  As long as ( )b,Xf  is a probability distribution function, it will necessarily follow 
the restriction that ip  stays in the [0,1]–interval.  We parameterise the probability of treatment ip  as 
the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution and estimate the binary 
choice model as a probit model. The matching parameter – the propensity score – is predicted as 
(15) bˆ'iX . 
(b) Results of the propensity score estimation 
The results of the propensity score estimations can be found in table 3.A2 where we report all co-
variates included in the score estimations.  The probit estimations model the influence of age (i), 
sector (ii), occupational status (iii), region (iv), firm size (v), level of education (vi), nationality (vii), 
regional type (viii), gender (ix), unemployment experience previous before treatment (x), the calen-
dar time of unemployment entry (xi), number of months before programme (xii) on the participation 
in training for specific professional skills.   
In most cases, age significantly affects the participation probability in training, indicating that the 
probability to take part in the courses decreases with age.  The sector of the last employment prior 
to the unemployment experience does only affect the training participation in East Germany, indi-
cating that short–term and medium–term unemployed from the building and the consumption re-
lated service sector have a lower probability to participate in the training in 93–4 compared to the 
base category of unemployed coming from manufacturing.  The occupational status affects the par-
ticipation decision: white collar workers in most cases are more likely to participate in the training 
compared to blue collar worker in East and West Germany for both training after short–term and 
after medium–term unemployment.  For long–term unemployed entering the programme this selec-
tivity does not exist.   
The variables indicating the region in which the training is carried out also show a significant influ-
ence on the training decision.  Compared to the base category (unemployed in the state North 
Rhine–Westphalia in West and unemployed in Berlin/Brandenburg in East Germany) participants in 
the northern states in the West are less likely to participate after short–term unemployment and 
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more likely in the Free state of Saxony in 93.  In 94, it seems as if these differences do not exist: 
Except for some few coefficients, the regional variables do not affect the participation decision.  
Concerning firm size of the last employment, we find a significant influence of the small–firm vari-
able in some propensity score estimations, indicating that the individuals are less likely to partici-
pate in training if they were laid off by small firms compared to individuals laid off by medium size 
firms.  However, these variables are significant only in few estimations.   
The propensity score estimation includes the level of education.  In many of the estimations we 
observe that a higher formal level of education corresponds to a higher propensity to participate in 
training whereas individuals without a formal occupational training participate relatively seldom in 
such treatments.  However, the coefficients are not in all specifications significant.   
The selectivity with respect to nationality indicates that non–German citizens have in some cases a 
significantly lower probability to participate in training.  A selectivity of the treatment with respect 
to gender was only found in some specifications: In West Germany, women are less likely to take 
part in treatment after a duration of unemployment of 7–9 months, whereas in East Germany, the 
selectivity is just opposite in the same year (93).  In 94, women are more likely to participate in East 
Germany after unemployment duration of 7–9 months whereas in the West, they tend more to take 
part in courses after unemployment duration of 1–3 months.   
A surprisingly low influence results from variables which pay attention to the previous employment 
history of treated and control observations: In West Germany, employment six months before the 
start of treatment state seems to increase the probability to participate, whereas employment to an 
earlier point in time decreases it or is of insignificant influence in 93.  This influence cannot be 
found in 94 for West Germany.  In East Germany, it seems that especially employment long time 
before the participation is important for the assignment to treatment.  The calendar month of treat-
ment as well as the months of experienced unemployment before treatment (within the interval as 
defined above) show in most cases significant parameters. 
(c) Overlap 
Propensity score matching can only be successful concerning the conditioning on observable char-
acteristics if the estimated propensity scores of treated and non–treated individuals overlap suffi-
ciently.  The estimated propensity scores of the treated individuals are without exception covered by 
the values of the control observations (figures 3.A1–3.A4 in the appendix).  The figures show the 
frequency of the different values of the propensity scores for treated and non–treated individuals.  
We therefore can assume that a matching based on the propensity score controls sufficiently for the 
observables considered.   
(d) Implementation of matching  
As stated in the conditional independence assumption, we estimate the probit only for the time 
when the treatment starts (at t=1) according to the estimation described above.  Based on this esti-
mation, the employment outcome is predicted at any point in time relative to treatment.  The match-
ing algorithm works as follows: 
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Step 1: We select the month t=1 of the panel data for treatment and sampled control group.  The 
propensity score is estimated as a static probit as indicated above based on time specific 
covariates of this month.  The propensity score for each individual of the treatment and the 
control group is predicted based on (15).   
Step 2: The individual propensity score is duplicated at any of the panel months of the same 
treatment or control observation.   
Step 3: A bandwidth is chosen with ROThh =  on the basis of { }0=Î Dj  of the specific treatment 
at t=1.   
Step 4: The first observation of the first treated individual for the month t=–18 and all available 
control observations at the calendar time corresponding to t=–18 of the treated individual 
are selected.  A weighting function is created as  
 ( )( )hXXK ij /ˆˆ bb -   
with a Gaussian Kernel weighting the predicted propensity scores jXbˆ  of the non–
treatment sample with respect to the predicted propensity score iXbˆ  of the (local) treated 
individual.   
Step 5: The expected employment outcome of non–participation 
 ( )( )
{ }
å
=Î
-- ==
0
18,18, ),(1,
Dj
tjiti YCjiwDXPYCE  
 for the first treated individual in the hypothetical state of non–treatment for the month 
 –18 is estimated by a nonparametric regression with the weighting function of step 4 in 
the sample of all non–treated observations.  The same procedure is applied to estimate the 
expected values of all socio–economic characteristics which are subject to the propensity 
score estimation (age [i], sector [ii], occupational status [iii], region [iv], firm size [v], level 
of education [vi], nationality [vii], regional type [viii], gender [ix], unemployment experi-
ence previous before treatment [x], the calendar time of unemployment entry [xi], number 
of months before programme [xii] on the participation in training for specific professional 
skills at t=1).   
Step 6: Step 4 and step 5 are repeated for all months available to the treated individual for the time 
t=–17 to t=36 relative to the start of treatment based on the available naïve control group at 
the same calendar time.   
Step 7 The socio–economic characteristics and the employment outcome for the treated individ-
ual and the estimated non–treatment outcome for employment and the predicted socio–
economic characteristics are stored into a new data file. 
Step 8 The steps 4–7 are repeated for all other treated individuals until no more treatment obser-
vations are available.   
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(e) Matching quality 
A simple test for the quality of matching is the standard t–test that assesses whether the means of 
two groups are statistically different from each other with respect to the observable X.  We construct 
the observable characteristics of the matched controls based on a local linear model applying the 
same weighting formula as for the dependent variable and predict the covariates for the matched 
sample.  These “non–treatment characteristics of the treated” are then subject to a simple t–test that 
is a ratio of the difference between the two means of the treatment and the matched control group 
(numerator) and the dispersion of the scores (denominator).  By means of this, it is an example of 
the signal–to–noise metaphor: the difference between the means is the signal, the bottom part of the 
formula is a measure of variability that is essentially noise that may make it harder to see the group 
difference.  The complete formula of the test is: 
N
X
N
X
XX
t
iji
iji
)(
)(
varvar +
-
=  
where iX  is the mean of the observable characteristics X of the treatment sample, )(ijX  is the 
sample means of the observable characteristics predicted as the control outcome for the treatment 
sample analogously to (9) for all observable characteristics, iXvar  is the sample variance of the 
treatment, )(var ijX  the variance of the predicted control observations, N  is the sample size of the 
treatment sample or the matched controls.   
The results of the tests are shown in table 3.A3 in the appendix: With the exception of only very few 
dimension of the covariate vector X (namely the occupational status of trainees predicted for the 
participants in training after 7–9 months of unemployment in East Germany and the gross salary of 
the former employment predicted for participants after 4–6 months of unemployment in the West), 
there is never a significant difference with respect to the observable characteristics between the 
treated and the matched control.  The matching procedure was successful in creating a suitable con-
trol group with respect to the observable covariates.  The second test implemented here, the pre-
programme test on the outcome variable as discussed under section 3.4.1.4 will be discussed in the 
following.   
3.4.2.3 Preprogramme test 
As a last test for the suitability of the matched sample – especially with respect to the application of 
a static comparison of the employment levels with and without treatment – one has to check 
whether unobservable characteristics are still existing in the data that could affect the outcome vari-
able before treatment.  We implement this test as motivated under section 3.4.1.4 for all different 
matched samples.   
The results can be found in table 3.A4 of the appendix.  Differences in unobservable characteristics 
seem to be overcome sufficiently by stratification and matching: the preprogramme test suggested 
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here gives no evidence that employment rates are different at any point in time before treatment 
(with the exception of long–term unemployed eleven months before the beginning of treatment, 
where we observe significantly different outcomes however referring to a very small sample of 
treated individuals, see table 3.A4 in the Appendix)..  To our opinion, it is then permitted to inter-
pret the differences in the employment rate of the treatment sample compared to the matched con-
trols’ outcome as the causal effect of treatment–on–the–treated. 
3.4.2.4 Employment outcomes 
As defined above, the outcome of treatment–on–the–treated with respect to employment is repre-
sented by  
(16)  tkiKtkitki YCYTY ,,,,,,,,, ttt -=D  
for any participant of the programme k after a specific period of unemployment duration in calendar 
year t (these subscripts will be dropped in the following) with tkiYT ,,, t  taking the value 1 in case of 
dependent employment and 0 in the case of recorded benefit reception in the data.  tkiKYC ,,, t  is the 
estimated non–treatment outcome of the respective person based on kernel matching.  t indicates 
the time relative to treatment, i.e. t>0 for the months following the treatment.   
Note that the time individuals spend in treatment is recorded as unemployment in the outcome 
variable and is considered in the period of observation – contrarily to section two of this thesis – in 
order to become more sensible for the very short–term effects of the treatment.  In case of reiterated 
treatments or participation in another type of treatment after treatment in “specific professional 
skills” the employment outcome is also zero.  We specify this outcome for any month after the be-
ginning of treatment )0(,36,...1 ¹= tt  for any of the treatments k after specific unemployment ex-
perience in calendar year t   (subscripts are dropped for simplicity) as 
(17)  å
=
D=
tN
i
ti
t
t YN
TT
1
,
1
  
Again the outcomes are estimated as linear regression models.  Inference is based upon heteroske-
dasticity–consistent standard error estimates.  The results for the monthly average differences in em-
ployment rates as percentages are summarized graphically in Figures 3.2–3.7.  In general, the inter-
pretation of the figures works as follows: The thick line shows the estimated differences in the em-
ployment rate of the treated individuals compared to the non–treatment outcome for the time pe-
riod from the beginning of the treatment until 36 months after the beginning.  We plot the employ-
ment effect tTT  as defined in equation (13) as a function of t .  Figures 3.2 and 3.3 give the average 
employment effects, whereas figures 3.4–3.5 and 3.6–3.7 display the results for the subgroups be-
low 36 years of age and above 35.  The two surrounding dashed lines indicate the 95% confidence 
interval.  Participation begins at 0=t , so that the duration of treatment is included in the period of 
observation.  It would be plausible to expect that employment levels are slightly lower for the time 
while the treatment population takes part in the programme and should increase with the individu-
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als re-entering the labour market from training.  The zero horizontal line should be understood as 
the benchmark for measuring success or failure of the programme: According to our definition, a 
programme should be considered as successful in terms of employment if the confidence interval 
lies in the positive region, so that we have a significant difference in employment rate between the 
treatment sample and the matched control observations.   
3.4.3 Results7 
Differences for all participants 
We estimate employment effects separately for participants in the specific skills training for the years 
93 and 94 and for different target groups according to the previous time spent in unemployment.  
Figure 3.3 shows the results for all participants in the year 1993 in West and East Germany.  With 
the exception of participants in training after short–term unemployment in East Germany 36 months 
after the beginning of the treatment, we never find a significantly positive coefficient of the outcome 
estimation, indicating that the programmes never had a positive outcome with respect to employ-
ment.   
In general, the employment rates lie around to 40 percentage points (ppoints) lower due to treat-
ment for the first month of treatment in West Germany and only slightly higher in East Germany for 
participants in training after a short–term unemployment experience in 93.  As the time of the 
treatment is included in the period of observation, this result is clearly not surprising.  Over the 
post–treatment period the differences in the employment rate between treatment and matched con-
trol decline from the first month onwards, except for the very long–term unemployed in East Ger-
many whose employment remains 40 ppoints reduced compared to non–treatment for a period up 
to six months after the treatment.   
Both in West and in East Germany, significant differences in the employment disappear after 20 
months for the participants starting the treatment after experiencing short–term unemployment.  For 
the individuals starting treatment after a medium–duration of unemployment, the percentage differ-
ence in employment rate immediately after the beginning of the treatment are lower than for indi-
viduals starting after short–term unemployment.  They increase up to 12 months after the beginning 
of treatment to an insignificant difference for West Germany.  In East Germany, there are significant 
differences for a period up to 18 months after the treatment begun which points out that either the 
duration of training is longer in East Germany or the negative employment effect due to treatment is 
more persistent in the post–treatment period.   
For individuals who start treatment after a long–term unemployment, i.e. 7–9 months of unem-
ployment before treatment, the differences in employment rates are comparable: In West Germany, 
                                                          
7 As in the second section of this thesis, the standard errors of the estimated treatment effects are likely to be 
underestimated because we cannot account for the sampling variability of the propensity score estimate.  
However, the complexity of the data – especially the size of the naïve control group – did not allow to 
bootstrap the estimated coefficients.  However, as most effects for the medium– and long–term employ-
ment outcome are already insignificant without trustworthy confidence intervals and standard errors are 
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the employment rates lie around 30 ppoints lower for participants compared to the matched control 
outcome, which is slightly higher than for participants after short–term and medium–term unem-
ployment.  The differences remains significantly negative the period up to 20 months after the be-
ginning of the treatment.  In East Germany, the employment level after the beginning of treatment 
lies more than 40 ppoints below the non–treatment outcome for the treated, and again, the differ-
ence remains significantly lower for a period up to 20 months of out period of observation.  Con-
trary to West Germany, the employment level is significantly reduced by around 40 ppoints for a 
period 12 months after the beginning of the treatment, showing at the duration of the treatment in 
East Germany is possible higher than in the West.   
The employment effects of treatment for the populations entering into treatment in the year 94 can 
be found in figure 3.4.  Compared to the participation in the treatment one year earlier, we see the 
same pattern of treatment effects, but there are differences in the employment levels after treatment: 
While participants starting treatment after short–term unemployment in West Germany have signifi-
cantly lower employment for a 20 months after the beginning of the treatment, this negative em-
ployment effect due to treatment is significant only for a shorter period.  It could be caused by either 
an increase of the effectiveness of the treatment (better: a reduction of the negative effect following 
treatment) or by reducing of the time individuals spend in treatment.  For the population starting 
treatment after short–term unemployment in East Germany, the same picture is found: The signifi-
cantly negative employment rates for the treated can only be observed for a period up to one year 
after treatment.  For the medium and long–term unemployed who start provision of specific skills, 
the employment rates are lower in the first month compared to 93, especially in East Germany, the 
employment rate for the treated individuals is 50 ppoints lower compared to non–treatment.  The 
employment effect in general remains significantly negative for a longer time in East Germany than 
in the West, again indicating to a longer duration of the treatment in the East.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
assumed to increase due to the variance of the propensity score estimation, it is not likely that the results 
will change qualitatively.  
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Figure 3.3 Employment effects for participants in 1993 after short–term (top), medium–term (mid) long–
term (bottom) unemployment, in West (left) and East (right) Germany 
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Figure 3.4 Employment effects for participants in 1994 after short–term (top), medium–term (mid) long–
term (bottom) unemployment, in West (left) and East (right) Germany 
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gramme generates poorer results in the East than in the West: The reduced employment for the par-
ticipants compared to the non–treatment outcome remains significant for a longer period after the 
beginning of the treatment in the East: While the employment effect becomes insignificant in West 
Germany after 8 (for entrants coming form short–term unemployment) to 12 months (for those from 
long–term unemployment), the effect is negative for short–term unemployed in East Germany (up to 
20 months after the beginning of the treatment).   
We essentially never estimate any positive employment effects.  However, there are some few ex-
ceptions to this when we compare the employment outcomes for the young cohorts between 93 
and 94: For participants starting treatment in West Germany after short–term unemployment in the 
year 94, we find a positive employment effect 23–26 months after the beginning of the treatment, 
for participants in East Germany, there seems to be a positive employment outcome 35 months after 
treatment for young cohorts participating either after short– or after long–term unemployment 93.  
All other employment outcomes are insignificant for this as well as for the other populations starting 
the treatment after medium–term and long–term unemployment for both East and West Germany 
after a period following the beginning of the treatment in which the employment effect is signifi-
cantly negative for all these populations.  Again, the policies seem to more negatively affect the 
employment prospect for individuals in the East than in the West: Especially groups starting treat-
ment after medium and long–term unemployment in East Germany show a longer and compared to 
the West a more severe reduction of the employment outcomes following the beginning of the 
treatment. 
Figures 3.7 and 3.8 show the findings for the age group above 35 years.  As in the case for the 
whole participation group, individuals start with a 40 ppoints reduced employment rate for the first 
months of treatment in West Germany after a short–term unemployment experience in 93.  Over 
the post–treatment period, the differences in the employment rate between treatment and matched 
control disappear to an insignificant employment effect.  The negative employment effect for the 
group above 35 lasts longer than for the total participation group, and an insignificant employment 
effect takes place later after the start of the programme than for all participants.  These effects vary 
between the years for West Germany: For participants starting treatment after short–term unem-
ployment in 93, we find a negative treatment effect up to 32 months after treatment, whereas this 
negative effect disappears after seven months for the participation group starting the treatment one 
year later.  For East Germany, the effects are essentially the same for both years.  Again, the estima-
tions suggest that the negative employment effect is more persistent in East Germany compared to 
West Germany.  At the end of the evaluation period, we never find any significant difference in the 
employment rate caused by the treatment. 
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Figure 3.5 Employment effects for participants in 1993 after short–term (top), medium–term (mid) long–
term (bottom) unemployment, in West (left) and East (right) Germany age group below 36 
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Figure 3.6 Employment effects for participants in 1994 after short–term (top), medium–term (mid)  
long–term (bottom) unemployment, in West (left) and East (right) Germany  
age group below 36 
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Figure 3.7 Employment effects for participants in 1993 after short–term (top), medium–term (mid) long–
term (bottom) unemployment, in West (left) and East (right) Germany age group above 35 
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Figure 3.8 Employment effects for participants in 1994 after short–term (top), medium–term (mid)  
long–term (bottom) unemployment, in West (left) and East (right) Germany 
age group above 35 
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3.5 Conclusion 
Over the last years, a number of analyses about the effects of public sector sponsored further train-
ing were published indicating that only poor employment effects for the participants resulted from 
these policies.  As many of these evaluation studies made use of the available survey data from the 
GSOEP and the Labour Market Monitor, neither a direct link to the specific policies nor inference 
for specific targets groups could be drawn.  It is vital for the progress of the empirical evidence to 
make use of alternative data providing new evidence for evaluation.  This paper should be regarded 
as a first attempt to provide such evidence based on the social insurance data, which is regularly 
recorded for the biggest part of the active labour force in Germany. 
It became apparent that using these data for evaluation study requires detailed knowledge both of 
the institutional regulations of further training and the available data.  In preparing the analysis, a 
complex merge procedure needs to be implemented in order to create an integrated database for 
evaluation as well as an understanding how and to which particular groups the Employment Service 
offer these trainings.  After sketching the basic regulation of further training in section 3.2, we sug-
gested in section 3.3 to evaluate these policies rather as interventions for specific target groups 
(short, medium and long–term unemployed) and restricted to evaluation to the most important type 
of treatment, the provision of specific occupational skills to the unemployed.   
The data offer extensive and most detailed information about the legal regulation under which fur-
ther training is implemented in an individual case.  Clear–cut treatments could only be identified by 
an integration of the information provided and by multiple validation processes.  A direct applica-
tion of evaluation approaches to social insurance data is not adequate because the information pro-
vided do not correspond to any socio–economic concept of work, treatment or unemployment.  
Consequently, only an extensive recoding could clarify the policy interventions in the data, so that 
we could identify most homogeneous treatment groups in the sample.   
The evaluation study then implements different procedures to overcome the microeconomic evalua-
tion problem in non–experimental data.  We rely on conditional independence assumption claim-
ing that the non–treatment outcome for treated and non–treated persons are comparable if we con-
dition on observable characteristics.  We restrict this identifying assumption to specific observable 
characteristics and especially to the employment history prior to treatment and condition on these 
covariates by stratifying the samples based on the same unemployment experience of treated and 
non–treated individuals to the same calendar time and further covariates subject to kernel matching 
on the propensity score.  We extensively test whether the non–treatment outcome before treatment 
and the matching on covariates achieve appropriate evaluation data.  As there are no more observ-
able differences before treatment, we can evaluate the effect of treatment–on–the–treated non–
parametrically within the matched samples.   
The results indicate that the employment effect is significantly negative immediately after the begin-
ning of the treatment.  This is of course expected because we include the duration of the treatment 
into the outcome variables in our evaluation design.  Some months after the beginning of the train-
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ing, it seems to initiate a positive employment dynamic, but the effect of the treatment does not 
show a positive impact on employment.   
The effect remains insignificant for long–time after the beginning of the treatment when the training 
itself is supposed to have ended for the treated.  These insignificant employment effects were found 
for both years 93 and 94, for all three different target groups after short–term, medium–term and 
long–term unemployment and they are surprisingly similar for East and West Germany.   
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3.7 Appendix 
3.7.1 Tables and figures 
Table 3.A1 Descriptive Statistics for cohorts starting treatment after short–term unemployment between 
January and December 93 and naïve control group 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unmployment entry time
Programm entry time
Groups T NT T NT T NT T NT T NT T NT
Number of cases 7 1210 15 1527 20 1650 10 1882 12 1012 5 1129
Unemployment duration at programme start 3.571 3.683 3.067 3.24 2.75 3.432 3.2 3.801 2.25 3.589 2.8 3.669
Sector
Agriculture 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Ground industry 0.29 0.12 0.07 0.16 0.05 0.16 0.10 0.13 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.11
Metal, automotive, electronics 0.00 0.21 0.20 0.12 0.20 0.14 0.20 0.21 0.17 0.21 0.00 0.27
Other industry 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.15 0.08 0.00 0.12 0.08 0.14 0.40 0.13
Building and civil engineering 0.14 0.08 0.07 0.17 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.09 0.20 0.05
Production related services, trade, and banking 0.29 0.25 0.40 0.23 0.40 0.21 0.60 0.25 0.42 0.28 0.00 0.25
Consumption related/social services/state 0.29 0.24 0.27 0.23 0.20 0.17 0.10 0.18 0.33 0.18 0.40 0.18
Occupational status of last employment
Trainee 0.14 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.03 0.00 0.08 0.20 0.05
Blue collar 0.71 0.61 0.53 0.73 0.35 0.76 0.20 0.63 0.17 0.61 0.00 0.63
White collar 0.14 0.27 0.40 0.17 0.45 0.14 0.50 0.24 0.75 0.22 0.80 0.21
Working at home or missing 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Part-time worker 0.00 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.15 0.06 0.20 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.00 0.10
Regional information at programme entry
Schleswig-Holstein/Hamburg 0.14 0.06 0.13 0.07 0.20 0.06 0.10 0.06 0.25 0.06 0.40 0.06
Lower Saxony/Bremen 0.14 0.14 0.20 0.16 0.05 0.13 0.10 0.14 0.08 0.12 0.20 0.14
Northrhine-Westphalia 0.43 0.29 0.20 0.21 0.35 0.20 0.30 0.27 0.08 0.28 0.00 0.30
Hesse 0.00 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.20 0.10
Rhineland-Palatinate/Saar 0.14 0.08 0.13 0.09 0.15 0.07 0.10 0.08 0.17 0.07 0.00 0.07
Baden-Wuerttemberg 0.00 0.15 0.07 0.11 0.20 0.13 0.00 0.14 0.25 0.19 0.20 0.16
Bavaria 0.14 0.19 0.20 0.28 0.05 0.35 0.40 0.22 0.08 0.18 0.00 0.17
Firm size of last employment
less than 11 0.57 0.27 0.40 0.35 0.30 0.30 0.50 0.23 0.08 0.26 0.20 0.25
11 to 200 0.00 0.40 0.27 0.45 0.40 0.47 0.40 0.42 0.42 0.40 0.20 0.37
200 to 500 0.00 0.12 0.13 0.07 0.15 0.08 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.10 0.20 0.10
more than 500 0.43 0.22 0.20 0.12 0.15 0.15 0.10 0.24 0.50 0.24 0.40 0.29
Level of education
No vocational training 0.00 0.26 0.20 0.24 0.35 0.28 0.20 0.28 0.25 0.29 0.00 0.31
Dual System 1.00 0.68 0.67 0.72 0.60 0.68 0.70 0.66 0.58 0.67 0.80 0.63
A-level 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.20 0.01
Technical college or university 0.00 0.05 0.13 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.10 0.04 0.08 0.03 0.00 0.03
no information 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02
Nationality
German 0.86 0.83 0.73 0.85 0.85 0.86 1.00 0.85 1.00 0.81 0.80 0.81
EU citizen (1995 enlargement) 0.00 0.06 0.20 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.06
Former Yugoslavia 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.10 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.02
Turkey 0.14 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.07
Others 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.20 0.04
Region type
Rural area 0.29 0.20 0.33 0.33 0.10 0.32 0.20 0.21 0.00 0.18 0.20 0.19
Medium populated area 0.14 0.36 0.40 0.35 0.45 0.35 0.30 0.34 0.33 0.35 0.20 0.35
Densely populated area 0.43 0.30 0.13 0.20 0.20 0.22 0.40 0.30 0.42 0.29 0.40 0.31
Metropolitain areas 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.25 0.12 0.10 0.15 0.25 0.18 0.20 0.15
Gross salary of former employment (€) 40.35 50.65 54.95 49.67 50.81 52.03 47.06 55.60 63.80 46.05 61.18 50.92
Sex 0.29 0.43 0.47 0.35 0.45 0.28 0.80 0.36 0.50 0.38 0.80 0.38
Jan 93 - Mar 93
Apr 93 May 93 Jun 93
Mar 93 - May 93Feb 93 - Apr 93Oct 92 - Dec 92
Jan 93 Feb 93 Mar 93
Nov 92 - Jan 93 Dec 92 - Feb 93
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Table 3.A1 Descriptive Statistics for cohorts starting treatment after short–term unemployment between 
January and December 93 and naïve control group (cont.) 
 
 
Unmployment entry time
Programm entry time
Groups T NT T NT T NT T NT T NT T NT
Number of cases 5 1237 5 948 8 1020 11 1366 14 860 9 3257
Unemployment duration at programme start 3.6 3.79 2.6 3.396 3 3.539 3.455 3.78 2.429 3.671 2.889 2.874
Sector
Agriculture 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Ground industry 0.00 0.12 0.20 0.10 0.13 0.08 0.00 0.11 0.07 0.13 0.33 0.12
Metal, automotive, electronics 0.60 0.18 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.22 0.36 0.22 0.36 0.21 0.22 0.19
Other industry 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.11 0.11 0.10
Building and civil engineering 0.20 0.06 0.20 0.06 0.00 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.21 0.08 0.11 0.08
Production related services, trade, and banking 0.00 0.29 0.40 0.29 0.88 0.29 0.36 0.28 0.36 0.26 0.22 0.25
Consumption related/social services/state 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.23 0.00 0.22 0.18 0.21 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.26
Occupational status of last employment
Trainee 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.09 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.00 0.04
Blue collar 0.40 0.52 0.00 0.55 0.38 0.56 0.46 0.48 0.43 0.58 0.56 0.63
White collar 0.60 0.32 1.00 0.25 0.50 0.22 0.27 0.31 0.50 0.26 0.44 0.25
Working at home or missing 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Part-time worker 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.11 0.18 0.11 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.09
Regional information at programme entry
Schleswig-Holstein/Hamburg 0.00 0.07 0.20 0.06 0.25 0.07 0.00 0.06 0.14 0.07 0.11 0.07
Lower Saxony/Bremen 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.13 0.07 0.14 0.00 0.15
Northrhine-Westphalia 0.20 0.27 0.40 0.30 0.75 0.29 0.27 0.29 0.36 0.27 0.33 0.29
Hesse 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.09
Rhineland-Palatinate/Saar 0.40 0.09 0.20 0.08 0.00 0.07 0.46 0.09 0.14 0.09 0.22 0.07
Baden-Wuerttemberg 0.40 0.17 0.20 0.18 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.16 0.11 0.15
Bavaria 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.18 0.27 0.18 0.29 0.19 0.22 0.18
Firm size of last employment
less than 11 0.00 0.28 0.20 0.29 0.38 0.25 0.27 0.22 0.36 0.26 0.22 0.29
11 to 200 0.80 0.40 0.60 0.43 0.63 0.43 0.27 0.42 0.29 0.45 0.22 0.42
200 to 500 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.12 0.09 0.12 0.14 0.10 0.44 0.10
more than 500 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.18 0.00 0.20 0.36 0.24 0.21 0.19 0.11 0.19
Level of education
No vocational training 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.31 0.13 0.32 0.09 0.29 0.00 0.26 0.11 0.27
Dual System 1.00 0.67 1.00 0.63 0.88 0.61 0.91 0.62 0.86 0.67 0.78 0.67
A-level 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.00 0.01
Technical college or university 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.05 0.11 0.04
no information 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
Nationality
German 1.00 0.83 1.00 0.82 0.75 0.83 0.91 0.84 0.93 0.86 1.00 0.82
EU citizen (1995 enlargement) 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.09 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.00 0.05
Former Yugoslavia 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03
Turkey 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.13 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06
Others 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.13 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04
Region type
Rural area 0.20 0.14 0.20 0.18 0.00 0.19 0.27 0.17 0.43 0.19 0.22 0.20
Medium populated area 0.60 0.38 0.00 0.36 0.38 0.38 0.46 0.36 0.14 0.35 0.44 0.37
Densely populated area 0.20 0.33 0.40 0.31 0.25 0.28 0.18 0.32 0.14 0.32 0.22 0.28
Metropolitain areas 0.00 0.15 0.40 0.15 0.38 0.14 0.09 0.15 0.29 0.14 0.11 0.16
Gross salary of former employment (€) 71.83 52.49 42.06 46.21 48.52 44.68 48.66 53.40 63.14 49.42 67.71 51.71
Sex 0.40 0.46 0.80 0.44 0.38 0.42 0.46 0.42 0.29 0.40 0.33 0.41
Dec 93Aug 93 34213 Oct 93
Aug 93 - Oct 93 Sep 93 - Nov 93
Jul 93 Nov 93
Apr 93 - Jun 93 May 93 - Jul 93 Jul 93 - Sep 93Jun 93 - Aug 93
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Table 3.A2 Probit estimation of the propensity scores, treatment in 1993 after short-term (left), medium-term (centre) and long-term (right) unemployment in West 
Germany 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
N = 17219 Sc. Pseudo R-squared = .010747
Positive obs. = 121 LR (zero slopes) = 174.540 [.000]
Mean of dep. var. = .702712E-02 Schwarz B.I.C. = 784.403
Sum of squared residuals = 117.945 Log likelihood = -633.219
Pseudo R-squared = .018368
Fraction of Correct Predictions = 0.99
Estimate t-statistic P-value
Constant 6.53 3.03 0.00
Age
Years -0.01 -2.95 0.00
Sector (left out category: metal and electronic)
Agriculture and primary industry -0.15 -1.12 0.27
Other industry -0.28 -1.74 0.08
Building and civil engineering -0.10 -0.65 0.52
Production related services, trade, and banking -0.04 -0.34 0.73
Consumption related and social services, and the state -0.29 -2.30 0.02
Occupational status (left out category: blue collar)
Trainee 0.11 0.66 0.51
White collar 0.44 4.77 0.00
At home, part-time or missing 0.15 1.01 0.31
Region (left out: Northrhine-Westphalia)
Schleswig-Holstein/Hamburg 0.23 1.82 0.07
Lower Saxony/Bremen -0.30 -2.08 0.04
Hesse -0.53 -2.48 0.01
Rhineland-Palatinate/Saar 0.25 2.09 0.04
Baden-Wuerttemberg -0.15 -1.22 0.22
Bavaria -0.23 -1.83 0.07
Firm size (left out: 11 to 200 employees)
Less than 11 0.05 0.61 0.54
200 to 500 0.15 1.16 0.25
More than 500 0.24 2.31 0.02
Level of education (left out: dual system)
Without formal education -0.18 -1.73 0.08
Technical college/university -0.06 -0.34 0.74
Nationality (left out: German)
Non-German 0.03 0.25 0.81
Regional type (left out: densely populated)
Rural area 0.08 0.64 0.52
Medium populated area -0.01 -0.06 0.95
Inner city area 0.04 0.31 0.76
Sex (left out: male)
Women 0.06 0.77 0.44
Employment experience previous to unemployment
Employment six months before t = 1 0.20 1.56 0.12
Employment nine months before t = 1 -0.23 -1.83 0.07
Employment 12 months before t = 1 0.19 1.60 0.11
Calendar time of unemployment entry
Month -0.04 -3.72 0.00
Months before programme
Months -0.34 -7.74 0.00
N = 11013 Sc. Pseudo R-squared = .017995
Positive obs. = 115 LR (zero slopes) = 185.118 [.000]
Mean of dep. var. = .010442 Schwarz B.I.C. = 690.713
Sum of squared residuals = 112.026 Log likelihood = -546.457
Pseudo R-squared = .019344
Fraction of Correct Predictions = 0.99
Estimate t-statistic P-value
Constant 13.16 5.44 0.00
Age
Years -0.01 -3.94 0.00
Sector (left out category: metal and electronic)
Agriculture and primary industry 0.08 0.55 0.58
Other industry -0.29 -1.50 0.13
Building and civil engineering -0.15 -0.79 0.43
Production related services, trade, and banking 0.11 0.85 0.39
Consumption related and social services, and the state -0.08 -0.62 0.54
Occupational status (left out category: blue collar)
Trainee -0.41 -1.58 0.11
White collar 0.22 2.11 0.04
At home, part-time or missing 0.12 0.79 0.43
Region (left out: Northrhine-Westphalia)
Schleswig-Holstein/Hamburg 0.22 1.44 0.15
Lower Saxony/Bremen 0.21 1.66 0.10
Hesse -0.54 -2.24 0.03
Rhineland-Palatinate/Saar 0.12 0.77 0.44
Baden-Wuerttemberg -0.04 -0.33 0.74
Bavaria 0.15 1.11 0.27
Firm size (left out: 11 to 200 employees)
Less than 11 -0.02 -0.26 0.79
200 to 500 -0.03 -0.19 0.85
More than 500 -0.15 -1.24 0.22
Level of education (left out: dual system)
Without formal education -0.03 -0.31 0.76
Technical college/university 0.42 3.08 0.00
Nationality (left out: German)
Non-German -0.07 -0.58 0.56
Regional type (left out: densely populated)
Rural area -0.40 -2.93 0.00
Medium populated area -0.11 -1.09 0.28
Inner city area -0.11 -0.86 0.39
Sex (left out: male)
Women -0.10 -1.13 0.26
Employment experience previous to unemployment
Employment nine months before t = 1 0.36 2.46 0.01
Employment 12 months before t = 1 -0.16 -1.19 0.23
Employment 15 months before t = 1 0.13 1.11 0.27
Calendar time of unemployment entry
Month -0.06 -5.52 0.00
Months before programme
Months -0.40 -9.11 0.00
N = 7895 Sc. Pseudo R-squared = .015493
Positive obs. = 60 LR (zero slopes) = 113.102 [.000]
Mean of dep. var. = .759975E-02 Schwarz B.I.C. = 435.096
Sum of squared residuals = 59.4587 Log likelihood = -295.999
Pseudo R-squared = .011590
Fraction of Correct Predictions = 0.99
Estimate t-statistic P-value
Constant 16.69 5.09 0.00
Age
Years -0.02 -5.05 0.00
Sector (left out category: metal and electronic)
Agriculture and primary industry -0.03 -0.13 0.89
Other industry -0.08 -0.38 0.70
Building and civil engineering -0.15 -0.64 0.52
Production related services, trade, and banking 0.11 0.70 0.49
Consumption related and social services, and the state 0.02 0.10 0.92
Occupational status (left out category: blue collar)
Trainee -0.28 -0.92 0.36
White collar 0.06 0.43 0.67
At home, part-time or missing 0.01 0.02 0.98
Region (left out: Northrhine-Westphalia)
Schleswig-Holstein/Hamburg 0.21 1.05 0.29
Lower Saxony/Bremen -0.08 -0.44 0.66
Hesse -0.13 -0.55 0.59
Rhineland-Palatinate/Saar 0.06 0.29 0.78
Baden-Wuerttemberg -0.03 -0.17 0.86
Bavaria 0.12 0.66 0.51
Firm size (left out: 11 to 200 employees)
Less than 11 -0.11 -0.80 0.43
200 to 500 -0.23 -1.09 0.28
More than 500 0.02 0.12 0.91
Level of education (left out: dual system)
Without formal education -0.23 -1.62 0.11
Technical college/university -0.21 -0.70 0.48
Nationality (left out: German)
Non-German -0.30 -1.11 0.27
Regional type (left out: densely populated)
Rural area -0.07 -0.39 0.69
Medium populated area 0.07 0.55 0.58
Inner city area -0.10 -0.54 0.59
Sex (left out: male)
Women -0.31 -2.58 0.01
Employment experience previous to unemployment
Employment 12 months before t = 1 0.00 0.01 0.99
Employment 15 months before t = 1 0.21 1.19 0.24
Employment 18 months before t = 1 -0.06 -0.42 0.68
Calendar time of unemployment entry
Month -0.07 -4.86 0.00
Months before programme
Months -0.35 -6.55 0.00
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Table 3.A2 Probit estimation of the propensity scores, treatment in 1993 after short-term (left), medium-term (centre) and long-term (right) unemployment in East 
Germany (cont.) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
N = 8673 Sc. Pseudo R-squared = .032721
Positive obs. = 170 LR (zero slopes) = 265.032 [.000]
Mean of dep. var. = .019601 Schwarz B.I.C. = 835.762
Sum of squared residuals = 155.794 Log likelihood = -704.276
Pseudo R-squared = .066525
Fraction of Correct Predictions = 0.98
Estimate t-statistic P-value
Constant 16.90 7.47 0.00
Age
Years -0.01 -2.33 0.02
Sector (left out category: metal and electronic)
Agriculture and primary industry -0.13 -0.98 0.33
Other industry -0.11 -0.69 0.49
Building and civil engineering -0.51 -3.08 0.00
Production related services, trade, and banking -0.15 -1.25 0.21
Consumption related and social services, and the state -0.27 -2.34 0.02
Occupational status (left out category: blue collar)
Trainee -0.18 -0.64 0.52
White collar 0.29 3.25 0.00
At home, part-time or missing 0.02 0.11 0.91
Region (left out: Berlin/Brandenburg)
Mecklenburg / West Pommerania 0.12 0.90 0.37
Saxony-Anhalt -0.09 -0.72 0.47
Saxony Free State 0.25 1.92 0.06
Thuringia 0.04 0.29 0.77
Firm size (left out: 11 to 200 employees)
Less than 11 0.07 0.74 0.46
200 to 500 0.30 2.88 0.00
More than 500 0.24 2.43 0.02
Level of education (left out: dual system)
Without formal education -0.49 -2.74 0.01
Technical college/university 0.14 1.09 0.28
Nationality (left out: German)
Non-German -0.32 -0.83 0.40
Regional type (left out: densely populated)
Rural area -0.24 -1.19 0.24
Medium populated area -0.36 -1.98 0.05
Inner city area -0.44 -2.08 0.04
Sex (left out: male)
Women 0.07 0.93 0.35
Employment experience previous to unemployment
Employment six months before t = 1 0.12 0.86 0.39
Employment nine months before t = 1 0.01 0.10 0.92
Employment 12 months before t = 1 -0.04 -0.39 0.69
Calendar time of unemployment entry
Month -0.08 -7.75 0.00
Months before programme
Months -0.56 -12.18 0.00
N = 7057 Sc. Pseudo R-squared = .032688
Positive obs. = 138 LR (zero slopes) = 215.416 [.000]
Mean of dep. var. = .019555 Schwarz B.I.C. = 695.963
Sum of squared residuals = 128.066 Log likelihood = -571.898
Pseudo R-squared = .053480
Fraction of Correct Predictions = 0.98
Estimate t-statistic P-value
Constant 15.89 5.67 0.00
Age
Years -0.02 -4.58 0.00
Sector (left out category: metal and electronic)
Agriculture and primary industry -0.26 -1.83 0.07
Other industry -0.26 -1.60 0.11
Building and civil engineering -0.60 -3.06 0.00
Production related services, trade, and banking -0.36 -2.81 0.01
Consumption related and social services, and the state -0.44 -3.67 0.00
Occupational status (left out category: blue collar)
Trainee -0.52 -1.32 0.19
White collar 0.32 3.41 0.00
At home, part-time or missing -0.28 -0.76 0.45
Region (left out: Berlin/Brandenburg)
Mecklenburg / West Pommerania 0.55 3.87 0.00
Saxony-Anhalt 0.05 0.29 0.77
Saxony Free State 0.30 2.07 0.04
Thuringia 0.19 1.24 0.22
Firm size (left out: 11 to 200 employees)
Less than 11 0.04 0.45 0.65
200 to 500 -0.06 -0.52 0.60
More than 500 -0.21 -1.79 0.07
Level of education (left out: dual system)
Without formal education -0.27 -1.77 0.08
Technical college/university 0.02 0.16 0.87
Nationality (left out: German)
Non-German
Regional type (left out: densely populated)
Rural area 0.15 0.50 0.62
Medium populated area 0.16 0.56 0.57
Inner city area 0.24 0.77 0.44
Sex (left out: male)
Women 0.00 0.02 0.98
Employment experience previous to unemployment
Employment nine months before t = 1 0.07 0.49 0.63
Employment 12 months before t = 1 0.05 0.37 0.71
Employment 15 months before t = 1 0.10 1.03 0.30
Calendar time of unemployment entry
Month -0.07 -5.38 0.00
Months before programme
Months -0.55 -10.31 0.00
N = 5831 Sc. Pseudo R-squared = .042846
Positive obs. = 94 LR (zero slopes) = 224.281 [.000]
Mean of dep. var. = .016121 Schwarz B.I.C. = 486.154
Sum of squared residuals = 85.8468 Log likelihood = -369.097
Pseudo R-squared = .072927
Fraction of Correct Predictions = 0.98
Estimate t-statistic P-value
Constant 21.69 6.15 0.00
Age
Years -0.02 -4.73 0.00
Sector (left out category: metal and electronic)
Agriculture and primary industry -0.33 -1.45 0.15
Other industry -0.08 -0.40 0.69
Building and civil engineering 0.08 0.33 0.74
Production related services, trade, and banking -0.04 -0.22 0.82
Consumption related and social services, and the state 0.00 0.01 0.99
Occupational status (left out category: blue collar)
Trainee 0.35 3.01 0.00
White collar -0.19 -0.47 0.64
At home, part-time or missing
Region (left out: Berlin/Brandenburg)
Mecklenburg / West Pommerania 0.62 3.55 0.00
Saxony-Anhalt -0.07 -0.33 0.74
Saxony Free State 0.22 1.06 0.29
Thuringia 0.14 0.68 0.50
Firm size (left out: 11 to 200 employees)
Less than 11 0.09 0.73 0.47
200 to 500 0.10 0.76 0.45
More than 500 -0.22 -1.53 0.13
Level of education (left out: dual system)
Without formal education -0.09 -0.55 0.59
Technical college/university 0.47 2.81 0.01
Nationality (left out: German)
Non-German
Regional type (left out: densely populated)
Rural area 0.02 0.06 0.96
Medium populated area 0.12 0.38 0.71
Inner city area -0.17 -0.45 0.65
Sex (left out: male)
Women 0.30 2.71 0.01
Employment experience previous to unemployment
Employment 12 months before t = 1 -0.01 -0.06 0.96
Employment 15 months before t = 1 0.15 1.21 0.23
Employment 18 months before t = 1 -0.09 -0.80 0.43
Calendar time of unemployment entry
Month -0.09 -5.75 0.00
Months before programme
Months -0.48 -9.87 0.00
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Table 3.A2 Probit estimation of the propensity scores, treatment in 1994 after short-term (left), medium-term (centre) and long-term (right) unemployment in West 
Germany (cont.) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
N = 6673 Sc. Pseudo R-squared = .012234
Positive obs. = 57 LR (zero slopes) = 77.2079 [.000]
Mean of dep. var. = .854189E-02 Schwarz B.I.C. = 426.120
Sum of squared residuals = 55.8966 Log likelihood = -289.630
Pseudo R-squared = .011744
Fraction of Correct Predictions = 0.99
Estimate t-statistic P-value
Constant -5.78 -1.70 0.09
Age
Years -0.02 -2.98 0.00
Sector (left out category: metal and electronic)
Agriculture and primary industry -0.17 -0.72 0.47
Other industry -0.07 -0.30 0.77
Building and civil engineering -0.14 -0.64 0.52
Production related services, trade, and banking 0.01 0.03 0.98
Consumption related and social services, and the state -0.25 -1.25 0.21
Occupational status (left out category: blue collar)
Trainee 0.26 0.82 0.41
White collar 0.49 3.51 0.00
At home, part-time or missing 0.29 1.27 0.21
Region (left out: Northrhine-Westphalia)
Schleswig-Holstein/Hamburg 0.18 0.87 0.39
Lower Saxony/Bremen -0.16 -0.79 0.43
Hesse -0.13 -0.57 0.57
Rhineland-Palatinate/Saar 0.26 1.36 0.18
Baden-Wuerttemberg -0.24 -1.18 0.24
Bavaria 0.04 0.21 0.84
Firm size (left out: 11 to 200 employees)
Less than 11 -0.22 -1.76 0.08
200 to 500 0.12 0.65 0.52
More than 500 -0.35 -1.55 0.12
Level of education (left out: dual system)
Without formal education -0.06 -0.38 0.70
Technical college/university 0.15 0.64 0.52
Nationality (left out: German)
Non-German -0.21 -1.18 0.24
Regional type (left out: densely populated)
Rural area -0.43 -2.33 0.02
Medium populated area -0.14 -1.04 0.30
Inner city area -0.25 -1.29 0.20
Sex (left out: male)
Women -0.31 -2.35 0.02
Employment experience previous to unemployment
Employment six months before t = 1 0.03 0.21 0.84
Employment nine months before t = 1 -0.18 -1.25 0.21
Employment 12 months before t = 1 0.04 0.30 0.76
Calendar time of unemployment entry
Month 0.02 1.53 0.13
Months before programme
Months -0.19 -2.64 0.01
N = 6010 Sc. Pseudo R-squared = .022606
Positive obs. = 95 LR (zero slopes) = 128.190 [.000]
Mean of dep. var. = .015807 Schwarz B.I.C. = 559.012
Sum of squared residuals = 91.0305 Log likelihood = -424.144
Pseudo R-squared = .027438
Fraction of Correct Predictions = 0.98
Estimate t-statistic P-value
Constant -5.87 -1.74 0.08
Age
Years -0.01 -1.94 0.05
Sector (left out category: metal and electronic)
Agriculture and primary industry -0.35 -1.78 0.08
Other industry -0.17 -0.91 0.36
Building and civil engineering -0.34 -1.65 0.10
Production related services, trade, and banking -0.08 -0.58 0.56
Consumption related and social services, and the state -0.27 -1.81 0.07
Occupational status (left out category: blue collar)
Trainee -0.07 -0.24 0.81
White collar 0.39 3.42 0.00
At home, part-time or missing -0.06 -0.30 0.77
Region (left out: Northrhine-Westphalia)
Schleswig-Holstein/Hamburg 0.15 0.87 0.39
Lower Saxony/Bremen -0.25 -1.40 0.16
Hesse -0.44 -1.81 0.07
Rhineland-Palatinate/Saar 0.35 2.18 0.03
Baden-Wuerttemberg 0.00 -0.01 0.99
Bavaria 0.06 0.41 0.68
Firm size (left out: 11 to 200 employees)
Less than 11 -0.15 -1.40 0.16
200 to 500 -0.16 -0.92 0.36
More than 500 -0.09 -0.64 0.52
Level of education (left out: dual system)
Without formal education -0.28 -1.98 0.05
Technical college/university 0.22 1.33 0.18
Nationality (left out: German)
Non-German -0.18 -1.22 0.22
Regional type (left out: densely populated)
Rural area -0.18 -1.22 0.22
Medium populated area -0.13 -1.12 0.26
Inner city area 0.00 0.02 0.98
Sex (left out: male)
Women -0.05 -0.49 0.62
Employment experience previous to unemployment
Employment nine months before t = 1 0.05 0.39 0.70
Employment 12 months before t = 1 0.01 0.09 0.93
Employment 15 months before t = 1 0.10 0.81 0.42
Calendar time of unemployment entry
Month 0.03 1.89 0.06
Months before programme
Months -0.30 -5.69 0.00
N = 5904 Sc. Pseudo R-squared = .024659
Positive obs. = 88 LR (zero slopes) = 136.150 [.000]
Mean of dep. var. = .014905 Schwarz B.I.C. = 523.991
Sum of squared residuals = 85.2095 Log likelihood = -389.398
Pseudo R-squared = .021438
Fraction of Correct Predictions = 0.98
Estimate t-statistic P-value
Constant -3.87 -1.02 0.31
Age
Years -0.02 -5.32 0.00
Sector (left out category: metal and electronic)
Agriculture and primary industry -0.02 -0.10 0.92
Other industry 0.01 0.05 0.96
Building and civil engineering 0.00 -0.01 0.99
Production related services, trade, and banking 0.02 0.14 0.89
Consumption related and social services, and the state -0.52 -2.77 0.01
Occupational status (left out category: blue collar)
Trainee 0.07 0.31 0.76
White collar 0.18 1.53 0.13
At home, part-time or missing -0.34 -0.95 0.34
Region (left out: Northrhine-Westphalia)
Schleswig-Holstein/Hamburg 0.28 1.34 0.18
Lower Saxony/Bremen 0.26 1.60 0.11
Hesse -0.13 -0.59 0.56
Rhineland-Palatinate/Saar 0.06 0.29 0.78
Baden-Wuerttemberg 0.03 0.17 0.87
Bavaria 0.41 2.60 0.01
Firm size (left out: 11 to 200 employees)
Less than 11 -0.02 -0.19 0.85
200 to 500 0.02 0.11 0.91
More than 500 0.02 0.17 0.86
Level of education (left out: dual system)
Without formal education -0.35 -2.45 0.01
Technical college/university 0.42 2.46 0.01
Nationality (left out: German)
Non-German -0.70 -2.06 0.04
Regional type (left out: densely populated)
Rural area 0.00 0.00 1.00
Medium populated area 0.05 0.38 0.70
Inner city area -0.08 -0.43 0.67
Sex (left out: male)
Women -0.05 -0.43 0.67
Employment experience previous to unemployment
Employment 12 months before t = 1 -0.02 -0.17 0.86
Employment 15 months before t = 1 -0.01 -0.04 0.97
Employment 18 months before t = 1 0.10 0.75 0.45
Calendar time of unemployment entry
Month 0.02 1.26 0.21
Months before programme
Months -0.21 -4.68 0.00
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Table 3.A2 Probit estimation of the propensity scores, treatment in 1994 after short-term (left), medium-term (centre) and long-term (right) unemployment in East 
Germany (cont.) 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N = 3358 Sc. Pseudo R-squared = .025575
Positive obs. = 71 LR (zero slopes) = 81.7244 [.000]
Mean of dep. var. = .021144 Schwarz B.I.C. = 416.855
Sum of squared residuals = 67.6120 Log likelihood = -303.188
Pseudo R-squared = .027751
Fraction of Correct Predictions = 0.98
Estimate t-statistic P-value
Constant -8.85 -2.64 0.01
Age
Years -0.01 -1.57 0.12
Sector (left out category: metal and electronic)
Agriculture and primary industry -0.13 -0.46 0.65
Other industry 0.43 1.56 0.12
Building and civil engineering -0.18 -0.68 0.50
Production related services, trade, and banking 0.08 0.35 0.73
Consumption related and social services, and the state 0.11 0.47 0.64
Occupational status (left out category: blue collar)
Trainee 0.24 0.48 0.63
White collar 0.19 1.31 0.19
At home, part-time or missing -0.09 -0.49 0.62
Region (left out: Berlin/Brandenburg)
Mecklenburg / West Pommerania 0.26 1.47 0.14
Saxony-Anhalt -0.18 -0.91 0.36
Saxony Free State -0.17 -0.76 0.45
Thuringia -0.30 -1.37 0.17
Firm size (left out: 11 to 200 employees)
Less than 11 -0.19 -1.48 0.14
200 to 500 -0.15 -0.79 0.43
More than 500 -0.29 -1.36 0.18
Level of education (left out: dual system)
Without formal education -0.21 -0.98 0.33
Technical college/university 0.44 2.19 0.03
Regional type (left out: densely populated)
Rural area -0.15 -0.37 0.71
Medium populated area -0.12 -0.32 0.75
Inner city area -0.32 -0.77 0.44
Sex (left out: male)
Women -0.08 -0.65 0.52
Employment experience previous to unemployment
Employment six months before t = 1 -0.13 -0.81 0.42
Employment nine months before t = 1 -0.38 -2.51 0.01
Employment 12 months before t = 1 0.52 3.67 0.00
Calendar time of unemployment entry
Month 0.04 2.55 0.01
Months before programme
Months -0.22 -3.12 0.00
N = 3044 Sc. Pseudo R-squared = .049693
Positive obs. = 96 LR (zero slopes) = 141.855 [.000]
Mean of dep. var. = .031537 Schwarz B.I.C. = 467.667
Sum of squared residuals = 87.4202 Log likelihood = -355.374
Pseudo R-squared = .060545
Fraction of Correct Predictions = 0.97
Estimate t-statistic P-value
Constant -1.80 -0.49 0.62
Age
Years -0.02 -3.82 0.00
Sector (left out category: metal and electronic)
Agriculture and primary industry -0.34 -1.69 0.09
Other industry -0.32 -1.40 0.16
Building and civil engineering -0.51 -2.49 0.01
Production related services, trade, and banking -0.42 -2.51 0.01
Consumption related and social services, and the state -0.70 -4.18 0.00
Occupational status (left out category: blue collar)
Trainee -0.38 -0.81 0.42
White collar 0.48 3.72 0.00
At home, part-time or missing 0.24 0.86 0.39
Region (left out: Berlin/Brandenburg)
Mecklenburg / West Pommerania 0.23 1.16 0.25
Saxony-Anhalt -0.01 -0.07 0.94
Saxony Free State 0.14 0.69 0.49
Thuringia -0.04 -0.19 0.85
Firm size (left out: 11 to 200 employees)
Less than 11 -0.18 -1.41 0.16
200 to 500 -0.06 -0.36 0.72
More than 500 0.07 0.47 0.64
Level of education (left out: dual system)
Without formal education -0.22 -1.17 0.24
Technical college/university 0.11 0.56 0.57
Regional type (left out: densely populated)
Rural area -0.27 -0.87 0.39
Medium populated area -0.03 -0.12 0.90
Inner city area -0.41 -1.21 0.23
Sex (left out: male)
Women -0.09 -0.85 0.40
Employment experience previous to unemployment
Employment nine months before t = 1 0.28 1.66 0.10
Employment 12 months before t = 1 -0.46 -2.93 0.00
Employment 15 months before t = 1 0.52 3.52 0.00
Calendar time of unemployment entry
Month 0.02 1.03 0.30
Months before programme
Months -0.42 -6.91 0.00
N = 2767 Sc. Pseudo R-squared = .059248
Positive obs. = 109 LR (zero slopes) = 154.363 [.000]
Mean of dep. var. = .039393 Schwarz B.I.C. = 489.162
Sum of squared residuals = 95.2518 Log likelihood = -382.167
Pseudo R-squared = .090462
Fraction of Correct Predictions = 0.96
Estimate t-statistic P-value
Constant 6.29 1.66 0.10
Age
Years -0.01 -3.10 0.00
Sector (left out category: metal and electronic)
Agriculture and primary industry -0.46 -1.90 0.06
Other industry -0.27 -1.06 0.29
Building and civil engineering -0.36 -1.45 0.15
Production related services, trade, and banking -0.04 -0.22 0.82
Consumption related and social services, and the state -0.21 -1.19 0.24
Occupational status (left out category: blue collar)
Trainee 0.17 1.44 0.15
White collar 0.17 0.73 0.47
At home, part-time or missing
Region (left out: Berlin/Brandenburg)
Mecklenburg / West Pommerania 0.30 1.63 0.10
Saxony-Anhalt 0.12 0.68 0.50
Saxony Free State 0.08 0.42 0.68
Thuringia -0.12 -0.61 0.54
Firm size (left out: 11 to 200 employees)
Less than 11 0.11 0.89 0.37
200 to 500 -0.09 -0.54 0.59
More than 500 0.24 1.71 0.09
Level of education (left out: dual system)
Without formal education -0.60 -2.79 0.01
Technical college/university 0.24 1.26 0.21
Regional type (left out: densely populated)
Rural area 0.32 0.79 0.43
Medium populated area 0.41 1.05 0.29
Inner city area 0.08 0.19 0.85
Sex (left out: male)
Women 0.20 1.82 0.07
Employment experience previous to unemployment
Employment 12 months before t = 1 -0.07 -0.42 0.68
Employment 15 months before t = 1 0.12 0.73 0.47
Employment 18 months before t = 1 -0.27 -2.04 0.04
Calendar time of unemployment entry
Month -0.01 -0.73 0.47
Months before programme
Months -0.55 -8.72 0.00
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Table 3.A3 Differences in matched samples (selected co-variates) treatment in 1993 after short-term, 
medium-term and long-term unemployment  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sample mean 
participants
Mean matched 
controls
t-value
Age 34.03 33.52 -0.54
Months of unemployment before programme 2.91 2.90 -0.15
Agriculture and primary industry 0.09 0.09 0.10
Metal and electronic 0.21 0.20 -0.31
Other industry 0.06 0.06 0.13
Building and civil engineering 0.08 0.09 0.14
Production related services, trade, and banking 0.39 0.39 0.05
Consumption related, social services, state 0.17 0.17 -0.01
Trainee 0.06 0.06 0.14
Blue collar 0.37 0.38 0.06
White collar 0.50 0.49 -0.20
Working at home 0.07 0.08 0.12
part-time or missing 0.07 0.08 0.12
No vocational training 0.15 0.15 0.06
Dual System 0.77 0.78 0.17
A-level 0.03 0.02 -0.91
Technical college or university 0.05 0.05 0.01
German 0.89 0.89 0.00
Non-German 0.11 0.11 0.00
Gross salary of former employment (€) 54.97 51.48 -1.49
Sex 0.47 0.48 0.18
Participation in treatment 1993 after 1-3 months of unemployment, West Germany
Sample mean 
participants
Mean matched 
controls
t-value
Age 35.09 34.95 -0.14
Months of unemployment before programme 5.93 5.61 -1.06
Agriculture and primary industry 0.13 0.12 -0.38
Metal and electronic 0.17 0.15 -0.44
Other industry 0.04 0.04 -0.27
Building and civil engineering 0.06 0.06 -0.23
Production related services, trade, and banking 0.40 0.43 0.57
Consumption related, social services, state 0.20 0.21 0.28
Trainee 0.02 0.02 0.26
Blue collar 0.48 0.47 -0.11
White collar 0.42 0.42 0.02
Working at home 0.09 0.09 0.02
part-time or missing 0.09 0.09 0.02
No vocational training 0.18 0.18 0.01
Dual System 0.65 0.66 0.22
Technical college or university 0.15 0.14 -0.20
German 0.86 0.87 0.18
Non-German 0.14 0.13 -0.18
Gross salary of former employment (€) 55.85 49.78 -1.93
Sex 0.39 0.40 0.09
Participation in treatment 1993 after 4-6 months of unemployment, West Germany
Sample mean 
participants
Mean matched 
controls
t-value
Age 32.80 31.36 -1.20
Months of unemployment before programme 8.95 9.10 1.22
Agriculture and primary industry 0.10 0.09 -0.21
Metal and electronic 0.20 0.19 -0.16
Other industry 0.08 0.08 -0.07
Building and civil engineering 0.07 0.07 -0.03
Production related services, trade, and banking 0.37 0.39 0.30
Consumption related, social services, state 0.18 0.18 0.02
Trainee 0.03 0.03 -0.10
Blue collar 0.55 0.61 0.88
White collar 0.27 0.29 0.34
Working at home 0.02 0.02 0.07
part-time or missing 0.15 0.07 -1.64
No vocational training 0.18 0.18 -0.08
Dual System 0.75 0.77 0.30
Technical college or university 0.03 0.03 -0.15
German 0.90 0.86 -1.03
Non-German 0.03 0.03 -0.19
Gross salary of former employment (€) 50.67 46.19 -1.42
Sex 0.32 0.32 0.12
Participation in treatment 1993 after 7-9 months of unemployment, West Germany
Sample mean 
participants
Mean matched 
controls
t-value
Age 38.96 43.18 1.85
Months of unemployment before programme 2.92 2.89 -0.38
Agriculture and primary industry 0.16 0.15 -0.48
Metal and electronic 0.17 0.15 -0.64
Other industry 0.07 0.10 1.35
Building and civil engineering 0.05 0.06 0.43
Production related services, trade, and banking 0.27 0.26 -0.42
Consumption related, social services, state 0.28 0.28 0.22
Trainee 0.02 0.02 0.09
Blue collar 0.44 0.46 0.53
White collar 0.47 0.46 -0.33
Working at home 0.08 0.07 -0.41
part-time or missing 0.08 0.07 -0.41
No vocational training 0.04 0.04 0.13
Dual System 0.84 0.84 0.09
Technical college or university 0.12 0.11 -0.64
German 0.99 0.99 -0.34
Non-German 0.01 0.01 0.34
Gross salary of former employment (€) 40.11 40.48 0.25
Sex 0.50 0.48 -0.40
Participation in treatment 1993 after 1-3 months of unemployment, East Germany
Sample mean 
participants
Mean matched 
controls
t-value
Age 38.57 37.75 -0.86
Months of unemployment before programme 6.05 6.01 -0.42
Agriculture and primary industry 0.13 0.13 0.07
Metal and electronic 0.20 0.19 -0.48
Other industry 0.09 0.08 -0.38
Building and civil engineering 0.04 0.05 0.37
Production related services, trade, and banking 0.25 0.25 -0.03
Consumption related, social services, state 0.29 0.31 0.45
Trainee 0.01 0.01 0.14
Blue collar 0.45 0.48 0.76
White collar 0.46 0.45 -0.22
Working at home 0.01 0.01 0.13
part-time or missing 0.09 0.06 -0.98
No vocational training 0.06 0.07 0.37
Dual System 0.85 0.83 -0.50
Technical college or university 0.09 0.08 -0.18
Gross salary of former employment (€) 39.35 36.86 -1.73
Sex 0.52 0.51 -0.26
Participation in treatment 1993 after 4-6 months of unemployment, East Germany
Sample mean 
participants
Mean matched 
controls
t-value
Age 38.90 36.91 -1.83
Months of unemployment before programme 8.90 9.11 2.04
Agriculture and primary industry 0.09 0.05 -1.33
Metal and electronic 0.13 0.11 -0.48
Other industry 0.10 0.08 -0.42
Building and civil engineering 0.07 0.07 -0.29
Production related services, trade, and banking 0.28 0.32 0.93
Consumption related, social services, state 0.34 0.37 0.63
Trainee 0.00 0.05 6.43
Blue collar 0.34 0.33 -0.24
White collar 0.54 0.53 -0.18
Working at home 0.01 0.01 -0.23
part-time or missing 0.12 0.09 -0.74
No vocational training 0.10 0.10 -0.04
Dual System 0.72 0.75 0.50
Technical college or university 0.16 0.14 -0.60
Gross salary of former employment (€) 35.53 33.76 -0.85
Sex 0.71 0.72 0.14
Participation in treatment 1993 after 7-9 months of unemployment, East Germany
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Table 3.A3 Differences in matched samples (selected co-variates) treatment in 1994 after short-term, 
medium-term and long-term unemployment  (cont.) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sample mean 
participants
Mean matched 
controls
t-value
Age 31.67 31.44 -0.17
Months of unemployment before programme 3.12 3.15 0.27
Agriculture and primary industry 0.07 0.07 0.04
Metal and electronic 0.12 0.12 -0.08
Other industry 0.09 0.09 0.08
Building and civil engineering 0.12 0.12 -0.03
Production related services, trade, and banking 0.44 0.43 -0.17
Consumption related, social services, state 0.16 0.17 0.24
Trainee 0.04 0.03 -0.02
Blue collar 0.49 0.49 0.04
White collar 0.40 0.40 -0.05
Working at home 0.07 0.07 0.04
part-time or missing 0.07 0.07 0.04
No vocational training 0.18 0.18 0.03
Dual System 0.75 0.74 -0.32
Technical college or university 0.07 0.07 0.09
German 0.90 0.90 0.17
Non-German 0.11 0.10 -0.17
Gross salary of former employment (€) 53.60 53.83 0.07
Sex 0.26 0.27 0.17
Participation in treatment 1994 after 1-3 months of unemployment, West Germany
Sample mean 
participants
Mean matched 
controls
t-value
Age 35.78 35.66 -0.13
Months of unemployment before programme 6.08 6.12 0.36
Agriculture and primary industry 0.06 0.05 -0.38
Metal and electronic 0.23 0.23 -0.15
Other industry 0.07 0.08 0.05
Building and civil engineering 0.06 0.06 -0.10
Production related services, trade, and banking 0.38 0.40 0.49
Consumption related, social services, state 0.19 0.18 -0.19
Trainee 0.02 0.02 0.19
Blue collar 0.41 0.41 -0.05
White collar 0.52 0.52 0.02
Working at home 0.05 0.05 -0.06
part-time or missing 0.05 0.05 -0.06
No vocational training 0.10 0.09 -0.10
Dual System 0.79 0.79 -0.05
Technical college or university 0.12 0.11 -0.22
German 0.92 0.91 -0.21
Non-German 0.08 0.09 0.21
Gross salary of former employment (€) 65.02 57.08 -2.83
Sex 0.40 0.40 0.02
Participation in treatment 1994 after 4-6 months of unemployment, West Germany
Sample mean 
participants
Mean matched 
controls
t-value
Age 33.21 31.98 -1.22
Months of unemployment before programme 9.15 9.33 1.84
Agriculture and primary industry 0.10 0.10 -0.19
Metal and electronic 0.22 0.21 -0.18
Other industry 0.13 0.12 -0.14
Building and civil engineering 0.08 0.08 0.17
Production related services, trade, and banking 0.39 0.41 0.49
Consumption related, social services, state 0.08 0.08 -0.07
Trainee 0.05 0.05 0.03
Blue collar 0.47 0.51 0.76
White collar 0.38 0.39 0.24
Working at home 0.01 0.01 -0.06
part-time or missing 0.11 0.06 -1.63
No vocational training 0.13 0.12 -0.16
Dual System 0.73 0.75 0.40
Technical college or university 0.13 0.12 -0.26
German 0.90 0.91 0.46
Non-German 0.01 0.01 -0.10
Gross salary of former employment (€) 54.36 52.23 -0.72
Sex 0.38 0.39 0.22
Participation in treatment 1994 after 7-9 months of unemployment, West Germany
Sample mean 
participants
Mean matched 
controls
t-value
Age 37.87 37.47 -0.32
Months of unemployment before programme 3.10 3.08 -0.17
Agriculture and primary industry 0.09 0.07 -0.47
Metal and electronic 0.07 0.08 0.22
Other industry 0.11 0.12 0.09
Building and civil engineering 0.10 0.11 0.25
Production related services, trade, and banking 0.27 0.26 -0.10
Consumption related, social services, state 0.37 0.37 0.03
Trainee 0.01 0.01 -0.06
Blue collar 0.56 0.58 0.22
White collar 0.31 0.30 -0.25
Working at home 0.11 0.12 0.06
part-time or missing 0.11 0.12 0.06
No vocational training 0.06 0.07 0.31
Dual System 0.78 0.80 0.51
Technical college or university 0.14 0.12 -0.42
Gross salary of former employment (€) 41.52 40.05 -0.89
Sex 0.42 0.40 -0.37
Participation in treatment 1994 after 1-3 months of unemployment, East Germany
Sample mean 
participants
Mean matched 
controls
t-value
Age 36.79 36.32 -0.45
Months of unemployment before programme 6.00 6.04 0.39
Agriculture and primary industry 0.12 0.11 -0.25
Metal and electronic 0.19 0.18 -0.13
Other industry 0.07 0.07 -0.03
Building and civil engineering 0.10 0.11 0.24
Production related services, trade, and banking 0.29 0.30 0.15
Consumption related, social services, state 0.23 0.23 -0.03
Trainee 0.01 0.01 -0.17
Blue collar 0.47 0.49 0.40
White collar 0.42 0.41 -0.07
Working at home 0.03 0.03 -0.32
part-time or missing 0.10 0.09 -0.49
No vocational training 0.07 0.07 -0.17
Dual System 0.83 0.83 -0.07
Technical college or university 0.09 0.09 -0.27
Gross salary of former employment (€) 39.07 39.54 0.25
Sex 0.46 0.45 -0.18
Participation in treatment 1994 after 4-6months of unemployment, East Germany
Sample mean 
participants
Mean matched 
controls
t-value
Age 37.67 37.43 -0.24
Months of unemployment before programme 9.05 8.98 -0.59
Agriculture and primary industry 0.06 0.06 0.23
Metal and electronic 0.12 0.10 -0.70
Other industry 0.06 0.05 -0.47
Building and civil engineering 0.05 0.06 0.90
Production related services, trade, and banking 0.33 0.34 0.11
Consumption related, social services, state 0.39 0.40 0.07
Trainee 0.00 0.02 14.16
Blue collar 0.40 0.44 0.80
White collar 0.45 0.43 -0.40
Working at home 0.05 0.04 -0.16
part-time or missing 0.15 0.11 -1.00
No vocational training 0.04 0.05 0.62
Dual System 0.85 0.84 -0.36
Technical college or university 0.10 0.09 -0.48
Gross salary of former employment (€) 37.11 36.23 -0.51
Sex 0.66 0.62 -0.79
Participation in treatment 1994 after 7-9 months of unemployment, East Germany
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Table 3.A4 Differences in matched samples with respect to outcome variable before treatment (PPT) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D Y t-statistic P-value D Y t-statistic P-value D Y t-statistic P-value
t=-18 0.03 1.44 0.15 0.00 -0.04 0.97 -0.06 -1.18 0.24
t=-17 0.01 0.40 0.69 0.03 1.01 0.31 -0.04 -0.95 0.34
t=-16 0.02 0.92 0.36 0.00 -0.09 0.93 -0.09 -1.69 0.09
t=-15 0.05 1.92 0.06 -0.03 -0.91 0.36 -0.04 -0.91 0.36
t=-14 0.05 2.13 0.03 -0.05 -1.38 0.17 0.00 0.05 0.96
t=-13 0.02 1.03 0.30 -0.04 -1.11 0.27 0.00 -0.10 0.92
t=-12 -0.02 -0.74 0.46 -0.04 -1.18 0.24 0.02 0.87 0.39
t=-11 -0.04 -1.26 0.21 -0.06 -1.90 0.06 0.02 15.08 0.00
t=-10 0.00 0.13 0.90 -0.02 -0.70 0.48
t=-9 0.00 -0.13 0.90 0.01 0.55 0.58
t=-8 -0.02 -0.77 0.44 0.00 -0.26 0.80
t=-7 -0.01 -0.52 0.60
t=-6 -0.03 -1.26 0.21
t=-5 -0.03 -1.41 0.16
Participation in west Germany 1993 after ...
short-term unemployment medium-term unemployment long-term unemployment
D Y t-statistic P-value D Y t-statistic P-value D Y t-statistic P-value
t=-18 0.01 0.33 0.74 0.05 1.37 0.17 0.01 0.13 0.89
t=-17 0.01 0.13 0.89 0.03 0.89 0.37 -0.03 -0.52 0.60
t=-16 0.00 0.09 0.93 0.02 0.63 0.53 0.01 0.30 0.76
t=-15 0.04 1.34 0.18 0.01 0.33 0.74 -0.03 -0.74 0.46
t=-14 0.03 1.14 0.25 0.02 0.58 0.56 0.03 1.09 0.28
t=-13 0.03 1.12 0.26 0.02 0.71 0.48 0.04 2.39 0.02
t=-12 -0.01 -0.33 0.74 0.02 0.72 0.47 0.02 1.66 0.10
t=-11 0.00 0.01 0.99 0.03 1.71 0.09 0.00 0.22 0.82
t=-10 0.00 -0.11 0.91 0.03 1.74 0.08
t=-9 0.00 0.19 0.85 0.02 1.78 0.08
t=-8 -0.01 -0.41 0.69 0.02 1.78 0.00
t=-7 -0.01 -0.52 0.60
t=-6 0.00 0.14 0.89
t=-5 -0.02 -1.52 0.13
Participation in east Germany 1993 after ...
short-term unemployment medium-term unemployment long-term unemployment
D Y t-statistic P-value D Y t-statistic P-value D Y t-statistic P-value
t=-18 -0.01 -0.14 0.89 0.03 0.67 0.50 0.02 0.56 0.58
t=-17 -0.05 -0.87 0.38 0.02 0.64 0.52 0.02 0.50 0.62
t=-16 -0.06 -0.98 0.33 0.04 1.10 0.27 -0.01 -0.24 0.81
t=-15 0.05 1.05 0.29 0.01 0.36 0.72 0.00 -0.02 0.99
t=-14 -0.01 -0.20 0.84 -0.01 -0.19 0.85 -0.03 -0.71 0.48
t=-13 -0.03 -0.59 0.55 -0.03 -0.75 0.45 0.03 1.18 0.24
t=-12 -0.04 -0.79 0.43 0.00 -0.04 0.97 0.00 0.16 0.87
t=-11 -0.07 -1.31 0.19 0.01 0.38 0.71 0.02 1.51 0.13
t=-10 -0.11 -1.91 0.06 0.02 0.71 0.48
t=-9 -0.05 -0.89 0.37 0.04 2.51 0.01
t=-8 -0.04 -0.82 0.41 0.01 0.86 0.39
t=-7 -0.06 -1.13 0.26
t=-6 -0.06 -1.27 0.21
t=-5 -0.05 -1.22 0.22
Participation in east Germany 1994 after ...
short-term unemployment medium-term unemployment long-term unemployment
D Y t-statistic P-value D Y t-statistic P-value D Y t-statistic P-value
t=-18 -0.05 -0.76 0.45 -0.02 -0.47 0.64 -0.10 -1.51 0.12
t=-17 -0.09 -1.41 0.16 0.01 0.36 0.72 -0.06 -1.28 0.20
t=-16 -0.07 -1.10 0.27 0.06 1.45 0.15 0.01 0.20 0.84
t=-15 -0.02 -0.28 0.78 -0.02 -0.46 0.64 0.00 -0.01 0.99
t=-14 0.02 0.34 0.74 -0.05 -1.07 0.29 -0.01 -0.29 0.77
t=-13 0.00 -0.07 0.94 -0.03 -0.60 0.55 -0.03 -0.67 0.50
t=-12 -0.03 -0.39 0.70 0.00 -0.04 0.97 -0.04 -1.10 0.27
t=-11 0.07 1.19 0.23 0.00 0.11 0.91 -0.04 -1.10 0.27
t=-10 0.05 0.91 0.36 -0.03 -0.68 0.50
t=-9 -0.04 -0.56 0.58 -0.01 -0.40 0.69
t=-8 -0.07 -1.09 0.28 0.01 0.24 0.81
t=-7 -0.06 -1.04 0.30
t=-6 -0.04 -0.91 0.36
t=-5 0.01 0.24 0.81
Participation in west Germany 1994 after ...
short-term unemployment medium-term unemployment long-term unemployment
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Figure 3.A1 Predicted propensity scores, treatment after short-term(i), medium-term (ii) and long-term (iii) 
unemployment in West Germany 1993 (left: N, right: density estimates) 
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Figure 3.A2 Predicted propensity scores, treatment after short-term(i), medium-term (ii) and long-term (iii) 
unemployment in West Germany 1994 (left: N, right: density estimates) 
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Figure 3.A3 Predicted propensity scores, treatment after short-term(i), medium-term (ii) and long-term (iii) 
unemployment in East Germany 1993 (left: N, right: density estimates) 
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Figure 3.A4 Predicted propensity scores, treatment after short-term(i), medium-term (ii) and long-term (iii) 
unemployment in East Germany 1994 (left: N, right: density estimates) 
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 3.7.2 Coding plan for the treatment information 
Preparation, social skills and short–term training 
(a)  If the income maintenance information shows valid codes, “preparation” corresponds to a consolidated type of measure FMA-
SART* if the following programme codes in the training data (FUU) appear: 
Programme code Label Label in German 
10 Training enterprise Übungsfirma  
11 Training studio Übungswerkstatt  
13 Short term training §41a 
20 Assess–, and preparation courses Feststell–, Vorschalt– und Vorbereitmaßnahme 
(b) If the values of an income maintenance payment according to § 41a AFG appear in the income maintenance variables, a partici-
pation in “Preparation, social skills and short–term training” is identified if the participation data (FUU) indicate either “missing” 
or “12 sonst. Anpassung der berufl. Kenntnisse“ (other adjustment of working skills) in the same record: 
Benefit code Label Label in German 
UHG41A Full income maintenance necessary short–term training 
Unterhaltsgeld, notwendige § 41a, volles 
Unterhaltsgeld  
EGGUM Short–term training for resettlers or German ethics 
EGG bei § 41a Maßnahme v Aus–
/Übersiedlern  
UHG1M 
Income maintenance ending former unemployment for 
short–term training in § 41a 
Unterhaltsgeld bei notwendiger § 41a wegen 
vorheriger Arbeitslosigkeit 
UHGMHG 
Income maintenance amounting to unemployment 
benefits for necessary short–term training in § 41a 
Unterhaltsgeld bei notwendiger § 41a in Höhe 
des ALG  
UHGM328 
Full income maintenance because of unemployment or 
in danger of loosing the job for necessary short–term 
training in § 41a 
Volles Unterhaltsgeld bei notwendiger § 41a 
aufgrund von Arbeitslosigkeit oder Bedrohung 
von Arbeitslosigkeit 
UHGMAH 
Income maintenance amounting to un–employment 
assistance for necessary short–term training in § 41a 
Unterhaltsgeld § 41a in Höhe der Arbeitslo-
senhilfe 
(c) If the income maintenance variables are either missing or have any reasonable value corresponding to employment in the IAB-
SLED–data, then the person is never considered as participating in the “Preparation, social skills and short–term training” treat-
ment because we do not suppose individuals participation in preparation courses while working.  Especially a training informa-
tion corresponding to “12 sonstige Anpassungen der berufl. Kenntnisse“ (other adjustment of working skills) is then not seen as 
such a treatment, but as a treatment in type b. 
Provision of specific professional skills and techniques 
(a) If the income maintenance variables show valid codes, a treatment is considered to be a “provision of specific professional skills” 
if the information of the type of programme FMASART* given in the FuU–data shows the coding. 
Programme code Label Label in German 
34 Basic training Grundausbildungslehrgang (before 1986) 
18 Other training institution sonst. Übungs– und Trainingseinrichtung 
21 Qualification below skilled worker level 
Qualifikation unterhalb des Facharbeiterni-
veaus  
24 Practical further education berufspraktische Fortbildung 
31 
Further education of trainers and multidisciplinary 
qualification 
Heran–/Fortbildung v. Ausbildungskräften/ 
berufsfeldübergreifende Qualifikation 
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(b) In many cases, the incomes maintenance payment indicate that individuals receive unemployment benefits.  However, FuU–data 
may suggest that training occurred at the same time by indicating “other adjustment of working skills” (“sonst. Anpassung der be-
rufl. Kenntnisse“) because programmes can also be taken during unemployment.  In this case, we assume that persons participate 
in courses which provide only specific professional skills.  So the exact condition of this treatment is a coding of FMASART* to 
this type of treatment and a parallel transfer payment as documented below: 
 
Programme code Label Label in German 
12 Other adjustment of working skills  sonst. Anpassung der berufl. Kenntnisse  
 If this information corresponds to one of the following transfer payments the type of treatment is identified as „provision of spe-
cific professional skills”. 
Benefit code Label Label in German 
ALGEH 
Unemployment benefits for former development aid 
volunteers 
Arbeitslosengeld für ehemalige Entwicklungs-
helfer 
ALG101 Regular unemployment benefits Arbeitslosengeld Code 101  
ALGHKALG 
Regular unemployment benefits and unemployment 
benefits for home comers  
Arbeitslosengeld und Arbeitslosengeld für 
Heimkehrer 
ALBSZ Unemployment assistance for temporary soldiers  Arbeitslosenhilfe für Soldaten auf Zeit  
HKALG Unemployment benefits for home comers Arbeitslosengeld für Heimkehrer 
ALGHU 
Unemployment benefits for political prisoners sub-
ject to §249g 
Arbeitslosengeld für polit. Häftlinge gem. 
§249g  
ALB7 
Unemployment assistance for former development 
aid volunteers Arbeitslosenhilfe für ehem. Entwicklungshelfer 
EGGA Benefits in case of language education 
Eingliederungsgeld für Aus–/Übersiedler bei 
Arbeitslosigkeit 
ALUEG 
Benefits to bridge the time to retirement pension 
subject Altersübergangsgeld  
EGHI Assistance in case of language education 
Eingliederungshilfe bei Arbeitslosigkeit oder 
Sprachkurs für Spätaussiedler 
DLUEG 
Benefits/transfers to bridge the time to retirement 
pension paid by BA Altersübergangsgeld– Ausgleichsbetrag von BA 
DLUEGB 
Benefits/transfers to bridge the time to retirement 
pension paid by Federal Ministry Altersübergangsgeld– Ausgleichsbetrag Bund 
ALUEGV 
Benefits to bridge the time to retirement pension for 
former recipients of early retirement payments 
Altersübergangsgeld für ehem. Bezieher von 
Vorruhestandsgeld 
ALUEGS 
Benefits to bridge the time to retirement pension for 
independent workers  Altersübergangsgeld für Selbstständige 
ALUEGH 
Benefits to bridge the time to retirement pension for 
former prisoners and hindered persons 
Altersübergangsgeld für ehem. Häftlinge u. 
verhinderte Arbeitnehmer 
ALUEGF 
Benefits to bridge the time to retirement pension for 
former recipients of early retirement payments as of 
the 833rd day 
Altersübergangsgeld für ehem. Bezieher von 
Vorruhestandsgeld ab dem 833 Tag  
ALUEGB 
Benefits to bridge the time to retirement pension as 
of the 833rd day Altersübergangsgeld ab dem 833. Tag  
ALG118 Regular unemployment benefits code 118 Arbeitslosengeld Code 118 
ALG119 Regular unemployment benefits code 119 Arbeitslosengeld Code 119 
ATGALG Regular unemployment benefits  Arbeitslosengeld (andere) 
ATGAUF Regular unemployment benefits  Arbeitslosengeld (andere) 
ALHIA 
Unemployment assistance which follows unem-
ployment benefits Anschlussarbeitslosenhilfe an Arbeitslosengeld 
ALHIB 
Original unemployment assistance, no claim for 
unemployment benefits 
Originäre Arbeitslosenhilfe (kein Anspruch auf 
Arbeitslosengeld) 
ALHIEH 
Unemployment assistance for former development 
aid volunteers Arbeitslosenhilfe für ehem. Entwicklungshelfer 
ALB8 
Unemployment assistance which follows unem-
ployment benefits for former development aid volun-
teers 
Anschlussarbeitslosenhilfe an Arbeitslosenhilfe 
nur für Entwicklungshelfer 
RV Advanced pension payment  Rentenvorschuss 
ALHISZ Unemployment assistance for temporary soldiers Arbeitslosenhilfe für Soldaten auf Zeit 
ALHIHU 
Unemployment assistance for political prisoners 
subject to §249g 
Arbeitslosenhilfe für ehem. Häftlinge u. ver-
hinderte Arbeitnehmer nach 249g AFG 
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(c) If the FuU–data shows a missing value or “12 sonstige Anpassung der berufl. Kenntnisse” (other adjustment of working skills) and 
the income maintenance variables indicate the following values, treatment were identified to be of the specific professional 
skills–type: 
Benefit code Label Label in German 
EGGUF 
Benefits in case of further education for resettlers or 
German Ethics 
Eingliederungsgeld bei notwendiger Fortbil-
dung von Aus–/Übersiedlern 
UHGTF 
Income maintenance in case of part time further 
education 44 IIb Unterhaltsgeld bei Teilzeitfortbildung 44 II b 
UHGFAG 
Income maintenance for further education, unem-
ployment and conditions for income maintenance 
not met, income maintenance amounting to unem-
ployment benefits is paid 
Unterhaltsgeld bei Fortbildung, Arbeitslosig-
keit, Zeiten für Unterhaltsgeld nicht erfüllt, 
Unterhaltsgeld in Höhe der Arbeitslosenhilfe 
UHGF 
Income maintenance for necessary further education 
for unemployed persons or persons whose jobs are 
in danger 
Unterhaltsgeld bei notwendiger Fortbildung 
(arbeitslos oder bedroht) 
UHGEH335 
Income maintenance for development aid volunteers 
in further education measures code 335  
Unterhaltsgeld für Entwicklungshelfer notwen-
diger Fortbildung (arbeitslos oder bedroht) 
UHGF4 
Complete income maintenance for further education 
due to unemployment 
volles Unterhaltsgeld bei notw. Fortbildung 
wegen Arbeitslosigkeit 
UHGTF4 
Income maintenance because of necessary part time 
further education due to danger of loosing the job as 
of 1.1.94 
Unterhaltsgeld bei notw. TZ–Fortbild wegen 
Bedrohung von Arbeitslosigkeit oder Berufsab-
schluss ab 1.1.94 
UHGEH4 
Income maintenance for unemployed development 
aid volunteers as of 94 
Unterhaltsgeld für Entwicklungshelfer notwen-
diger Fortbildung (arbeitslos oder bedroht) ab 
1994 
UHGFA4 
Income maintenance amounting to unemployment 
assistance because of necessary further education 
due to unemployment or danger of loosing the job as 
of 1.1.94 
Unterhaltsgeld in Höhe der Arbeitslosenhilfe 
bei notw. Fortbildung wegen Arbeitslosigkeit 
ab 1994 
Qualification for the first labour market via the education system 
(a) If the income maintenance variables show valid codes (no missing) in case of the following programmes from the FuU–data, the 
type of treatment is recoded to a “Qualification via the educational system/retraining”. 
Programme code Label Label in German 
29 Certification berufl. Abschlussprüfung 
32 Retraining Umschulung 
(b) In case of a missing of the benefit information indicating that participants are employed while preparing for a vocational exam or 
attending a retraining, the treatment is also coded to a qualification for the first labor market via the education system if the FuU–
data shows the following codes: 
Programme code Label Label in German 
29 Certification berufl. Abschlussprüfung 
32 Retraining Umschulung 
(c) If the FuU–data shows a missing value or a treatment “other type of treatment” (12 sonstige Anpassung der berufl. Kenntnisse), 
but the benefit variables indicate one of the following codes referring to the receipt of subsistence during a retraining course, the 
treatment is considered to be a qualification for the first labor market via the education system: 
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Benefit code Label Label in German 
UHGTU Income maintenance for part time jobs and retraining Unterhaltsgeld bei Teilzeit und Umschulung 
EGGUU 
Benefits in case of necessary further education for 
resettlers or German Ethics 
Eingliederungsgeld bei notwendiger Umschu-
lung von Aus–/Übersiedlern 
UHGU 
Income maintenance in case of retraining of unem-
ployed persons or persons whose jobs are in danger 
Unterhaltsgeld bei notwendiger Umschulung 
wegen Arbeitslosigkeit oder Bedrohung 
UHGUAG 
Income maintenance amounting to unemployment 
benefits because of retraining of former unemployed 
persons 
Unterhaltsgeld in Höhe des Arbeitslosengeldes 
bei Umschulung und vorheriger Arbeitslosig-
keit 
UHGUAH 
Income maintenance amounting to unemployment 
assistance because of retraining of former unem-
ployed persons 
Unterhaltsgeld in Höhe der Arbeitslosenhilfe 
bei Umschulung und vorheriger Arbeitslosig-
keit 
UGHU4 
Income maintenance for necessary retaining of 
persons whose jobs are in danger or vocational exam 
as of 1.1.94 
Unterhaltsgeld bei notwendiger Umschulung 
wegen Bedrohung von Arbeitslosigkeit oder 
Berufsabschluss ab 1994 
UHGTU4 
Income maintenance for necessary part–time retain-
ing of persons whose jobs are in danger or voca-
tional exam as of 1.1.94 
Teilzeit–Unterhaltsgeld bei notwendiger Um-
schulung wegen Bedrohung von Arbeitslosig-
keit oder Berufsabschluss ab 1995 
UHGUA4 
Income maintenance amounting to unemployment 
assistance in case of retraining due to unemployment 
as of 1.1.94 
Unterhaltsgeld in Höhe der Arbeitslosenhilfe 
bei notwendiger Umschlung aus Arbeitslosig-
keit, ab 1994 
Training for precise job offers 
(a) Given that the variable BTYP indicates that individuals are in employment and that the parallel benefit variable has no valid 
code, we expect these individuals to prepare themselves for a precise jobs in a firm if the type of treatment in the FuU–data 
shows the following codes: 
Programme code Label Label in German 
10 Training enterprise  Übungsfirma 
11 Training studio  Übungswerkstatt 
12 Other adjustment of working skills  sonst. Anpassung der berufl. Kenntnisse 
31 
Further education of trainers and multidisciplinary 
qualification  
Heran–/Fortb. v. Aus-
bild.kräften/berufsfeldübergr. Qualif. 
18 Other training centre  sonst. Übungs– und Trainingseinrichtung 
21 Qualification below skilled worker level  Qualif. unterhalb Facharbeiterniveau 
24 Practical further education  berufspraktische Fortbildung 
Direct Integration in the first labour market 
(a) Familiarisation into regular employment can be supported by a wage subsidy (“direct integration”), so that we onlyobserve regu-
lar employment and no income maintenance payments in the data.  Treatment is then identified by the FuU–data.  Therefore we 
identify “direct integration” only from the aggregated FMASRT–variables if they are coded by:  
Programme code Label Label in German 
33 Integration Einarbeitung  
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Career advancement training 
(a) “Career advancement training” is often implemented simultaneously to a regular employment.  Hence the treatment variables 
FMASART* in the FuU–data should contain one of the following: 
Programme code Label Label in German 
14 Foreman  Industriemeister (< 97) 
15 Master craftsman  Handwerksmeister (< 97) 
16 Other master  sonstiger Meister (< 97) 
26 Technician  Techniker (< 97) 
27 Master of business administration  Betriebswirt (< 97) 
28 Other promotion  sonstiger Aufstieg (< 97) 
17 Qualification for promotion Aufstiegsfortbildung (nur 97) 
(b) If the benefit information exhibits the following values which refer to income maintenance during a career advancement training 
and if the FuU–data show a missing or “other adjustment of working skills” (12 sonstige Anpassung der beruflichen Kenntnisse), 
then we identify a career advancement if the benefit information shows one of the following values (including a retraining which 
implemented as a career advancement training financed by a loan): 
Benefit code Label Label in German 
UHGDF 
Income maintenance paid as loan for advisable 
further education 
Unterhaltsgeld als Darlehen bei zweckmäßiger 
Fortbildung 
UHGDU 
Income maintenance paid as loan for advisable 
retraining 
Unterhaltsgeld als Darlehen bei zweckmäßiger 
Umschulung 
UHGDEH 
Income maintenance paid as loan for advisable 
further education of development aid volunteer 
Unterhaltsgeld als Darlehen bei zweckmäßiger 
Fortbidung v. Entwicklungshelfern 
Language training 
(a) If the benefit information shows any valid code (no missing) and the treatment information from the FuU–data provides informa-
tion that these individuals pass through a language training, then treatment is identified as a language training: 
Programme code Label Label in German 
35 Language training Deutschlehrgang 
(b) If the benefit information is missing because individuals are regularly employed while taking part in the training, the treatment is 
identified to be a language training if the FuU–data provide the following treatment information: 
Programme code Label Label in German 
35 Language training Deutschlehrgang 
(c) If the FuU–data do not provide a valid code for treatment or indicate that individuals participated in “other adjustment of working 
skills“ (12 sonst. Anpassung der berufl. Kenntnisse), but the benefit information indicates clearly that benefit was paid for lan-
guage training as indicated by the codes displayed below, the treatment is identified as a language training. 
Benefit code Label Label in German 
EGHI 
Assistance in case of unemployment or language 
course for resettlers or German Ethics 
Eingliederungshilfe bei Arbeitslosigkeit oder 
Sprachkurs für Spätaussiedler 
UHGVAK 
Income maintenance in case of language courses for 
asylum seekers and refugees 
Unterhaltsgeld bei Sprachlehrgang für Asylbe-
rechtigte und Kontingentflüchtlinge 
UHGVA 
Income maintenance in case of language courses for 
German Ethic or recipients of welcome benefits 
Unterhaltsgeld für Aussiedler u Begrüßungsga-
bempfänger bei Sprachlehrgang 
EGHIS Other benefit for resettlers andere Eingliederungsgeld 
EGGSA 
Benefits in case of full–time language courses for 
resettlers or German Ethics 
Eingliederungsgeld bei Vollzeit–
Sprachlehrgängen für Aus–/ Übersiedler 
EGGSTA 
Benefits in case of part–time language courses for 
resettlers or German Ethics 
Eingliederungsgeld bei Teilzeit–Sprachlehrg für 
Aus–/Übersiedler 
EGGSAK 
Benefits in case of full time language courses for 
asylum seekers and refugees 
Eingliederungsgeld bei Vollzeitsprachlehrg. für 
Kontingentflüchtlinge oder Asylbewerber 
EGGSTK 
Benefits in case of full time language courses for 
asylum seekers and refugees 
Eingliederungsgeld bei Teilzeitsprachlehrg. für 
Kontingentflüchtlinge oder Asylbewerber 
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4 The aggregate impact of active labour market policy in Germany and 
the UK: Evidence from administrative data 
4.1 Introduction1 
Active Labour Market Policy (ALMP) plays a leading role in attempts to improve the situation for 
groups on the labour market, which are particular in need of counselling, information and training 
in both Germany and the United Kingdom.  However, the policy design and the level of expendi-
ture for ALMP vary widely between the two countries: While Germany spends on average 1.2% of 
its GDP for ALMP, the UK only spends 0.5% (data referring to 99, OECD 2001).  How do the out-
comes of these policies compare?  
At the individual level, a programme can be considered as economically successful if the labour 
market situation of the participating individual improves significantly due to the participation in the 
programme and if the costs of the programme are lower than the benefits for the participants.  Ag-
gregate evaluation studies can be seen as a necessary complementary to interpret positive or nega-
tive microeconomic effects because they allow to estimate an employment effect of ALMP beyond 
the ceteris paribus effect on the treated and can include equilibrium price effects, behavioural 
changes, and other repercussions on the non–treated labour force or on the entire economy.  These 
indirect effects of ALMP might consist of displacement effects (treated workers gain their jobs at the 
expense of non–treated workers), deadweight effects (subsidising a treatment, which would have 
occurred anyway), substitution effects (replacement of jobs for other types of non–treated workers 
because of relative wage changes), and tax effects (the effects of financing ALMP, see Calmfors 
1994)  
Microeconomic studies found out that the British ALMP –the New Deal programmes– substantially 
increased the employment outcome for participants (Dorsett 2001).  Contrary, most microeconomic 
evaluation studies found that the German ALMP does not affect the employment prospects of the 
participants.  This contribution aims at making a first step for a comparative macroeconomic evalua-
tion study main ALMP programmes in Germany and the UK, the further training (Förderung der 
beruflichen Weiterbildung, FbW) and the job creation programmes (Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnah-
men, ABM) in Germany and the New Deal for Young People (NDYP) in the United Kingdom, 
which are the biggest programmes in both countries.   
                                                
1  This study is a part of the project “On the effectiveness of further training programmes.  An evaluation 
based on register data provided by the Institute of Employment Research, IAB (Über die Wirksamkeit 
von Fortbildungs– und Umschulungsmaßnahmen.  Ein Evaluationsversuch mit prozessproduzierten 
Daten aus dem IAB)”.  Financial support by the IAB under contract number 6–531 A of the Federal 
Employment Service and by the Anglo–German Foundation under contract number 1379 were grate-
fully acknowledged.  I am grateful to Michael White, PSI, for giving me access to the New Deal 
Evaluation data base.  Moreover, I want to thank Dorothe Bonjour and Genevieve Knight, PSI, and 
Bernd Fitzenberger, Michael Gebel and Norbert Schanne at Mannheim for their remarks.  I greatly 
appreciated Reinhard Hujer’s  comments at the Annual Congress of the Verein für Socialpolitik in Zu-
rich who suggested to consider both the current and the lagged level of ALMP in the estimation of 
macroeconomic outcomes in order to capture the time specific effectiveness of programmes.  Of 
course, the usual disclaimer applies. 
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This paper conducts an empirical analysis of the macroeconomic employment effects of ALMP for 
Germany and the UK.  It reconsiders the effects of ALMP on wages and employment with the appli-
cation of the theoretical framework developed by Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) and Calmfors, 
Lang (1995).   
It is well known that empirical evaluations of macroeconomic effects of ALMP faces severe identifi-
cation problems because of the endogeneity of the ALMP variable, which is caused by the political 
system that answer to unemployment by allocation of ALMP.  It is crucial to control for endogeneity 
because the simultaneous occurrence of high levels of ALMP and high unemployment could lead to 
biased estimates about its effects.  This contribution suggests different procedures to control for en-
dogeneity: either instrumental variables that are strictly exogenous are used in order to identify the 
exogenous variation of ALMP irrespective the level of unemployment or a dynamic panel data esti-
mation on the basis of Arellano, Bond (1991) is implemented to control for the dynamic structure of 
the endogeneity of ALMP. 
The remainder of the paper is as follows: Section 4.2 gives an overview of the institutional regula-
tion of the programmes of further training and job creation in Germany and the NDYP in the United 
Kingdom.  The paper shows the main incentive structures of the programmes, the intended function-
ing and describes the participation figures.  Section 4.3 discusses the effects of ALMP on the wage 
setting and employment schedules in the model suggested by Layard, Nickell, Jackman (1991) and 
Calmfors, Lang (1995) and on the matching of unemployment and vacancies.  It also surveys the 
empirical evidence, which has been found up to now for the two countries.  Section 4.4 describes 
the data used for Germany and the United Kingdom and specifies the empirical model.  It is then 
tested with quarterly regional panel data for the period 98–02.  This section also describes the 
choice of instrumental variables and shows the results of the first step of the IV estimation.  Section 
4.5 concludes.   
4.2 ALMP programmes 
4.2.1 ALMP 
Active Labour Market Policy (ALMP) consists of “selective interventions by the government in the 
pursuit of efficiency and/or equity objectives, acting indirectly or directly to provide work to, or 
increase the employability of people with certain disadvantages in the labour market“.  Following 
this definition, ALMP is predominantly: 
§ Policies implemented by the Bundesanstalt für Arbeit in Germany (Federal Employment In-
stitute, in the following BA) under its regulatory framework, the Sozialgesetzbuch III (Social 
law book III, SGB III). 
§ National ALMP of the Department for Work and Pensions in the United Kingdom imple-
menting the UK's Welfare to Work Strategy (New Deals) via the Employment Service (ES) 
besides other ALMP (Job–seekers Allowance, JSA, and the Restart Interviews). 
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Other programmes of ALMP might exist at the level of local municipalities in Germany, of the Ger-
man Länder and at the European level, mainly co–financing the ALMP of the BA.  Recent changes in 
the UK including the set–up of devolved administrations in Scotland and Wales and Regional De-
velopment Agencies (RDAs) could lead to more regional activities in the UK as well.   
4.2.2 Germany 
4.2.2.1 Basic regulation 
In 98, the new Social Law Book (SGB) III replaced the basic regulation of ALMP in Germany, the 
former Labour Promotion Act (Arbeitsförderungsgesetz, AFG).  For the general targets as well as for 
the organisation and implementation of ALMP in Germany, this reform had far reaching conse-
quences. 
Compared to the AFG, the SGB III rejects the role of ALMP as a part of growth policy: In its funda-
mentals in § 1 the objectives of ALMP are identified as the integration of disadvantaged groups and 
the improvement of the labour market situation of these target groups by increasing their human 
potential with advice, training measures, and special subsidies for professional integration or busi-
ness start ups.  The instruments of ALMP in Germany are now “more subsidiary“ (Sell 1998: 545) 
and the SGB III puts more emphasis on the insurance principle, underlining that the promotion of 
employment opportunities of disadvantaged groups primarily aims at the reduction of income main-
tenance payments (SGB III, §§ 1). 
4.2.2.2 Organisational change 
Besides this more general “new orientation of ALMP“, the introduction of the SGB III significantly 
modifies the allocation of ALMP measures by means of organisational and financial reforms of the 
internal structure of the BA as well as new or differently applied ALMP measures:  
The former regulation implied separate budgets for either further training schemes or job creation 
measures (the main ALMP in Germany).  With the reform of the organisational structure, an integra-
tion of both big funds in the local employment offices was introduced.  With this gain in flexibility, 
the local employment offices are now enabled to implement programmes according to local re-
quirements.  The formerly homogeneous ALMP designs on the disaggregated level become more 
diverse with respect to design and implementation.  Additional to the flexible shift between the dif-
ferent schemes of the SGB III, the new regulation allows that 10% of the regional budgets of ALMP 
can be utilised for “experimental“ ALMP on the regional level (§ 10, SGB III) allowing the local em-
ployment offices to work out individual solutions and case management for individuals and specific 
problem groups (Sell 1998: 541).   
4.2.2.3 Programmes 
ALMP in Germany consists of three main policy areas: The first and most important aim is the inte-
gration or re–integration of problem groups by supporting individual vocational and further training, 
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the second policy instrument enables the creation of temporary or permanent employment oppor-
tunities with a broad variety of wage–cost subsidies and the third target area are grants for occupa-
tional or regional mobility.  The most important programmes of these areas are described in the 
following sections and are summarised in table 4.1. 
Training 
Among the ALMP programmes, further training is the most important.  It aims at the integration of 
unemployed persons and those at risk of becoming unemployed by providing recognised vocational 
qualifications including schemes for individuals who completed first vocational training aiming at 
assessment, maintaining, extension or adaptation of vocational skills to technical developments.  
Participants may be granted an “income maintenance payment“ (Unterhaltsgeld) if they have been 
previously in employment subject to social contributions for a minimum length during a set period 
of time or if they have received unemployment benefits or assistance.  Under certain conditions, 
these payments can be extended to persons who return to the labour market.  The income mainte-
nance payment is equal to unemployment allowance, i.e. 60–67% of the previous net wage.  Train-
ing measures are usually carried out by private training centres, which offer programmes for speci-
fied target groups and market segments to the local employment offices.  The selection of the ap-
propriate participants among the unemployed lies in the responsibility of the local employment 
office.  The duration of measures varies between 3 and 8 months for further training and up to 24 
months for re–training in a new profession.   
Measures to improve prospects of integration are financially supported short–term training courses 
or practical activities that improve the prospects of unemployed workers for integration by the as-
sessment of the suitability of the unemployed person for employment or training.  Furthermore, they 
can comprise job–application training, counselling on job–search possibilities or measures, which 
investigate the unemployed person's willingness and ability to work.  This new instrument of ALMP 
introduced with the SGB III aims at the support for individual job–search activity. 
Job creation programmes 
Among the target area of job creation, the most important programme is Job creation (ABM).  ABM 
aims at the creation of temporary employment for long–term unemployed (> 12 months) in pro-
jects that “have to benefit the community“ and “ must be additional“, meaning that they would not 
have carried out without the subsidy.  ABM is co–financed: between 30% and 75% of the total 
wage costs (i.e. the wages plus the employers’ shares of the social insurance contributions) are sub-
sidies by the BA and where the implementing body (public or private legal entities) incurs further 
costs.   
These general rules are only rough guidelines: In many cases additional loans or subsidies are given 
to the implementing body.  The regulation gives priority to projects that considerably improve the 
chances for permanent jobs that support structural improvement in social or environmental services 
or that aim at the integration of extremely hard–to–place individuals.  The gross wage must not ex-
 177
ceed 80% of a comparable unsubsidised job.  The duration of ABM is in most cases restricted to 1 
year, but can be extended up to 36 months if permanent employment is offered subsequently.   
Another job creation programme, structural adjustment measures aims at the temporary re–
integration of long–term unemployed, too.  This programme applies less severe eligibility criteria: 
Individuals who are only threatened by unemployment may participate, too.  A priority is given to 
individuals, who cannot be placed in regular employment without subsidies in foreseeable future, 
i.e. long–term unemployed.   
The wage cost subsidy is a flat rate equal to the amount of unemployment allowance or assistance 
the individual would have received if unemployment had continued.  Temporary employment is 
mainly supported by means of this programme if the projects conserve or improve the environment 
or provide social services or youth aid.  The implementing institutions, public institutions or private 
companies, pay the remaining personnel and material costs. 
Wages for participants in this programme must not exceed 80% of equal unsubsidised employment.  
The subsidy is paid for 36 months and can be extended up to 48 months if the participants are regu-
larly employed after the end of the programme.  Besides these two main programmes, quite a vari-
ety of wage cost subsidies exist which are targeted to long–term unemployed (Integration subsidies, 
recruitment subsidies for business start–ups, employment assistance for the long–term unemployed) 
as well as programmes which are intended to increase the geographical mobility of the individuals 
(mobility allowances) or to improve the transition to self–employment.  As data for these pro-
grammes are usually not available at the level of regions these programmes are not considered in 
the analysis in section 4.4 and therefore are not described in details here.  A detailed description of 
these programmes can be found for example in Fitzenberger/Speckesser (2000).   
4.2.2.4 Participation 
Table 4.2 shows the participation figures in ALMP programmes according.  Here, considerable 
changes are noticeable over the last 9 years in participant inflows into measures for both East and 
West Germany: Inflows into ABM and structural adjustment measures in the public sector (“tradi-
tional SAM“) vary between 0.2 and 0.35% of the total civilian labour force between 93 and 01 in 
West and 2.5 and 4.7% in East Germany.   
There are two peaks over the last years for both East and West Germany in 94 and 98, suggesting 
that the participation and the extent of the programme depend on the election to the federal parlia-
ment.  In total, significantly less than 1% of the total civilian labour force starts an ABM programme 
or a traditional SAM every year (except for the two peaks).  The inflow into programmes aiming at 
the integration of hard–to–place individuals into the regular labour market shows the same pattern.  
This category, including integration subsidies, recruitment subsidies for business start–ups, integra-
tion contracts and the employment assistance for long–term unemployed as well as special SAMs 
for the private sector, employed about .31% of the total civilian labour force in West Germany and 
1,58% in East Germany in 01 (0.5% of total civilian labour force countrywide), again with a peak in 
the election year 98. 
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Further training, the most common ALMP intervention, shows participation figures like the ABM 
programme (1.1% of total civilian labour force in 98) in the eastern part.  In the western part, further 
training involves twice as many participants compared to ABM and traditional SAM, the relative size 
in East Germany is just opposite after a decline from 3.87% to 2.35% between 93 and 01, indicat-
ing that the first and extensive use of further training for the purpose of qualification to new occupa-
tions in the market economy ended.   
A declining usage of further training among the German ALMP can be observed.  For the ABM 
scheme, this trend cannot be found because of two peaks in election years (which is also true for 
wage subsidies for regular employees in 98). 
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Table 4.1 Main ALMP programmes in Germany 
 
Training 
Programme name Aim SGB III Target group ALMP support Duration Participants, 01 Costs, 01 
Further training and Re–
training 
Improving qualifica-
tion of unemployed 
§§ 77–96; 
§§ 153–156  
• Unemployed with 
“training necessity“ 
• Re–entrants from 
inactivity 
• Course fees  
• Income maintenance payment 
for participants (equal to unem-
ployment benefit) 
• Accommodation/child care 
a) 2 to 8 months 
b) 24 months 
Total:  344,800 
East: 135,800 
West: 209,000 
Total: 6,982 Mill.  € 
East: 2,795 Mill.  € 
West: 4,187 Mill.  € 
Improving prospects of 
integration 
Improvement of job 
search  
§§ 48–51 Unemployed • Course fees 
• Accommodation/child care 
½ to 2 months n.a. n.a. 
 
Subsidised Employment 
Programme name Aim SGB III Target group ALMP support Duration Participants, 01 Costs, 01 
Job creation measures 
(ABM) 
Temporary integra-
tion in “additional“ 
employment in the 
public interest 
§§ 260–217; 
§ 416  
• Long–term unem-
ployed  
• Wage cost subsidy (30–90% of 
the wage costs) 
• Wages must not exceed 80% 
of equal unsubsidised employ-
ment  
• Financial support for institu-
tions 
• 12 to 24 months 
• 36 months (if 
creation of perma-
nent employment 
follows) 
Total: 166,643 
East: 116,024 
West: 50,619 
Total: 2,976 Mill.  € 
East: 2,113 Mill.  € 
West: 863 Mill.  € 
Structural adjustment 
measures (SAM) 
Temporary integra-
tion in “additional“ 
employment im-
proving social 
service and the 
environment 
§§ 272–279; 
§ 415  
• Long–term unem-
ployed  
• Unemployed  
• Persons at risk of 
becoming unemployed 
• Wage cost subsidy (equivalent 
to individual unemployment 
benefit)  
• Social insurance contributions 
• Wages must not exceed 80% 
of equal unsubsidised employ-
ment 
• 36 months  
• 48 months (if 
creation of perma-
nent employment 
follows) 
Total: 76,466 
East: 65,767 
West: 10,699 
Total: 871 Mill.  € 
East: 744 Mill.  € 
West: 121 Mill.  € 
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Table 4.2 Participation entries in ALMP as percentage of total civilian labour force 
 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 
West 0.20 0.31 0.30 0.31 0.26 0.35 0.30 0.28 0.23 
East 4.12 4.74 3.74 3.80 2.54 4.39 3.14 2.80 2.16 
Job–creation measures (ABM) and traditional 
structural adjustment measures (SAM) 
Total 0.97 1.17 0.97 0.99 0.71 1.15 0.87 0.78 0.61 
West 0.09 0.09 0.20 0.16 0.21 0.44 0.43 0.38 0.31 
East 0.68 0.53 0.84 0.60 1.46 3.38 2.66 1.70 1.58 
Regular employees receiving ALMP subsi-
dies* 
Total 0.20 0.18 0.32 0.25 0.46 1.02 0.88 0.64 0.56 
West 1.12 0.98 1.30 1.23 0.89 0.86 0.95 1.05 0.80 
East 3.87 3.82 3.44 3.62 2.20 2.42 2.25 2.66 2.35 
Further training 
Total 1.66 1.53 1.72 1.70 1.15 1.17 1.21 1.37 1.11 
West 1.41 1.38 1.80 1.71 1.37 1.66 1.16 1.04 0.85 
East 8.66 9.09 8.03 8.01 7.17 12.93 6.23 4.88 4.05 
Total 
Total 2.84 2.88 3.01 2.94 2.51 3.87 2.96 2.79 2.28 
Source: Amtliche Nachrichten der Bundesanstalt für Arbeit (Official Bulletin of the Federal Employment Institute), 1, 1999: 14ff, 
own calculations 
4.2.3 The New Deal in the UK 
4.2.3.1 Introduction of the New Deal 
The New Deal for Young Unemployed People (NDYP)2 was introduced in April 98.  Similar to other 
programmes, which were introduced under the New Deal policy of the Labour government after 
97, this programme was tested in a three–month period before in selected regions of the UK (“path-
finder regions”) for collecting first experience with the programme.  The NDYP is intended to en-
courage young people to actively seek work and to provide them necessary skills, opportunities and 
motivation.  The NDYP basically consists of three stages (see figure 4.1): 
§ The “Gateway” period: After a period of six months of open unemployment, people enter 
the NDYP in a stage called the “Gateway” period which can last up to four months.  During 
this period, participants on the NDYP are offered intensive assistance in the job search proc-
ess. 
§ Individuals who are not successful in finding employment in the “Gateway” period are as-
signed to any of the ALMP programmes of the NDYP after the four–month period.  This 
stage of the NDYP is called “the options”.  Individuals either are offered a subsidised job in 
a private sector form, a job placement in the voluntary sector or to the environmental task–
force or start full–time education and training.  The “options” are supposed to last up to a 
period of 6 months, with training lasting up to one year.  Individuals leaving an option with-
out placement to regular employment outside the NDYP then start a third phase. 
                                                
2  An extensive description of the New Deals can be obtained under 
http://www.newdeal.gov.uk/newdeal.asp?DealID=1824 
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§ The third stage is called the “Follow through”.  During this period the employment service 
offers additional assistance in finding regular employment to ensure that New Deal clients 
are helped throughout their participation on an option to progress towards the goal of find-
ing and sustaining work, and are given further assistance if they return to unemployment.  If 
individuals do not find adequate work in the private sector after a period of six months, they 
may start a second option. 
Figure 4.1 The three stages of the NDYP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In principle, unemployed young people enter the NDYP after a period of six months.  There are 
however exceptions to this period; if individuals start regular employment after participating in the 
gateway and become unemployed again within a period of 13 weeks, they do not have to wait an-
other six months of unemployment before re–qualifying for the NDYP.   
4.2.3.2 The options 
Before participants start any of the options, a personal adviser will set up an induction session in 
order to make participants understanding the aims of the option and knowing what they can expect 
to gain from working or learning in either one of the options.  Participants are offered a personal 
development plan, which should ideally match their individual needs.  There will also be support 
available during the whole time, with job search help and advice and regular progress checks.  
When individuals start an option, they either receive a wage from the employers, or an allowance 
equal to their unemployment benefit (Job Seekers Allowance, JSA) entitlement plus a grant of up to 
GBP 400 (€ 650) for the whole period granted as weekly supplements to the benefit.  The four op-
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Employment option (EMP) 
The employment option EMP offers subsidised employment in the private sector.  Employers receive 
a direct payment of GBP 60 (€ 100) per month plus GBP 750 (€ 1,200) towards the costs of provid-
ing training to the participants for at least one day per week.  This new deal programme is the pri-
vate sector centred option as it is explicitly targeted at tackling skills shortages at the same time as 
helping job–seekers to find regular employment.  Participants on the employment options are paid 
with normal wages, only being subsidised by the NDYP.  The employment option is focused on the 
most employable fraction of participants on the NDYP previously screened in the Gateway phase.   
Voluntary Sector Work (VS) 
Individuals starting a VS option work up to six months in the voluntary sector, developing skills and 
gaining experience for future jobs.  Voluntary sector work has to benefit the community, ranging 
widely between social care work in private household and public charities benefiting for children 
and disabled as well as work in arts and media related projects for public administration.  Partici-
pants on the VS option are guaranteed an allowance equivalent to the Job–seekers Allowance (JSA) 
plus GBP 400 (€ 650) on top for six months.  Other benefits such as housing and council tax bene-
fits are continued if applicable.  On average, voluntary sector work offers one full day of training per 
week which is intended to lead to a recognised qualification besides the work experience the par-
ticipants gather in VS (approx.  30 to 40 hours per week). 
Environment Task Force (ETF) 
The Environment Task Force (ETF) has the same structure as the VS option providing work experi-
ence for a period up to six months in the voluntary sector and one day of full–time education per 
week, but has a focus on environmental work.  Environmental work is usually carried out by non–
profit organisations close to the public sector and to local authorities improving run–down estates, 
save energy and water, repair homes, recycle waste and look after the countryside.  As in the VS 
scheme, individuals are offered one day of full–time training during this period.  The benefit level is 
comparable to the JSA, plus an extra GBP 400 (€ 650) once in the period of six months.   
Full–time education and training (FTET) 
If participants are not quite ready to move directly into work, they can spend up to 12 months in 
full–time education or training leading to a recognised qualification.  Participants may start this op-
tion if they do not have training up a medium skilled qualification or in some circumstances after 
completion of vocational training if further training is necessary for finding a job.  Participants in this 
option start full–time education and training.  If necessary the FTET option is combined with general 
training such as reading and writing.  The training option can last up to 12 months and participants 
are granted income maintenance equivalent to the JSA. 
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4.2.3.3 Participation 
The NDYP started in January 98 in selected pathfinder areas and nationwide with the beginning of 
April 98.  35,911 individuals started the Gateway in April 98.  After half a year, participation entries 
stabilised at around 15,000 new entries per month and remained at this figure afterwards 
(www.dwp.gov.uk/asd/online.html).  Participation outflows from the NDYP are relatively low at the 
beginning, but also average near 15,000 per month after April 99.   
The composition of the NDYP participation varies significantly over time (see table 4.3).  At the be-
ginning, the employment option had participation stocks varying between 10,787 in the quarter 
when the NDYP started and a peak of 11,636 persons on EMP in the third quarter of 99.  Over the 
next five quarters, participation in EMP declined to 4,481.  Participation in full time education and 
training started with 23,190 persons in the first quarter of 99 and declined constantly over time to 
near half of this figure in the first quarter of 01.  On the contrary, the subsidised employment in the 
public sector provided by either voluntary sector work or the option of the environment task force 
remained relatively stable with participation figures around 7,850 and 6,950 at the beginning of the 
NDYP and now 6,248 in the VS option and roughly 5,600 in the ETF scheme.  The full–time educa-
tion and training option therefore can be considered as the most important of these four ALMP pro-
grammes with almost one third of the participants going through this scheme. 
Table 4.3 Quarterly participant stock on NDYP 
Options Quarter Gateway 
EMP FTET VS ETF 
Follow 
Through 
Total 
99–1  74,550 10,787 23,190 7,848 6,952 14,308 137,635 
99–2 71,837 11,633 20,922 7,980 7,278 20,243 139,893 
99–3 65,513 11,636 19,384 7,644 7,327 24,656 136,160 
99–4 60,873 10,893 17,779 7,168 7,023 22,667 126,403 
00–1 63,662 10,664 17,806 7,971 7,537 20,266 127,906 
00–2 59,875 6,328 15,701 8,027 7,109 19,688 116,728 
00–3 50,706 5,758 14,990 7,302 6,543 20,151 105,450 
00–4 50,012 4,481 13,243 6,432 6,097 18,938 99,203 
01–1 51,959 4,288 12,207 6,248 5,593 17,667 97,962 
Source: www.dwp.gov.uk/asd/online.html 
4.3 Expected outcomes 
A modified version of the Layard, Nickell, Jackman framework (1991) was introduced by Calmfors, 
Lang (1995) to derive the macroeconomic effects resulting from ALMP based on a union wage–
setting model.  This model makes a distinction between regular employment and participation in 
programmes.  Both labour demand and wage setting are affected by ALMP.  The model (see figure 
4.2) assumes price setting firms, non–competitive wage determination and formulates a wage–
setting schedule and a labour demand schedule.  Regular employment outside ALMP programmes 
then depends on real wages (w/p) and employment, both the employers (LD labour demand) and 
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the unions (WS wage–setting) curves are determined by outside options of the workers, the firms 
and the relative bargaining power.  Labour demand depending on technology, payroll taxes and 
product market competition of the firm is not equal to the employment schedule (ES), because some 
vacancies remain unfilled even after bargaining (mismatch, indicated by the distance between N and 
D). 
Figure 4.2 Layard–Nickell–Jackman–Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The intersection of wage setting and employment schedule shows the planned level of employment 
and wages (D).  This may differ from the level of full employment as indicated by the distance be-
tween D and LS (LS is the exogenous labour supply).  It is important to note that the aggregate wage 
setting in this model is only affected by the level of structural unemployment, i.e. not by short–term 
unemployment caused by mismatch. Mismatch D–N does not affect the wage setting and the 
planned level of employment, but of course the realised employment.  
Following Calmfors (1994) both wage setting and labour demand are affected by ALMP, either be-
cause the job search is improved, the productivity of workers is affected by the implementation of 
ALMP or because of the changes of the bargaining power of the unions caused by ALMP to be dis-
cussed in the following.  Possible effects of ALMP can be identified within this framework by deriv-
ing separately effects on wage setting and labour demand.  The equilibrium in this system is point 0, 
where N people are employed and the unemployment rate is given by  
u = (LS–N)/LS.  The distance ND gives the number of available vacancies, i.e. the total number of 
jobs which could be filled, so that the vacancy rate is represented by v = (D–N)/D.  An increase in 
the unemployment can be caused either by an upward shift in the wage setting schedule WS, a 
downward shift of the employment schedule ES or by a shift of the effective labour demand LD to 
the left, i.e. reducing the number of employed.   
Extending this framework, Calmfors (1994) distinguishes between regular employment and the em-
ployment in ALMP programmes.  Hence, the effective labour supply is reduced by the number of 
individuals in programmes.   
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Figure 4.3 Calmfors’ LNJ–Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As the exogenous labour supply is reduced, R – the remaining labour supply outside the ALMP pro-
gramme – indicates the effective labour supply.  Within this framework, any increase in ALMP par-
ticipation corresponds to a leftward shift of the R curve to any point R' and to a reduction of the 
structural unemployment.  If nothing else happened, the effect would result in a reduction of the 
open unemployment, which usually is referred to as the “bookkeeping effect” of ALMP.  Note that 
the mismatch unemployment is not affected by ALMP if the effect of ALMP consisted only of this 
reduction.   
However, because of the wage setting schedule in the model assumed to depend on the overall 
employment level, a reduction of the effective labour supply – corresponding to a reduction of the 
structural unemployment – increases the employment rate as a percentage of the “remaining” total 
labour force and might increase the bargaining power of the unions.  With ALMP reducing the effec-
tive labour supply, the unions tend to request higher wages.  Thus, a reduction of the level of struc-
tural unemployment by ALMP programmes (indicated through the leftward shift of the R curve) 
could increase the aggregate wage pressure by the unions and correspond to a leftward shift of the 
wage–setting schedule.  Consequently, an expansion of ALMP programmes would results in an 
even reduced employment level as the wages increase.  This effect will be discussed in details in the 
next section.  Other effects on the wage setting schedule arise from “crucial design features“ (Calm-
fors 1994) such as the level of benefit, duration of the programme and eligible groups.   
Other possible effects can occur via changes in the labour demand or the employment schedule: As 
a fraction of all vacancies usually remain unfilled and mismatch by the distance between N and D is 
included in the model, the effects of ALMP are often discussed with respect to the matching effi-
ciency on the labour market: By increasing information on the labour market with additional signal-
ling devices (e.g. certificates acquired in further training programmes) or by extending the place-
ment activity, the matching efficiency is improved.   
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The consequence is, that even if we do observe unchanged wages, employment could increase at 
the same time – at least theoretically.  Many of the ALMP evaluations so far carried out discuss the 
ALMP outcomes via this mechanism, see for example Bellmann, Lehmann (1991), Burda, Boeri 
(1993), Hagen, Steiner (2000, 2002), Schmid, Speckesser, Hilbert (2001), Buettner, Prey (1998) and 
Prey (1999) for Germany and Bellmann, Lehmann (1991), Lehmann (1993) and Riley, Young (2001) 
for the United Kingdom.  Calmfors, Lang (1995) term this effect “the iron law“ of ALMP.  The effect 
of ALMP on matching will be discussed in the second part of this section on the basis of a simple 
matching function.   
4.3.1 Effects of ALMP on wage–setting 
Three possible effects on the wage setting process can be derived from the previously mentioned 
way how unions internalise the effects of ALMP benefit levels and altered search or drop–out be-
haviour in the utility function: 
1. If the instantaneous utility in ALMP is bigger than the utility of open unemployment this raises 
the wages: If programmes are entered directly by individuals laid off from employment, the ef-
fect on the wage setting schedule is higher than in the case of being unemployed for a certain 
time (see Calmfors, Lang 1995) because the alternative utility then differs by the discount factor 
as individuals have to wait at least one period in open unemployment before profiting from the 
higher utility in the programme.   
2. The second effect on wages comes via the reduced outflows from the labour market and an in-
creased competition among the job–seekers (“competition effect”): If the proportion of the job–
seekers in programmes increases and the programmes are supposed to attach closer to the la-
bour market than open unemployment, the flow out of the labour force is reduced.  For given 
employment, this tends “to keep up the number of job–seekers and hence to reduce the re–
employment probability for the individual“ (ibid. 609).   
3. The third effect of this model however weakens the wage–reducing outcome from the competi-
tion effect.  Supposed the dropout from the labour force is reduced and the benefit level is 
higher in the case of remaining a job–seeker either in a programme or in open unemployment, a 
reduction of the dropout leads of course to a higher alternative utility and increases the wages.   
The effects which Calmfors, Lang (1995) derive from this theoretical framework are ambiguous – 
because ALMP can either lead to an increase or decrease of the wage setting schedule and the ag-
gregate employment level.  However two clear effects can be derived: 1) the influence on wages is 
lower, the later a possible treatment of ALMP occurs.  This however would imply that already a 
certain fraction of individuals dropped out of the labour force and the competition effect might be 
lower than in the case of a programme concentrated on an earlier stage of unemployment.  2) If 
formerly employed are never eligible to start an ALMP participation, ALMP does not appear as al-
ternative utility in the wage bargaining process.  In this case, an effect on wage bargaining will not 
arise. 
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4.3.2 Labour demand 
Deadweight and substitution effects 
Many job creation programmes are considered to have deadweight and substitution effects meaning 
that either hirings from the target group would have occurred also in the absence of the programme 
or that workers gained their jobs because they substitute workers from other categories as their rela-
tive wage costs are changed.  For further training substitution effects are supposed to be lower than 
for job creation programmes.   
In practice the distinction between further training and wage–subsidies is not clear, meaning that 
especially on–the–job–training can have the same effects on relative wages as a normal wage sub-
sidy.  A quantification of substitution effects has not yet been worked out empirically.  There is 
however on the basis of simple regression models little evidence that it could be substantial at least 
for wage subsidy programmes (see Calmfors 1994: 19). 
Productivity effects 
ALMP is assumed to counteract possible negative effects of unemployment – and especially long–
term unemployment – on the productivity of the workforce.  Training for unemployed is aimed at 
rising or maintaining the productivity level.  This is for example one of the reasons for the long–
lasting use of ALMP in East Germany even after it became obvious that unemployment was not tem-
porary but persistent.   
Thinking of training programmes for the unemployed as improving the technology the effect on the 
labour demand schedule would be a rightward shift indicating so that regular employment would 
be increased because the unit wage costs decrease.  A positive effect however does not arise from 
this in any case: If output depends on the amount of labour in efficiency units and labour becomes 
more efficient, then the employment effect is uncertain.  Besides, the reaction of wages to the tech-
nological changes is unclear.  According to Calmfors (1994) it is empirically uncertain how the ef-
fects of ALMP on employment via the technological progress work out.  However, productivity 
changes could increase the employment level as a whole for a heterogeneous workforce because 
the reallocation of workforce from a low productivity sector with excess labour supply to a high 
productivity sector with excess demand can be increased.   
4.3.3 Matching 
The effects of ALMP are also evaluated with respect to the relationship between unemployment and 
open vacancies,3 often referred to as the Beveridge curve.  Labour market matching in this context is 
defined as a production function of unemployment and vacancies.  ALMP in this context could in-
                                                
3  For a general discussion of the unemployment/vacancy relationship see Blanchard, Diamond (1989). 
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crease or decrease the productivity parameter of this production function.  If job–seekers are het-
erogeneous, ALMP increases the probability of programme participants to find employment so that  
ur scs ×=            (1) 
with us  the matching probability of an unemployed person and rs the probability of an ALMP pro-
gramme participant.  The assumption of 1>c  gives the statement of the effects of ALMP on the in-
dividual search efficiency.  Note that this efficiency parameter would correspond with a microeco-
nomic increase in individual employment characteristics, which might not in any case be war-
ranted.  Furthermore, consider a constant stock of vacancies in the period t given as tV .  Then, the 
transition from unemployment and ALMP to employment follows a matching function of the form 
);(0 ttt UEVmch =           (2) 
where new hiring th  from either unemployment or ALMP can be specified as a function of vacan-
cies and job–seekers tUE , which in this case are both ALMP participants and unemployed job–
seekers.  0c  is a general technology parameter, m  is a matching function that can be specified for 
example as a Cobb–Douglas function4 with constant returns to scale, so that  
dd -= 1)()( tt UEVm           (3) 
The theoretically expected effect of ALMP would be an increase in the search efficiency of the re-
spective share of job–seekers coming from the programme by a positive quantity because a) addi-
tional vacancies are generated by measures or b) placements facilitate the matching process or c) 
stock of human capital is improved and search costs as a part of total wage costs decrease, so that 
an increasing employment can be observed. 
);(*0 tttt UEVmcch =  
where *tc  indicates a technological increase in efficiency caused by ALMP with: 
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jk  exhibits the influence of the aggregate participation jM  in pj ,...,1=  different ALMP pro-
grammes on the search efficiency.  Reformulation of (3) in outflows per unemployed yields to: 
                                                
4  The empirical analysis of ALMP effects on the basis of this framework often apply specifications of the 
matching function as a Cobb–Douglas type (see for example Bellmann, Lehmann 1991 for Germany 
and Blanchard, Diamond 1989 for the USA).   
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Assuming the ALMP influence on the search efficiency to be small, the permissible approximation  
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1ln  leads to a log–linear model that allows the estimation of the ALMP 
effects as linear in the parameters with: 
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Outflows from unemployment then can be regarded as a function of the general efficiency parame-
ter and the available vacancies on regional labour markets over the unemployed as a measure of 
labour market tightness and the increased technology of the ALMP.  If ALMP is supposed to increase 
the search efficiency, then the overall outflows from unemployment increase.  This implies an in-
crease in employment while the open vacancies decline – given constant outflows from employ-
ment to unemployment.  Hence the matching of unemployment and open vacancies is improved.  
In terms of the matching function regarded as a production function, the ALMP influence can be 
seen as an efficiency parameter increasing total factor productivity.   
4.3.4 Previous empirical evidence 
Previous evidence reported here focuses on studies, which were explicitly worked out for Germany 
and the UK on the basis of regional data in order to identify the macroeconomic impact.  For the 
90s, six evaluations studies have been conducted for Germany.  For the UK, only two comparable 
evaluation studies exist about the effects of the NDYP.  Therefore, an evaluation study from a pro-
gramme of the 80s will also be discussed here to find out more about macroeconomic effects in the 
UK.  The NDYP study considers the effects of ALMP on regional or local unemployment outflows of 
the ND specific target group as compared to the non–eligible group of participants and applies dif-
ference–in–difference estimators.   
Germany 
Bellmann, Lehmann (1991) evaluate the outcomes of ALMP on the aggregate regional outflows of 
specific age–groups distinguished by having experienced either short–term or long–term unem-
ployment for the United Kingdom and for West Germany over the 80s.  Based on administrative 
data for both countries, they implement estimations of an outcome equation specified as a linear 
regression in a panel data set.  They apply a Hausman test in order to find the correct specification 
of the panel estimation (fixed effect model).  The units of observation for Germany are local em-
ployment office districts (N = 142) in West Germany with a quarterly frequency for the years 79–
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88.  In this study, the effects of different programmes of ALMP are investigated, either Job Creation 
schemes, further training and wage subsidies.  It can be shown that neither one of these policies 
significantly affects the outflows from unemployment, except job creation, which decreases out-
flows from short–term unemployment, but has no significant effect on outflows from long–term 
unemployment either.   
Pannenberg, Schwarze (1996) make use of on an extended wage curve approach and analyse how 
the level of ALMP for East German regions affects the average regional wages in the years 92–94.  
Based on data of the German Socio–economic Panel (GSOEP), information is aggregated to local 
employment office districts for East Germany (N = 39).  The results indicate that a standard wage 
curve relation does not hold for East Germany.  The extended wage curve however shows a signifi-
cantly negative effect of the aggregate number of job–seekers on the wage pressure, indicating that 
equilibrium unemployment could have been reduced due to carrying out further training in East 
Germany.   
Büttner, Prey (1998) and the following study by Prey (1999) analyse to which extent ALMP influ-
ences the labour market mismatch in West Germany measured as the structural rate of unemploy-
ment.  The analysis is based on regional data corresponding to Planning regions (N = 74) for 86–
93.  Endogeneity of ALMP is considered in the outcome equations by either applying fixed effects 
panel data estimations or by the use of instrumental variables estimations in which the level of 
ALMP is instrumented by data of political majorities in the regions or other structural variables.  The 
effects of ALMP on the regional labour market mismatch parameter are estimated with different 
specifications of the outcome equation, either on the basis of fixed effect models or with IV estima-
tions identifying the exogenous variation of ALMP in the first step.  To control additionally for dy-
namic forms of endogeneity, the authors make use of the Arellano and Bond (1991) dynamic panel 
data estimator which allows to instrument the first differences of lagged endogenous variable with 
the lagged levels of the dependent variable and further strictly exogenous variables.  The results of 
this analysis are mixed: based on the fixed effects estimations there are neither effects of job crea-
tion nor of further training whereas the dynamic panel data estimations indicate that job creation 
reduced mismatch while further training had no significant effect.   
Schmid, Speckesser, Hilbert (2001) evaluate the outcomes for regional structural unemployment, 
estimating the effect of ALMP on the regional level, share and change of unemployment and on the 
aggregate regional outflows from unemployment.  The units of observation of this study are local 
employment office districts (N = 142) for the years 94 – 97 in West Germany.  Job Creation pro-
grammes have only insignificant effects on the outflows from unemployment whereas further train-
ing reduces the outflows significantly.  If the outcome is measured with respect to the level and the 
share of long–term unemployment defined, the effect becomes positive for further training and in-
significant for Job Creation schemes.  A significant effect of wage subsidies cannot be found in any 
of the specifications on either long–term unemployment or outflows from unemployment.  A causal 
effect of the length of the schemes cannot be found in the individual specifications.  It can however 
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be shown that regional implementation variables significantly affect the outcomes and that the re-
gional policy variation matters.   
Hagen, Steiner (2000) evaluate the effects of ALMP on the regional level of unemployment for east 
German local employment districts (N = 35) on the basis of a monthly panel for the years 93–99.  
The data cover regional inflows into and outflows from unemployment and variables for ALMP cov-
ering further training and job creation schemes.  The empirical model is derived from a unemploy-
ment/vacancies relation considering ALMP to have an impact on the regional job matching.  This 
model assumes the outflows from unemployment and inflows into unemployment to be affected by 
the ALMP.  The evaluation of the effects of ALMP on inflows into and outflows from unemployment 
is carried out with fixed effects estimations, which should allow controlling for the endogeneity of 
ALMP.  The authors additionally include polynomials of lagged variables of the level of ALMP in the 
region to control for the long–term effect of ALMP on the regional labour market outcomes.  The 
results indicate a positive effect of ALMP on the level of unemployment in the long run, i.e. the un-
employment level increased.   
Hujer, Blien, Caliendo and Zeiss (2002) evaluate the outcomes of ALMP on the regional job–
seekers rate.  On the basis of regional data for 175 local employment office districts, the authors 
estimate the effects on the basis of quarterly data.  The endogeneity problem is controlled for by 
several sets of instrumental variables, which are included in the first step.  Sensitivity checks with 
respect to the set of instruments are performed.  In order to control for bias arising from estimations 
of dynamic panel models, which are justified in the presence of highly frequent data, the study ap-
plies the estimator developed by Arellano, Bond (1991).  The results are separately estimated for 
east and West Germany: For West Germany, the authors find a reducing effect of further vocational 
training on the job–seekers rate and job creation schemes whereas for East Germany no significant 
effect could be found.  The authors conclude that job creation schemes and other extensively im-
plemented ALMP programmes were not able to overcome the essential mismatch problem in East 
Germany. 
UK 
Lehmann (1993) and Bellmann, Lehmann (1991) examine the effects of the restart programme in the 
United Kingdom on the outflows from unemployment for specific target groups.  In several specifi-
cations, a significant increase in the outflow rates from long–term unemployment was found which 
however was counteracted by an adverse effect on the outflows from short–term unemployment.  
The total effect on the outflows was positive and significant. 
For the NDYP two comparable evaluation studies have been published investigating the effects of 
ALMP on regional or local unemployment outflows of the ND specific target group as compared to 
the non–eligible group of participants.  The study by Riley, Young (2001) makes use of the New 
Deal evaluation data base (NDED) and estimates the impact of the NDYP on all outflows from the 
programme compared to non–participation applying a difference–in–differences estimator. 
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The authors consider outflows from unemployment to different destinations and also assess the total 
effect of the NDYP.  The flow models are specified as matching functions describing the production 
of matches made between vacancies and job–seekers.  The study derives the total effect of ALMP on 
the unemployment level by estimating the impact of ALMP on inflows into unemployment. 
Data refer to 144 ND units of delivery5 taken from the NDED, which is matched with vacancy data 
and social insurance data.  Data then are aggregated to 95 modified UoDs because the information 
is not fully compatible between the different data sets and some regional units had to be aggregated.  
The panel covers 61 months.  The authors can identify the macroeconomic effect with respect to 
outflows from unemployment using difference–in–differences estimators.  The DiD estimators com-
pare the effects of the introduction of the ND on the target group relative to a near non–target group 
before and after the introduction of the NDYP.  Because of the recent introduction of the NDYP as 
well as the restriction to a specific target group, DiD is assumed to be an adequate instrument to 
evaluate the NDYP.  However, there are two restrictions to this methodology because 1.) the com-
parison group might also be affected by the introduction of the programme if they can be substituted 
by the participants of the programme and 2) this methodology does not allow to estimate the long–
term effects of the NDYP. 
On the basis of regressions on the inflow into unemployment and the outflow from unemployment 
into regular jobs this evaluation study finds that positive effects on outflows are partially counter-
acted by positive effects on the inflows into unemployment.  However, the authors find an overall 
reducing effect of 35,000 on the unemployment of the target group. 
The evaluation study by Dolton, Balfour (2000) also refers to the regional data of 144 Units of De-
livery and has focus on cohorts of entrants in the NDYP programme between April – June 98 and 
July – September 98, after the nation–wide introduction of the ND.  These authors make use of the 
regional variation among the 144 UoDs and their region specific labour market conditions resulting 
in a regional specific accommodation ratio of the options.  The evaluation estimates the outcomes 
with respect to hirings to four different points in time for the respective cohort as a percentage of all 
unemployed.  Within the panel model, the authors control for additional heterogeneity by including 
a number of other variables.  The regional specific heterogeneity is modelled as a random effect 
model.  In order to cope for remaining endogeneity, the authors instrument for the allocation of 
NDYP programmes and the costs.  The study does not specify the model as a dynamic panel model 
because the time periods covered did not allow the adequate modelling.  The fit of the equations is 
used as an indicator that the matching process is adequately explained.  The results with respect to 
matching indicate that only a limited effect of the employment option can be found in the estima-
tions.   
                                                
5 The New Deal “units of delivery” (UoD) are regional subdivisions exclusively implemented for the 
New Deal programmes. They do not match properly to other regional subdivisions in the UK such as 
the Travel-to-work areas (TTWA) or the local authority districts (LAD).   
 193
4.4 Empirical Analysis 
4.4.1 Data 
4.4.1.1 Germany 
Data for the estimation of the effects of ALMP on the regional extended unemployment and the 
matching function for Germany were taken from the published administrative data of the regional 
employment offices for the period 98 – 01, available for monthly and annual frequencies.6 The es-
timation is restricted to West German regions in this paper.  Data become available for 141 West 
German employment offices districts with respect to the structure of employment, unemployment 
and participation in ABM, SAM and FbW.  Besides, detailed information about the structure of un-
employment and an indicator for the implementation capacity of the employment office (unan-
swered claims for ALMP or unemployment benefit) can be obtained from the same source.  How-
ever, as the organisational unit of “local employment offices” does not match to any of the other 
administrative units in Germany (Kreise, Regierungsbezirke, Länder), data from other sources had to 
be aggregated to the level of employment office districts.  This additional information consists of 
political party shares in the regions and is obtained from published sources of the statistical offices 
of the Bundesländer for the aggregation level of Kreise (counties).  We measure either the share of 
the conservative CDU in the regional representative assembly (Kreistage, Bügerschaften) or the 
share of the social democratic SPD.  Topographical data for Kreise, i.e. the population figures and 
the surface, were obtained from the Bundesamt für Bauwesen und Raumordnung (Federal Institute 
for Environmental Planning). 
As the different regional units of observation do not match perfectly, an approximate match of data 
from the different sources became necessary: Although a regional employment office district can 
consist of up to 10 Kreise, an aggregation to this unit can not always be achieved, because some 
Kreise belong to more than one employment office district had to be split.  This is especially the 
case in northern Germany.  In cases, in which one employment office district consists of several 
Kreise, the covariates – especially the political party information – was weighted according to the 
number of inhabitants of a region in order to represent the political power in the local employment 
office district appropriately.   
Based on the employment office districts, ALMP participation were specified for the empirical mod-
els as the stock of participants in a region in either one of the programmes as a percentage of all 
unemployed and programme participants in this region (these ratios are referred to as accommoda-
tion ratios in the literature, see below section 4.4.2.1).  Information of the unemployed was taken 
from the unemployment register although this does not match exactly to the international definitions 
of unemployment: only unemployed who register are recorded.   
                                                
6  http://www.arbeitsamt.de/hst/services/statistik/detail/index.html 
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Data for the political majorities turned out to be most significant when interacted with the regional 
topographical information and were transformed into dummy variables displaying the regional to-
pographical type and the political majority within one variable (see first step of the IV estimations in 
the Appendix). 
The first version of this analysis only used the annual totals for the regional aggregates and estimated 
the effects of ALMP for the years 98–01.  In this paper, we also report results based on quarterly 
data that was obtained from the same source.  However, informative covariates that could in princi-
ple serve as instruments in order to overcome the endogeneity, are not available from this source, 
so that we have to restrict the estimations of the macroeconomic effects based on quarterly data to 
dynamic panel estimations without instrumenting for ALMP.  The job match is defined as the re-
gional outflow from unemployment (reduced by the programme entrants in any of the ALMP pro-
grammes) as percentage of the stock of extended unemployment (i.e. unemployed as well as pro-
gramme participants) in the same quarter.  The vacancy rates describe the vacancy stocks as per-
centage of regional extended unemployment7. 
4.4.1.2 UK 
The analysis for the UK is based on data taken from the New Deal Evaluation Database (NDED), the 
Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) for the period 1/98 to 2/01 and claimant count data from the 
Office for National Statistics of the United Kingdom (ONS). 
The release of the NDED used for this evaluation covers data for all entrants into the NDYP between 
the beginning of the programme in January 98 and September 01 throughout the United Kingdom.  
The data provide monthly cross sections of all participants on the New Deal, but do not record full 
continuous information between these dates.  The available data offer information about the indi-
vidual status related to the New Deal on the date of observation.  The data record whether a person 
started New Deal or the Gateway, whether he/she is on one of the four options, between options, 
on the follow trough or finished the new deal.  On the basis of all individuals on New Deal, a cross 
section of the New Deal participation can be calculated for each month and quarter.  Besides the 
information on ND, variables on the regions where individuals participate in the New Deal and the 
reason why they left the programme were taken from the ND database.  Information was adjusted to 
quarterly averages.  The individual information then was aggregated to the level of Travel–to–work 
areas in order to obtain a panel for 297 regions.  Regions in Northern Ireland were excluded from 
the analysis.  With quarterly observations from the first quarter of 98 to the second quarter of 01, the 
panel consists of 4,158 observations.  However the ND started with the second quarter of 98 in 
most of the regions resulting in balanced panel 3,861 observations.  Within the regions, accommo-
                                                
7 The literature suggests several strategies how to model appropriately the matching of unemployment 
and vacancies, mainly justified by job search theories (Petrongolo, Coles 2002).  As the results of this 
study however did not change if we tried different vacancy rates and different definitions of the un-
employment outflow, we retuned to this simple specification of the matching function (see below for 
the exact form).  
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dation ratios were calculated on the basis of the regional registered unemployment and the partici-
pants on the NDYP.   
Information about the regional unemployment stocks and flows as well as on regional vacancies 
were taken from the unemployment count data of the UK available through the statistical office.  
We define matching of unemployment and vacancies by the outflows from unemployment to em-
ployment as percentages of the regional extended unemployment based on unemployment count 
data.  Vacancies rates are defined as the average stock of vacancies available in a region within a 
quarter as a percentage of regional extended unemployment.   
4.4.2 Empirical model 
4.4.2.1 Effects on extended unemployment 
The basic empirical specification of the estimation in this analysis is given by  
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where u  is the rate of unemployment as percentage of the total labour force, r is the rate of partici-
pants in programmes of ALMP as percentage of the total labour force, the rate of non–employment 
in the region i  at time t  and { }1,...,1,0 -Î tt  indicates possible lags of the ALMP effects.  If the 
outcome is specified in this form, we control for the bookkeeping effect of ALMP.  ia  is a regional 
specific fixed effect, ta  is a time effect.  The policy variables of any of the p programmes are speci-
fied as j ti ,g  representing the accommodation ratios  
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of the p different programmes of ALMP in the regions i  at time t .  The specification of the pro-
gramme participation in accommodation ratios measures the participation in any of the programmes 
of ALMP as a percentage of the total proportion of job–seekers without employment (i.e. unem-
ployed and programme participants), ti ,e  is the error term. 
If ALMP had an effect on aggregate employment, either one of the policy variables should indicate a 
negative impact on the non–employment rate.  Assuming that ALMP does not affect the outcome 
instantaneously, the model is also tested with lagged variables of the ALMP accommodation ratios, 
too.   
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In the above–mentioned specification of the outcome equation, severe problems of endogeneity 
arise.  First and foremost, the allocation of programme participation in ALMP in a region depends 
on the level of unemployment in this region, so that a problem of reverse causality exists.  The gov-
ernment certainly reacts to the unemployment problems at the regional level, so that the estimates 
of the impact of ALMP on employment are subject to simultaneity bias, especially if it is measured 
as a percentage of the total labour force.  Taking the accommodation ratios (i.e. measuring pro-
gramme participation as a percentage of all non employment in a region) might be less endogenous 
(Calmfors, Skedinger 1994) as a priori it is not clear whether increases in unemployment should be 
expected to lead to more or less than proportional increases of programme participation as a share 
of all job–seekers.  However, taking the accommodation ratio might not be sufficient for controlling 
on endogeneity: As most of the participants in any ALMP are recruited from the pool of unemployed 
job–seekers, the accommodation ratio in the region i  at time t  reflects the previous unemployment 
problem and remains endogenous.  In an econometric analysis, the simultaneity problem leads to 
biased estimators of the effect of ALMP due to ( ) 0,, ¹- eg tjtiCov  at any point in time t-t. 
As the correlation between the amount of ALMP allocated to a region and the outcome can be con-
sidered to be positive, i.e. ALMP is higher in regions with a high level of unemployment, the esti-
mated coefficient is likely to be upward biased.  If we suppose for example the impact of ALMP on 
unemployment to be negative, the estimated coefficient might be higher than its true parameter if 
the endogeneity is not controlled for sufficiently in the econometric analysis, and hence, the effect 
of ALMP may be underestimated. 
4.4.2.2 Modelling ALMP allocation 
The accommodation ratio of ALMP is endogenous because it depends on the level of non–
employment in a region (the political system “answers” to unemployment by ALMP allocation).  The 
success criterion ( )ru +  then determines the allocation of ALMP with W  and is supposed to have a 
lagged influence on the level of ALMP.  Besides, there exists an autonomous policy choice for 
ALMP, which depends on exogenous covariates Z set by political planners in regions and the condi-
tions of implementation in the employment service offices.  The allocation of any of the ALMP pro-
grammes then would depend on ( )ru +  and Z as follows: 
[ ]( )ttpg -+W= - tijjti ruZg ti ,, ,,           (9) 
with j ti ,g  the accommodation ratios of any of the j=1,…p ALMP programmes, { }1,...,1,0 -Î tt , (.)g  
an unspecified function of the ALMP allocation as the policy response to the local unemployment 
problem and p showing the amount of ALMP allocation depending on exogenous covariates.  Tak-
ing the policy response of ALMP into consideration, the estimation of the empirical model from 
equation (7) yields: 
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The estimated coefficients of (7) would not only show the effect of the exogenous variation of ALMP 
j
tiZ tp -, (the autonomous policy choice), but also the effect that the level of ALMP always depends 
on [ ] t-+W tiru , , the level of the outcome variable.  Therefore, a substantial part of the variation of 
ALMP is caused by a variation in [ ]ru +W .  As W  is supposed to be different from zero, any coeffi-
cient estimate tb -tp ,ˆ  without taking into consideration the endogeneity will report a biased ALMP 
effect: Effectively, one is correlating ( )ru +  with itself.   
With respect to this, we implement two different solutions in order to control for endogeneity in the 
context of the estimation of an ALMP effect on the extended unemployment rate:  
§ We estimate (7) as a fixed effects model, in order to remove unobserved, however stable re-
gional specific effects.  This model considers the regional policy response of the ALMP allo-
cation, if we assume it to depend on the variation of [ ]ru +W  within a region in a stable re-
lationship.  This could e.g. be justified e.g. by a fixed formula implemented by the admini-
stration.  The fixed effects model the removes a stable allocation formula as long as it is un-
changing, which is plausible for the short–term period we observe.  Estimation by fixed ef-
fects would then lead to estimators of tb -tk ,ˆ  that only describe the influence of the stable, 
exogenous component of ALMP – irrespective the variation of [ ]ru +W  – on the regional 
unemployment outcome.  In this sense, fixed effect models lead to unbiased estimators.   
§ Another identification strategy applied in the following is the explicit modelling of the ex-
ogenous component of any of the ALMP programmes ktiZ tp -,  by two–stage least squares 
estimation with panel data.  Here, we assume regional indicator variables such as the work-
load of the regional employment office, regional policy variables and long–term structural 
variables of the region to be influential on the allocation of ALMP.  We model the influence 
of these indicator variables on the ALMP allocation in the first step and the estimate in the 
second step the influence of the predicted “exogenous” component of ALMP on the out-
come variable.  However, the instrumental variables approach critical depends on the avail-
ability of informative covariates that serve as instruments and capture the endogeneity in an 
appropriate way, which is however difficult on the basis of regional data, because many 
structural variables only exist on more aggregated units of observations.  ALMP implementa-
tion variables provided by of the implementing institutions (i.e. public and private training 
centres) of the programmes – which would be the most promising instrument – does not ex-
ist in any of the regions.  The instrumental variables estimates reported in the next section 
therefore should be understood mainly as explorative.  Basically, the instrumenting strategy 
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is doomed to failure due to the lack of informative data for both countries.  In the context of 
the dynamic modelling of the ALMP outcomes on employment or matching, the instrumen-
tal variable approach could not be implemented because the policy variables depend on the 
election cycles (up to 5 years): In many of the cases, the political variables offer to few varia-
tion and are basically omitted in fixed effects models due to missing variation.   
The estimation of the matching function – based on quarterly data in both countries – therefore 
could not be achieved by applying the explicit modelling of the ALMP allocation as a first step of an 
IV estimate and refers only to static or dynamic panel estimators.   
4.4.2.3 Dynamic model: Matching 
The second approach implemented here is the estimation of the regional matching function as de-
scribed in section 4.3.2 where we regress the outflow rate from unemployment on a constant term, 
the accommodation ratios of ALMP and an indicator of vacancies over unemployment.  As monthly 
data are available for both countries, Germany and the UK, we are allowed to estimate the effects of 
ALMP on matching with dynamic models of a quarterly frequency.  Of course, the dynamic model-
ling can be regarded as preferable compared to the static estimation of ALMP effect on the regional 
extended unemployment rate as shown above: It (i) models the employment dynamics more appro-
priately and (ii) takes into account that hirings adjust slowly to their long–term level, which can be 
considered by including the lagged levels of the depending variables into the model.  However, we 
cannot instrument for the exogenous component of ALMP any longer, as there are too few informa-
tive covariates at the disaggregated level of employment offices for quarters.  Therefore, we had to 
restrict the macroeconomic analysis of the matching function according to (6) to (i) static and (ii) 
dynamic fixed effects panel models.   
Then, the dynamic model (6) becomes: 
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where { }5,...1,0Ît  and ( ) t-tiUEh ,/ , the lagged endogenous variable, is included.  ia  and ti,e  are 
assumed to be independent for each i  over all t .  Note that we now also consider further lags of 
the ALMP accommodation rations jti tg -, in the model, because ALMP usually lasts significantly 
longer than one quarter, i.e. the outcomes of the policies should be modelled for at least one year 
relative to the policy intervention because many programmes last up to that duration (or might last 
even longer).  The policy effect of ALMP then basically consists of the cumulative effect of the coef-
ficients of the lagged policy variables.   
The basic problem of dynamic panel models consists of a correlation of a right hand side regressor 
with the individual effect (Baltagi 2001: 129 ff.).  As before, the parameter estimates of the dynamic 
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panel model are again biased due to endogeneity: Since tiUEh ,/ depends on ia , then 1,/ -tiUEh  is 
also a function of ia , too, and 1,/ -tiUEh  (a right hand regressor) is correlated with the error term.  
Any OLS or within–transformation estimate of (11) will be biased.   
In the case of fixed effect estimators, the within–transformation wipes out the individual fixed effect 
ia ,.  However )//( 1.1, -- - iti UEhUEh  with å = -- -=
T
t
ii TUEhUEh
2
1,.1 )1/(//  will still be correlated 
with )( , iti ee -  even if the ti,e are not serially correlated, because 1,/ -tiUEh  is correlated with ie  by 
construction (ibid. 130): 1, -tie  is correlated with 1,/ -tiUEh .  The within estimator will be biased of 
)/1( Ts , but would be consistent as long as T being large.  However, for a typical panel where N is 
large and T is fixed, the within estimator is biased and inconsistent.  Only if ¥®T  the within es-
timator will be consistent for qa  and any of the b .  The study by Arellano, Bond (1991) states that 
instruments in order to overcome the endogeneity problem in dynamic panel data estimates can be 
obtained if one utilises the orthogonality conditions between the lagged values of tiUEh ,/  and the 
disturbances ti ,e .   
The final specification of the empirical modelling of the matching function includes five lagged lev-
els of the dependent variable, so that 
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This model can be estimated in first differences earliest for the period 7 we observe.  Then, it be-
comes  
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As the error structure 
6,7, ii ee -  is by construction not correlated with 
5,1,
ln,...,ln
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valid instruments for the lagged endogenous variables are provided by these lagged levels. 
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For period 8, the second period in which we can observe the relationship, the lagged levels 
( ) ( )6,1, /ln,.../ln ii UEhUEh  serve as valid instruments. For period 9, the third period in which we can 
estimate the mode, we again add a further lag of the dependent variable to the set of instruments, so 
that ( ) ( )7,1, /ln,.../ln ii UEhUEh  serve as instruments.  For the following periods, all levels of the de-
pendent variables up to the time t–2 serve as instruments for the differences in the lagged dependent 
variables as long as the 
ti,e  are not serially correlated.  This needs to be tested for in the empirical 
analysis8. 
Additional instruments could in principle be obtained by using the lagged levels of the other covari-
ates 
j
i
j
i 5,1, ..., gg  and 
5,1,
ln...,ln
ii EU
V
UE
V
÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ
÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ  
as suggested in Arellano, Bond (1991).  We however decided not to use the other covariates as in-
struments because of the endogeneity problems of the ALMP allocation discussed above.   
One could argue that a number of important regional characteristics are omitted in this specifica-
tion, especially the capital stock and other public policies as the tax rates and public sector em-
ployment.  However, regional variation is covered by fixed effects and can be assumed to be time 
constant for the short period we observe (98–02).   
4.4.3 Estimation and results 
4.4.3.1 Germany 
The empirical analysis of ALMP in Germany is based on data of the local employment office dis-
tricts for either the years 98– 01 or the quarterly data of the first quarter 00 to the second quarter 02.  
Table 4.4 shows the basic characteristics of the annual data, indicating that over the period 98–01 
considered here, the extended unemployment rate u+r varies between 3.4% (Freising near Munich) 
and 18.5% (Gelsenkirchen) in West Germany with a mean of almost 10% of the civilian labour 
force.  Extended unemployment comprises both unemployment and programme participation as a 
percentage of the labour force.  We observe vacancy rates above the average in southern Germany 
(especially in the suburban districts near Munich and Stuttgart): over 60% in Freising and between 
50% and 60% in Munich and Landshut.   
                                                
8  As the 
ti,eD  are differences of serially uncorrelated errors, ( )1,, , -DD titiE ee  might not be zero. Following 
Arellano, Bond (1991: 281), this first order autocorrelation does not imply that the estimates are in-
consistent.  However, the consistency of the estimator hinges on the assumption that 
( ) 0, 2,, =DD -titiE ee .  The related tests of autocorrelation of first and second order (AR[1]–test and 
AR[2]–test) are reported in tables 4.9 and 4.12.   
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For the estimation of the regional matching function, we refer to quarterly data, which again shows 
the huge regional variation in Germany: With a maximum of 33.6% of all extended unemployment, 
the Bavarian region Passau shows the highest exit rate from unemployment in the third quarter of 
01, whereas Gelsenkirchen had the lowest rate of 8.23% of all extended unemployment in the 
fourth quarter of 01.   
Accommodation ratios for the most important ALMP programmes differ significantly across the re-
gions.  Employment office districts in the north implement relatively more job creation programmes 
while local offices in the south usually focus on further training.  Descriptive statistics for other re-
gional indicators can be obtained from table 4.4 also displaying the basic information about the 
regional labour market structure, particularly the age structure of unemployment (unemployed be-
low the age of 25 as percentage of all regional unemployment and the unemployed aged above 55 
as percentage of all regional unemployment.  Other covariates used in the first step of the IV esti-
mates of the ALMP outcomes on regional extended unemployment are the ethnic structure of un-
employment, whether individuals were in employment in the service sector before and the age and 
ethnic structure of the total labour force (namely the share of the labour force aged below 25 as 
percentage of all, the share of women and the share of foreigners as percentage of the total labour 
force).   
The descriptive statistics are based on lagged values because the variables are included as lags in 
the IV estimation.  Additionally, there are indicators for the good organisation of a regional em-
ployment office (the number of unanswered requests by unemployed as a percentage of all ex-
tended unemployed), the degree of urbanisation (indicators for the population density) and finally 
terms of regional population density (medium density, city centres and rural areas) interacted with a 
share of the social democratic party in the regional councils above 40% of all voters to time t–2.  
These variables are included in the IV estimates in order to identify the exogenous variation of 
ALMP with policy variables. 
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Table 4.4 Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Mean Std.  Dev. Min. Max. 
regional extended unemployment 
(u+ r) 9.9911 3.0000 3.3675 18.5129 
Exits from unemployment (without exits to 
ALMP programmes as % of extended unemployment) 
h / UE 76.9017 32.8575 23.1911 272.4718 
Vacancies as % of extended unemployment 
(V / UE) 15.9682 9.4722 3.1397 71.3274 
Accommodation ratio FBW  
gfbw 7.4321 1.5308 2.7662 14.2374 
Accommodation ratio ABM  
gabm 1.7339 0.9640 0.1397 5.8671 
Accommodation ratio SAM 
gsam 0.3433 0.5012 0.0000 3.0498 
Unemployed below the age of 25 as %  
of all unemployment (lag –1) 12.4804 1.8304 6.5847 18.3296 
Unemployed above 55 as %  
of all regional unemployment (lag –1) 22.3561 4.2904 11.0323 38.5475 
Share of non–German unemployed as %  
of all regional unemployment (lag –1) 5.0648 3.6149 0.0329 22.7204 
Share of non–German female unemployed  
as % of all regional unemployment (lag –1) 2.9782 2.2283 0.0205 14.2468 
Unemployment of service sector occupations  
as % of all regional unemployment (lag –1) 14.9349 2.7351 9.2035 26.0338 
Share of the labour force aged below 25 
as % of total labour force (lag –1) 12.7683 1.9906 8.5610 19.3276 
Share of the female labour force  
as % of total labour force (lag –1) 43.6704 2.1026 37.2093 49.3413 
Share of the non–German labour force 25 
as % of total labour force (lag –1) 7.7899 3.9929 1.7778 22.0273 
Share of unanswered requests  
as % of total  5.9500 3.1611 0.8864 22.7498 
 
City centres  0.5213 0.4998 0.0000 1.0000 
 
Rural areas  0.2030 0.4024 0.0000 1.0000 
Medium population density interacted  
with share of left party above 40 % (lag –2) 0.0934 0.2911 0.0000 1.0000 
City centre interacted  
with share of left party above 40 % (lag –2) 0.3286 0.4700 0.0000 1.0000 
Rural area interacted with share of  
left party above 40 % (lag –2) 0.0248 0.1557 0.0000 1.0000 
As aforementioned, we account for the endogeneity ALMP by estimating IV.  The IV approach cho-
sen here makes use of variables that model the decision of policy makers on the regional level 
and/or the local capacity for the implementation of ALMP based on regional characteristics, espe-
cially the ethnic structure and the age groups of unemployment and the labour force, the degree of 
urbanisation and the political majorities on the local level.  The instruments are justified by institu-
tional reasons.  The structural problems of a regional labour market can be supposed to influence 
the implementation of policies in the long–run independently form the short–term unemployment 
figure.  The selected variables can be motivated as follows: 
§ The age structure of the labour force and unemployment indicates the regional demographic 
structure, i.e. if the regional labour market has to adjust to either more or less tight supply 
problems in the long run. 
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§ The share of unemployed who were formerly working in the service sector is taken into 
consideration in order to show the degree of tertiarisation of the regional labour market 
§ The share of unemployed who are non–German citizens offers information about the re-
gional need to adjust language and occupational skills. 
§ Information on the regional rate of unanswered requests by unemployed and participants in 
ALMP programmes as a percentage of all extended unemployment indicates how efficient 
the local employment office implements ALMP.  This variable especially shows the capacity 
of the local employment office, the availability of staff and the regional capacity to imple-
ment ALMP. 
§ Urban and rural areas are supposed to follow a different implementation strategy of ALMP: 
In urban areas, more carriers of ALMP exist supplying a greater variety of ALMP programmes 
that in the long–run is decisive for the ALMP allocation.  We assume the supply structure of 
ALMP in a region to be most crucial for the exogenous variation of ALMP. 
§ Political planning on the regional level is important for the exogenous variation of ALMP 
because the social democratic party is supposed to be more in favour of demand oriented 
ALMP (Job Creation) whereas the right wing party CDU prefers supply oriented ALMP (i.e. 
FbW).  However the political process differs between the centres of cities and rural areas, so 
that political majorities (an SPD share of seats in Kreistagen of more than 40%) is interacted 
with information about the regional population density: The politics are supposed to be dif-
ferent in medium urbanised areas compared to rural areas and city centres.   
The first step estimations of a 2 SLS dummy variable regression can be found in table 4.A1 in the 
Appendix.  Especially the regional labour force characteristics turn out to be significant (share of 
women and non–German unemployed as percentage of all unemployment) as well as the political 
planning in regions: The estimated coefficients show that strong left wing parties at the regional 
level implement significantly less further training in medium urbanised areas and city centres and 
implement significantly more job creation schemes in the centres compared to the base category of 
weaker left wing party shares – the allocation of structural adjustment programmes however is not 
affected by any of the variables indicating the regional political majorities9.  The first stage of the IV–
estimates instruments for the level of the accommodation ratios of ALMP and includes dummy vari-
ables for each region and period.  The two stage estimator (table 4.6) implements least squares 
dummy variables (LSDV) for estimating the model and includes dummies for each region in the first 
stage as suggested by Büttner, Prey (1998: 403).   
The results of the static fixed effects model show that further training has a reducing effect on the 
extended level of unemployment as well as the implementation of structural adjustment pro-
grammes.  However, the effect disappears after one year: The coefficients of the lagged variables are 
                                                
9  The t–statistics of all the estimations reported in this paper are based on heteroskedasticity consistent 
standard errors.  Here – as in all subsequent estimations – the p–value of the chi–square test indicates 
the significance of the null–hypothesis that all coefficients have a joint influence of zero. It is rejected 
in any of the specifications.   
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insignificant for either the further training or the structural adjustment programmes.  Except for the 
short–term static fixed effects model, the coefficients of ALMP programmes are insignificant for all 
specifications of the outcome equation with respect to the level of extended unemployment (tables 
4.5 and 4.6).   
Table 4.5 Effects of ALMP on extended unemployment (FE) 
u + r Coef. t Coef. t 
gfbw –0.107 –3.330     
gabm 0.024 0.420     
gsam –0.271 –2.060     
gfbw(t–1)     –0.040 –1.090 
gabm(t–1)     0.100 1.610 
gsam(t–1)     0.041 0.280 
_cons 7.982 24.260 16.031 23.050 
N 564 423 
(df) Wald–Test (146) 1112.87 (145) 1623.07 
P–value .00 .00 
Table 4.6 Effects of ALMP on extended unemployment (IV) 
u + r Coef. t Coef. t 
gfbw 0.117 1.300     
gabm 0.013 0.080     
gsam 0.351 0.970     
gfbw(t–1)     0.050 0.610 
gabm(t–1)     0.212 1.130 
gsam(t–1)     0.410 0.970 
_cons 16.572 16.490 8.552 6.670 
N 564 423 
(df) Wald–Test (146) 1000.35 (145) 3636.95 
P–value .00 .00 
The estimation of the matching function is based on quarterly data for the period first quarter 00 to 
the second quarter 02.  Table 4.7 provides a short descriptive overview of the data and again indi-
cates the wide variation of the ALMP accommodation across regions.   
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Table 4.7 Descriptive Statistics – quarterly data (3/00 – 6/02) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Accommodation ratio ABM 
(gabm) 1.48 0.84 0.06 6.13 
Accommodation ratio SAM  
(gsam) 0.38 0.56 0.00 4.81 
Accommodation ratio FBW  
(gfbw) 7.35 1.51 3.26 15.42 
Unemployment  
(entry ) 2,688.46 1,525.27 820.67 12,458.67 
Unemployment  
(stock) 16,882.61 10,994.49 3,343.00 80,536.67 
Extended unemployment  
(stock) 19,845.72 12,769.52 4,000.00 96,452.67 
Total vacancies 
(stock) 3,068.18 2,768.41 516.67 29,772.00 
Civilian Labour Force  
(total) 227,595.60 137,546.40 70,226.00 1,159,238.00 
Unemployment rate 
(% of the civilian labour force) 8.79 2.78 2.82 17.88 
Unemployment exit rate  
(% of the extended unemployment) 14.68 3.40 6.27 33.65 
Vacancy rate  
(% of extended unemployment) 17.08 10.98 3.71 111.42 
In the following, we report the estimated coefficients of the ALMP effects on regional mismatch, 
which have been estimate either by fixed effects panels models or by the dynamic models applying 
the estimator by Arellano, Bond (1991).  In the short term, all programmes significantly increase the 
outflows from unemployment.  That is surprising because we control for the bookkeeping effect of 
ALMP programmes with respect to the outcome variables.  If we simultaneously estimate the effects 
of ALMP programmes implemented in the same and in earlier periods in order to estimate the cu-
mulated effect of ALMP, we find negative effects of the lagged ALMP variables which in all cases 
out weight the positive effects of the ALMP implemented in the quarter, in which we measure the 
outcomes.  If we consider further lags of the ALMP variables, this results becomes more empha-
sised: Practically all positive effects of ALMP in the short run are counteracted by the long–run ef-
fects, so that the cumulated ALMP effect does not affect significantly the regional matching.  A 
closer look at the coefficients e.g. in the specification including ALMP variables for up to three lags 
shows that the coefficients for further training, which are jointly significant, sum up to exactly 0.01 
in the long run, which indicates that if we increase the proportion of further training as percentage 
of all regional extended unemployment by 1 percentage point, the hiring rate would increase ex-
actly by 0.01%.  The results for structural adjustment programmes are relatively better with cumu-
lated coefficients amounting to 0.03%, and they are better for the job creation programme, too 
(0.1%).   
 206
Table 4.8 Effects of ALMP on matching (Fixed effects) 
log (h / UE) Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t
T 0.20 0.85 0.00 –3.14 0.00 –0.89 0.00 0.67
log (V / UE) 0.20 13.99 0.19 12.38 0.19 11.47 0.19 11.26
gabm 0.03 2.95 0.06 5.96 0.06 4.45 0.06 4.15
gsam 0.12 6.49 0.15 9.66 0.17 9.17 0.13 5.80
gfbw 0.01 4.26 0.01 3.89 0.02 3.66 0.01 3.24
gabm (t–1)   –0.07 –7.17 –0.07 –4.95 –0.03 –1.55
gsam (t–1)   –0.13 –8.46 –0.13 –6.63 –0.10 –3.76
gfbw (t–1)   –0.01 –4.26 –0.01 –2.70 –0.01 –1.41
gabm (t–2)     0.01 1.36 –0.03 –2.10
gsam (t–2)     0.02 1.08 0.00 0.04
gfbw (t–2)     0.00 0.74 0.00 –0.68
gabm (t–3)      0.04 2.90
gsam (t–3)      0.03 1.31
gfbw (t–3)      0.01 2.83
Number of obs. 1410.00 1269.00 1128.00 987.00 
(df) Wald–Test (145) 9664.25 (148) 10244.56 (151) 7989.41 (154) 8303.68 
P–value .00 .00 .00 .00 
In further lags of the dependent variable are included into the model and are estimated by the dy-
namic panel model, the positive macroeconomic effects of the job creation scheme and the struc-
tural adjustments fully disappear in the long–run, for ABM , the effect amounts to –0.01% and for 
further training to +0.02%.  The significance of the estimated employment effects critically depends 
on the specification.  The coefficients themselves are very small in general.   
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Table 4.9 Effects of ALMP on matching (Dynamic Panel) 
log (h / UE) Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t
t –0.02 –5.11 –0.02 –5.03 –0.03 –5.00 –0.02 –3.58
log (V / UE) 0.13 4.71 0.12 4.49 0.11 4.10 0.11 4.03
log (h / UE) (t–1) –0.67 –8.06 –0.70 –7.80 –0.73 –7.83 –0.70 –7.71
log (h / UE) (t–2) –0.43 –7.10 –0.43 –6.82 –0.43 –6.52 –0.41 –6.35
log (h / UE) (t–3) –0.40 –7.20 –0.41 –7.19 –0.42 –7.03 –0.43 –7.79
log (h / UE) (t–4) 0.19 3.52 0.17 3.01 0.17 2.97 0.17 2.99
log (h / UE) (t–5) 0.17 2.55 0.19 2.87 0.19 2.75 0.15 2.18
gabm 0.02 1.28 0.01 1.04 0.00 0.16 0.01 0.43
gsam 0.06 3.92 0.06 4.15 0.05 2.14 0.04 1.97
gfbw 0.00 0.85 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.68
gabm (t–1)   –0.02 –1.45 0.00 –0.18 0.00 0.15
gsam (t–1)   –0.03 –1.31 –0.02 –1.09 –0.01 –0.40
gfbw (t–1)   0.01 2.08 0.01 1.88 0.01 2.57
gabm (t–2)     –0.04 –2.77 –0.03 –2.34
gsam (t–2)     0.00 –0.18 0.00 –0.17
gfbw (t–2)      0.00 –0.98
gabm (t–3)      0.01 0.52
gsam (t–3)      0.02 0.66
gfbw (t–3)      0.01 3.14
Number of obs 564.00 564.00 564.00 564.00 
Number of groups 141.00 141.00 141.00 141.00 
(df) Wald–Test (10) 1585.40 (13) 1842.18 (16)2130.44 (19) 2466.93 
P–value .00 .00 .00 .00 
AR(1)–test (H0 no) –3.16 –2.38 –2.12 –2.34 
AR(2)–test (H0 no) 0.68 0.43 –0.02 0.02 
4.4.4.2 UK 
The basic characteristics of the empirical data for the UK are summarised in table 4.10.  The pro-
grammes of the NDYP have much lower participation figures than the German ALMP programmes: 
With an average accommodation of 0.5%, the participation in the employment option of NDYP is 
much lower than participation in the big German programmes (further training has participant 
stocks of 7.4% of the regional extended unemployment).  However, there are regions where the 
participation in NDYP options reach higher levels, for example Keswick where in the third quarter 
98 the accommodation ratio of the employment option peaks with 5.8%.  On average the training 
option is the most important programme with an average participation of 0.88% of the regional ex-
tended unemployment, followed by the employment option.  The ETF and VS options are less im-
portant: Participation here has an average value of 0.4% and 0.36% of the regional extended un-
employment.  Over the period of observation, this picture does not change very much: The training 
option is the most important programme since the start of the NDYP, however reaches its maximum 
already at the beginning of the NDYP in the fourth quarter 98 with an average participation figure of 
roughly 1.3% of the regional extended unemployment.  After 98, the participation in the training 
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option decreases to 0.8% in the second quarter 01.  The employment option decreases only slightly 
over time, from an accommodation ratio of almost 0.8% to 0.6% in 01.   
Table 4.10 Descriptive Statistics – quarterly data (6/98 – 6/01) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
geo  0.5800 0.5250 0.0000 5.8201 
gto 0.8814 0.7022 0.0000 4.9645 
gvs 0.4037 0.3729 0.0000 3.1987 
get 0.3621 0.4090 0.0000 4.8561 
h / UE 26.3935 7.2018 9.0596 71.2439 
V / UE 78.2135 56.0496 0.6501 734.5795 
The estimations of the fixed effects model are reported in table 4.11.  The effects of the NDYP on 
the regional outflow rate to employment are again estimated by including different lags of the ALMP 
variables in the outcome equation.  In the first column we do find significant effects of the employ-
ment and the voluntary sector option in the same quarter, indicating that these policies significantly 
increased the outflow from unemployment.  Even in  the long–run, if we include further lags into 
the estimated form, these effects do not disappear and the cumulated effects remain positive, how-
ever very tiny.   
Again, the coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities, meaning that a 1% increase in the accom-
modation ratio of any the training option would increase the outflow rate from unemployment by a 
fraction of 0.01% (table 4.11, cumulated coefficients) and to the same by the voluntary sector work 
and the employment option.   
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Table 4.11 Effects of ALMP on matching (Fixed effects) 
log (h / UE) Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t
t 0.01 15.51 0.01 16.01 0.01 12.41 0.01 10.19
log (V / UE) 0.28 20.93 0.27 18.80 0.24 16.27 0.25 14.85
geo 0.01 4.54 0.03 8.05 0.03 7.31 0.03 6.61
gto 0.00 –0.05 0.00 2.45 0.01 5.91 0.01 5.00
gvs 0.01 3.05 0.02 4.91 0.02 5.45 0.02 4.85
get 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.74 0.01 1.49 0.01 1.47
geo (t–1)   –0.03 –10.40 –0.03 –8.62 –0.03 –5.89
gto (t–1)   0.00 –1.53 –0.02 –9.07 –0.03 –9.45
gvs (t–1)   –0.01 –1.86 –0.01 –2.55 –0.01 –2.26
get (t–1)   0.00 0.33 –0.01 –2.20 –0.01 –1.99
geo (t–2)     0.01 1.83 –0.01 –1.91
gto (t–2)     0.02 11.52 0.03 11.48
gvs (t–2)     0.00 0.67 0.00 –0.07
get (t–2)     0.01 2.54 0.01 1.65
geo (t–3)      0.02 5.20
gto (t–3)      –0.01 –4.88
gvs (t–3)      0.00 0.49
get (t–3)      0.00 0.14
Number of obs. 3876 3599 3322 3045 
(df) Wald–Test (282) 16821.3 (286)  15375.36 (290) 16132.7 (294) 14514.78 
P–value .00 .00 .00 .00 
Table 4.12 finally reports the results of the dynamic panel estimations.  Allowing for five lags of the 
dependent variables in the response for ALMP in order to model the long–term adjustment of the 
outflow rate to its long–term level and including lags of the ALMP accommodation ratios into the 
estimation finally shows that the cumulated effect estimated in the static model amounting to 0.01% 
is exactly found in this specification, too, however only in the short run.  In the long–run, there is 
no effect at all. 
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Table 4.12 Effects of ALMP on matching (Dynamic Panel) 
log (h / UE) Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t
t 0.04 10.89 0.04 10.23 0.04 10.94 0.04 11.41
log (V / UE) 0.17 11.44 0.17 11.47 0.16 10.89 0.16 10.94
log (h / UE) (t–1) –0.27 –6.43 –0.28 –6.09 –0.30 –6.66 –0.30 –6.50
log (h / UE) (t–2) –0.51 –16.77 –0.52 –15.69 –0.55 –16.34 –0.55 –16.04
log (h / UE) (t–3) –0.22 –6.05 –0.23 –6.22 –0.25 –6.63 –0.25 –6.67
log (h / UE) (t–4) 0.29 8.99 0.29 8.64 0.26 7.72 0.26 8.09
log (h / UE) (t–5) –0.20 –6.41 –0.20 –6.53 –0.18 –5.89 –0.19 –5.92
geo 0.01 3.53 0.01 3.60 0.01 3.15 0.01 2.86
gto 0.01 3.30 0.01 3.40 0.01 4.27 0.01 3.78
gvs 0.00 1.41 0.00 1.20 0.01 1.62 0.00 1.46
get 0.01 2.47 0.01 2.26 0.01 2.75 0.01 2.69
geo (t–1)   0.00 –0.83 0.00 –0.19 0.00 –0.51
gto (t–1)   0.00 0.17 0.00 –1.88 0.00 –2.06
gvs (t–1)   0.00 0.97 0.00 1.13 0.00 0.98
get (t–1)   0.00 –0.72 0.00 –0.87 0.00 –0.52
geo (t–2)     0.00 –1.42 0.00 –0.68
gto (t–2)     0.01 4.33 0.01 4.02
gvs (t–2)     0.00 0.33 0.00 0.24
get (t–2)     0.00 1.24 0.00 1.08
geo (t–3)      0.00 –0.67
gto (t–3)      0.00 –0.74
gvs (t–3)      0.00 0.01
get (t–3)      0.00 1.10
Number of obs 2213.00 2213.00 2213.00 2213.00 
Number of groups 277.00 277.00 277.00 277.00 
(df) Wald–Test  (11) 8533.83 (15) 9677.07 (19) 10855.46 (23) 11409.83 
P–value .00 .00 .00 .00 
AR(1)–test (H0 no) –6.58 –6.12 –5.79 –5.75 
AR(2)–test (H0 no) –0.1 0.02 1.31 1.45 
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4.5 Conclusion 
This paper describes the institutional design of ALMP programmes in details and compares it with 
the outcomes theoretically expected.  In theory, no clear effects can be derived.  An empirical 
analysis of the macroeconomic effects of ALMP on the basis of regional aggregate data for German 
local employment office districts and British travel to work–areas brought no evidence for macro-
economic effects in the short or in the long–run: 
§ Both countries dispose over a variety of ALMP programmes among greater policy areas that 
differ with respect to duration, the way of integration into regular employment and the level 
of benefits that are granted to the participants.  Training programmes are more important in 
both Germany and the UK, and they are supposed to have a positive impact because of a 
structural improvement of the labour force, the creation of more transparency in the match-
ing of unemployed and vacancies.  On the other hand, the levels of benefit in further train-
ing programmes in both countries are lower than for subsidised employment, so that wage 
increasing effects are supposed to be lower for training than for Job Creation and direct 
wage subsidies.  The main differences between Germany and the UK are the participation 
figures: the NDYP in the UK is a programmes targeted to a restricted group of participants 
with durations usually less than one year.  German ALMP programmes are targeted to un-
employed later in the life cycle.  The institutional analysis could make clear that the level of 
benefits associated with programmes and the duration is much more generous in Germany 
than in the UK. 
§ The conclusion of the theoretical part indicates that the effects of ALMP on the macroeco-
nomic level are uncertain, because positive and negative effects occur simultaneously: On 
the one hand, the participation in ALMP programmes increases the participation on the la-
bour market and decreases possible drop–outs.  This effect is certainly positive for aggregate 
employment because a more numerous workforce leads to more competition between in-
siders and outsiders and unambiguously reduces the bargaining power of unions and their 
wage claims.  On the other hand, a high level of benefit – especially in the German case – 
leads to a higher alternative wage in the case of being laid off and increases the wage claims 
of unions.  Finally the effects of ALMP are usually supposed to be positive with respect to 
matching.   
§ The empirical analysis applies regional aggregate data for the UK and Germany in order to 
assess the macroeconomic impact of ALMP.  To control for the endogeneity of ALMP, it is 
necessary to use instruments which have an impact on the extent of ALMP and which at the 
same time do not influence directly the state of the labour market.  However, in both coun-
tries necessary complementary information on regional aggregates are hardly available.  The 
results are mixed:  
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1. In Germany, we find a reducing effect of further training on the extended unemployment 
rate in the short run in fixed effects models, which is however not confirmed by estima-
tions which explicitly instrument of the ALMP accommodation.  The estimations of the 
dynamic panel models of the matching function shows that structural adjustment pro-
grammes improve matching in the short run (a result which was also found in Büttner, 
Prey (1998) for other regional aggregates), but is exactly zero in the long–run.   
2. For the British NDYP programmes, we applied static and dynamic panel models in order 
to estimate the effects of the NDYP on matching.  The static specifications indicate an 
improving effect of the options in the long–run, which however vanishes in the dynamic 
model.  If we include the lagged dependent variable into the matching model, we can 
only estimate very small short–term effects of the NDYP. 
Summarising these findings, one can clearly state that macroeconomic effects of ALMP are very 
weak.  The estimated coefficients are very small on average and not significant or near zero in the 
long run.  We can conclude that ALMP has no effects on the macroeconomic employment out-
come.  If at all, the macroeconomic effects are presumable found in other areas, such as the effects 
on aggregate demand and regional incomes.   
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4.7 Appendix 
Table 4.A1 Instrumental variable estimations 
Accommodation ratio fbw Accommodation ratio abm Accommodation ratio sam 
 
Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
unemployed below the age of 25 as %  
of all unemployment (lag –1) 0.080 0.820 -0.022 -0.280 -0.039 -1.230 
unemployed above 55 as %  
of all regional unemployment (lag –1) 0.163 3.650 0.037 1.490 -0.004 -0.420 
share of non-German unemployed as %  
of all regional unemployment (lag –1) 0.234 1.060 -0.111 -0.870 0.096 1.760 
share of non-German female unemployed  
as % of all regional unemployment (lag –1) -0.351 -0.990 0.186 0.900 -0.196 -2.400 
unemployment of service sector occupations 
as % of all regional unemployment (lag –1) 0.107 1.010 -0.047 -0.910 -0.009 -0.380 
share of the labour force aged below 25 
as % of total labour force (lag –1)  -0.439 -2.990 -0.074 -0.900 -0.113 -3.160 
share of the female labour force  
as % of total labour force (lag –1)  -0.460 -4.310 -0.185 -2.580 -0.065 -2.220 
share of the non-German labour force 25 
as % of total labour force (lag –1) -0.969 -3.900 -0.208 -1.840 0.100 2.190 
 
share of unanswered requests as % of total  0.050 1.610 -0.009 -0.640 0.001 0.120 
 
city centres  -0.066 -0.400 0.094 1.480 0.032 1.210 
 
rural areas  -0.089 -0.480 -0.245 -2.550 -0.066 -1.470 
medium population density interacted  
with share of left party above 40 % (lag –2) -0.380 -2.010 -0.070 -0.770 -0.006 -0.150 
city centre interacted  
with share of left party above 40 % (lag –2) -0.283 -2.300 0.117 1.730 0.023 0.800 
rural areasinteracted with share of  
left party above 40 % (lag –2) -0.248 -0.900 0.167 0.680 -0.003 -0.040 
 
share of unanswered requests as % of total  37.984 5.690 13.065 2.940 4.371 2.250 
N  423 423 423 
(df) Wald–Test (156) 13882.44 (156) 41260.44 (156) 42953.04 
P–value .00 .00 .00 
R² 0.9403 0.9537 0.9662 
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